Sustained Monopolistic Business Relationships: A UK Defence Procurement Case by Humphries, Andrew
   
CRANFIELD UNIVERSITY 
 
 
 
ANDREW S HUMPHRIES 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sustained Monopolistic Business Relationships: 
A UK Defence Procurement Case 
 
 
 
 
SCHOOL OF MANAGEMENT 
 
 
 
 
PhD THESIS 
   
 
CRANFIELD UNIVERSITY 
SCHOOL OF MANAGEMENT 
PhD THESIS 
Academic Year 2002/2003 
 
ANDREW S HUMPHRIES 
Sustained Monopolistic Business Relationships: 
A UK Defence Procurement Case 
 
Supervisor: Dr Richard Wilding 
August 2003 
 
 
This thesis is submitted in fulfilment of the requirements 
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
 
 
 
 
 
© Cranfield University 2003.  All rights reserved.  No part of this publication may be reproduced 
without the written permission of the copywright owner. 
 
 
 
 
Table of Contents  I 
  
Table of Contents 
TABLE OF CONTENTS........................................................................................................................... I 
LIST OF FIGURES..................................................................................................................................V 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ....................................................................................................................VIII 
DECLARATION...................................................................................................................................VIIII 
ABSTRACT ......................................................................................................................................... IXX 
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION.....................................................................................................................................1 
1 OUTLINE........................................................................................................................................1 
2 RESEARCH PROJECT OVERVIEW .............................................................................................2 
3 BACKGROUND TO THE RESEARCH ..........................................................................................4 
4 THE RESEARCH PROBLEM.......................................................................................................16 
5 JUSTIFICATION FOR THE RESEARCH.....................................................................................18 
6 METHODOLOGY .........................................................................................................................20 
7 OUTLINE OF THE THESIS..........................................................................................................22 
8 DEFINITIONS...............................................................................................................................23 
9 LIMITATION OF SCOPE & KEY ASSUMPTIONS.......................................................................25 
10 CONCLUSION..............................................................................................................................27 
CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW.........................................................................................................................28 
1 INTRODUCTION..........................................................................................................................28 
2 RELATIONSHIPS WITHIN THE SUPPLY CHAIN .......................................................................30 
3 BUSINESS RELATIONSHIPS FROM A RELATIONSHIP MARKETING PERSPECTIVE..........59 
4 BUSINESS RELATIONSHIPS FROM AN ECONOMICS PERSPECTIVE..................................84 
5 CRITIQUE OF THE LITERATURE AND IDENTIFICATION OF RESEARCH GAPS................104 
CHAPTER 3 
METHODOLOGY................................................................................................................................115 
1 INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................................115 
2 STRATEGY ................................................................................................................................117 
3 DATA SOURCES .......................................................................................................................130 
Table of Contents  II 
  
4 INSTRUMENTS AND PROCEDURES FOR DATA CAPTURE.................................................133 
5 ADMINISTRATION OF INSTRUMENTS & DATA CLASSIFICATION.......................................148 
6 LIMITATIONS OF THE METHODOLOGY .................................................................................153 
7 ANALYSIS DESIGN ...................................................................................................................157 
8 ETHICAL ISSUES ......................................................................................................................164 
9 CONCLUSION............................................................................................................................166 
CHAPTER 4 
ANALYSIS OF DATA..........................................................................................................................167 
1 INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................................167 
2 THE RESEARCH SUBJECTS ...................................................................................................171 
3 PRESENTATION OF RESULTS – THE DATA STRUCTURE...................................................173 
4 ANALYSIS PHASE 1: Q4 THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK (HIGH LEVEL PERSPECTIVE)
 179 
5 ANALYSIS PHASE 1: Q4 THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK (DETAILED PERSPECTIVE) & 
ANALYSIS PHASE 2: DIMENSIONAL Q3 TRANSACTION COST ECONOMICS ............................185 
6 ANALYSIS PHASE 2: DIMENSIONAL Q1 – SUPPLY CHAIN MANAGEMENT .......................191 
7 ANALYSIS PHASE 2: DIMENSIONAL Q2 – RELATIONSHIP MARKETING............................198 
8 ANALYSIS PHASE 3: RELATIONAL .........................................................................................203 
9 RQ - THE RESEARCH QUESTION...........................................................................................219 
10 CHAPTER 4 CONCLUSION ......................................................................................................227 
CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS...............................................................................................228 
1 INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................................228 
2 CONCLUSIONS ABOUT THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND PROBLEM.............................235 
3 IMPLICATIONS FOR THEORY .................................................................................................244 
4 IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY AND PRACTICE .......................................................................264 
5 LIMITATIONS.............................................................................................................................267 
6 SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS................................................................................................268 
7 IMPLICATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH ..........................................................................271 
8 A FINAL WORD..........................................................................................................................275 
REFERENCES....................................................................................................................................276 
 
Table of Contents  III 
  
APPENDIX 1 
QUESTIONNAIRE FORMAT ..............................................................................................................290 
APPENDIX 2 
SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEW PLAN..........................................................................................293 
APPENDIX 3 
PILOT PROJECT BUSINESS REPORT.............................................................................................295 
APPENDIX 4 
EXAMPLE BUSINESS UNIT REPORT ..............................................................................................304 
APPENDIX 5 
DEFENCE LOGISTICS ORGANISATION REPORT..........................................................................315 
APPENDIX 6 
SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEW KEY POINTS..............................................................................330 
APPENDIX 7 
DETAILED DATA ANALYSIS Q3 TRANSACTION COST ECONOMICS & Q4 THE THEORETICAL 
FRAMEWORK (DETAILED PERSPECTIVE) .....................................................................................386 
1 INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................................386 
2 DIMENSION 1 – BOUNDED RATIONALITY (RELATIONSHIP CREATIVITY) .........................387 
3 DIMENSION 2 – UNCERTAINTY/COMPLEXITY (RELATIONSHIP STABILITY).....................391 
4 DIMENSION 3 – INFORMATION IMPACTEDNESS (COMMUNICATION) ..............................396 
5 DIMENSION 4 - OPPORTUNISM (RELATIONSHIP RELIABILITY) .........................................400 
6 DIMENSION 5 – SMALL NUMBERS (RELATIONSHIP QUALITY)...........................................404 
APPENDIX 8 
DETAILED DATA ANALYSIS Q1 – SUPPLY CHAIN MANAGEMENT..............................................409 
1 INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................................409 
2 DIMENSION 1 – BOUNDED RATIONALITY (RELATIONSHIP CREATIVITY) .........................410 
3 DIMENSION 2 – UNCERTAINTY/COMPLEXITY (RELATIONSHIP STABILITY).....................415 
4 DIMENSION 3 – INFORMATION IMPACTEDNESS (COMMUNICATION) ..............................420 
5 DIMENSION 4 - OPPORTUNISM (RELATIONSHIP RELIABILITY) .........................................425 
6 DIMENSION 5 – SMALL NUMBERS (RELATIONSHIP QUALITY)...........................................430 
APPENDIX 9 
DETAILED DATA ANALYSIS Q2 – RELATIONSHIP MARKETING ..................................................434 
Table of Contents  IV 
  
1 INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................................434 
2 DIMENSION 1 – BOUNDED RATIONALITY (RELATIONSHIP CREATIVITY) .........................435 
3 DIMENSION 2 – UNCERTAINTY/COMPLEXITY (RELATIONSHIP STABILITY).....................439 
4 DIMENSION 3 – INFORMATION IMPACTEDNESS (COMMUNICATION) ..............................444 
5 DIMENSION 4 - OPPORTUNISM (RELATIONSHIP RELIABILITY) .........................................449 
6 DIMENSION 5 – SMALL NUMBERS (RELATIONSHIP QUALITY)...........................................456 
APPENDIX 10 
CLUSTER ANALYSIS DATA ..............................................................................................................462 
APPENDIX 11 
CLUSTER ANALYSIS QUALITATIVE DATA TABLE .........................................................................465 
 
 
 
List of Figures  V 
  
List of Figures 
CHAPTER 1 
 
FIGURE 1.1.  CHAPTER 1 STRUCTURE..............................................................................................1 
FIGURE 1.2.  THE DEFENCE LOGISTICS ORGANISATION...............................................................5 
FIGURE 1.3.  AIR BUSINESS UNIT ORGANISATION ..........................................................................6 
FIGURE 1.4.  AN EXAMPLE AIRCRAFT IPT ORGANISATION............................................................7 
FIGURE 1.5.  THE DEFENCE PROCUREMENT AGENCY ..................................................................9 
FIGURE 1.6.  SMART ACQUISITION (WWW.MOD.UK/BUSINESS/, 2002).......................................11 
FIGURE 1.7.  CONSOLIDATION OF EUROPEAN AEROSPACE & DEFENCE INDUSTRY 
(HUMPHRIES & WILDING, 2001B) .............................................................................................12 
FIGURE 1.8.  THE UK DEFENCE PROCUREMENT ENVIRONMENT (ADAPTED FROM HC 
138,1998 & HARLAND ET AL, 2000)...........................................................................................14 
 
CHAPTER 2 
 
FIGURE 2.1.  LITERATURE REVIEW STRUCTURE ..........................................................................28 
FIGURE 2.2.  STRUCTURE OF SECTION 2. ......................................................................................31 
FIGURE 2.3.  INTERNAL LOGISTICS INTEGRATION (STEVENS, 1989) .........................................32 
FIGURE 2.4.  EXTERNAL LOGISTICS INTEGRATION – SCM (ADAPTED FROM STEVENS, 1989)
......................................................................................................................................................37 
FIGURE 2.5.  CONTINUUMS OF RELATIONSHIP STYLES...............................................................43 
FIGURE 2.6.  THE PARTNERING PROCESS (ADAPTED FROM LAMBERT ET AL, 1996) .............46 
FIGURE 2.7.  CUSTOMER/SUPPLIER DEPENDENCE GRID (ADAPTED FROM SCOTT & 
WESTBROOK, 1991)...................................................................................................................47 
FIGURE 2.8.  PARTNERSHIP-ENHANCING ACTIVITIES & PROCESSES .......................................48 
FIGURE 2.9.  BOW-TIE VS. DIAMOND PERSPECTIVES (CHRISTOPHER, 1997)...........................49 
FIGURE 2.10.  PARADIGM SHIFT IN RELATIONSHIPS (ADAPTED FROM ELLRAM & EDIS, 1996)
......................................................................................................................................................52 
FIGURE 2.11.  STRUCTURE OF SECTION 3 .....................................................................................59 
FIGURE 2.12.  STRATEGIC SHIFT IN ORGANISATIONAL BUYING BEHAVIOUR (ADAPTED FROM 
SHETH & SHARMA, 1997) ..........................................................................................................61 
FIGURE 2.13.  RELATIONSHIP SPECTRUMS – SCM & RM COMPARISON ...................................63 
FIGURE 2.14.  ADOPTED PORTFOLIO MODEL (OLSEN & ELLRAM, 1997)....................................64 
FIGURE 2.15.  KEY ACCOUNT RELATIONAL DEVELOPMENT MODEL (MCDONALD ET AL, 1997)
......................................................................................................................................................67 
FIGURE 2.16.  A DIGEST OF BUSINESS-TO-BUSINESS RELATIONSHIP BEHAVIOURAL 
VARIABLES..................................................................................................................................69 
FIGURE 2.17.  THE COMMITMENT-TRUST THEORY (MORGAN & HUNT, 1994)...........................70 
FIGURE 2.18.  MOVING FROM THE POWER GAME TO THE TRUST GAME (KUMAR, 1996) .......77 
FIGURE 2.19.  THE IMP INTERACTION MODEL (METCALF ET AL, 1992) ......................................78 
FIGURE 2.20.  THE THREE GENERATIONS OF PARTNERING (WATSON, 1999)..........................79 
FIGURE 2.21.  AN INTERACTIVE MODEL OF BUYER-SELLER RELATIONSHIPS (LEWIN & 
JOHNSTON, 1997).......................................................................................................................80 
FIGURE 2.22.  STRUCTURE OF SECTION 4 .....................................................................................85 
FIGURE 2.23.  THE ORGANISATIONS FAILURE FRAMEWORK (WILLIAMSON, 1975)..................88 
FIGURE 2.24.  COMPARING WILLIAMSON’S AND MACNEIL’S GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES 
(ADAPTED FROM WILLIAMSON, 1979).....................................................................................93 
FIGURE 2.25.  TCE THEORY DEVELOPMENT FROM TRANSACTIONAL TO RELATIONAL .........98 
FIGURE 2.26.  THE PROCUREMENT CONTINUUM (PARKER & HARTLEY, 1997) ......................100 
FIGURE 2.27.  RELATION POWER ANALYSIS (COX ET AL, 2000)................................................109 
FIGURE 2.28.  BUSINESS RELATIONSHIP SUCCESS CYCLE ......................................................110 
FIGURE 2.29.  BUSINESS RELATIONSHIP FAILURE CYCLE ........................................................111 
FIGURE 2.30.  CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR RESEARCH ....................................................112 
 
CHAPTER 3 
 
FIGURE 3.1.  METHODOLOGY CHAPTER STRUCTURE ...............................................................115 
FIGURE 3.2.  COMPARISON OF QUANTITATIVE & QUALITATIVE METHODS (ADAPTED FROM: 
EASTERBY-SMITH ET AL, 1991)..............................................................................................118 
List of Figures  VI 
  
FIGURE 3.3.  RESEARCH STRATEGY OVERVIEW ........................................................................119 
FIGURE 3.4.  WILLIAMSON’S (1975) ECONOMIC ORGANISATION FAILURE FRAMEWORK 
UNDERLYING CONCEPTS WITH SUPPLY CHAIN SUCCESS FACTORS DIMENSIONS ....134 
FIGURE 3.5 QUESTIONNAIRE QUESTIONS SELECTION PROCESS. ..........................................137 
FIGURE 3.6.  RELATIONSHIP INDEPENDENT VARIABLES...........................................................150 
FIGURE 3.7.  OVERALL DATA COLLECTION PROGRAMME.........................................................151 
FIGURE 3.8.  QUALITATIVE DATA STATISTICS..............................................................................151 
FIGURE 3.9. DIMENSIONAL QUANTITATIVE DATA ANALYSIS SPREADSHEET HIERARCHY...158 
FIGURE 3.10.  SPECIMEN RELATIONSHIP SUCCESS SUMMARY ...............................................159 
FIGURE 3.11.  BEST PRACTICE DATABASE INPUT SCREEN.......................................................163 
FIGURE 3.12.  RELIABILITY, VALIDITY, GENERALISABILITY CROSS REFERENCE MATRIX....166 
 
CHAPTER 4 
 
FIGURE 4.1.  CHAPTER 4 STRUCTURE..........................................................................................168 
FIGURE 4.2.  JOINT MEAN SCORES BY RELATIONSHIP AND DIMENSION WITH RANGE LIMITS 
HIGHLIGHTED...........................................................................................................................174 
FIGURE 4.3.  RELATIONSHIPS RANKING GRAPH SERIALS 1-26.................................................176 
FIGURE 4.4.  RELATIONSHIPS RANKING GRAPH SERIALS 27 -54..............................................177 
FIGURE 4.5.  OVERALL CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK RESULTS BY DIMENSION .....................180 
FIGURE 4.6.  COMPARATIVE VIEWS OF RELATIONSHIP STATISTICS .......................................181 
FIGURE 4.7.  STANDARD DEVIATION PLOT (SPSS 11.0)..............................................................182 
FIGURE 4.8.  COMPARISON OF OVERALL BUSINESS UNIT RESULT PATTERNS.....................183 
FIGURE 4.9.  CORRELATION OF IPT & FIRM RESPONSES (MS EXCEL) ....................................184 
FIGURE 4.10.  COMPARISON OF SUPPLY CHAIN PARTNERSHIP-ENHANCING ACTIVITIES...192 
(CHAPTER 2, FIGURE 2.8) WITH QUALITATIVE DATA CATEGORIES..........................................192 
FIGURE 4.11.  CORRELATION SHOWING RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SCM & SMALL NUMBERS 
(MS EXCEL) ...............................................................................................................................195 
FIGURE 4.12.  COMPARISON OF RM BEHAVIOURAL VARIABLES (CHAPTER 2, FIGURE 2.16) 
WITH QUALITATIVE DATA CATEGORIES ..............................................................................198 
FIGURE 4.13.  POOR QUALITY RELATIONSHIPS GROUPING......................................................208 
FIGURE 4.14.  MODERATE QUALITY RELATIONSHIPS GROUPING............................................210 
FIGURE 4.15.  MODERATE QUALITY RELATIONSHIPS GROUPING............................................212 
FIGURE 4.16.  GOOD QUALITY RELATIONSHIPS GROUPING .....................................................214 
FIGURE 4.17. CLUSTERS BY MEAN SATISFACTION % AND SIZE...............................................217 
 
CHAPTER 5 
 
FIGURE 5.1.  CHAPTER 5 STRUCTURE..........................................................................................228 
FIGURE 5.2.  THE PROCUREMENT CONTINUUM – MONOPOLY BUYER & MONOPSONY 
SELLER (ADAPTED FROM PARKER & HARTLEY, 1997) ......................................................245 
FIGURE 5.3. THE NEGATIVE MONOPOLISTIC PARTNERING PROCESS (ADAPTED FROM 
LAMBERT ET AL, 1996) ............................................................................................................255 
FIGURE 5.4.  THE COMMITMENT-TRUST THEORY WITH POSSIBLE MONOPOLY COMPONENTS 
(ADAPTED FROM MORGAN & HUNT, 1994)...........................................................................260 
FIGURE 5.5.  UK DEFENCE PROCUREMENT MONOPOLISTIC RELATIONSHIP INFLUENCES.263 
 
APPENDIX 10 
 
FIGURE A10.1.  AGGLOMERATION SCHEDULE (SPSS V.11) .......................................................462 
FIGURE A10.2.  PROXIMITY PLOT SHOWING COEFFICIENTS/CLUSTER MAPPING (MS EXCEL)
....................................................................................................................................................463 
FIGURE A10.3.  DESCRIPTIVE SOURCE STATISTICS TABLE (SPSS V.11).................................464 
FIGURE A10.4.  EXTERNAL VARIABLE CROSS-TABULATION RESULTS (SPSS V.11) ..............464 
Acknowledgements  VII 
  
Acknowledgements 
 
 
This thesis represents for me a monumental achievement.  Not only was it 
undertaken as a part-time activity in parallel with a busy ‘day job’ but, it also involved 
taking first steps in the hitherto unfamiliar domain of Academia.  I do not make this 
introduction as a means of seeking approbation but, I believe the quality of my 
endeavour reflects even more conspicuously on those who have supported and 
guided me.  These include my supervisor, Richard Wilding and my review team John 
Towriss, Moira Clark and Colin Pilbeam who provided the essential ‘touch on the 
tiller’ that kept me pointed in the right direction.  I also wish to thank Kim James and 
the Cranfield School of Management faculty who organised an excellent Research 
Methodology Course and the superb group of individuals who constituted the PhD 
Year of 99 who gave me so much inspiration and fun.  I am indebted to the Library 
for a service second-to-none and especially to Anita Beal, to whom no request for 
literature or information was ever too much trouble.  I could not have carried out such 
an extensive research project without the support and sponsorship of a number of 
key individuals within the UK Defence Logistics Organisation who gave me open 
access to it’s Defence Procurement activities.  I am extremely grateful to them.  Last 
but no means least, I offer my sincere thanks to my wife Patricia, for her 
forebearance. 
 
 
 
Declaration  VIII 
  
Declaration 
 
 
I declare that I am the sole author of this work and that it has not been submitted for 
any other award.  All sources of published information have been acknowledged in 
the text by the use of references. 
 
 
Summary  IX 
  
Abstract 
 
Business-to-business relationships within sustained monopolies, such as those 
within Defence Procurement, have received limited attention by Management 
Researchers.  This is unusual because under these market circumstances typically 
there appear to be few incentives to achieve mutually beneficial outcomes despite 
their strategic policy importance.  The purpose of this thesis is therefore, to 
determine the influential relationship factors between the UK Ministry of Defence and 
its Industrial partners within a predominantly monopolistic Defence Procurement 
business. 
 
The approach adopted for this research project is exploratory and inter-subject area. 
It uses quantitative and supportive qualitative data to examine the problem through 
an economic model using Supply Chain Management, Relationship Marketing and 
Transaction Cost Economics.  A self-selected census of 54 business relationships is 
carried out from both the buyer and supplier perspectives through staff 
questionnaires and team leader semi-structured interviews.  
 
The findings from this research show, contrary to the expectation of the theoretical 
model, a positive relationship success situation with a spectrum of both positive and 
negative behavioural factors present.  However, a significant adversarial influence is 
a suite of issues that are endemic to the business in question such as old products, 
obsolescence, staff and organisational upheavals, poor end-customer visibility and 
lack of investment in modern procedures and systems.  Within the monopoly 
environment these accentuate managers’ frustrations due to lack of freedom of 
action.  The primary contribution of this research is therefore, an increased 
understanding of the business-to-business relationship dynamics within long-term, 
Summary  X 
  
closely coupled, collaborative, business-to-business arrangements as exemplified by 
UK Defence and the results are likely to be of interest to both academics and 
managers. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
1 Outline 
This chapter, whose structure is shown in Figure 1.1, lays the foundations for the 
thesis.  It first introduces the research by means of an overview of the project.  Next 
the background is provided which sets the business environmental scene and 
describes the main actors.  The business problem, the research question and 
supporting hypotheses are then rehearsed.  The research is then justified, definitions 
are presented and the methodology is briefly described and justified.  Finally, the 
thesis is outlined and its scope is specified. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.1.  Chapter 1 Structure 
 
1 – Introduction 
6 – Methodology 
3 – Background to 
the Research 
4 – The Research 
Problem 
5 – Justification 
for the Research 
 
2 – Research 
Project Overview 
10 – Conclusion 
7 – Outline of the 
Thesis 
8 – Definitions 9 – Limitations 
and Key 
assumptions 
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2 Research Project Overview 
This thesis addresses an under-researched area of business-to-business 
relationships, namely that which exists where one or both parties has a monopoly of 
supply or demand (Fishwick, 1993).  Many theories of buyer-seller relationships have 
discussed in general terms the concept of structural bonds and opportunism, but not 
adequately applied them to the extreme situation of monopoly buyer and monopoly 
seller relationships (Humphries & Wilding, 2004).   
 
The thesis first summarises the difficulties faced by the UK Ministry of Defence (UK 
MoD) and its major industrial suppliers in moving away from traditional, adversarial 
relationships whilst facing increasingly monopolistic business dealings.  The 
literatures covering the relational aspects of Supply Chain Management (SCM - the 
business area), Relationship Marketing (RM - business relationship variables) and 
Transaction Cost Economics (TCE - business exchange factors) are examined but, 
although they offer considerable knowledge and guidance to managers on 
competitive and limited small numbers markets, there is much less research in the 
region of sustained monopolistic business of the type found within UK Defence 
Procurement.   The Organisations Failure Framework (Williamson, 1975) is selected 
from a number of options as the theoretical lens through which to view the problem.  
It provides a very clear affinity to monopolistic market failure situations and is 
therefore appropriate to the business problem and moreover, is amenable to support 
the descriptive features of the literature fields.  This is a radically different approach 
that combines two or more subject areas with the aim of producing an outcome that 
is more than the sum of the parts (Starkey & Madan, 2001).  An exploratory research 
programme, which uses a combination of quantitative and qualitative method within 
a selected part of the UK Ministry of Defence (UK MoD) Procurement organisation, is 
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justified and the pattern of results is then analysed.  As expected, negative relational 
features are found and are explained.  However, positive relationship features from 
SCM, RM and TCE are also revealed.  The thesis concludes that these findings offer 
an extension to knowledge about business dynamics within long term collaborative 
relationships of the specific type found within UK Defence Procurement, which is of 
interest to academics and of practical use to managers.  Finally a number of 
opportunities for further research are identified. 
 
The next Section introduces the background to the research. 
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3 Background to the Research 
At the beginning of this thesis it is essential to provide some background information 
about the UK Defence Procurement business environment, the 2 sides: the UK MoD 
and the Defence industries.  This Section therefore describes their recent history, 
organisation, policies and their current relationship situation and unless otherwise 
indicated, the information has been drawn from the UK MoD website 
(www.mod.uk/business/, 2002). 
3.1 UK Defence Procurement 
  To set the scene, the ending of the Cold War in 1989 after a 40 year arms race 
allowed the UK Government (in concert with other Western governments) to refocus 
its Defence expenditure to less costly, low intensity operations and to reap ‘peace 
dividends’ from reduced support costs.  Thus between 1985 and 2000 the 
percentage of GDP spent on defence dropped from 5.1% to 2.5% and the spending 
on equipment reduced by over 40% in real terms (DASA, 2001).  This situation 
began a radical change in the UK Defence Procurement business, which arguably is 
still in progress to this day (Humphries & Wilding, 2000).  
3.2 The UK MoD Position 
In reaction to the loss of planning and budget stability of the Cold War period the UK 
MoD organisation has been driven by operational, financial and political pressures to 
become smaller, flatter and more flexible by using out-sourcing, rationalisation, 
redundancies and stock reduction programmes (Cm 4446, 1999).  It has formed new 
organisations, the Defence Procurement Agency to manage the procurement of new 
weapon systems and the Defence Logistics Organisation to support the weapon 
systems being used by the front line forces.  These initiatives, together with the key 
policies, which underpin UK Defence Procurement today, are described below.   
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3.2.1 The Defence Logistics Organisation (DLO) 
The DLO is the UK MoD body responsible for providing logistic support to the UK's 
Armed Forces.  The DLO is the single largest organisations in the UK MoD, with an 
annual spend of over £4 billion and £22 billion worth of assets spread across some 
88 major UK sites.  It employs 43,000 staff (over 75% of the UK MoD’s Civil 
Servants) and consists primarily of five major Business Units each providing 
specialist logistics for Air, Sea, Land, Communications and Defence Supply Chain 
(e.g. warehousing, distribution, fuel, munitions, postal and food).  Its organisation 
structure is shown in Figure 1.2.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.2.  The Defence Logistics Organisation 
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An example Business Unit organisation structure is shown in Figure 1.3. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Figure 1.3.  Air Business Unit Organisation 
 
Many of these staff (24,800) work in 55 Integrated Project Teams (IPTs) (Sea – 18, 
Land – 11, Air – 19, Communications – 7) delivering support on individual pieces of 
equipment such as ships and aircraft.  Each IPT is comprised of a multi-disciplinary 
group of staff comprising engineering, supply chain, commercial, finance, and 
industry personnel.   
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An example IPT organisation is shown in Figure 1.4.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.4.  An Example Aircraft IPT Organisation 
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performance, which depended upon partnering with its main industrial suppliers to 
reduce costs and increase equipment reliability.  In order to illustrate the DLO’s 
intentions and beliefs with regard to internal process and external relationships 
improvement, the organisation’s strategic objectives are listed below: 
• We will provide training to develop the skills, competences and behaviour 
needed to deliver the transformation required and to enable everyone to realise 
their full potential.  
• We will create a single Defence inventory, sharing information with our 
suppliers, and we will shorten and rationalise our supply chain.  
• We will transform our relationship with industry to engage them more effectively 
in delivering support to our Armed Forces.  
• We will reduce both the volume and value of stock held and ensure that all of 
our assets are exploited fully.  
• We will make radical improvements to engineering support, particularly in repair 
and maintenance, to ensure both private sector suppliers and in-house 
agencies provide more complete and higher quality services.  
• We will aggressively exploit the potential of e-business, which will be key to our 
business transformation programme.  
• We will rigorously examine all parts of the DLO against the principle of 
achieving maximum integration of process and capacity across the organisation 
in order to remove overlap and duplication.  
3.2.2 The Defence Procurement Agency (DPA) 
The 2nd key organisation within Defence Procurement is the Defence Procurement 
Agency (DPA) which is based at Abbey Wood in north Bristol.  It was launched on 1 
April 1999 as an Executive Agency of the UK MoD, replacing the UK MoD 
Chapter 1  9 
  
Procurement Executive.  With the mission ‘to equip the Armed Forces’ it aims to buy 
equipment and related services for the Armed Forces that meets their requirements 
and timescales, while achieving the best value for money for tax-payers.  The DPA's 
objectives are to: 
• buy weapons systems and platforms and manage major upgrades  
• deliver projects within defined performance, time and cost bands  
• provide certain procurement-related services, guidance and standards  
• participate in the UK’s military nuclear programmes. 
 
With an annual budget of £6 billion, the DPA is the single biggest purchaser of 
manufactured goods in the UK.  Its 4,300 staff are brigaded into 70 project teams 
managing 1,000 projects and more than 13,000 contracts.  Approximately 14% of 
staff are military, the rest are civilian and there are over 1800 Engineers and 
Scientists.  Its organisation structure is shown in Figure 1.5.   
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For the financial year 2000/2001 the DPA delivered new equipment to the Armed 
Forces valued at over £3.5 billion, which included the Hercules C130J transport 
aircraft, the Apache Attack Helicopter and the Merlin HC Mark 3 Support Helicopter.  
59 projects have individual values over £400 million (@ 1 Jan 2002) and the biggest 
project is Eurofighter.  The DPA’s vision is: 'to excel in delivering equipment to the 
Armed Forces by meeting our promises to our customers and developing the 
excellence of our people.' 
3.2.3 UK Defence Procurement Policies 
UK Defence Procurement has developed and aggressively implemented a number of 
important policies to enable a more streamlined approach to the way it manages its 
relationships with industry.  These are explained below. 
 
Firstly, although it is increasingly difficult to achieve in practice – see sub-Section 
3.3, competition is fundamental to achieving value for money and is used wherever 
possible.  It is important not simply to accept the cheapest bid, but that which 
provides the best overall value for money, taking account of all the relevant factors. 
The entire life of a piece of equipment is considered, because support costs over its 
lifetime can far exceed the cost of acquiring it.  Competition usually results in keen 
offers, but taut contract terms are required to ensure that value is delivered. Where 
possible, a single prime contractor is selected and, with the aid of clear 
specifications, made responsible for delivering a complete system, which meets the 
requirement.  Firm (i.e. cash) or fixed prices (i.e. varying with inflation or other 
indices) are used wherever possible to ensure that the contractor carries financial 
risk.  Where competition is either not possible or sensible, Ministry of Defence policy 
is "No Acceptable Price - No Contract" (NAPNOC), which is designed to ensure 
prices are fully agreed before a contract is let.  Where longer contracts need interim 
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payments, they will be made only against the achievement of clearly defined 
performance milestones or acceptable delivery.  Frequently a proportion of the 
payments will be retained until the equipment has been in service for a period and it 
can be sure that the specification has been met. 
 
Smart Acquisition: Over recent years, various initiatives have been introduced to 
improve the management of Defence Procurement. These include improved risk 
assessment and management; integrated logistic support planning; enhanced 
consideration of reliability and maintainability, streamlined contractual procedures, 
improved communications and consultation with suppliers, whole life cost forecasting 
(Kirkpatrick, 2000) and more systematic consideration of defence industrial factors. 
The DPA is also open to innovative proposals from industry under the Government’s 
Private Finance Initiative, where it can be shown that the introduction of private 
sector finance and management expertise can yield efficiencies, for example in 
training and support.  All these concepts came together under the Smart 
Procurement (now called Smart Acquisition) Initiative (HC 138, 1998).  Acquisition is 
defined as Requirements + Procurement + Support + Disposal and the integrated 
approach is designed to procure equipment for the Armed Forces ‘faster, cheaper 
and better' and where possible to employ partnering principles to improve the quality 
of business relationships.  See the illustration at Figure 1.6. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.6.  Smart Acquisition (www.mod.uk/business/, 2002) 
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Finally, in order to allow sufficient funds to maintain modern, capable, front-line 
forces whilst Defence budgets continue to fall, the Government has declared that 
20% support cost savings are to be achieved (CM 4446, 1999) from its annual £10.1 
Bn (DASA 2001) spend over the next 4 years. 
3.3 The UK Defence Industries Position 
The impact of the post-Cold War reduction in Defence spending on UK Defence 
firms has been serious.  As a result of radical downsizing, employee numbers fell 
from 650,000 in 1985/86 to 345,000 in 1999/00 and half of these losses occurred 
between 1990 and 1995 (DASA 2001).  Structurally, since 1980 the UK Defence 
industries (British Aerospace, Rolls Royce, Shorts, VSEL, Yarrow and Royal 
Ordnance) have gravitated from state to private ownership and following the 
downturn in income have concentrated through numerous mergers and acquisitions 
in efforts to reduce over-capacity (Hartley 1998).  A more recent view of the 
concentration of Defence Industries in Europe is portrayed in Figure 1.7.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.7.  Consolidation of European Aerospace & Defence Industry (Humphries & 
Wilding, 2001b) 
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Today the UK Defence industrial base is dominated by a small number of major 
companies who are ‘virtual domestic monopolies’ (Hartley, 1998) and this is born out 
by the fact that the UK MoD spent 50.7% on equipment with only 11 contractors 
(DASA, 2001). 
 
The UK Defence industries have a further strength with exports that have risen from 
£1,753 in 1985/86 to £4,406 in 1999/00 (DASA, 2001).  These made a major 
contribution to the national balance of payments as well as reducing UK MoD’s 
procurement costs by spreading overheads over a larger output.  UK Defence firms 
also have a number of anti-competitive advantages.  Many companies are involved 
in European and US collaborative projects such as the Eurofighter and the Joint 
Strike Fighter, which protect them from competition.  Furthermore, there have been 
numerous instances when companies have made ‘supply side adjustments’ by 
merging or collaborating with other bidders for major contracts and further limited 
competitive forces (Hartley, 1998).  Finally, although the UK MoD has opened up its 
Defence Procurement business to foreign competition such that between 1995/96 
and 1999/00 foreign purchases rose from £246m to £1,660m, it is doubtful whether a 
contract would be let to an overseas supplier if in consequence a UK company went 
out of business (Hartley, 1998).  Not only would this have a strategic defence 
capability impact but would doubtless encounter strong political opposition from 
industry groups, unions and regional economic interests (Hartley, 1998). 
 
UK Defence industries may have been adversely affected by post-Cold War 
government spending cuts but the resultant market concentration together with 
national political and economic considerations has resulted in the formation of a 
powerful group of suppliers where opportunities for competition have disappeared in 
the majority of cases (Kilpatrick, 2001, Humphries & Wilding, 2004).   
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3.4 The UK Defence Procurement Relationship Environment 
Both the UK MOD and its industrial suppliers clearly need each other to survive both 
in terms of the affordability of a credible national Defence capability and the 
promotion of a viable, indigenous, military industrial base (Kilpatrick, 2001).  
However, in an environment where monopoly, rapid change and increasingly tight 
economic factors predominate, their respective long-term objectives can only be met 
if they can overcome their traditional attitudes and achieve better co-operation 
(Hartley 1998).    A diagram illustrating the situation showing the influences on both 
Industry and the UK MoD, their organisational dispositions, strategies and objectives 
is at Figure 1.8. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.8.  The UK Defence Procurement Environment (adapted from HC 138,1998 
& Harland et al, 2000) 
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A spectrum of potential procurement relationships is shown from partnering 
(relational) to traditional (transactional) but in practice this tends towards the 
adversarial, traditional end (HC 138, 1998).   
 
The next Section summarises the business problem and introduces the Research 
Question (RQ) and supporting questions.   
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4 The Research Problem 
4.1 Business Problem 
Having outlined the UK Defence Procurement situation, the business problem 
addressed by this research reflects the unusual nature of the field of study: 
• How is it possible to improve the quality of sustained economic relationships to 
the benefit of both UK MoD and Industry within UK Defence Procurement in a 
monopoly market? (for a definition of relationships for the purposes of this 
research see the definitions in Section 6). 
This study proposes that given an understanding of the environmental pressures 
imposed by a monopoly market, it is possible to determine the business and 
behavioural factors that may be employed to improve UK Defence Procurement 
relationships.  It furthermore suggests that managerial emphasis must be placed 
upon balancing monopoly rather than competition with partnering (Humphries & 
Wilding, 2001a). 
4.2 Research Question 
Following on from the Introduction to this Chapter that provided an overview of the 
thesis and in particular the theoretical approach to the research, the initial RQ is 
thus: 
• To determine, using an appropriate theoretical framework, the behavioural 
and business factors that influence relationships between the UK MoD and 
its main industrial suppliers in a monopoly market.  
 
Each theoretical field defined in Section 6 and considered in detail in Chapter 2 (the 
Literature Review) reveals that much is known about business-to-business 
relationships in ‘normal’ or competitive markets but that much less is written about 
sustained monopolistic situations.  As a result the following, initial-supporting 
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questions must be answered by the research in order to provide enough evidence to 
satisfy the RQ: 
• Q1 – Can Supply Chain Management (SCM) partnering activities, 
processes and requirements from the commercial environment provide an 
understanding of the monopolistic relationships found within UK Defence 
Procurement? 
• Q2 – Can Relationship Marketing (RM) behavioural variables provide an 
understanding of the monopolistic relationships found within UK Defence 
Procurement? 
• Q3 – Can factors within Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) explain the 
dynamics within monopolistic UK Defence Procurement relationships? 
• Q4 – Can the TCE Organisation Failure Framework be used as a theoretical 
lens with which to view the problem? 
 
The RQ and supporting questions are developed in detail in Chapter 2, Section 5 
where the theoretical framework for the research project is also explained.  The next 
Section justifies the research. 
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5 Justification for the Research 
A monopoly market in which there are significant degrees of economic and political 
power on the supply and procurement sides dominates the relationship between the 
UK MoD and its industrial suppliers (Hartley 1998, Humphries & Wilding, 2001c).  
Furthermore, this association has traditionally been adversarial where lack of trust 
has reduced efficiency and value outcomes (Parker & Hartley 1997).  Against this 
background, in the 1999 Defence White Paper (Cm 4446, 1999) the Government 
made a clear statement of policy that its Smart Procurement Initiative – faster, 
cheaper, better, depended heavily on the concept of partnership in order to reap the 
benefits of competition and collaboration (Bruce George MP, 1998).  The concept of 
Partnering has already been acknowledged by the private sector as ‘best practice’ in 
managing customer/supplier relationships to provide mutually beneficial results 
(Bechtel & Jayaram, 1997).  The UK MoD believed that partnering would allow it to 
overcome the adversarial relationships within a Defence market containing few 
competitors (Kirkpatrick, 2001).  However, despite clear strategic intentions, the 
practical implementation of partnering arrangements by the UK MOD has been slow, 
patchy and clouded by uncertainty over ways and means (HC 138, 1998).  
Furthermore, the fundamental differences of aims by both sides appear to make the 
selection of common objectives difficult and problematic (Defense News, 2000).  
Overcoming these difficulties is the business problem faced by UK MoD and its 
industrial suppliers under the Governments recently announced Smart Acquisition 
policy (Hansard, 2000).  Given the current, high political priority to making partnering 
in UK Defence Procurement, this research is timely and potentially very influential in 
addressing the business problem described (Humphries & Wilding, 2001a). 
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The empirical research available in the area of Supply Chain relationships covers 
both private and public sectors and includes limited research on short term, small 
numbers relationships between powerful, global industrial organisations.  However, 
the majority of research is found within the commercial sector within ‘normal’ (non 
monopoly) market conditions (Palmer, 2001, Parker & Hartley, 1997) and seldom 
covers both buyer and supplier perspectives (Ghoshal & Moran, 1996).   Research in 
Transaction Cost Economics of public utility monopolies has tended to concentrate 
on governance issues and failed to take a fully integrate approach to the theory 
under these market conditions (Crocker & Masten, 1997).   Thus from an academic 
perspective, the study extends the body of knowledge on sustained collaborative 
business dealings within the specific UK Defence Procurement environment using 
both buyer and supplier data and broadens business-to-business relationships 
research to the UK Defence sector.  Moreover, the inter-subject area approach to 
this research using 3 subject areas produces ‘transcendent’ insights that would not 
be perceived by the individual fields of interest working alone (Starkey & Madan, 
2001).  The findings of the study may also contribute to an understanding of 
business relationships within limited markets where near monopoly conditions 
develop in the Private Sector as a result of the globalisation and concentration of 
modern industries such as telecoms and media and, where long-term, closely 
coupled relationships exist. 
 
The next Section outlines the approach taken to the research methodology. 
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6 Methodology 
The aim of the research is to determine the influential relationship factors between 
UK MoD and its Industrial partners within a predominantly monopolistic UK Defence 
Procurement business.  Given the currency of the business problem it is considered 
necessary to produce the research knowledge in the context of its application with 
the aim of allowing as short a time as possible enable its dissemination and 
exploitation (Tranfield & Starkey, 1998).   
 
This exploratory research therefore, took a wide, cross-sectional perspective in order 
to make a statement about the outcomes of broadly comparable experiences using 
numerical supporting evidence (Johnson, 1984).  It relied upon the collection and 
analysis of large quantities of data to determine the range and strength of factors 
within the conceptual framework described in Section 5.5 of Chapter 2 – essentially 
a hypothesis testing approach (Huber & Power, 1985).  However, it also took a 
relational perspective in identifying the main types of interaction and, also included 
data collection by qualitative methods in order to capture the richness of perceptions 
needed to gain insight into the subtleties and cultural depth of the business problem 
(Bailey et al, 2000).  This was therefore Key Informant Research (Kumar et al,1993, 
Seidler,1974) using surveys supported by semi-structured interviews which allowed 
the results to be overlaid on the conceptual framework for statistical and qualitative 
analysis of the relationships between UK MoD and Industry.  Similar research 
strategies have been operationalised on Supply Chain relationships by Lambert et al 
(1996), Metcalf et al (1992), Spekman et al (1998); on buyer-seller relationships 
within Relationship Marketing by Doney & Cannon (1997), Mohr & Spekman (1994), 
Moorman et al (1992), Morgan & Hunt (1994), Noordewier et al (1990); and business 
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to business relationships within TCE by Nooteboom (1999), Parkhe (1993) and Buvik 
& Torger (2001).  The research methodology is covered in detail in Chapter 3.   
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7 Outline of the Thesis 
Following this introduction, the report has the following chapter structure: 
• Chapter 2 Literature Review – builds a theoretical foundation for the research by 
reviewing primarily the SCM, RM and TCE literatures, identifies research issues 
that are controversial or not answered by previous researchers, defines the 
research question and supporting hypotheses and finally, describes a conceptual 
framework for the research. 
• Chapter 3 Methodology – justifies the methodology in terms of the research 
question and the literature review, identifies the sources of data appropriate to 
the focus of the study, describes the instruments and procedures used to 
capture and analyse data, specifies any known limitations.  Finally, highlights 
any ethical issues. 
• Chapter 4 Data Analysis – presents patterns of results and analyses them for 
relevance to the research by comparing them to the hypotheses and the 
research question. 
• Chapter 5 Conclusions & Implications - summarises and justifies the 
contributions of the research, describes the implications for the wider body of 
knowledge, identifies practical implications for managers and lastly, suggests 
opportunities for further research.  
 
The next Section makes clear a number of key terms used throughout this thesis. 
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8 Definitions 
Definitions adopted by researchers are often not uniform so key and controversial 
terms are defined in this section to establish the positions taken in this report. 
8.1 Supply Chain Management (SCM)  
There are many definitions of SCM and they are discussed in Chapter 2, Section 2.4 
but one that suits the purposes of this research is ‘an integrative, proactive approach 
to manage the total flow of a distribution channel (including procurement) to the 
ultimate customer’ (Matthyssens & Van den Bulte, 1994).  Integrative means closer 
relationships, including trust, commitment and collaboration between Supply Chain 
members to ensure the success of these arrangements (Spekman et al, 1998). 
8.2 Relationship Marketing (RM) 
RM has many definitions and these are discussed in Chapter 2, Section 3.  However, 
the following is an appropriate set of terminology for this research.  RM is where all 
marketing activities are directed towards establishing, developing and maintaining 
successful relational exchanges (Morgan & Hunt, 1994).  It involves designing and 
negotiating strategic partnerships with vendors and technology partners through 
which the firm deploys its distinctive competences to serve market opportunities 
(Webster, 1992). 
8.3 Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) 
TCE was developed by Oliver Williamson’s (1975, 1979, 1996) as part of the New 
Institutional theories which are discussed in Chapter 2, Section 4.  He stated that the 
main purpose and effect of an economic organisation was to economise on the cost 
of transactions including negotiating and enforcing contracts and internal control and 
management (governance) overheads (Faulkner & De Rond, 2000, Palmer, 2001).  
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8.4 Monopoly 
Monopoly/monopsony is where there is only one buyer/seller.  A related term is 
Small Numbers (oligopoly/oligopsony) where there are few sellers/buyers.  Professor 
Hartley (1998) asserts that within the UK Defence Procurement environment despite 
successive government policies to ensure adequate competition, spending 
reductions and global defence industry concentration have resulted in 
interdependence between few dominant organisations resulting in alternating 
détente and aggression usually over price.  Thus because both sets of conditions 
(Small Numbers and Monopoly) have similar outcomes within the area of research 
and, the pure economic theory that differentiates them is insignificant (Fishwick, 
1993), they are treated in this thesis as being synonymous. 
8.5 UK Defence Procurement 
The UK MoD deals with many contractors for the supply of new equipment, repairs, 
spares and services.  However, 50.7% of the total budget is spent with 11 
contractors (DASA, 2001) where effectively a statutory monopoly pertains.  This is 
the area of interest of this report.   
 
The next Section outlines the thesis limitations of scope and key assumptions. 
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9 Limitation of Scope & Key Assumptions 
9.1 Overall Approach 
This thesis describes an exploratory project designed to expose a phenomenon that 
has received limited attention by management researchers; long-term monopolistic 
relationships within UK Defence Procurement.  The distinction between ‘normal’, 
competitive market business relationships and those within the target area defined 
as monopolistic (8.4, Chapter 2, sub-Sections 4.6) is made by specifying the special 
features found within the UK Defence Procurement market situation (see Chapter 2, 
sub-Sections 2.3.6 & 4.11) and then, by examining its subjects in the light of the 
theoretical framework using environmental factors (SCM, RM & TCE) from research 
carried out on businesses within competitive markets.  The researcher’s ontology is 
described in Chapter 3, Section 2 but essentially takes a positivist approach although 
some qualitative data is also collected in order to add richness to the findings.  The 
research deliberately does not attempt to identify a control situation for comparison 
purposes because of the difficulty of finding a truly representative example and, 
given that the target phenomenon is largely unknown, to avoid the danger of pre-
judgement.  
9.2 UK Defence Procurement 
Although the overall field of interest is UK Defence Procurement, this is comprised of 
two separate elements with different characteristics.  The first (The DPA) is 
concerned with new equipment projects from conception, development and eventual 
procurement but is a specialised, long-term business where process improvements 
take time to materialise.  The second area (The DLO) is responsible for the on-going 
support (spares and repairs) of in-service weapons systems and thus provided a 
more stable research environment although; the findings are likely to be useful to 
managers in both.  It was also necessary to choose an area for research that could 
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be adequately addressed within as short a historical timescale as possible in order to 
limit the impact of context changes and to allow results to be of use to current 
managers in both UK MoD and the Defence industries.   
9.3 Focus of the Study 
 The object of this thesis is to research the monopolistic relationship between 
industry and UK MoD by collecting data from each side of a number of individual 
businesses located within the DLO.  Each business is conducted in the UK MoD by 
an IPT and on the industry side by a contract team; this is the focus of the study.  
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10 Conclusion 
This chapter laid the foundation of the report.  It introduced the research problem 
and research question and hypotheses.  Then the research was justified, definitions 
were presented, the methodology was briefly described and justified, the report was 
outlined and the limitations were given.  The thesis will now proceed with a detailed 
description of the research starting with the Literature Review. 
Chapter 2  28 
  
Chapter 2 
Literature Review 
 
1 Introduction 
This Section reviews the relevant literature relating to the research and is organised 
in 5 Sections as shown in Figure 2.1. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1.  Literature Review Structure 
 
The RQ is: 
• To determine, using an appropriate theoretical framework, the behavioural 
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varied and have been advanced in diverse bodies of literature such as: supply chain 
management, logistics, transaction cost economics, strategic alliances, industrial 
marketing, purchasing and organisational behaviour (Zheng et al, 2000).  Sections 2 
- 4 examine the development of relational modes of business relationships mainly 
within (2) the Supply Chain, (3) Marketing and (4) Transaction Cost Economics 
perspectives although, it is impossible not to stray into other fields.  Each of these 
Sections is structured in a similar manner and covers the evolution of transactional to 
relational ways of doing business, knowledge of monopolistic relationships, the 
impact on UK Defence Procurement and any potential, research-related questions.  
Finally, Section 5 critiques the literature and identifies the research gaps. 
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2 Relationships within the Supply Chain 
2.1 Introduction 
The business of UK Defence Procurement is essentially the management of supply 
chain relationships in order to achieve ‘the synchronisation of the physical flow of 
goods from sourcing to consumption’ (Tompkins, 2000).  This Section therefore 
concentrates on the importance of relationships to Supply Chain Management 
(SCM) in order to seek parallels with the UK Defence Procurement business and to 
provide a context for an important aspect of the research environment.   
 
SCM is covered by diverse bodies of literature which include SCM, logistics, 
transportation, transaction cost economics, strategic alliances, industrial marketing, 
purchasing and organisational behaviour (Zheng et al, 2000).  This review touches 
on most of these areas although Transaction Cost Economics is omitted because it 
is covered specifically in Section 4.  It does not intend to provide a comprehensive 
resumé of Supply Chain Management.  If the reader wishes to discover such detail 
then, works such as Christopher (1998) and Lamming (1993) will provide an 
adequate starting point.       Section 2 begins with a brief explanation of logistics as 
an important antecedent of the Supply Chain and its management.  It then traces the 
evolution of supply chain concepts as they changed with the business fashion from 
transaction to relational dealings.  Both public sector and small numbers applications 
are described.  The Section then examines the relational requirements of successful 
SCM implementation and especially the necessary behavioural and attitudinal 
factors.  A salient feature of the review is to highlight the issues surrounding the 
consequence of closer business-to-business relationships of increasingly smaller 
numbers.  In the light of this review, it identifies a knowledge gap and specifies the 
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consequences for the design and execution of the research.  This structure is shown 
in Figure 2.2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2.  Structure of Section 2. 
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requirements.  In essence both these concepts represent a similar business planning 
and operational framework (Christopher, 1992) as shown in Figure 2.3 but it is 
noticeable that relationships do not feature in either because interfaces with external 
agencies are seen as managed through formal agreements such as contracts which 
prevent opportunistic behaviour (Peck et al, 2000). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.3.  Internal Logistics Integration (Stevens, 1989) 
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2.3 Supply Chain Management Evolution  
Strong business pressures in the last 10 years have included scarcity of resources, 
increased competition, globalisation of markets, faster change and higher customer 
expectations (Hines, 1999, Lambert et al, 1996, Scott & Westbrook, 1991). These 
have resulted in increased external focus, vertical disintergration as companies have 
out-sourced non-core activities, concentration on improving operational efficiency, 
adoption of Just-in-Time supply and a recognition of the necessary contribution of 
other supply chain players (Harland, 1996a).   The importance of co-ordinated 
processes (Cooper et al, 1997), both up and down the channel of distribution 
(Christopher, 1992), of supply chains as multi-organisational networks (Cooper et al, 
1997, Spekman et al, 1998), of value webs and coordinated collectives (Peck et al, 
2000), of industry-spanning entities (Langley et al, 1992), of concentration on 
interfunctional total costs – especially excessive inventory holdings (Cavatino, 1992, 
Peck et al, 2000) have been clearly identified.  The ability to gain flexibility through 
agility (Christopher, 1997, Wilding, 1999) and to achieve lean supply (Hines, 1999) 
through the quasi-firm (Lamming, 1993) offers prospects of a more integrated and 
holistic approaches.  A realisation that customer service directly results from the 
combined effects of all the supply chain components (Stevens, 1989) and can 
provide a unique type of customer value (Langley et al, 1992) have forced the pace 
to adopt more relational approaches.  In the UK MoD improved value for money in 
the post Cold War environment have been the principle drivers for change (Cm 
4446, 1999) and has brought about a similarly radical review of the role and conduct 
of logistics.  The next sub-Section turns to Partnership Sourcing which specifically 
addressed the requirements of relational supply chain dealings.   
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2.3.1 Partnership Sourcing  
Macbeth & Fergusson (1994) describe Partnership Sourcing (a CBI/DTI sponsored 
approach) as a means of rationalising supplier numbers to achieve process 
integration and improved quality consistency through long term relationships.  They 
emphasised the importance of a change in mindset in order to achieve the 
necessary commitment, trust and continuous improvement.    Ellram (1991) defines 
purchasing partnerships as long-term, trusting agreements where the risks and 
rewards are shared.  Partnership Sourcing stemmed from Japanese history and 
culture and is illustrated by Toyota’s policy where the assembler controls the 
relationship, the specialist abilities of the supplier (not present in the assembler) are 
crucially important and, shared capital or financial ties avert opportunism.  This was 
a step away from the traditional view of the supply chain but it continued to accept 
that some companies would dominate others, even in a paternal way, and  
partnership remained a ‘one way street’ (Lamming, 1993). 
2.3.2 Lean Supply 
A further step in the evolution of supply chain relationship thinking is Lean Supply.  
This replaces traditional, wasteful, inefficient and adversarial contracting practices 
(Lamming, 1993) and is the key to unlocking the goodwill in the relationship in order 
to become interdependent (Lamming et al, 2001).  Each process step is broken 
down and fully optimised with tasks and complexity shared in order to create a 
frictionless flow of value-enhancing activities (Lamming, 1993).  The aim is to use 
radical techniques to do things differently, not old things better, and concentrates on 
removing waste through lean production rather than economies of scale (Lamming et 
al, 2001).    Lean Supply requires external resource management skills in order to 
analyse, frame, negotiate and manage contracts and relationships (Cox & Lamming, 
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1997) and as for partnership sourcing, attitudinal reorientation was essential to 
achieve the necessary step change (Lamming, 1993).  Very much in the same vein 
is a related field known as ‘agility’.  Its main points, known as the 7 steps, are: 
substitute information for inventory, work smarter, not harder (eliminate or reduce 
non-value adding activities), partner with suppliers to reduce in-bound lead-times, 
seek to reduce complexity (e.g. common platforms), move from push to pull through 
vendor managed inventory, manage processes not just functions and use 
appropriate performance metrics (e.g. time based measures) (Lamming, 1993, 
Christopher, 1998).  This overall approach is emphasised as a key relationship 
success factor because although soft issues such as trust and commitment are 
important, process efficiency is at the heart of the value chain (Harland, 1995). 
2.3.3 Supply Chain Networks 
In recognition of the complex webs of supply chain relationships created and 
managed by firms came the concept of Networks.  The concept originated from 
industrial networks – linked activities, tied resources and bonded actors (Zheng et al, 
2000) – and represents a set of supply chains embodying the flow of goods and 
services from original source to end customers where firms play several roles 
simultaneously (Christopher, 1992, Harland, 1996b, Hines 1996).  This overturns the 
idea of a simple linear flow and concern for purely up-stream purchasing and 
encourages a shared responsibility for the health and performance of the 
relationship.  It builds on the work of the Industrial Marketing Group (described more 
fully in the next Section – 3.6) and research in automotive, consumer electronics, 
drugs and health care, pharmaceuticals and banking indicate that firms can achieve 
success in managing the supply chain network value chains (Harland, 1996b).  
Zheng et al, 2000 suggested there were 4 integrating elements: equipment and 
resources, human resources, materiel and inventory and, facility configuration.  The 
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critical success factors were risk and benefit sharing, conflict resolution and 
information sharing.  Although this theory usefully sheds light on more complex 
relationship structures it concentrated on focal firms (the dominators) and suggested 
that firms coped reactively rather than followed any particular strategy (Harland, 
1996b). 
2.3.4 Supply Chain Management 
SCM can be seen as an integrative, proactive approach (Matthyssens & Van den 
Bulte, 1994) to manage the total flow of a distribution channel to the ultimate 
customer – like ‘a well-balanced and well-practiced relay team’ (Cooper & Ellram, 
1993).  Another definition that highlights its ‘board level’ importance is the strategic 
management of the network of organisations that are involved in the up-stream 
production and down-stream distribution processes and activities associated with the 
satisfaction of customers and maximisation of both current and long term profitability 
is (Christopher, 1992, 1998, Cox & Lamming, 1997, Harland, 1996a).  It is located 
between vertically integrated systems and those where the channel members 
operate completely independently and it aims to reduce inventory, to increase 
customer service reliability and build a competitive advantage for the channel (Boddy 
et al, 2000, Cavinato, 1992, Hines & Jones, 1996).  
 
A key feature of SCM is an early decision to reduce the number of suppliers in the 
chain (the elimination of multiple sourcing) (Ellram, 1991) because maintaining close, 
intense relationships can be very expensive in management effort (Cavinato, 1992, 
Langley & Holcomb, 1992).  The intention is to have no more ‘partners’ than 
necessary and to work more closely, effectively, and over the longer term, (Peck et 
al, 2000, Scott & Westbrook, 1991) with those who have the most critical impact on 
the overall operation (Cooper et al, 1997).  Japanese lean automotive producers 
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have typically 300 suppliers compared to 1000-2500 in the west and operate a 
determined policy of supplier base reduction – moving from away from multi-
sourced, adversarial trading - towards closer relationships with fewer, key partners 
(Harland, 1996a, Hines 1996).  It is hoped that deeper, inter organisational 
alliances/partnerships can evolve and focus on the whole Supply Chain rather than 
diluting each company’s efforts through conflicting goals (Anscombe & Kearney, 
1994). In fact Bechtel & Jayaram (1997) and Perks & Easton (2000) extend this 
concept further to suggest that SCM provides a business environment in which firms 
closely co-operate rather than compete to achieve mutual goals and are incentivised 
to join in collaborative innovation (Harland, 1996a).  With fewer, strategic partners it 
is possible to share confidential demand information and to reduce uncertainty and 
therefore safety stocks, which lower costs and order cycle time (Cooper & Ellram, 
1993, Lamming, 1993, Bechtel & Jayaranth, 1997).  To this end the use of e-
commerce is a prime example of what Tompkins (2000) calls quality 
communications.   SCM’s operational concepts are represented in Figure 2.4.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.4.  External Logistics Integration – SCM (adapted from Stevens, 1989) 
 
The integrated Supply Chain view uses a number of terms that indicate the need for 
closer relationships, including trust, commitment, co-operation, co-ordination and 
collaboration between Supply Chain members to ensure the success of these 
arrangements (Christopher, 1997, Hines & Jones, 1996, 1999, Spekman et al, 
1998).  Both Stevens (1989) and Hulme (1997) point out that integration of this 
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nature is more than a change of scope; it is more significantly a change in attitude 
away from the adversarial attitude of conflict to one of mutual support and co-
operation.     
 
However, SCM appears to implicitly require a move towards a limitation of the 
number of market players involved – small numbers and, this demands a more 
complex set of management challenges to achieve success.  Ellram (1991) propose 
that SCM avoids some of the main drawbacks of vertical integration including limiting 
competition, increasing risk and diseconomies of scale.  Nevertheless, Macbeth & 
Fergusson (1994) suggest that despite the availability of modern information 
systems, the practice of managing Supply Chain players is wasteful of resources and 
drags performance backwards rather than promoting continuous improvement.  
Moreover, Cooper et al (1997) believe that achieving true Supply Chain integration 
was ‘a lofty and difficult goal’ and research indicates that companies continue to 
struggle to operationalise SCM principles such that they support dynamically 
changing business influences (Braithwaite, 1998).  
2.3.5  Public Sector Supply Chains 
The review up to this point has predominantly concentrated on concepts developed 
in the private sector but in comparison, relatively little research has examined SCM 
within the public sector (Harland et al, 2000).  Networking theory considers focal 
firms but not the larger systems of public sector supply and, describes important 
context variables but does not consider regulation.  Porter’s (1980) strategic 
management framework focuses on individual firm’s vertical integration strategies 
compared to their competitors but does not consider the non-competitive aspects of 
the private sector.  All offer some generalisable features that are relevant but no one 
model or framework comprehensively addresses public sector SCM relationships 
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(Harland et al, 2000, Zheng, 1998).  Harland et al, (2000) in their UK Health Authority 
research list the following distinctive features of public sector supply chain 
organisations: 
 
• Service: Large and specific. 
• Customers: remote. 
• Stakeholders: complex, difficult to integrate, crucial to success. 
• Market: dedicated suppliers. 
• Availability of alternatives: reduced. 
• Accountability: national interest rather than shareholders. 
• Regulation: the government makes the rules and can sanction anti-
competitiveness. 
• Investment cycles: long compared to annual reports and returns on 
investment. 
• Government theme: politics. 
 
These factors are confirmed by Brooks & Pawar’s (2000) research which also 
concludes that the public sector is different and that the correlation to commercial 
supply chain relationships cannot be taken as straight forward.  However, given that 
SCM aims to manage a limited number of complex business-to-business 
relationships over a longer term, there are some fundamental similarities of principle 
that seem to apply. 
2.3.6 Small Numbers 
Leading on from an introduction to public sector supply chain relationships, it is clear 
that limited markets/small numbers will tend to exist naturally where specialised 
services such as utilities, health and defence are provided for the common good.  
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Nevertheless, many of these have been subject to deregulation in recent years and 
agencies such as the rail companies have been formed with some exposure to 
competitive conditions (Harland et al, 2000).  Despite the anti-trust activities of 
national governments, examples of small numbers and strong market power 
relationships between dominant firms in the civil sector are to be found.  Typically, 
the price competition ‘wars’ between major supermarkets with their own brands 
versus global companies such as Marlboro cigarettes, Coca Cola and Pepsi and 
between major market players such as Walmart and Rubbermaid, in the early/mid 
1990s displayed some characteristics similar to those found between UK Defence 
Procurement organisations and their major suppliers.  The giant brand owners 
initially forced the supermarkets to support high prices for their products however in 
response the latter promoted the development of high quality alternatives such as 
Virgin Cola and Cott Corporation carbonated drink products and eventually restored 
a balance of power and prevented destructive, adversarial influences from 
destroying long term relationships (Christopher, 1997).  This is reminiscent of the 
Levene reforms which forced the UK Defence Industries to accept that long term 
prosperity depended on a balance of power between the sides (Cm 4446, 1999).  
Furthermore, although Walmart forced Rubbermade to climb down over price level 
maintenance, subsequently Rubbermade lost its direction and market share 
requiring Walmart to offer support (Basury et al, 2001).  This equates to the rescue 
by the UK Government of Westlands after the EH101 helicopter project problems 
and BAe Systems after the Nimrod Airborne Early Warning aircraft project failure 
(Cm 4446, 1999).  These examples provide useful insights into the dynamics of 
power confrontations between powerful organisations but, the balance of power 
changes within the UK Defence Procurement monopolies are effected as much by 
public interest considerations as by commercial forces.  UK Defence Procurement 
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relationships exhibit a number of explicit differences in most, if not all, of the 
following characteristics that set them apart from commercial examples: 
 
• Not of the same duration (some over 50 years, average is 20 years). 
• Not of the same size (many individual contracts are worth over £250m). 
• Not the same strategic (industrio/politico) significance (high government 
interest in employment, trade and international relations). 
• Not the same adversarial tradition. 
• Incapable of marketisation due to industry structure (few, highly specialized 
firms). 
• Output clarity is problematic (leading edge technology, security, high R&D 
costs, small production runs, very long equipment lives with inherent support 
difficulties). 
• Both sides equally powerful without the benefit of alternative market choices – 
marriage without the option of divorce. 
• Small numbers deemed to be within the public interest and thus free from 
anti-trust regulation.  
A more technical discussion about monopoly conditions from an economics 
perspective is in sub-Section 4.6 later in this thesis. 
2.3.7 Supply Chain Evolution – Conclusions 
The review has shown that traditional business relationships linked to logistics have 
given way to the manifestly increased benefits that may be available from more 
relational supply chain approaches.  A variety of evolutionary steps have developed 
during the last 20 or so years and although the principles are clearly evident, their 
application in practice as a different relationship strategy has revealed management 
challenges.  Research in the public sector reveals fundamental similarities with 
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subtle differences in SCM to those in the private sector and the differences between 
small numbers power relationships UK Defence Procurement are even more 
marked.  For the purposes of the design and execution of the research, a number of 
supply chain management principles have been found that can useful sought in the 
organisations to be examined.  The remainder of this Section expands on the 
characteristics of closer supply chain relationships and the attitudes that need to be 
adopted to achieve success. 
2.4 Implementing & Managing Supply Chain Relationships 
This sub-Section considers the relational factors that underpin SCM and acts as an 
introduction to the next sub-Sections where partnering is examined in greater detail.      
As already described, depending on the business strategy employed, a spectrum of 
relationships between the transactional and relational are found and these include a 
variety of power positions.  At one end formal contracts with specified benefits and 
fixed terms may be found.  At the other end co-operative development, commitment 
and attitudinal change may occur (Harland, 1995).  Relationships may comprise 
those loosely connected with friction, those with conflict resolution but no shared 
destiny, those where joint strategy is formulated collaboratively and finally where 
innovation achieves sustained competitive advantage (Harland, 1996b).  Other 
illustrative views of these dimensions are shown in Figure 2.5. 
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Figure 2.5.  Continuums of Relationship Styles 
 
The next sub-Section examines the characteristics of relational business 
arrangements under the generic term ‘partnering’. 
2.4.1  Partnering 
Empirical evidence suggests that close relationships between customers and 
suppliers has a beneficial impact on performance.  Customer and supplier commit to 
continuous improvement and shared benefits by exchanging information openly and 
resolving problems by working together (Sako et al, 1994).  Relational supply chain 
business dealings are given a number of labels.  Bechtel & Jayaram (1997) define 
partnering/partnerships as demand-led, integrated, inter-company relationships 
based on collaboration.  Boddy et al (2000), Hulme (1997), Olsen & Ellram (1997) 
and Zheng et al, (2000) and add that such relationships are long-termed and 
focussed on complex, problem solving.  Lambert et al (1996) propose that partnering 
is a tailored business arrangement based on mutual trust, openness, shared risks 
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and rewards that leverages the skills of each partner to achieve competitive 
performance not achieved by individual partners.  Christopher (1992, 1997) and 
Harrison (1990) use the term ‘co-makership’ to describe a seamless, end-to-end 
pipeline or virtual corporation between the supplier and the customer based on high 
quality processes, co-operation, inter-dependence, openness, trust, commitment, 
shared goals, open information flows and long-term, mutual benefits.  Lamming et al, 
(2001) propose that by harnessing the unique capabilities of partnership it is possible 
to create a shield from system-level forces.  Sako et al (1994) suggest partnership is 
a complex concept whose success depends upon length of time to build trust.   
When mistrust is entrenched, a shift from adversarial to co-operative relationship 
styles is extremely difficult.  Cooper & Gardner (1993) describe interorganisational 
relationships consisting of enduring transaction flows and linkages that come about 
because of a variety of reasons including necessity (monopoly), asymmetry (a 
dominant partner), reciprocity (co-operation and co-ordination), efficiency (cost 
reduction) and stability (risk reduction).  Ellram & Edis (1996) and Boddy et al (2000) 
use very similar terms to describe collaborative buyer-seller relationships as ‘co-
destiny’ situations although they also mention the obligational nature of the 
arrangement to overcome opportunistic temptations.  Finally, a succinct description 
is ‘an arrangement where suppliers and customers are inextricably linked’ (Spekman 
et al, 1998, Weinstein, 1992).  
 
The thinking on relational business arrangements such as partnerships, alliances 
and strategic alliances (Olsen & Ellram, 1997) covers a wide field.  It generally 
presents a holistic (Langley & Holcomb, 1992) approach to managing the Supply 
Chain involving technology, process and information links (Christopher, 1992, 1997, 
Scott & Westbrook, 1991) based on trust and long-term commitment with the 
ultimate aim of securing improved economic returns for all chain members 
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(Weinstein, 1992, Hines & Jones, 1996).  Nevertheless, Anscombe & AT Kearney 
(1994) warn about the dangers of misconceptions inherent in the use of a generic 
partnering concept and especially its implication of a common, ideal solution.   
Partnering contains a multitude of dimensions such that each business relationship 
needs to be tailored precisely to generate mutual competitive advantage.  Lastly, the 
importance of clear objectives at the outset and regular, honest reviews are 
underlined (Humphries & Wilding, 2001c).  Marks & Spencer’s sudden break away 
from its 30 year relationship with its clothing supplier William Baird during 1999 might 
not have been such a shock if this advice had been taken (Daily Telegraph, 1999) 
and illustrates the point that even ‘perfect’ arrangements can end in acrimony.  The 
identification of this diversity of relationship types within Supply Chain partnerships 
provides is an important factor in the design and execution of the research as must 
the expectation that imperfect forms are likely to be found.   
 
UK Defence Procurement relationships are certainly long term, inextricably linked 
and characterised by complex problems.  This research aims to reveal how their 
partnerships are affected by the small numbers situation.  The next sub-Section 
covers in more detail the key, management success factors required to under-pin 
close business relationships.  
2.4.2 A Partnering Process 
In this sub-Section Lambert et al’s (1996) Partnering Process model in Figure 2.6 is 
used as a means of illustrating the main success factors identified within the 
literature.  It should be noted that via the Feedback loop, the model hopes to 
describe a virtuous circle of continuous improvement and sustainment (Humphries & 
Wilding, 2004).   The Drivers, compelling reasons to partner, are not mentioned 
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because they have already been covered in sub-Section 2.3.  Firstly therefore, the 
facilitators that influence the mindset of potential partners, are considered. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.6.  The Partnering Process (adapted from Lambert et al, 1996) 
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relationships.  Christopher (1992) insists that closer integration must not imply 
ownership or domination. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.7.  Customer/Supplier Dependence Grid (adapted from Scott & Westbrook, 
1991) 
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Having described the Drivers, Facilitators and the Partnering Decision, this Sub-
section considers the Components – joint activities and processes that sustain the 
partnership.   
2.4.5 Partnering Components 
An overview of the literature reveals a comprehensive list of management actions 
required for partnering success.  A summary of partnership-enhancing activities and 
processes is shown in Figure 2.8. 
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Figure 2.8.  Partnership-Enhancing Activities & Processes 
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In addition to the list of management actions in Figure 2.8, both Christopher (1997) 
and Cooper et al (1997) recommend a change in organisation structure that 
facilitates improved communications between companies.  The next sub-Section 
examines the main factors that bear upon the management of supply chain 
relationships. 
 
2.4.6 Interface Management 
An apposite representation of the interface management situation between firms is 
known as the Bow-tie/Diamond perspective shown in Figure 2.9.  This exposes the 
crucial importance of transparency and the management of inter-firm relationships. 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.9.  Bow-Tie vs. Diamond Perspectives (Christopher, 1997) 
 
In many firms even thought the need to co-operate is recognised, tension still exists 
because of the need to retain control over costs, intellectual property rights and price 
(Cox & Lamming, 1997).  This is a particularly strong issue in the high technology, 
UK Defence Procurement relationships.  Transparency needs to be treated as an 
integral element of the supply chain relationship rather than a property of the system 
(Lamming et al, 2001).   It is essential to realise the benefits resulting from greater 
openness including the demystification of arcane, obtuse or possibly illegal practices.  
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It goes beyond better communication and must include joint pooling/sharing of risk.  
This distinguishes it from other customer-driven approaches such as supplier 
development and open-book accounting which were often used by the powerful 
customer to intervene in suppliers’ processes in order to improve quality and drive 
down costs.  The flaw in this logic is the customer requires the supplier to risk 
exposing sensitive data without protection and often results in risk-hedging by 
providing distorted or corrupt information.  It is important to move towards value 
transparency where the parties create, nurture and deliver value for the benefit and 
continued existence of the relationship.  However, organisations must have the 
capability to absorb, exchange and benefit from this policy which involves managing 
risk with identified, additional, associated returns.  However, risk management is not 
commonly found within the skill sets of purchasing personnel and this leads into a 
review of the purchasing function; arguably the key role that manages business-to-
business supply chain relationships (Lamming et al, 2001). 
 
Dealing with suppliers has traditionally been assigned to lower levels of the 
organisation; a clerical matter of establishing lines of supply for purchased goods 
and services specified by an expert whose technical expertise is assumed to 
encompass the commercial niceties and logistical realities of inter-firm dealing.  
Policy is thus separated from practice.  Moreover, purchasing has changed as a 
result of strategic sourcing, SCM, supplier assessment and relationship 
development.  In organisations such as Fisons and the Nottingham Health Authority 
(Harland, 1996b) the replacement of purchasing function by a more strategic role for 
those who manage technology flows and supplies of products and services that 
result from very long term relationships suggest that the traditional Sales & 
Purchasing departments may even disappear.  Moreover, the management of 
operations may become part of Supply Management (Cooper et al, 1997, Cox & 
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Lamming, 1997).  Christopher (1997) believes their roles will change and grow into 
Key Account Management and Category Management.  The importance of joint 
activities in these areas is becoming recognised as a leading integration facilitation 
role for logistics personnel.   
It seems to be clear that extensive, open, honest communications are the key 
activities because they not only act as the ‘oil’ to lubricate the working of Lambert et 
al’s (1996) Partnering process but, they also support the feedback that sustains and 
improves the relationship.  However, good communications do not just occur by 
accident.  They need to be encouraged by a change in mindsets and behaviours 
away from the traditional adversarial to a more accommodating variety.  This is 
addressed in more depth in the next sub-Section. 
 
2.4.7 Behavioural Requirements 
This sub-Section examines the attitudinal side of Supply Chain relationships by 
considering the roles of human behaviours and trust in business partnering 
arrangements.  The Supply Chain literature does not extend deeply into sociological 
theory but instead concentrates on describing those practical aspects of human 
relationships that enable the operation of successful partnerships.  Ellram & Edis 
(1996), Lambert et al (1996) and Naude & Buttle, (2000) believe that ‘conventional 
thinking’ (non technical/sociological terminology) about relationships should also be 
applied to improve the performance of existing partnering arrangements.  Figure 
2.10 encapsulates these views and the term trust is mentioned as an essential 
component.  This key behavioural variable is examined more closely in the following 
paragraph. 
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Figure 2.10.  Paradigm Shift in Relationships (adapted from Ellram & Edis, 1996) 
 
Contracts (2.2) and Power (2.3.1) have already been mentioned as forms of 
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‘one stupid action’, which implies that the cycle in Figure 2.6 could be halted and 
possibly enter a failure cycle.  Naude & Buttle (2000) and Hines & Jones (1996) also 
add that trust is the cornerstone of relationship commitment.  Rapid, accurate 
communication mechanisms are suggested as the key to preventing local problems 
from endangering the relationship but, it is just as important to build up a culture of 
‘do as you say,’ sensitivity, dedication and goodwill (Tompkins, 2000).  Macbeth & 
Ferguson (1994) also hint at the importance of personal relationships by adding that 
the tendency to ‘churn’ (turnover) staff does not help in building and maintaining 
trust.   Wilding (1999) is more specific on the importance of emotional intelligence 
(EQ) to the success of agile Supply Chain arrangements.  In EQ (Goleman, 1998) 
trustworthiness means maintaining standards of honesty and integrity through close 
collaboration to build-up credibility.  
 
The literature generally agrees that a significant change in attitude at the 
organisational and personal levels is essential to the success of closer Supply Chain 
relationships.   
2.4.8 Implementing & Managing Supply Chain Relationships - Conclusions 
This review has identified that effective inter-firm relationships depend upon a 
number of complex components such as information, knowledge, history, forecasts, 
ethics, personal relationships, attitudes and hunches (Cox & Lamming, 1997).  
Furthermore, trust, friendliness and other soft features of long term co-operative 
relationships will not guarantee greater understanding and satisfaction.  It is 
important to understand the gap between expectations and perceptions of 
performance in areas such as timing, volume, speed, cost/price, quality and to make 
the improvements that count.  The greater the dependence the more important is 
measuring and monitoring performance (Harland, 1995, 1996a, 1996c).   
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In concluding this Section it is important not to underestimate the practical difficulties 
in making Supply Chain partnering work, a point that has been emphasised 
throughout the review of the literature.  Most managers and academics are fully 
aware of the principles of SCM but so often the espoused values do not meet the 
theory in use (Braithwaite, 1998) and successfully implemented examples are few 
(Spekman et al, 1998).  The main obstacle seems to be motivating chain members 
and company staff by communicating a clear vision of the benefits to be achieved in 
an environment of great complexity and uncertainty (Boddy et al, 2000, Harland, 
1996b).  The strong advice is to maintain pressure on achieving simple objectives 
and exercise leadership in carrying them out (Braithwaite, 1998, Lamming, 1993, 
Tompkins, 2000).       It is also important not to overlook the feedback loops in the 
Partnering Process model in Figure 2.6 where failure might overturn the intentions to 
achieve a ‘virtuous circle’ and instead instigate an increasingly adversarial 
relationship (Humphries & Wilding, 2001c).  Lambert et al (1996) are clear that 
without frequent, honest performance monitoring and joint problem-solving, a new 
relationship will not gather momentum and achieve the intended benefits.   
 
Thus, Supply Chain partnering concepts have a crucial importance in 
operationalising this research.  The ideas examined in these sub-Sections and 
especially the partnership-enhancing activities and processes in Figure 2.8 together 
with the behavioural concepts in Figure 2.10 offer a number of important factors that 
can be sought within the researched organisations.  
    
2.5 Supply Chain Literature Review Conclusions 
This review of the Supply Chain literature from a relational perspective implicitly 
identifies that there are almost identical business imperatives (2.3) that persuaded 
the UK MoD and the commercial world to develop operational logistics (2.2) into a 
Chapter 2  55 
  
holistic Supply Chain approach (2.4) that, in complex situations, demands closer 
relationships between partners to achieve success.  A review of the evolution of 
concepts and practices in the supply chain (2.3.1–2.3.6) traces the progress from 
transactional to relational approaches within the overarching requirement of firms to 
provide more integrated, complex and agile logistics services at less cost.  The 
solution is clearly to select a few business partners whose close co-operation can 
make the necessary difference and involves changing from traditional, arms-length 
to a fully relational approach (2.3.7).  There is less research on public sector supply 
chain relationships although, this reveals similar operational drivers but with different 
stakeholder influences (2.3.5).  Limited research on the power positions between 
major industry players offer some useful insights into the dynamics of short term, 
small numbers situations.  However, the reinstatement of power equilibrium within 
the UK Defence Procurement situation occurs through political rather than 
competitive forces and the relationships exhibit a number of defining characteristics 
that further differentiate them from commercial examples (2.3.6).   
 
The Section continued with a review of the concepts for managing and implementing 
Supply Chain relationships (2.4).  A generic term for operationalising relational 
supply chain dealings is partnering (2.4.1) which can have many forms because the 
detailed arrangements will be tailored to the business need.  Nevertheless, a 
process suitable for examining proposed or existing partnering arrangements was 
reviewed (2.4.2-2.4.5) as were the means of managing supply chain interfaces 
(2.4.6).  The complex mix of factors necessary to practically establish, maintain and 
manage supply chain relationships was identified.  Transparency of action, 
information and intention appeared to be critical success factors as was the need to 
treat supply chain relationships as strategic assets rather than operational matters 
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(2.5).  The need to change attitudes and behaviours was emphasised throughout the 
literature with a strong focus on building and maintaining trust. (2.4.7).   
2.6 Implications for the Research 
SCM depends upon co-operative relationships throughout the Supply Chain in order 
to achieve benefits for all participants (Stevens, 1989) and the literature contains a 
great deal of advice on how this should be achieved.  However, although there is this 
holistic view (Christopher, 1997), in practice it is generally operationalised as the 
integration of chains of suppliers in order to better satisfy customers (Peck et al, 
2000).  Although suppliers have recognised the need for integration with their 
customers, the literature contains limited empirical research on modelling and 
studying end-to-end Supply Chain relationships (Cooper et al, 1997, Bectel & 
Jayaram, 1997).  It is also apparent that full SCM implementation is not being 
achieved for other reasons (Spekman et al, 1998). Firms are still taking a short-term 
view which tends them towards adversarial relationships based upon power abuse 
(Braithwaite, 1998) and the development of partnering relationships is being 
obstructed by poor communications allied to reluctance to accept attitudinal change 
(Anscombe & Kearney, 1994, Hines & Jones, 1996).  Nevertheless, the importance 
of achieving good business-to-business relationships through partnering as a 
foundation for achieving the operational benefits of SCM in both Private and Public 
Sector situations is clearly identified (Brooks & Pawar, 2000, Cooper et al, 1997, 
Harland, 1996b).  However, supply chain research has concentrated mainly on 
competitive market operations and although there are some useful insights from the 
power confrontations between major industry players in small numbers situations, 
the research sheds only limited light on prolonged, small numbers, supply chain 
relationships of the very specific type found within UK Defence Procurement. 
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The RQ aims: 
• To determine, using an appropriate theoretical framework, the behavioural 
and business factors that influence relationships between the UK MoD and 
its main industrial suppliers in a monopoly market.  
This review of the Supply Chain literature examined the relational features of the 
business in question in order to identify the key features that would allow a research 
programme to be designed and implemented.  However, although it only found a few 
examples of empirical research, it did discover a considerable amount of best 
practice advice on SCM operations, Supply Chain partnering and the behavioural 
factors that support success that can be used in the design and implementation of 
the research.  But, this knowledge was found mainly within competitive markets 
environments.  It quite clearly provided little insight into Supply Chain relationships 
within the sustained monopolies found with the UK Defence Procurement and this is 
therefore a gap in the knowledge.  The following question is thus raised: 
• Q1 – Can SCM partnering activities, processes and requirements from the 
commercial environment, such as those encapsulated in Figure 2.8, 
provide an understanding of the monopolistic relationships found within 
UK Defence Procurement? 
  
SCM literature provides a view of business improvement measures that is largely 
pragmatic and generally concentrates on optimisation of material flows between 
value chain partners (Hines, 1999).  Although it considers relational, behavioural 
variables that enable business-to-business relationship success, its stand-point is 
naturally from a SCM perspective.  In order to explore these features in greater 
depth, this thesis now turns to the Relationship Marketing field which considers that 
all marketing activities are directed towards establishing, developing and maintaining 
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successful relational exchanges (Morgan & Hunt, 1994).  This involves designing 
and negotiating strategic partnerships with customers and technology partners 
through which the firm deploys its distinctive competences to serve market 
opportunities (Webster, 1992).  The intention in the next Section is therefore to seek 
a greater depth of view on close business-to-business relationships from a review of 
the Relationship Marketing literature. 
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3  Business Relationships from a Relationship Marketing 
Perspective 
3.1 Introduction 
The Relationship Marketing (RM) literature provides comprehensive views of the 
various styles used by firms when they do business with each other (Morgan & Hunt, 
1994) and these may also be of value when examining UK Defence Procurement’s 
monopolistic relationships.  Such perspectives do not just draw on Marketing for 
inspiration but they also extend into the fields of Behavioural Psychology, Sociology, 
Organisation and Transaction Cost Economics.     
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With the exception of Economics, which will be covered separately in Section 4, this 
Section’s structure is shown in Figure 2.11.  Its aims are to explore the business 
drivers, the development of various schools of thought, the key behavioural variables 
and the management implications of business-to-business relationships, to identify a 
gap in the knowledge and, to consider the implications for designing and 
implementing the research. 
3.2  Drivers for Closer Business Relationships 
In the last 20 years competitive pressures have forced companies to become more 
reactive to the satisfaction of rapidly changing, specific customer needs in global 
markets and this has prompted a search for reduced transaction costs and more 
efficient, agile processes (Christopher, 1997, Tuten & Urban, 2001).  Two main 
solutions have been adopted.  Firstly, quality systems, such as TQM, have 
encouraged ‘reverse marketing’ starting with the customer (demand driven/flexible 
manufacturing) and moving back to procurement process efficiencies (reduced cycle 
times and inventory).  Secondly, the need to optimise the Supply Chain has 
stimulated the use of IS tools and networks and highlighted the importance of Supply 
Chain relationships using fewer, key suppliers (Lewin & Johnston, 1997) to build 
competitive advantage (Wilson, 1995) throughout the Value Chain (Evans & Berman, 
2001).  This competitive advantage includes access to new technologies, 
information, skills and markets, increased capabilities to provide a wider range of 
products and services and, improved management that realises the importance of 
customer satisfaction, customer retention and relationships to the firm’s performance 
(Mohr & Spekman, 1994, Sheth & Sharma, 1997, Tuten & Urban, 2001).  When 
allied to a concentrating and globalising trend of business, these factors have 
produced a dramatic shift from domestic, transactional sourcing to a ‘New 
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Procurement Paradigm’ based upon global, relational sourcing (Sheth & Sharma, 
1997) as illustrated in Figure 2.12. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.12.  Strategic Shift in Organisational Buying Behaviour (adapted from Sheth 
& Sharma, 1997) 
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Sections first consider concepts from a relationship spectrum perspective and then 
trace the main schools of thought from the 1970s to the present. 
3.4 The Relationship Spectrum 
As an alternative to the Anglo/US, competitive style of business relationships, the 
Japanese Keiretsu model proposed avoidance of confrontation as a solution to 
disputes (Gundlach & Murphy, 1993).  Such an approach required discrete market 
transactions to be displaced by closer, long-term relationships between buyers and 
sellers (Lewin & Johnston, 1997, Sheth & Sharma, 1997). Furthermore, the concept 
of value creation through collaboration rather than exchange depended on 
purposeful co-operation using a web of operational and interpersonal connections 
and structures (Dyer & Chu, 2000, Moss Kanter, 1994, Palmer, 2001).  Three further 
spectrum views of relationship types are illustrated in Figure 2.13, which includes 
those shown in Figure 2.5 from the SCM literature for comparison.  A very similar 
pattern is revealed with adversarial forms giving way to closer structures such as 
joint ventures, alliances and partnerships. 
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Figure 2.13.  Relationship Spectrums – SCM & RM Comparison 
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These illustrative spectrums show that firms now contemplate a wider range of 
business relationships than previously and these may even extend to groups of co-
operating, similar product/service companies known as sourced service consortia 
(Kakabadse & Kakabadse, 2000, Perks & Easton, 2000).  The term partnership, as 
already introduced in 2.7, is therefore a broad concept with a number of definitions.  
A generic description from RM is a purposive strategic relationship between 
independent firms who share compatible goals and strive for mutual benefit.  Linkage 
takes place in form and substance that goes beyond the conventional flow of 
products and paper (Mohr & Spekman, 1994).   Business-to-business relationships 
may take many forms and moreover, firms may be involved in more than one at any 
time.  They are likely to classify suppliers/customers according to their importance 
and adopt a portfolio approach to create and manage appropriate relationships as 
illustrated in Figure 2.14. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.14.  Adopted Portfolio Model (Olsen & Ellram, 1997) 
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goods and services from producer to consumer.  The emphasis was on discrete 
transactions, planning, control and profit maximisation (Webster, 1992) and the 
primary focus was the exchange relationship with the aim to preclude killing and 
stealing (Dwyer et al, 1987).  This concept is otherwise known as Sales 
Management which thrived in large organisations in the 1970s and 80s and usually 
operated in an adversarial mode (McDonald et al, 1997).  This phase approximates 
to the transactional end of a Relationships Spectrum shown in Figure 2.13.  At the 
extreme end of the spectrum it is possible to encounter a relatively short term 
phenomenon where small numbers pertain and global companies such as Walmart 
and Rubbermaid enter a potentially mutually destructive confrontation, in this case 
over price.  Basury et al (2001) reported that although at first Walmart was able to 
impose its will on Rubbermaid, it finally had to make a reasonable accommodation in 
order to overcome a situation where adversarial behaviour became equally 
disempowering and financially damaging to both parties. 
3.6 Schools of Thought – Networks, Interactions and Marriage  
The first move away from Managerial Marketing was the theory of Industrial 
Networks which saw pairs of firms in dyadic relationships forming focal, value-added 
partnerships and, together with a secondary network of other firms, managing the 
flow of goods and services around a specific market opportunity (Anderson et al, 
1994).  This offered a first insight into the complexity of business relationships and a 
realisation that they could be other than adversarial (McDonald et al, 1997).   
 
The need to find richer meaning in these relationships was explored through the 
work of the European Industrial Marketing Group (IMP) led by Hakan Hakansson in 
1982 (Ford, 1980, Metcalf et al, 1992, Wilson, 1995).  They saw complex interactions 
between firms within networks and measured the degree of closeness of their 
relationships terming the result ‘embeddedness’ (Anderson et al, 1994).  They 
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particularly saw relationships as a valuable resource and an investment to increase 
economic and technological efficiency and, to serve as an information channel and a 
means of reducing uncertainty (McDonald et al, 1997). 
 
A further development beyond the IMP’s Interactionist perspective was the Marriage 
Analogy which saw building and sustaining customer and infrastructure relationships  
requiring similar relationship qualities to those in marriage (McDonald et al, 1997, 
Tuten & Urban, 2001).  As a result of dealing closely with a partner a firm achieves 
reduced uncertainty, managed dependence, exchange efficiency and social 
satisfaction (Dwyer et al, 1987, Moss Kanter, 1994).  Additionally, maintenance of 
the arrangement requires bilateral investment, a long-term perspective and the 
avoidance of legal remedies to secure co-operation (Gummesson, 1999, Gundlach & 
Murphy, 1993).  However, Palmer (2001) has warned that although closer 
relationships add value to end-customers and reduce costs for producers, in actuality 
the long term effect may be to restrict consumer choice and reduce the incentive of 
producers to reduce their costs because of the effects of diminished competition.  
This phase of Relationship Marketing development brought a clear view of the 
variety and closeness of many business-to-business relationships and became the 
precursor of the current ‘New Marketing’ approach. 
3.7 Schools of Thought – New Marketing 
New Marketing reflects the view that all marketing activities are directed towards 
establishing, developing and maintaining successful relational exchanges (Morgan & 
Hunt, 1994).  It involves designing and negotiating strategic partnerships with 
vendors and technology partners through which the firm deploys its distinctive 
competences to serve market opportunities (Webster, 1992).  The quintessential 
manifestation of New or Relational Marketing is Key Account Management (KAM).  
Here, the strategic importance of relationship building and maintenance is 
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recognised by the appointment of senior managers to provide high level expertise 
and management to this key task (McDonald et al, 1997).  Cases where KAM has 
been implemented successfully include Fisons PLC and the Nottingham Health 
Authority (Cox & Lamming, 1997) and in the National Health Service Supplies 
Organisation (Harland, 1996b).  It is also notable that the KAM concept has also 
become a descriptor for various types of relationships from a Relationship Marketing 
perspective as shown in Figure 2.15.  Pre-KAM indicates the parties are scanning 
the market; Early KAM is a transactional stage; Mid KAM means a preferred 
supplier; Partnership KAM is single sourcing and, Synergistic KAM refers to shared 
process delivery.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
Figure 2.15.  Key Account Relational Development Model (McDonald et al, 1997) 
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transactional to relational perspectives.  It has shown that a wide range of 
relationship forms are possible from quite simple ones such as the ‘marriage 
analogy’ to Synergistic KAM and, that firms may adopt different types depending on 
the depth and extent of their business dealings.  Moreover, this pattern appears to 
be reflected in SCM although from its particular conceptual standpoints.  The review 
did not find any instances of long term monopolistic relationships although it did find 
evidence of power confrontations between global industries.  The implications for this 
research are that its design and implementation must take into consideration the 
trend towards relational business-to-business dealings and the expectation that 
within Defence Procurement a spectrum of relationship types will exist. 
3.9 Relationship Variables 
The next few sub-Sections address the behavioural variables (such as trust and 
commitment) used within the schools of thought.  The aim is to identify the important 
features that build and sustain successful business-to-business relationships so that 
the research design and implementation can seek out these features within Defence 
Procurement monopolies.  A digest of the RM writers reviewed is contained in Figure 
2.16 and it can be seen that there is a reasonable consensus on the importance of a 
relatively short list of variables.  A number of them have been grouped because they 
are particularly related but in fact there are many links between them in a rich seam 
of business, organisational and behavioural interactions. These are 
reviewed next.
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Axelrod, 1984 X  X     
Cowles, 1997 X       
Currall & Inkpen, 2000 X  X  X   
Doney & Cannon, 1997 X       
Doz & Baburoglu, 2000  X X  X   
Dyer & Chu, 2000  X      
Eisenhardt et al, 1997     X   
Evans & Berman, 2001   X  X  X 
Faulkner & de Rond, 2000 X  X  X   
Frow, 2001 X X  X X   
Gaski, 1884      X  
Goleman, 1998 X       
Gulati, 1995 X       
Gummesson, 1999     X   
Hatch, 1997     X   
Kramer, 1999 X       
Kumar, 1996 X      X 
Lewin & Johnston, 1997    X X   
Madhok, 2000  X    X X 
McDonald et al, 1997   X     
Metcalf et al, 1992   X   X  
Mohr & Spekman, 1994   X  X  X 
Moorman et al, 1992  X      
Morgan & Hunt, 1994 X X      
Moss Kanter, 1994   X   X  
Naude & Buttle, 2000  X      
Oliver, 1990  X X X    
Palmer, 2001   X X X   
Rousseau et al, 1998 X       
Rugmen & D’Cruz, 2000   X X    
Sheth & Sharma, 1997 X X   X  X 
Stern & Reve, 1980   X  X   
Tuten & Urban, 2001 X    X X  
Watson, 1999     X  X 
Williamson, 1996 X       
Wilson, 1995  X    X X 
 
Figure 2.16.  A Digest of Business-to-Business Relationship Behavioural Variables 
 
3.10 Trust and Commitment   
Although trust and commitment are separate concepts, for the purposes of this 
thesis they are considered together because of their complex interrelationship.  This 
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is encapsulated in Morgan and Hunt’s (1994) seminal Commitment-Trust theory 
shown in Figure 2.17. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.17.  The Commitment-Trust Theory (Morgan & Hunt, 1994) 
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relationships (Currall & Inkpen, 2000, Dyer & Chu, 2000, Sheth & Sharma, 1997) 
and to SCM relationships in Section 2.10. 
3.11 Trust Analysed  
As already mentioned, trust is a keystone of business-to-business relationships and 
therefore for the purposes of this research it is important to be clear on its meaning 
within this context.  Trust is portrayed as a complex entity, which is not easy to 
measure (Gulati, 1995) in an extensive literature.  This review therefore samples the 
salient concepts with the intention of deriving a perspective appropriate to the 
research.   
 
There appears to be a consensus that trust integrates micro level psychological 
processes and group dynamics with macro level institutional arrangements or more 
simply that it encapsulates dispositions, decisions, behaviours, social networks and 
institutions (Rousseau et al, 1998).  Trust enables co-operative behaviour, promotes 
improved relationships, reduces harmful conflict and allows effective response in a 
crisis (Doney & Cannon, 1997, Gundlach & Murphy, 1993, Kumar, 1996, Mohr & 
Spekman, 1994).  It can be a psychological state that comprises the intention to 
accept vulnerability based upon positive expectations of behaviour of the other party 
and can thus be a substitute for more formal control methods (Kramer, 1999, 
Moorman et al, 1992).  Trust requires risk (a perceived probability of loss) (Cowles, 
1997, Currall & Inkpen, 2000, Moorman et al, 1992), uncertainty (over the intentions 
of the other party) (Doney & Cannon, 1997), interdependence (where the interests of 
one party cannot be achieved without reliance on the other) and choice (alternative 
options are available) as essential conditions (Kumar, 1996).  Both Economics and 
Games Theory (Axelrod, 1984) see trust as a stable phenomenon that either exists 
or doesn’t (Gulati, 1995).  Others see it as being ‘caused’ (eg. by previous good 
experience, institutional reputation, and commitment) and affecting factors such as 
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openness, reliability and honesty (Doney & Cannon, 1997, Goleman, 1998).  A more 
simplistic assessment is a combination of all these elements in a richer interaction 
between parties which sometimes requires a leap in faith to achieve but, the result is 
the creation of a reservoir of goodwill and the incentive to go the extra mile (Kumar, 
1996).  Thus, in an era of more flexible organisation forms, there is a shift from 
institutional (where trust is represented by the firm, brand or product) to relational 
trust (where trust is enshrined in what people do) (Gulati, 1995, Rousseau et al, 
1998) which ties in with the development of Relationship Marketing itself.   
 
Having considered some of trust’s more esoteric meanings it is also possible to find 
definitions that illustrate its crucial importance and effects in industrial and marketing 
contexts (Cowles, 1997).  It is present when a party has fundamental 
belief/confidence that the other partner will act reliably and with integrity in the best 
interests of the other (Cowles, 1997, Dwyer et al, 1987, Ganesan, 1994, Kramer, 
1999, Lewin & Johnston, 1997, McDonald et al, 1997, Morgan & Hunt, 1994, Wilson, 
1995).   
 
In conclusion, there is little doubt that repeated cycles of exchange, risk-taking and 
successful fulfilment of expectations strengthen the willingness of parties to rely 
upon each other and, as a result expand the relationship, in effect producing a 
virtuous circle that can be developed and promoted (Doney & Cannon, 1997, 
Goleman, 1998, Gulati, 1995, Gundlach & Murphy, 1993, Moorman et al, 1992).  The 
alternative, untrustworthiness, may precipitate a downward spiral of conflict leading 
to diminished operations or failure (Currall & Inkpen, 2000).  This is how trust is 
viewed as a concept by this thesis. 
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3.12 Commitment 
 Commitment is viewed as an outcome of trust because without it, the relationship 
lacks credibility and growth potential (Frow, 200, Gundlach & Murphy, 1993, 
Anderson et al, 1994, Naude & Buttle, 2000).  Commitment is defined variously in 
the literature as the belief by an exchange partner that the relationship with another 
is so important as to warrant maximum effort to maintain it indefinitely (Morgan & 
Hunt, 1994).  The desire to expend considerable additional effort in building the 
relationship is a recurring theme (Lewin & Johnston, 1997, Mohr & Spekman, 1994) 
as is an implicit or explicit pledge or enduring desire to maintain a valued relationship 
(Moorman et al, 1992, Wilson, 1995).  At the interactive level there can be an 
implication of stability, loyalty and sacrifice in both interorganisational and 
interpersonal dealings (Frow, 2001, Gundlach & Murphy, 1993).   
 
In summary, trust and commitment are strong, supportive factors that are 
communicated explicitly by action and without which a sound relational exchange will 
fail to deliver full benefits.  However, both require an enormously challenging 
learning curve to deliver effectively but, the benefits are better customer service, 
superior communication and increased joint profitability (Dyer & Chu, 2000, 
Ganesan, 1994, Hines & Jones, 1996, Watson, 1999).  This research will need to 
seek out data that exposes these features and to identify if they exist in the same 
way within sustained monopoly businesses.     
3.13 Co-operation, Co-ordination and Collaboration (C3) 
The co-operation, co-ordination and collaboration variables are closely related in the 
literature and for this reason they have been grouped in this thesis as an entity  
called C3 Behaviour.  The literature differentiates both behavioural and action 
aspects and these are reviewed in the next sub-Sections. 
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3.14 C3 Behaviour 
Co-operative, co-ordinating and collaborative (C3) behaviour is defined as working 
together/jointly to bring resources into a required relationship to achieve effective 
operations in harmony with the strategies/objectives of the parties involved, thus 
resulting in mutual benefit (Humphries & Wilding, 2004).  C3 Behaviour is seen as 
being essential to maintain a successful business partnership (Axelrod, 1984, 
Metcalf et al, 1992) especially when it is linked with commitment to the achievement 
of shared, realistic goals (Lewin & Johnston, 1997, Sheth & Sharma, 1997, Stern & 
Reve, 1980,  Wilson, 1995).  Morgan & Hunt (1994) and Oliver (1990) also describe 
the importance of pursuing mutually beneficial interests but additionally emphasise 
the fundamentally co-operative nature of business life characterised by balance and 
harmony.  These views are significant because they provide a concept of the 
boundary markers within which productive relationships can take place (Mohr & 
Spekman, 1994) and can often lead to the discovery of even more successful ways 
to co-operate and new objects of co-operation (Doz & Baburoglu, 2000).  
3.15 C3 Behaviour in Action 
In this context these variables are defined as similar or complementary, co-ordinated 
actions needed to achieve mutual outcomes with reciprocation over time (McDonald 
et al, 1997, Metcalf et al, Moorman et al, 1992, Oliver, 1990, Sheth & Sharma, 1997).  
At a higher level, co-operation, co-ordination and collaboration rather than pure 
exchange are used to create real value; an organisational competence know as 
‘collaborative advantage’ which requires developed mechanisms, structures, skills 
and processes (Anderson et al, 1994, Moss Kanter, 1994).  And then there is the 
more product-oriented approach that mentions collaboration or coalescing between 
buyers and sellers to produce quality products and contain costs over an indefinite 
stream of transactions (Rugman & D’Cruz, 2000).  The importance of capitalising on 
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supplier’s expertise by early involvement in early design phase is also mentioned 
(Metcalf et al, 1992, Stern & Reve, 1980). 
3.16 C3 Behaviour Conclusions 
C3 Behaviour is an essential factor in contributing to the practical success of 
business-to-business relationships.  It signifies joint endeavours to achieve common 
objectives and hence relationship success.  The research design will need to seek 
data from the organisation context under scrutiny to find evidence of this behavioural 
variable to determine its part in answering the Research Question. 
3.17 Long-term Orientation 
 A long-term orientation is an essential prerequisite for moving away from adversarial 
relationship because it suggests continuity, stability, predictability and working 
together consistently to achieve sustained competitive advantage and an opportunity 
to build trust and commitment (Oliver, 1990, Rugman & D’Cruz, 2000).  This attitude 
is also instrumental in increased morale, co-operation and improved dispute 
settlement procedures (Ganesan, 1994, Lewin & Johnston, 1997).  It is therefore 
concluded that this factor should feature in the research design and implementation.     
3.18 Interdependence, Power and Conflict 
As already mentioned when discussing trust, a business relationship will not survive 
unless both sides are dependent upon each other to achieve their objectives and any 
loss in individual autonomy is compensated through the expected gains (Mohr & 
Spekman, 1994).  A key outcome of interdependence is reduced temptation to act 
opportunistically and thus a tendency to prolong the relationship (Lewin & Johnston, 
1997).  Interdependence is built and reinforced by both parties investing in the 
relationship.  Such investments are likely to be non-retrievable such as funds, 
equipment, IS, tacit knowledge, skills and management time (Ganesan, 1994, Gulati, 
1995, Sheth & Sharma, 1997, Wilson, 1995).  However, Doz & Baburoglu (2000) 
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suggest that unless there is clear, mutual interdependence, the benefits that might 
result from co-operation may be ignored by managers steeped in a tradition of open 
competition.   
 
‘Power-play’ is also an important factor that determines whether an interdependent 
relationship will survive.  Power is itself a complex variable with both beneficial and 
destructive properties, even when not exercised overtly.  Unbalance, or asymmetry, 
can make one partner susceptible to the power and influence of the other (Ganesan, 
1994, Gundlach, 1993, Gummesson, 1999, Hatch, 1997, Tuten & Urban, 2001).  In 
the worst case where monopoly conditions apply the result may be mutual 
imprisonment where neither side has an exit option and complaints are ignored 
(Gummesson, 1999).  However, this need not be destabilising as long as the 
perception of equity (a relationship between equals (Watson, 1999)) remains in 
terms of sharing the outcomes and participation in the venture (Gaski, 1984, Kumar, 
1996, Lewin & Johnston, 1997, Moss Kanter, 1994, Stern & Reve, 1980).  An 
illustration of this point is shown in Figure 2.18 where equitable use of power can 
build trust.    
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Figure 2.18.  Moving from the Power Game to the Trust Game (Kumar, 1996) 
 
Destructive conflict (opponent-centred behaviour ( Stern & Reve, 1980)) should not 
be confused with functional conflict (creative abrasion (Eisenhardt et al, 1997)).  The 
latter’s freedom to disagree (Moorman et al, 1992) takes place in an atmosphere of 
trust and not only enables the productive resolution of disagreements but also 
produces innovation from teamwork (Hatch, 1997).  Thus conflict and co-operation 
are seen as complementary processes and as significant behavioural variables, 
should be incorporated in the research design to determine if they are also important 
to UK Defence Procurement monopolies. 
3.19 Adaption and Communication 
The need for investments such as money and skills to support dependence has 
already been mentioned however, a different type of investment is that which adapts 
to the needs of the relationship.  Examples are products, procedures, inventory 
management, attitudes, values and goals and these mark a commitment to maintain 
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the relationship (Humphries & Wilding, 2004).  The extent to which these adaptions 
are made will depend on the type and complexity of the product/service, the depth of 
information exchanged and the extent of organisational social and operational 
contacts and degree of co-operation required (Metcalf et al, 1992).  The interaction 
of these factors is shown in the IMP Model at Figure 2.19. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.19.  The IMP Interaction Model (Metcalf et al, 1992) 
 
Successful adaption is dependent upon multi-level, intensive communications 
(Morgan & Hunt, 1994, Moss Kanter, 1994, Tuten & Urban, 2001).  They flow 
through honest, open channels from joint planning and goal setting where mutual 
expectations are established and measured and allow the breadth and depth of the 
complex interaction to be managed (Gaski, 1984, Mohr & Spekman, 1994, Oliver, 
1990, Wilson, 1995).  At the operational level, clear guidelines on the sharing of 
proprietary information and technology influence product development, costs, sales 
and revenues and increase commitment (Gulati, 1995, Kumar, 1996, Lewin & 
Johnston, 1997, Moorman et al, 1992, Wilson, 1995). 
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Both adaption and communication are considered to be key behavioural variables 
that would provide important indicators to relationship success in this research. 
3.20 Building Relationship Management 
In the last few sub-Sections a number of key relationship variables have been 
reviewed.  The importance of trust and commitment, co-operation, co-ordination and 
collaboration, long-term orientation, interdependence, power and conflict and finally 
adaptation and communication are clear.  Moreover, they provide a suite of business 
relationship features which, although based in competitive market conditions, offer a 
means of gauging the success of the monopolistic businesses that the Research 
Question seeks to explain.  The table in Figure 2.20 summarises a number of 
management measures that can be taken to improve and sustain a business 
partnership and encapsulates a combination of the behavioural variables reviewed.  
It thus gives an possible view of the ideal conditions that could be found and offers 
some research design possibilities.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.20.  The Three Generations of Partnering (Watson, 1999) 
 
• First Generation Partnering: 
• Agreeing mutual objectives. 
• Making decisions and resolving problems openly as agree at the start of the project. 
• Aiming at targets that provide continuous measurable improvements. 
• Second Generation Partnering: 
• Develop strategy jointly. 
• Embrace participating firms fully. 
• Ensure equity by allowing all to be rewarded on the basis of fair prices and profits. 
• Integrate firms through co-operation and trust. 
• Benchmark performance accurately. 
• Establish best practice processes and procedures. 
• React to feedback positively and quickly. 
• Third Generation Partnering: 
• Understand the client’s business and its success factors. 
• Take joint responsibility for key outputs. 
• Turn the main processes into a seamless chain of value-adding activities. 
• Mobilise full partnership development expertise. 
• Create expert teams and Key Account Managers. 
• Innovate jointly. 
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However, important culture changes are also required and these may not be so 
clear-cut or easy to implement.  Firstly there is a need to develop a management 
philosophy or corporate culture where companies can operate in a climate of trust 
and openness (Evans & Berman, 2001, Mohr & Spekman, 1994).  Perhaps this can 
be accomplished by changing the reward systems which reinforce the behaviours 
that generate trust, mutual goals and adaption (Wilson, 1995) but, the difficulty of 
changing the mindsets of staff should not be underestimated (Sheth & Sharma, 
1997, Watson, 1999).  Finally, although a number of writers note the importance of 
rich interpersonal relationships (Gulati, 1995, Moorman, 1992, Moss Kanter, 1994, 
Palmer 2001) to the growth of trust, others express a more pragmatic view of 
business partnerships where close personal relationships are not essential and 
where enlightened self-interest operates such that both press hard for advantage but 
stay within their trust compact (Faulkner, 2000, Goleman 1998, Kumar, 1996, 
Wilson, 1995).  
 
In summary, business relationships depend on a clear understanding of each party’s 
needs and the maintenance of an agreed framework within which to prosecute 
shared objectives. This conclusion is summarised in Figure 2.21.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.21.  An Interactive Model of Buyer-Seller Relationships (Lewin & Johnston, 
1997) 
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3.21 Relationship Marketing Conclusions 
This review of the RM literature has concentrated on the specific factors that explain 
the essence of practical business-to-business relationships.  It first identifies the 
competitive pressures for closer business relationships (3.2) and then shows that 
RM theory has evolved from transactional roots to a relational form (3.3 & 3.4).  This 
development, from Managerial Marketing (3.5), Networks, Interactions and Marriage 
(3.6) to the New Marketing and Key Account Management of today, (3.7) is reviewed 
and indicates a field that has kept in step with business and organisation 
developments (3.8).  The next series of Sub-Sections introduced key relationship 
behavioural variables (3.9) and examined the contribution of trust and commitment 
(3.10 – 3.12), co-operation, co-ordination and collaboration (3.13 – 3.16), long-term 
orientation (3.17), interdependence, power and conflict (3.18) and, adaptation and 
communication (3.19) to successful business-to-business relationships.  Finally, and 
in order to draw the components together, sub-Section 3.20 provides some advice to 
managers on cultural issues and implementation.  Overall, the literature has 
benefited by drawing selectively from other theoretical fields in order to offer richer 
insights into some of the more complex areas of human interaction in business. 
3.22 Implications for the Research 
The RM literature covers a very wide field that encompasses the Supply Chain, 
Procurement, Economics, Games Theory, Organisation, Sociology and Behavioural 
Psychology as well as Marketing (Gundlach & Murphy, 1993, Sheth & Sharma, 
1997).  As a result it lacks consistency and also in some areas, depth (Kakabadse & 
Kakabadse, 2000).  Furthermore, some key concepts and assertions have become 
axiomatic and therefore not subjected to sufficient theoretical or practical scrutiny 
(Palmer, 2001).  Research has also tended to concentrate on vendor/retailer rather 
than vendor/end customer relationships (Ganesan, 1994) and this has resulted in 
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limited modelling of complete relationship chains (McDonald et al, 1997, Rousseau 
et al, 1998).  Nevertheless, an understanding of the complexity of business 
relationships, the behaviours that are important to success and important guidance 
to managers on improving business relationships (Evans & Berman, 2001) has been 
presented.  
 
The RQ aims: 
• To determine, using an appropriate theoretical framework, the behavioural 
and business factors that influence relationships between the UK MoD and 
its main industrial suppliers in a monopoly market.  
The development of RM thinking has to some extent mirrored that of the UK MoD 
and its industrial suppliers such that both see strategic interaction at a relational 
rather than a transactional level (CM 446, 1999).  The literature describes a complex 
suite of relationship variables that provide some insights to the improvement of 
relationships within UK Defence Procurement and offer factors that can be employed 
in the research design and its implementation.  However, the literature mostly 
describes relationships in the commercial environment within ‘normal’ markets and 
only rarely considers the impact of negative factors such as lack of relationship 
choice or exit as found within the essentially monopolistic situation in UK Defence 
Procurement.  This is a clear gap in the knowledge.  The following question is 
therefore raised: 
• Q2 – Can RM behavioural variables, especially those shown in Figure 2.16, 
provide an understanding of the monopolistic relationships found within 
UK Defence Procurement? 
 
Both the SCM and RM literatures provide analysis of ‘normal’ market business 
relationships and their improvement which are useful to support the design and 
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implementation of this research project but neither field offers an explanation of the 
economic drivers for closer business relationships nor the monopoly phenomenon 
itself.  For these reasons the thesis next reviews the Economics literature.  
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4 Business Relationships from an Economics Perspective 
4.1 Introduction 
Having identified business relationship practices, procedures and behaviours from 
the SCM & RM literatures that will support the design and implementation of a 
research project, it is necessary to seek further key components from the Economics 
literature in order to fully address the RQ.  This Section now examines the 
development of economic theories to rationalize the types of relationship that occur 
between purchasers and vendors within business transactions (the contract 
environment) and moreover, seeks a theory to explain the relational dynamics within 
the monopoly phenomenon.  The structure of the Section is shown in Figure 2.22.  
First the origins of relational economics are traced and the theme is followed through 
contract theory into Oliver Williamson’s influential transaction cost economics (TCE) 
ideas (Hill, 1990).  In TCE the main tenets of the theory are reviewed and in 
particular the interaction of human behavioural inputs that can lead to market failure 
and monopoly is identified.  The Section then examines the importance of selecting 
contracting methods that are appropriate to the transaction and relationship type and 
this then leads to a review of how TCE deals with trust in business-to-business 
relationships.  The development of classical TCE beyond Williamson towards a 
relational form is then summarised and the impact of TCE on relationships within UK 
Defence Procurement is examined.  Finally, a gap in the knowledge is identified, a 
supporting research question is posed and, the implications for designing and 
implementing the research are outlined. 
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Figure 2.22.  Structure of Section 4 
 
4.2 ‘Make or Buy’ 
In the nineteen thirties economists were exhorted to make the assumptions 
surrounding their theories clear and above all, correspond to the ‘real world’ (Coase, 
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factor in the operation of the market.  However, Coase (1937) observed that because 
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some cases it was thus cheaper to do the work in-house (he coined the term vertical 
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market – the make or buy decision.  Furthermore, instead of managers being pawns 
in an economic game, it was entrepreneurs who decided how resources should be 
allocated (Nooteboom, 1999).  
4.3 Contracts – The Bases of Economic Exchanges     
Given that managers have a leading part to play in the decisions surrounding 
economic exchanges, it is important to mention the management framework used; 
contract law.  A legalistic definition of a contract is: ‘a promise or set of promises for 
the breech of which the law gives a remedy or the performance of which the law in 
some way recognises a duty’ (Macneil, 1980).  A less arcane view is a relationship 
between parties that enables them to plan, negotiate and consummate their 
business (Gundlach & Murphy, 1993).  However, because contract doctrine 
encompasses such a wide range of complex, socio-legal components such as 
bankruptcy law and fraud, remedies to enforce promise-keeping are the weakest in 
the legal system and extremely costly to pursue (Macaulay, 1963).  In consequence 
as business deals become more extended (through transactional to relational) it is 
important to have a range of contracting options available that can cope with both 
the length and depth of business transactions.  Macneil (1980) accordingly offered 3 
classifications of contracts: 
• Classical: where all relevant future contingencies are described and discounted 
– for example the spot market where a simple, one-off purchase is made. 
• Neoclassical: contracts are long-term agreements executed under conditions of 
uncertainty where 3rd party assistance is often used to resolve disputes and to 
evaluate performance – an outsourcing operation is a good example of this. 
• Relational: based upon the improbability of determining the partners’ relative 
legal positions because contracts are essentially incomplete due to a lack of 
information and the difficulty of anticipating contingencies at the outset. 
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Thus despite its early positivist doctrines, changes in the way business was done 
persuaded economic and legal thinkers that business relationships depended on 
more subtle factors than market forces and the ‘small print’ of contracts.  This 
underpins the findings from the SCM & RM literature where market pressures were 
show to be the drivers for a move from transactional to relational business dealings 
with an economic, theoretical basis.       
4.4 TCE - New Institutional Economics 
Having accepted that business relationships needed to include a measure of 
flexibility to deal with more complex contracts, New Institutional Economists devised 
theories to account for the ‘human element’  (Nooteboom, 1999).  These were 
encapsulated within a sub-field of Economics called TCE.  Williamson’s (1975, 1979, 
1996) main thesis centred on micro economic issues dealing with transactions and 
costs where a bottom-up analysis was essential to provide detailed explanations of 
what was happening in firms and markets.  Following on from Coase, he defined the 
control circumstances under which transactions took place as Governance with 
institutions such as firms (make) and markets (buy) as alternative modes.  The main 
purpose and effect of an economic organisation was to economise on the cost of 
transactions including negotiating and enforcing contracts and internal control and 
management overheads (Faulkner & De Rond, 2000, Palmer, 2001).  The make or 
buy decision was thus clear because the use of complex structures to govern simple 
transactions was unnecessarily expensive whilst using a simple structure to govern 
complex transactions caused strain.  In his quest for realism, Williamson 
incorporated a series of human variables into his theory and constructed a model to 
explore their interactions.  Thus TCE focussed on adopting appropriate forms of 
governance to minimise the risks associated with opportunistic behaviour (Faulkner 
& De Rond, 2000, Madhok, 2000, Nooteboom, 1999).  TCE features will be useful to 
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this research by providing a number of theoretical business relationship mechanisms 
that will be covered later in this Section.  However, first the next Section describes 
Williamson’s (1975) economic Organisations Failure Framework, which explains the 
foundations of TCE and potentially offers a theoretical framework for this research. 
4.5 The Organisations Failure Framework 
The Organisations Failure Framework shown in Figure 2.23 shows how TCE saw the 
limitations of personal performance tending to reduce the effectiveness of economic 
exchange.  Although not overtly a causal model, it provides a powerful view of the 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.23.  The Organisations Failure Framework (Williamson, 1975) 
 
influences that exist within a ‘failing market’ where the increased costs of 
participation tend to accelerate its decline and force market concentration logically to 
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• Bounded Rationality:  Herbert Simon’s (1957) concept suggested that people 
have only so much capacity to rationalise what is going on around them and 
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are assumed to make rational decisions based on a finite information act and a 
Bounded 
Rationality 
Uncertainty/ 
Complexity 
Opportunism 
Small 
Numbers 
Information 
Impactedness
Atmosphere – human & environmental factors 
Chapter 2  89 
  
given ability to assimilate and order the information they have available to them) 
(Williamson, 1975).  This compounds and is compounded by 
• Uncertainty/complexity: which describes the difficulty people have in making 
sense of complex current and future events. 
• Information Impactedness: results from both Uncertainty/Complexity and 
Opportunism which refer to the imbalance caused by selective information 
disclosures, and distortions (such as inflating cost figures in order to justify 
higher prices) which are difficult or expensive to verify at the time and which 
undermine the durability of contract arrangements (Liston-Heyes, 1995). 
• Opportunism: is a lack of candour or honesty and includes self-interest seeking 
with guile.  This factor can be especially debilitating if the exchange involves 
transaction-specific human and physical capital investments (asset specificity).  
Examples are management time, skilled labour and IS links.   The higher the 
asset specificity (committed investment) the greater the risk of opportunism and 
that financial returns will be dissipated by organisation safeguards (Hill, 1990).  
Moreover, highly specific investments can give one party excessive power over 
the other or, because of the fear of loss, can lock a partner into the deal when he 
would rather leave i.e. trust and/or altruism are assumed not to coexist in 
transactions (Williamson, 1979).   Opportunism also contributes to Information 
Impactedness where the use of information is deliberately obfuscated. 
• Small Numbers /Monopoly market: the reduction of business choices resulting 
from poor information leads to the need for sophisticated controls that are only 
found in or close to the firm and thus may result in a failure of market conditions 
(Williamson, 1979).  Furthermore, this reduction in market power will interact 
negatively with business people’s altruistic principles and thus help to perpetuate 
an unsatisfactory market.  In these circumstances partnership might be seen as 
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‘just another way of appeasing the customer with slightly less guile’ (Lamming, 
1993). 
 
In summary, Williamson accepted that economic theory must acknowledge human 
input in order to be realistic but primarily it was a weakness to be overcome.  His 
assertion that a failure of the market could lead to unsatisfactory small 
numbers/monopoly conditions is considered in more depth in the next sub-Section 
and is particularly pertinent to this study because of the monopolistic market that 
exists within UK Defence Procurement. 
4.6 Small Numbers Markets - Monopolies   
Key to this thesis and its aim of understanding the monopolistic businesses within 
UK Defence Procurement is a definition of the monopoly condition and its effects.   
Small Numbers (Williamson, 1975) is otherwise known as oligopoly/oligopsony 
where there are few sellers/buyers.  Monopoly/monopsony is where there is only one 
buyer/seller, a bilateral monopoly.  Because both sets of conditions have similar 
outcomes where restriction in the market have adverse effects of varying degrees to 
both customers and suppliers (Fishwick, 1993), in this review Small Numbers and 
Monopoly are taken to be synonymous.   
 
Although Williamson (1996) believed that TCE explained the ‘small numbers’ 
phenomenon, he considered that nothing good could come from a technical 
monopoly which is ‘no more than a manifestation of 3 evils’: private unregulated 
monopoly (eg. arguably the Microsoft Corporation), private regulated monopoly (eg. 
the Post Office) and, government operation (eg. Defence).  Moreover, without the 
pressure of the market, monopolies tend to be prone to inefficiency, decay and 
flabbiness because costs are poorly controlled and service quality is low (Hirschman, 
1970).  Although parties have options of ‘voice’ and ‘exit’ in the face of a monopoly, 
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the costs of exit (leaving the market) may be high and as a result ‘lock’ the 
participants into an increasingly dissatisfying arrangement (Hirschman, 1970).  
Moreover, due to the possibility of ruling out further business opportunities, there 
may be a reluctance to (‘voice’) protest or appeal to outside authorities  (Hirschman, 
1970).  There has nevertheless, been considerable TCE research into ‘inevitable 
natural monopolies’ found in public utilities (Crocker & Masten, 1996, Rindfleisch & 
Heide, 1997, Williamson, 1996) but this has generally concentrated on the difficulties 
of making appropriate governance choices to maintain private and public interests 
rather than the achievement of improved performance (Crocker & Masten, 1996).  
Williamson’s dislike of the unnaturalness of the small numbers/monopoly condition 
and the dangers of allowing human foibles to intervene in the market to allow it to 
occur is unmistakeable however, in the UK monopoly is not illegal and action is only 
taken if it is against the public interest (Fishwick, 1993).  Moreover, US Government 
antitrust laws have always intimated that collusion (an agreement between two or 
more parties for a deceitful or fraudulent purpose (Palmer, 2001)) was illegal but, 
recent guide-lines have acknowledged that competitors in modern markets may also 
need to collaborate eg. for research and joint ventures.  The same is true of Articles 
85 and 86 of the Treaty of Rome where the definition of ‘workable competition’ is 
itself open to interpretation.  Therefore, the boundary between legal and illegal 
activities is still open to substantial opportunities for misunderstanding and 
misinterpretation (Palmer, 2001, Strutton et al, 2001).  Such findings introduce a 
measure of ambiguity to the overall assessment of the monopoly market condition, 
none more so than the definition and interpretation of ‘the public interest’ (Fishwick, 
1993, Palmer, 2001). 
 
This sub-Section has summarised the pertinent literature on the monopoly condition 
and has concluded that it is generally viewed as a short-term failure of normal 
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competition that will be overcome by the legal process or by regulatory governance.  
However, governments may be ambivalent about the application of the law due to 
interpretation of what is in or not in the public interest.  Many UK Defence 
Procurement contracts, which operate as government-supported stable monopolies 
thus, appear to occupy this ambivalent position.  
4.7 Governance and Commercial Transactions 
Having so far introduced TCE and monopoly, the next 2 sub-Section summarise 
TCE’s perspective on relational business dealings in order to determine the 
theoretical approach of economics to the RQ.  Williamson’s (1979) views on the 
purpose of governance changed over time.  Initially the approach was pragmatically 
to protect the interests of the respective parties and adapt the relationship to 
changing circumstances.  His development of more detailed contracting categories 
are compared with those of Macneil (1980), a Neoclassical Economist, which were 
reviewed in 4.3 as follows and summarised in a table at Figure 2.24. 
• Market Governance: equivalent to Classical contracting and involving non-
specific transactions of both occasional and recurring nature eg. purchasing 
standard software packages. 
• Bilateral Governance: equivalent to Neoclassical contracting and involving both 
non-specific and highly idiosyncratic, occasional transactions.  Highly 
idiosyncratic exchanges involve specialised physical and human capital (asset 
specificity) where the benefits can only be realised as long as the relationship is 
maintained (Palmer, 2001).  Third party arbitration is used to assist with dispute 
settlement.  An example is a running contract to repair combat aircraft hydraulic 
components. 
• Transaction-specific Governance: equivalent to Relational Contracting and 
sometimes known as hybrid governance, involving recurring transactions of the 
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mixed and idiosyncratic kinds.  Adaption of contracts can only be accomplished 
by mutual agreement eg. a development contract for aircraft stealth technology.  
(The next logical step, as transactions become progressively more idiosyncratic, 
is Unified Governance which means vertical integration or internal organisation) 
or potentially monopolistic conditions.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.24.  Comparing Williamson’s and MacNeil’s Governance Structures 
(Adapted from Williamson, 1979) 
 
Given that relational contracting and bilateral governance should be used for 
recurrent transactions involving long term investment in building relationships typical 
of co-operative activity, Williamson believed that these specific assets would 
generate mutual dependence and serve as ‘hostages’ against opportunism.  
However, although hybrids offered advantages of avoidance of market uncertainty 
and failure and, the cost of establishing hierarchies, problems of control made them 
unstable (Faulkner & De Rond, 2000).  This is illustrated in the following 2 cases. 
 
Arnt Buvik and Torger Reve’s (2001) empirical research demonstrated that where 
the deployment of specific assets such as the customisation of products and tailoring 
of production by the supplier together with joint product design, inter-firm 
dependence may increase to such an extent that a bilateral monopoly may be 
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created and with this will cause greater exposure to opportunism.  The research 
found that in these circumstances the safeguarding of assets at risk was 
accomplished by increased use of tighter contracts, a less relational outcome.  
Secondly within public utility ‘natural monopolies’, Crocker & Masten’s (1996) 
empirical research suggested that long term contracts based on competitive 
franchise bidding became unstable because of the lack of governance provisions to 
manage uncertainty.  Conversely, where regulation had been imposed to provide this 
missing flexibility, the very factor tended to undermine the commitment needed to 
instil incentives into the relationships.  It must therefore be concluded that the 
selection of the most appropriate methods of governance is extremely situation and 
time-specific. 
 
In his book The Mechanisms of Governance (1996), Williamson’s attitude to the 
human aspects of contract relationships seemed to harden when he redefined the 
focus of governance as ‘identifying, explaining and mitigating contract hazards’.  Due 
to the temptations to fall prey to bounded rationality and opportunism, all complex & 
long-term contracts were unavoidably incomplete and must be able to adapt to 
changing circumstance but, Williamson made no mention of Relational Contracting 
and moreover, mutual dispute settlement was not seen as viable outside of the firm.  
The latter point is counter to both Macaulay (1963) and Macneil (1980) who believed 
that relational contract disputes were ill served by the law and that the parties must 
be prepared to find mutually satisfactory solutions through other more co-operative 
means.   
 
To summarise, although TCE identifies a range of contracting options that can be 
matched to the depth and frequency of business transactions and these have been 
supported by empirical research, due to the uncertainties associated with ensuring 
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performance over distant time horizons, the literature provides few clear solutions.  
This perspective suggests that in viewing UK Defence Procurement monopolies, 
they may be expected to manifest a predominance of unpredictably unsatisfactory 
business characteristics.    
4.8    Trust and TCE 
This sub-Section explores the concept of trust within TCE to determine whether it 
offers a contribution to the design and implementation of research that will examine 
long-term monopolies.  ‘Trust may arise from prior dealings with a party, from the 
mores of the general society or particular business community’ (Macneil, 1980).  
Williamson’s earlier work (1975) advances this idea by saying that additional savings 
could accrue at the interface between the partners as the contracts evolved through 
communication and experience so that both institutional and personal trust 
relationships developed.  Here was the understanding that trusting relationships 
involved the parties in agreeing to adapt to unanticipated contingencies in a mutually 
profitable manner and that trust therefore, reduced the risk of opportunistic behaviour 
(and also transaction costs) in a long-term exchange relationship (Williamson, 1979).  
This logical deduction helped to explain the working of more relational forms of 
contracting but he then played down the potential gains by saying that in practice the 
temptations of opportunism made the attainment of trusting relationships a ‘utopian 
dream’. 
 
Although Williamson originally acknowledged the concept of trust, more recently 
(1996) he clearly expressed his doubt about the economic reality of trust as ‘the 
illusive notion’ used by social scientists as a user-friendly term.  Half in jest he added 
that ‘the only reliable human motive is avarice’ in which case, what economically 
motivates what social scientists have called trust?  He went on more significantly to 
explain that a farsighted, calculative approach to commercial contracting was 
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required that relied on cost-effective contractual safeguards rather than trust.  
Furthermore, efficiency and credibility, including reputation (Hill, 1990), were based 
upon calculativeness where failures to perform/reciprocate were not forgotten or 
forgiven and would result in sanctions if they persisted.  Williamson did acknowledge 
that personal trust could exist at a personal level within the family but the business 
world was organised in favour of ‘cynics, not innocents’.  This perhaps, indicated 
some notions of confusion over the very meaning of trust itself.  In conclusion, 
Williamson clearly discounted the efficacy of trust as a behavioural driver in 
economic exchanges, proposing instead that ‘credible commitments’ were key and 
these were driven by economics, not altruism.  Thus when viewed through a TCE 
‘lens’, UK Defence Procurement monopolistic business relationships are likely to 
exhibit few examples of genuine trust. 
4.9 TCE Critique 
Although TCE introduced greater realism to classical economics, offered a range of 
contracting methods and stressed the efficiency and cost minimisation rationale for 
business relationships, it was not a dynamic theory (Besanko et al, 2000).  It ignored 
the resource-based approach to strategy (concentrating on transactions rather than 
the ability of an organisation to dynamically configure itself to meet new market 
opportunities), did not consider innovation or issues such as risk, synergy, 
effectiveness and, the relational aspects of co-operation such as trust which evolve 
over time and change the nature of the transactions themselves (Faulkner & De 
Rond, 2000, Nooteboom, 1999).  Instead it advocated individuals’ focus on self-
interest and opportunism which demanded tighter contracts and institutional controls 
rather than more altruistic human behaviours such as trust and commitment  
(Nooteboom, 1999).  Moreover, the business world realised that a predominant 
orientation of safeguarding against opportunistic behaviour endangered the level and 
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quality of the relationship between partners and adversely affected the level of value 
attained through collaboration (Madhok, 2000).   
 
Although there has been considerable empirical research in the TCE field which has 
been used to investigate a broad range of exchange-related issues including 
horizontal interorganisational relationships, it has not been well-integrated and no 
study has examined Williamson’s (1975) Organisations Failure Framework in its 
entirety (Rindfleisch & Heide, 1997).  Thus, although it is possible to explain small 
numbers/monopoly markets (Fishwick, 1993) using the Framework and TCE 
concepts such as asset specificity and opportunism and, governance options such 
as long-term contracts (Franchise Bidding) and regulation (Crocker & Masten, 1996, 
Palmer, 2001, Williamson, 1996), there is little consensus on achieving successful 
performance in sustained monopoly conditions of the type found in UK Defence 
Procurement (Parker & Hartley, 1997).   Nevertheless although TCE offers a 
primarily mechanistic perspective, it is supported by a wealth of reasonably 
consistent empirical research (Crocker & Masten, 1996) and therefore provides a 
useful, theoretical explanation for business transactions, which can be used in this 
research as a means of focussing other theoretical approaches.  
4.10 TCE Theory Development 
TCE theory has not stood still despite remaining within the shadow of its inspirational 
architect (Pessali & Fernandez, 1999).  The drivers for change have come from rapid 
developments in technology and the competitive environment which have forced 
firms to use more flexible organisation and external relationship structures in order to 
access skills, knowledge, markets and technology (Van de Ven et al, 1984).  TCE’s 
‘monochrome’ view of the economic organisation as an efficiency-driven, market or 
hierarchy containing calculative, self-interested employees who must be watched 
and controlled (Ghoshal & Moran, 1996, Kramer, 1999, Ring & Van de Ven, 1992) 
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does not seem to fit.  As a result, theory development has transitioned towards a 
relational form and this is summarised in Figure 2.25.   
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.25.  TCE Theory Development from Transactional to Relational 
 
Although Williamson ‘broke the mould’ as an economist by introducing human 
factors into his theories, he sought to treat them as uncertain components that 
needed to be controlled (Granovetter, 1985, Pescali & Fernandez, 1999).  A key 
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likely to associate with the goals of the firm if they were inspired by ‘higher moral 
values’ (Argyres, 1999, Beamish & Banks, 1987, Ouchi, 1980) and if there was trust, 
that co-operation would be reciprocated (Kramer, 1999).  It was concluded that 
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opportunism may not be necessary because there will be a greater proneness to 
forbearance, greater and more willing sharing of information which lowers 
asymmetries and opportunities to combine resources more productively outside the 
scope of the contract (Madhok, 2000).  Finally, the growth of trust and goodwill do 
their part in attenuating opportunism by helping to stabilise relationships by 
increasing tolerance, avoiding conflicts, raising communication levels and replacing 
decision-making with consensus-building (Faulkner & De Rond, 2000). 
 
This sub-Section has reviewed literature that attempts to mitigate the harsh, 
economic approach of New Institutional Economists to relational exchanges with 
views that take account of a modern business environment characterised by 
alliances and partnerships.  This is illustrated in Figure 2.25.  However, these ideas 
are often difficult to relate back to the TCE theory where the cost of doing business 
largely determines whether or not this was done in the open market, within closer 
relationships or in-house (Pessali & Fernandez, 1999).  This thesis thus 
acknowledges the contribution of post-Williamson academics but for the purposes of 
the research, concentrates on SCM and RM for its relational business-to-business 
concepts.        
4.11 TCE - UK Defence Procurement Application 
Before drawing this Section to a close, and to illustrate the points introduced at the 
end of 4.6, the next part considers UK Defence Procurement from a TCE perspective 
in order to show the difficulties of explaining a sustained monopolistic business 
situation using established economic theory.  Contract and economic writers 
conclude that there is a spectrum of economic relationships that range between in-
house production and the spot market (Hartley & Parker, 1997, Macneil, 1980, 
Williamson, 1975).  However, as shown in Figure 2.26,  
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Figure 2.26.  The Procurement Continuum (Parker & Hartley, 1997) 
 
where either party has disproportionate power (monopoly or monopsony), equivalent 
to Williamson’s Organisations Failure condition (Williamson, 1975), then the welfare 
benefits will be unbalanced.  This will induce a strong incentive to break out of an 
unsatisfactory condition and move towards the open market end of the spectrum as 
happened with the break-up of the US Bell Telephone Company a few years ago 
(Crocker & Masten, 1996, Grant, 1995, Palmer, 2001).   
 
Parker and Hartley (1997) suggest that the UK MoD should accept that its major 
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attempting to maintain a competitive semblance, that adversarial competition should 
be abandoned and collaboration based on long-term, trusting relationships should be 
established.  But, apart from suggesting that the UK MoD’s past performance in 
managing complex projects has not been good, they merely say that any search for 
solutions will not be straightforward and Crocker & Masten (1996) support this view.  
UK Government policy is moving away from regulation (cost-plus and price-cap 
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term contracts is also proving to be problematic.  Perhaps the lack of clarity identified 
by Strutton et al (2001) on government policy towards competition and collusion is 
also a factor that militates against decisive action.  Potentially, performance may also 
depend on relational variables such as trust and commitment as well as governance.   
 
This sub-Section has shown that UK Defence Procurement monopolies can be 
described by TCE theory but the results are complex and unpredictable.  This 
research starts from this descriptive baseline and attempts to show and explain what 
actually happens in practice.  
4.12 TCE Conclusions   
This Section has reviewed the Contracting and TCE literature in order to identify the 
part played by human relations within economic exchanges.  In 4.2 and 4.3 it 
identifies that early writers such as Coase and Macneil saw a need for a relational 
approach to long-term exchanges between businesses.  In 4.5 and 4.6 Williamson’s 
Organisations Failure Framework shows how human factors play a part in TCE and 
if uncontrolled, can lead to a breakdown of the market and the formation of a Small 
Numbers/Monopoly situation.  This is particularly important because at face value it 
seems to correlate with the situation within UK Defence Procurement today where 
there is often little incentive to co-operate.  In 4.7 it was concluded that although TCE 
offers a range of contract forms that firms can use, they are not relational in nature 
and this point is reinforced in 4.8 where Williamson’s view of trust in business is 
shown to be entirely calculative.  In 4.9 a critique of TCE was offered and in 4.10 a 
review of literature covering the development of TCE in response to a more fast 
moving, competitive environment clearly indicates a change in direction towards a 
relational form.  Finally in 4.11, the difficulty that UK Defence Procurement faces in 
improving relationships within a monopoly market is highlighted. 
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4.13 Implications for the Research 
The RQ aims: 
To determine, using an appropriate theoretical framework, the behavioural and 
business factors that influence relationships between the UK MoD and its main 
industrial suppliers in a monopoly market. 
In trying to understand the exchange motivations within UK Defence Procurement 
using TCE theory it is possible to explain small numbers/monopoly markets 
(Fishwick, 1993) using the Organisations Failure Framework (Williamson, 1975) 
shown in Figure 2.23 and TCE concepts such as asset specificity and opportunism.  
But, the literature only explains these conditions so far as they represent short-term, 
unnatural phenomena (Palmer, 2001, Williamson, 1996) or in governance choices 
(Crocker & Masten, 1996, Williamson, 1996).  In the stable monopoly situation which 
prevails in UK Defence Procurement, it appears that contrary to the view that 
extremes of market conditions will inevitably result in pressures to escape 
(Williamson, 1975), the result is an impasse where neither side has the power or the 
motivation to improve the relationship (Parker & Hartley, 1997).   Moreover, 
governance options and performance/relational issues in this situation are not made 
clear.  There is thus a clear gap in the theoretical knowledge on the practical 
application of TCE in sustained, monopolistic economic exchanges involving high 
degrees of asset specificity, complexity and uncertainty as experienced in major UK 
Defence Procurements. 
 
The following supporting question is therefore posed: 
• Q3 – Can factors within Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) such as Asset 
Specificity and Opportunism help to explain the dynamics within 
monopolistic UK Defence Procurement relationships? 
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Williamson’s (1975) Organisations Failure Framework in Figure 2.23 provides a 
means of describing the human factors, which create and sustain a monopoly.  It is 
thus proposed that this theory could be tested to determine if it is valid within the 
sustained, UK Defence Procurement monopolies.  The following supporting question 
is therefore posed: 
• Q4 – Can the TCE Organisations Failure Framework be used as a 
theoretical lens with which to view monopolistic relationships within UK 
Defence Procurement? 
Having reviewed the SCM, RM and TCE literatures and raised a number of 
questions, the next part of this thesis draws these threads together into a succinct 
statement of objectives for the research project based upon the need to test a 
theoretical model.  
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5 Critique of the Literature and Identification of Research Gaps 
5.1 Introduction 
This Section provides a critique of the three literature areas reviewed in Sections 2, 3 
and 4.  It also identifies the ‘gaps’ in the literature with the supporting questions that 
will be addressed by the Research Question.  The Section finally proposes and 
justifies a theoretical framework for the research. 
5.2 Relationships within the Supply Chain 
The Supply Chain literature includes SCM, logistics, transportation, strategic 
alliances, industrial marketing, purchasing and organisational behaviour (Zheng et al, 
2000).  It covers a variety of transactional to relational business relationships both in 
the public and private sectors where issues of power dominance are described.  
However, although suppliers have recognised the need for increased integration with 
their customers, the literature contains limited empirical research on modelling and 
studying both end-to-end supply chain relationships and long-term dyadic 
interactions between major partners (Christopher, 1997, Cooper et al, 1997, Bectel & 
Jayaram, 1997).  Moreover, although it is acknowledged that there are advantages in 
reducing the number of suppliers within highly collaborative situations and, the 
literature describes a wealth of operational and behavioural success factors, the 
disadvantages of reduced flexibility and competition are only covered in restricted 
depth.  Lastly, it is widely accepted that co-operative supply chain relationships 
achieve benefits for the participants (Christopher, 1997, Stevens, 1989) however, it 
is also apparent that full SCM implementation is not being achieved because 
partners are still taking a short-term view which generates adversarial practices such 
as power abuse, lack of transparency, poor communications and reluctance to adopt 
attitudinal change (Anscombe & Kearney, 1994, Braithwaite, 1998, Hines & Jones, 
1996).  Research into these failure situations is comparatively rare.  In conclusion, 
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from a review of an extensive body of literature the concepts of SCM appear to be 
well known by academia and business but research is limited in some key areas on 
how practically to achieve it.  Furthermore, this research has covered the private and 
public sectors as well as small numbers situations and revealed many common 
factors as well as specialised nuances (2.8).  Nevertheless, the SC literature has not 
covered the prolonged, monopolistic supply chain relationships of the specialised 
type found within UK Defence Procurement.  This leads to the following question: 
• Q1 – Can SCM partnering activities, processes and requirements from the 
commercial environment, such as those encapsulated in Figure 2.8, 
provide an understanding of the monopolistic relationships found within 
UK Defence Procurement? 
The SCM literature provides a view of business improvement measures that is 
largely pragmatic and generally concentrates on optimisation of material flows 
between value chain partners (Hines, 1999).  Although it considers relational, 
behavioural variables that enable business-to-business relationship success, its 
stand-point is naturally from a SCM perspective.  In order to explore these features 
and to seek a greater depth of view on close business-to-business relationships the 
thesis turned to the Relationship Marketing field where ‘all marketing activities are 
directed towards establishing, developing and maintaining successful relational 
exchanges’ (Morgan & Hunt, 1994).  Moreover, this involves designing and 
negotiating strategic partnerships with vendors and technology partners through 
which the firm deploys its distinctive competences to serve market opportunities 
(Webster, 1992). 
5.3 Relationships within Relationship Marketing 
The Relationship Marketing literature covers a very wide field that encompasses the 
Supply Chain, Procurement, Economics, Games Theory, Organisation, Sociology 
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and Behavioural Psychology as well as Marketing (Gundlach & Murphy, 1993, Sheth 
& Sharma, 1997).  As a result it lacks consistency and also in some areas, depth 
(Kakabadse & Kakabadse, 2000).  Furthermore, some key concepts and assertions 
have become axiomatic and therefore not subjected to sufficient theoretical or 
practical scrutiny (Palmer, 2001).  Research has also tended to concentrate on 
vendor/retailer rather than vendor/end customer relationships (Ganesan, 1994) and 
this has resulted in limited modelling of complete relationship chains (McDonald et 
al, 1997, Rousseau et al, 1998).  Nevertheless, the development of understanding of 
the complexity of business relationships within networks from Dyadic through 
Interactionist to Key Account Management is clearly and usefully portrayed in sub-
Sections (3.5) (3.6) (3.7).  There is also an extensive literature on behavioural 
variables (3.9) and especially on trust/commitment (3.10 - 17), power (3.18) and 
communication (3.19), which provide valuable guidance on improving business 
relationships (Evans & Berman, 2001).  Overall, the literature reviewed concentrates 
on commercial companies within ‘normal’ markets and provides no insight into 
monopolistic UK Defence Procurement relationships (3.22).  These conclusions lead 
to the following question: 
• Q2 – Can RM behavioural variables, especially those shown in Figure 2.16, 
provide an understanding of the monopolistic relationships found within 
UK Defence Procurement? 
Both the SCM and RM literatures provided analysis of ‘normal’ market business 
relationships and their improvement, which is useful to support the design and 
implementation of this research project.  However, neither field offers an explanation 
of the economic drivers for closer business relationships or the monopoly 
phenomenon itself.  For these reasons the paper next reviewed the Economics 
literature.  
Chapter 2  107 
  
5.4 Relationships within TCE 
TCE draws upon Law, Economics and Organisation theory as base disciplines (4.3) 
and thinking has been dominated by Oliver Williamson’s seminal ideas in the field 
(4.4) (Gundlach & Murphy, 1993).  Although Williamson’s essentially legal and 
calculative approach (Macneil, 1980, Hill, 1980) to human business motivations has 
been softened by academics in the last 10 years as part of a general trend away 
from transactional business dealings (4.10), many of his underlying theories on why 
firms decide to make or buy are still valid (Pessali & Fernandez, 1999).  However, 
although there has been considerable empirical research in the TCE field which has 
been used to investigate a broad range of exchange-related issues including 
horizontal interorganisational relationships and public utility monopolies, it has not 
been well-integrated and no study has examined Williamson’s (1975) Organisations 
Failure Framework in its entirety (Rindfleisch & Heide, 1997).  In trying to understand 
the exchange motivations within UK Defence Procurement using TCE theory it is 
possible to explain small numbers/monopoly markets (4.6) (Fishwick, 1993) using 
the Organisations Failure Framework (4.5) (Williamson, 1975) but only so far as they 
represent short-term, unnatural phenomena (Palmer, 2001, Williamson, 1996) or 
governance options (Crocker & Masten, 1996).  In the stable monopoly situation 
which prevails in UK Defence Procurement (4.11), it appears that contrary to the 
view that extremes of market conditions will inevitably result in pressures to escape 
(Williamson, 1975), the result is an impasse where neither side has the power or the 
motivation to improve the relationship (Parker & Hartley, 1997).  This review leads to 
the following questions: 
• Q3 – Can factors within Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) such as Asset 
Specificity and Opportunism explain the dynamics within monopolistic UK 
Defence Procurement relationships? 
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• Q4 – Can the TCE Organisations Failure Framework be used as a 
theoretical lens with which to view monopolistic relationships within UK 
Defence Procurement? 
5.5 The Research Question 
From the literature review four questions were identified and described in 5.2, 5.3 
and 5.4.  The following Research Question is therefore derived: 
• RQ – To determine if it is possible to obtain an understanding of the 
monopolistic relationships within UK Defence Procurement using 
Williamson’s Organisations Failure Framework and to identify if SCM, RM 
and TCE relational and behavioural factors influence these relationships.  
5.6 The Monopoly Phenomenon and a Conceptual Framework for Research 
In order to answer the research question it is essential to be able to relate Supply 
Chain relationships to UK Defence Procurement monopoly conditions i.e. where 
there are few or single buyers and sellers and where both sides are trapped within a 
disempowered relationship.  A search of the literature for a suitable model with which 
to examine this situation suggested 2 relationship power perspectives.  First, Michael 
Porter’s (1980) five forces model of competitive advantage asserted that business 
relationships were characterised by a short-term orientation, arms-length competition 
and the exercise of market power (Harland et al, 2000, Rugman & D’Cruz, 2000, 
Zheng, 2000).  However, although participants may aim to achieve market 
dominance by limiting competition through the creation of barriers to entry, this did 
not accurately represent the situation within UK Defence Procurement monopolies 
where equally powerful ‘partners’ can be locked in a ‘deadly embrace’ from which 
neither can escape (Humphries & Wilding, 2004).   Andrew Cox et al (2000) saw the 
combination of resource utility and scarcity creating a power regime in which the 
involved parties employed adversarial/non-adversarial and arms-length/collaborative 
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arrangements, depending on their relative power positions provided an alternative 
view.  These options are shown in the matrix at Figure 2.27. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.27.  Relation Power Analysis (Cox et al, 2000) 
 
Unfortunately the difficulty of finding a useful model with which to view UK Defence 
Procurement is illustrated when considering Cox et al’s (2000) approach in the light 
of a situation where neither party has choice over the selection of relationship 
strategy, where equality of power really means equally disempowered and where the 
overall result is likely to be a ‘zero-sum game’ (Basury et al, 2001, Christopher, 
1997, Parker & Hartley, 1997).  It is therefore evident that although Porter and Cox et 
al provide perspectives on the appropriate use of power within a business 
relationship, both were optimised for use in ‘normal’ markets and thus unfortunately 
do not provide a robust framework for extending thinking on long-term, monopoly 
relationships (Humphries & Wilding, 2004). 
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became too high, the market could break down and force a firm to internalise the 
business, in effect creating an internal monopoly (Faulkner & de Rond, 2000) (4.7).  
However, in the stable monopoly situation that prevails in UK Defence Procurement, 
the opportunity to escape, even at a cost, is not available and the result is an 
impasse where neither side has the power or the motivation to improve the 
relationship (4.11) (Parker & Hartley, 1997).  Oliver Williamson's (1975) Economic 
Organisations Failure Framework (4.5) illustrates this self-defeating situation which 
although stylised, seems to have face validity in the UK Defence Procurement 
situation because the factors it represents are readily observable.  However, on the 
premise that the Defence Procurement environment contains a spectrum of business 
relationships it is possible to represent the poles as success and failure cycles as 
shown in Figures 2.28 and 2.29 (Wilding & Humphries, 2002).  The self-reinforcing 
Success Cycle is similar to Lambert et al’s (1996) Partnering Process described in 
2.4.2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.28.  Business Relationship Success Cycle 
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Figure 2.29.  Business Relationship Failure Cycle 
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The yellow boxes contain the elements of the Organisations Failure Framework 
(Williamson, 1975) and encapsulate Question 4 (Q4) and from a TCE perspective, 
Question 3 (Q3).  The green boxes contain variables from the Relationship 
Marketing literature that represent ‘antidotes’ to the TCE elements that undermine 
market equilibrium and thus encapsulate Question 2 (Q2).  They are incidentally, 
supported by post-Williamson TCE researchers (4.10).  The blue boxes contain 
examples of business actions from the Supply Chain literature that can 
operationalise the corresponding relational variables and therefore encapsulate 
Question 1 (Q1).  Examples from the literature of how this framework might be 
envisioned are as follows:   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.30.  Conceptual Framework for Research 
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• Bounded Rationality can be reversed by enabling mutual creativity through 
approaches such as open contracts (Cooper & Ellram, 1993), joint innovation, 
applying stretch targets, ensuring disputes are resolved quickly and fairly and 
finally by taking a long-term view of the relationship (Ganesan, 1994).   
• Uncertainty/Complexity may be overcome by building relationship stability and 
creating a framework for successful business (Peck et al, 2000, Zheng et al, 
2000).  Working more closely with fewer partners (Ellram, 1991, Lewin & 
Johnston, 1997, Boddy et al, 2000), pursuing mutual objectives through value 
creation (Lamming et al, 2001), joint investment and harmonised processes 
(Cooper et al, 1997, Harland, 1996a, Madhok, 2000), actively managing the 
relationship interface through key account management and innovative 
procurement processes (Cox & Lamming, 1997) and, through C3 Behaviour, 
building interdependence (Moss Kanter, 1994, Spekman et al, 1998).  
• Information Impactedness can be defeated by creating a communication 
environment optimised for success (Sheth & Sharma, 1997).  This involves 
implementing multiple communication links at all level between firms (Mohr & 
Spekman, 1994, Morgan & Hunt, 1994) including KAM, IS (Harrison, 1990), 
sharing business and design data, objective performance measurement 
(Matthyssens, 1994), transparency in jointly managing risk (Cox & Lamming, 
1997) and, responding quickly to the needs of your partner (McDonald et al, 
1997).   
• Opportunism is a dangerous effect that is quite difficult to reverse and requires 
measures to strengthen the relationship by creating a reliable business 
infrastructure.  A focus on the quality of the relationship outputs (Christopher, 
1997, Harrison, 1990) including operational efficiency (Harland, 1996a, 
Lamming, 1993), is key as is clarity over the boundaries of the relationship 
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(Noordewier et al, 1990).  A creative approach to conflict and problem solving 
(Hatch, 1997, Hulme, 1997) helps to sustain impetus and finally the building of 
goodwill, trust and commitment (Beamish & Banks, 1987, Faulkner & De Rond, 
2000) by incrementally building on achievements through credible commitments 
creates a virtuous circle (Goleman, 1998, Doz & Oguz, 2000).   
• Lastly, the Small Numbers syndrome can be overturned by incentivising a quality 
relationship where the gains are both shared and highly rewarding (Watson, 
1999, Zajac & Olsen, 1993).  Both sides feel empowered to strive dynamically for 
the mutual good (Cooper & Gardner, 1993) and above all true equity in the 
relationship overcomes any power imbalance (Eisenhardt et al, 1997, Kramer, 
1999, Lamming et al, 2001). 
 
The objective of the Research Question (RQ) is to determine the factors (both 
business and behavioural) from the overall framework that can result in the Small 
numbers position changing from a ‘zero-sum game’ (Axelrod, 1984) to an equitable, 
empowered relationship (Parker & Hartley, 1997).  It is therefore proposed that the 
conceptual research framework could be tested by an appropriate methodology and 
used to answer the research question.   This approach would not only allow 
Williamson’s model to be tested at a high level but it would also be possible to 
identify best and worst practices and therefore the factors that bring relationship 
success. 
5.7 Conclusion 
Section 5 has drawn together the findings from the literature review, identified gaps 
and defined appropriate sub-issues to support the research question.  Finally, it has 
constructed a conceptual framework for the research.  The next Chapter will address 
the Research Methodology. 
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Chapter 3 
Methodology 
1 Introduction 
So far, this thesis has introduced the business background to the research in 
Chapter 1.  Chapter 2 described a review of appropriate literatures, highlighted 
specific gaps that supported the formulation of a research question and finally 
presented a theoretical framework for research.  In Section 1.4 of Chapter 1 an 
introduction to the methodology was presented; Chapter 3 builds on that introduction 
by describing, justifying and providing assurance that appropriate procedures were 
followed.  An illustration of the structure of Chapter 3 is shown in Figure 3.1.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1.  Methodology Chapter Structure 
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Firstly the methodology is justified in terms of the research question and the 
literature review. The sources of data appropriate to the focus of the study are 
identified and the instruments and procedures used to capture and analyse data 
together with any known limitations are described.  Finally, some ethical issues are 
highlighted.  
 
The next Section presents and justifies the research strategy. 
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2 Strategy 
This Section provides the rationale for the selected project methodology and 
describes the key reliability, validity and generalisability considerations that were 
taken into account in order to underpin its claim to be a serious piece of academic 
research. 
2.1 Research Drivers 
The purpose of this research is to explore, understand and explain the influential 
relationship factors between UK MoD and its Industrial partners within UK Defence 
procurement in order that inter-organisation relationships might be improved.  As 
stated in Chapter 1, the business problem is an urgent one and involves several 
organisations that spend large sums of public money and have a considerable 
influence over the effectiveness of national defence.  Moreover, there appears to be 
only limited research in the specific area of interest – sustained, monopolistic 
relationships within the UK Defence Procurement environment.  It is therefore 
essential to adopt research methods and supporting philosophical approaches that 
facilitate the production of rapid, comprehensive results that will be both useful to 
business policy-makers and ‘interesting’ to academics (Davis, 1971).  Tranfield & 
Starkey (1998) describe this as a Mode 2 knowledge-production study where 
‘knowledge is produced in the context of application with the intention of allowing 
short time to market dissemination and exploitation’ whilst maintaining scholarly 
quality and relevance (Whitely, 1984, Pettigrew, 1996, Huff, 2000).  Hines (1997) 
recommended that when undertaking research which aims to provide practitioners 
with added value it should offer a route to effective implementation, a checklist for 
success and, a continuous improvement approach.   
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2.2 Qualitative versus Quantitative Approaches 
The Conceptual Framework described in Section 5.5 of Chapter 2 shows counter-
posing, positive business-to-business relationship factors superimposed on an 
established model of negative, monopolistic environments.  This research aims to 
collect data on the relationships within the field of interest in order to test the 
usefulness of the model and to determine the relational and behavioural factors that 
influence them.  There are 2 possible approaches to the form of research namely: 
quantitative methods, which are associated with the positivist paradigm and 
qualitative methods of the phenomenologist or humanistic paradigm (Hirschman, 
1986).  The strengths and weaknesses of both these approaches are shown in 
Figure 3.2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2.  Comparison of Quantitative & Qualitative Methods (Adapted from: 
Easterby-Smith et al, 1991) 
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methods (Huber & Power, 1985).  However, an important objective is also to provide 
managers with guidance on the nature of actions needed to solve the business 
problem (why it is happening) and therefore qualitative research is also utilised to 
add richness to the quantitative data (Easterby-Smith et al, 1991).  It is for these 
reasons that a combination of Popper’s Critical Rationalism (Walace, 1971) and 
Bhaskar’s Realism (Blaikie, 1993) approaches which support both quantitative and 
qualitative research phases have been selected.  This represents the reality of 
research, which involves compromise between pure positions (Easterby-Smith et al, 
1991) and is crystallised in the 2-stage research process that is illustrated in Figure 
3.3.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.3.  Research Strategy Overview 
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2.3 The Selected Research Approach 
This research therefore, takes a wide, cross-sectional perspective in order to make a 
statement about the outcomes of broadly comparable experiences (from similar 
organisations) using numerical supporting evidence (Johnson, 1984).  It relies upon 
the collection and analysis of large quantities of data to determine the range and 
strength of factors within the Conceptual Framework described in Section 5.5 of 
Chapter 2 – essentially a hypothesis testing approach (Huber & Power, 1985).  
However, it includes some data collection by qualitative methods in order to capture 
the richness of perceptions needed to gain insight into the subtleties and cultural 
depth of the business problem; measures based on self-report play an important role 
because they elicited informed opinion (Bailey et al, 2000).  Hence, each of the 5 
elements from the Conceptual framework shown in Figure 2.30 in Chapter 2 and 
described more fully in Section 4.1 namely: Bounded Rationality, 
Uncertainty/Complexity, Information Impactedness, Opportunism and Small 
Numbers, are operationalised within selected constructs namely: Relationship 
Development, Relationship Stability, Communication, Relationship Strengthening 
and Relationship Quality (Anderson, 1987), so that data can primarily be captured by 
surveys and supported by semi-structured interviews.  The results can then be 
subjected to statistical and qualitative analysis of the relationships between MoD and 
Industry.  This is therefore a survey research methodology which makes use of key 
informant research which involves the selection of multiple individuals who are 
knowledgeable (Kumar et al,1993, Seidler,1974) with respect to the phenomenon of 
interest.  Within a survey they provided information at the aggregate or 
organisational focus of the study by reporting on group and organisational properties 
rather than personal attitudes or behaviours (Philips, 1981).  In interviews they act as 
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informants to report their perceptions and judgements of the constructs offered 
(Anderson, 1987).     
 
Similar research strategies have been operationalised on Supply Chain relationships 
by Harland (1996b) and (1996c), Lambert et al (1996), Metcalf et al (1992), 
Spekman et al (1998); on buyer-seller relationships within Relationship Marketing by 
Doney & Cannon (1997), Mohr & Spekman (1994), Moorman et al (1992), Morgan & 
Hunt (1994), Noordewier et al (1990); and business to business relationships within 
TCE by Nooteboom (1999), Parkhe (1993) and Buvik & Torger (2001). 
2.4 Triangulation 
A further supporting justification for the use of a combination of methodologies 
(quantitative and qualitative) in the study of the same phenomenon is triangulation.  
This provides a number of benefits including improved accuracy of judgement 
through cross-comparison, ensures results variance is due to trait (the data captured 
from respondents) not method (bias inherent in the data capture instruments), 
enhances belief that the results are valid and not a methodological artefact, helps to 
uncover deviant results and overall enhances external validity (Jick, 1979). 
2.5  Rejected Alternatives 
The possibility of using archival measures is discounted because of their limited 
ability to measure internal organisational processes (Bailey et al, 2000), because of 
their general paucity and inconsistency across the large number of organisations to 
be surveyed (Schwenk, 1985), and because of their failure to take into account more 
recent events and data (Boyd et al, 1993).  From preliminary discussions with both 
sides within UK Defence Procurement these reasons were clearly justified.  Other 
types of research are considered but rejected on the grounds that they do not meet 
the overall research aims.  In particular longitudinal approaches such as Case 
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Studies, Action Research, Co-operative Inquiry and Grounded Theory might provide 
extremely interesting results from a small sub-set of the business in question.  
However, because little is known about the total phenomenon (business-to-business 
relationships within sustained monopolies), concentration on a small area over a 
longer period is unlikely to reveal conclusions on the scale required ie. to be able to 
understand the macro-level dynamics at work in a very large environment.  Similar 
arguments prevail against the use of experimental and ethnographic methods.    
2.6 Reliability, Validity and Generalisability 
From the broadly positivist, philosophical perspective adopted for this research 
(Easterby Smith, 1991), reliability (or convergent validity) involves determining 
whether or not the measures used will yield the same results on different occasions 
(assuming the phenomenon of interest remains substantially the same) (Schwenk, 
1985).  Validity (or discriminant validity) means whether or not an instrument (e.g. a 
questionnaire) measures what it is supposed to measure (Bagozzi et al, 1991, 
Sapsford, 1999).  Lastly, generalisability asks what is the probability that patterns 
observed in a sample will be present in the wider population from which the sample 
is drawn (Sapsford, 1999).  Key informant research presents a number of specific 
challenges that must be faced in order to achieve reliability, validity and 
generalisability.  The next few sub-Sections examine the factors that needed to be 
considered when designing Key Informant Research methods appropriate to this 
project and especially how to deal with Random and System Errors that can 
undermine reliability, validity and generalisability.  A cross-reference to the important 
research design and implementation considerations in this Chapter is provided in 
Figure 3.12 at the end of this Chapter. 
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2.7 Random Errors 
Because key informants are asked to perform complex, judgements on potentially 
sensitive or controversial issues, errors and biases will occur which attenuate 
observed relationships and may induce inference errors (Bagozzi et al, 1991, Kumar 
et al, 1993, Philips, 1981).  These have been classified into Organisational, 
Perceptual and Personality circumstances that may predispose informants to a 
particular response.  
2.8 Organisational Effects  
The particular circumstances that affect an organisation, both externally and 
internally, together with the different roles and time served within them will influence 
the quality of responses from informants and result in reduced correspondence 
between informant reports and the organisational concepts they intend to represent 
(Philips, 1981).  For instance the Integrated Project/Industry Team Leaders are likely 
to have the best vantage-point for viewing the whole organisation and making 
inferences about strategic business dimensions although a drawback is often a lack 
of consensus in firms about strategic issues (Bowman & Ambrosini, 1997).  
Moreover, multiple participants in projects and decisions mean information may be 
spread over different people and individuals’ lack of crucial information about the 
events of interest may result in second-hand information and imagination being used 
to fill-in the gaps (Huber & Power, 1985).  Other factors may also skew perceptions 
and hence the accuracy of reports (Boyd et al, 1993).  The organisation may be 
operating in a rapidly changing context - this is certainly true in UK Defence 
Procurement - and it is therefore natural for staff to simplify their interpretation by 
retrospective accounts or hindsight as a result of uncertainty (ambiguity tolerance) or 
complexity (cognitive complexity).  In some types of organisation demographic 
issues such as age, gender or race might affect cognitive values.  The same is also 
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true of internally or externally oriented organisations and those that are either low or 
high performing.  Homogeneous organisations might have a tendency to ‘group 
think’ whereas more heterogeneous teams might exhibit more accurate perceptions.  
At the more personal level the need for achievement, security and social acceptance 
might reduce the possibility of divulging information that might affect career or 
commitment to the organisation (Sapsford, 1999).  There may also be a tendency 
through self-esteem or impression management to project an image of adherence to 
socially or organisationally desirable practices or norms or to contrive or invent 
stories or facts in order to appear knowledgeable or important (Kumar et al,1993). 
 
In conclusion, organisational influences will result in random reporting errors due to 
selective commentary and over/under reporting and these will affect the weight that 
should be given to the information captured.  Sensitivity to those influences within 
the Defence Procurement environment will thus need to be taken into consideration 
in a most aspects of the research design and execution as indicated in Figure 3.12, 
at the end of this Chapter. 
2.9 Perceptual Errors 
As information processors, people have perceptual and cognitive limitations (Kumar 
et al, 1993, Schwenk, 1985) and those in the Defence Procurement environment are 
no different in these respects from those in any other large, mature commercial 
environment.  They have limited or imperfect recall, they are influenced by implicit or 
espoused theories, they have predictable biases such as a dependence on few 
sources of evidence or over-response to vivid information (Sapsford, 1999).  They 
tend to exhibit hindsight bias where they see events as having been inevitable.  They 
are subject to attributional bias where outcomes resulting from appealing but 
inappropriate causes are favoured.  They often consider activities were more 
systematic and logical than they were and attribute favourable outcomes to 
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themselves and associates and unfavourable ones to uncontrollable forces.  And 
lastly, respondents’ perceptions change over time (Boyd et al. 1993).  It is thus most 
important to conduct the research over as short a time frame as possible, to carefully 
design the data capture instruments in order to limit the opportunity to provide 
incomplete or unclear answers and to cross-check responses between different 
methods in the analysis - see Figure 3.12, at the end of this Chapter.   
2.10 Personality Bias – Response Sets 
 Lee Cronbach (1950) was instrumental in providing theoretical foundations for the 
design and analysis of questionnaire data capture.  He defined the concept of 
Response Sets, which are the biases that individuals exhibit as a result of their 
personalities.  These include: Acquiescence i.e. the tendency to answer 
‘yes/no/agree/true/false’; Evasiveness i.e. the tendency to answer 
‘?/indifferent/uncertain’ when fixed alternatives are offered; Rushed Response i.e. 
the tendency to respond with speed rather than accuracy; Any Response i.e. the 
tendency to guess when uncertain; Bulk Response i.e. the tendency to tick many 
items in a list.  Beyond these factors individuals may be unwilling or incapable of 
expressing their true feelings or may be subject to transient personal factors such as 
mood or fatigue (Churchill, 1979).   Research has confirmed that bias is more 
pronounced as items become more difficult or ambiguous and that Response Sets 
inevitably dilute the accuracy of measurement and reduce logical and empirical 
validity.  Nevertheless, external variables such as attitudes, interests and personality 
are a reflection of real and stable traits and research has confirmed that individual 
Response Sets are consistent throughout any particular test Cronbach (1950).  
These features are considered in the design and implementation of this research 
within the questionnaire and interview design and the administration of the 
instruments – see Figure 3.12, at the end of this Chapter.  
Chapter 3  126 
  
2.11 Method Error (Systematic Variance) 
A number of errors can be attributed to problems with the methods employed and 
can include difficulty of observation due to nature of organisation, its size, 
complexity, and volatility (Bagozzi et al, 1991).  Situational factors such as 
inappropriate locations of interviews and variations in interview techniques or 
changing questionnaire items between tests may also apply (Foddy, 1993).  Lack of 
clarity of the measuring instrument due to vague or ambiguous questions, loose or 
inconsistent terms or labels and mechanical factors such as ticking the wrong box or 
incorrect coding (Churchill, 1979) come into the same class of errors.  More serious 
is the use of inappropriate data elicitation procedures such as question-framing 
which will effect recollection or reflect researcher’s views i.e. prompting appropriate 
answers (Wragg, 1984, Schwenk, 1985).  In the same vein generalisability can be 
situation-specific and limited by the key variables used (Foddy, 1993).  This 
illustrates the importance of understanding that measurement or operationalisation 
involves rules for assigning numbers to objects to represent quantities of attributes.  
The rigour with which the rules are specified and the skill with which they are applied 
determines whether the construct has been captured by the measure (Churchill, 
1979, Sapsford, 1999).  Furthermore, the researcher must not forget that ‘no survey 
is ever neutral’; the subject matter and characteristics of researcher may alter 
responses provided and the choice of variables and their operationalisation entail 
subjective judgements (Hirschman, 1986).  It is thus essential to ensure that 
measures ‘fully tap into the respondent’s understanding or enactment of his 
environment’ (Boyd et al. 1993).  It can be seen from Figure 3.12 that method error 
must be considered in virtually all the elements of the research design and 
implementation. 
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2.12 Conclusions 
From the above sub-Sections it can be seen that Random and Systematic error 
factors are complex and numerous and obtaining valid data from survey methods is 
complex and full of potential difficulties.  However, as identified in Figure 3.12, a 
number of precautions can be taken to improve reliability, validity and 
generalisability.   
 
Firstly, developing an instrumental theory to pinpoint sources of bias and error in 
measurement by considering the object of study, the traits of the informants and the 
observation situation and then designing the study and selecting the informants in 
accordance with the instrumental theory (Seidler, 1974).  It was especially important 
to avoid alienating or siding with a particular strong culture in either the Defence 
Industries or the DLO.  Thus care was taken to ensure that the data capture 
instruments and procedures were culturally neutral.   
 
Next, the teams to be surveyed were generally homogenous and potentially deemed 
to be at strong risk of collusion and ‘group-think’.  Careful use of sampling 
procedures to reduce the random errors attributable to organisational factors and 
highlight any perceptual anomalies (Churchill, 1979) were used.  These include 
assuring anonymity of responses, selecting only knowledgeable respondents, 
discouraging collusion between informants, providing a wide selection of 
respondents from across the organisation in order to secure a variety of balanced 
perspectives and including multiple sets of measurements in the survey instrument 
(Huber & Power, 1985).  Asking direct questions at the outset to determine the 
informant’s competence e.g. length of tenure, depth of knowledge and involvement 
aimed to ascertain the validity of the data to be collected (Kumar et al, 1993).  
Finally, asking questions that required less demanding social judgement and 
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concentrating on objective, observable phenomena together with minimising the 
elapsed time between events and data collection were also expected to reduce 
distorting influences (Schwenk, 1985)   
 
All organisations, including the DLO and Defence Industries, are subject to 
numerous questionnaires and other data collection activities.  As a result staff 
become lackadaisical over participation.  This research intended to minimised the 
impact of Personality effects by careful design.  Multiple-choice/forced choice tests 
were used because since they limit the options for random errors and are reinforced 
by the use of judgement scales with limited choices they are nearly free of Response 
Sets (Cronbach, 1950).  Special directions were used because they could reduce 
Response Sets by providing both clear directions on how to complete the data 
collection and the rationale for the exercise (Foddy, 1993, Kumar et al, 1993).  
Attention to the design and layout of the questionnaire ensured that it was completed 
accurately and consistently (Youngman, 1984).  Finally, using multiple respondents 
from the same organisation together with multiple measures (constructs) and 
methods (surveys/interviews/informants) allowed the inter-rating reliability 
(comparison of observations from two or more judges (Sapsford, 1999)) and validity 
of the questionnaire to be checked and refined (Seidler, 1974, Bagozzi et al, 1991). 
 
In the final analysis, considerable care and attention to detail was exercised to 
ensure that the data collected was ‘a known quantity’ i.e. that it answered the 
question set and that its drawbacks wee fully known (Foddy, 1993).  ‘Social 
scientists are enamoured of numbers and counting – rarely do they stop to ask what 
lies behind the numbers’ - statistical significance is meaningless if the data collection 
instrument generates invalid data (Churchill, 1979).  Furthermore, it was fully 
acknowledged that one cannot take bad data and turn it into good using 
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sophisticated analysis techniques and, without good data the quality of the resultant 
theory-testing and development would be seriously undermined (Williams, 1995).  
Figure 3.12 at the end of this Chapter shows how the design considerations 
described in this Section were incorporated into the selected research methods for 
the project.   
 
The next Section describes the data sources for this research project. 
Chapter 3  130 
  
3 Data Sources 
3.1 Introduction 
The last Section made a case for survey research supported by semi-structured 
interviews and identified important design criteria.  A detailed description of how 
these methods were designed and used is provided in Section 4.  This Section 
describes the focus of the study and the sources of data.  It specifically covers the 
reasoning for selecting the population, the sampling frame, the sample and the 
sample size. 
3.2 UK MoD Procurement 
Chapter 1 introduced the structure and roles of the UK Defence Procurement 
organisation.  The focus of this study is the relationship between the UK MoD and 
Industry that exists through contracts for goods and services that is managed by 
Integrated Project Teams (IPTs).  All the statistics quoted in this sub-section are from 
the Defence Analytic Services Agency (2001) year 2001/02 estimates.  The UK 
MoD’s procurement organisation (the research population) is very large and, as 
described in Chapter 1, is divided into 2 main departments: 
• The UK Defence Procurement Agency manages new equipment projects from 
conception through development and production to hand over to the Front Line 
military customers.  Its business is necessarily very long-term and complicated 
by relationships with industry which change according to the project phases.  It 
employs some 4,300 people, is organised into 70 IPTs and spends 
approximately £6,246m per year. 
• The Defence Logistics Organisation (DLO) manages the support of equipment 
and weapon systems that are in-use with the Front Line military customers.  
Although it is split into 3 constituent parts (Sea, Land and Air), its procurement 
activity is less complex because it is confined to the purchase of goods (spare 
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parts) and services (repair and overhaul).  It employs some 24,800 people 
organised into 55 Integrated Project Teams and spends approximately £4,066m 
per year. 
 
The DLO business was chosen as the sampling frame for this study because firstly it 
presented a simpler, more unified business, which was more likely to allow clear 
research results to be derived in a shorter timescale.  Secondly, since the author 
works within the organisation and is sponsored by it, access was also facilitated.  
(See Section 6 – Limitations, where the issue of researcher independence is 
discussed). 
 
Of the DLO’s annual spend, approximately 70% is spent under monopoly conditions 
i.e. where competition is severely restricted by minimal or complete lack of choice 
(see Chapter 1, Section 8 for definition).  The research thus aimed to take a wide 
cross-section census of the 55 IPTs within the DLO, which led to the selection of the 
Industries concerned.  These relationships were managed by small teams on each 
side involved in placing and processing orders, monitoring production and 
performance, dealing with problems and authorising payment. 
3.3   Criteria for Selecting Questionnaire Respondents 
Because of the need to select knowledgeable respondents from the UK MoD and 
Industry teams working on either side of each relationship, the leader of each team 
was asked to determine who would take part in the survey and, mindful that previous 
research has concentrated on senior sales/purchasing staff (Tuten & Urban, 2001), it 
was emphasised that the most useful results would be obtained if a cross-section of 
team members were selected to take part.  This was therefore, a census rather than 
a sample (Sapsford, 1999).  A post-census (Easterby Smith, 1991) 10% check of UK 
MoD telephone directories indicated that Integrated Project Team leaders had 
Chapter 3  132 
  
indeed chosen a wide cross-section team members to take part.  It was not possible 
to carry out a similar check of Industry teams because of the lack of access to 
internal phone directories however; scrutiny of the post titles of questionnaire 
respondents indicates that a broad variety of functions and levels was selected.   
3.4 Criteria for Selecting Semi-Structured Interview Respondents 
Semi-structured interviews were designed to capture richer data about the quality of 
each relationship.  The number of Interviewees was dependent on the need to 
capture sufficient, qualitative information from knowledgeable respondents but 
limited by the time available to complete the project.  As a result, the respective 
Industry and UK MoD team leaders for each relationship researched were chosen.  
Moreover, by dint of their positions, they were considered to ‘knowledgeable’ about 
the issues under examination.   
3.5 Data Sources – Conclusion 
In conclusion, this research concentrated on collecting census data from team 
members within a representative sample of monopoly relationships within UK 
Defence Procurement between the Defence Logistics Organisation and its industrial 
partners.  As a result, the strategy provided a stronger test of the stability of the 
hypothesised relationships than the more standard approach to sampling from only 
one group or the other (Heide & Miner, 1992). 
 
The next Section describes the design of the instruments and procedures for the 
data capture. 
Chapter 3  133 
  
4 Instruments and Procedures for Data Capture 
Having described the sample selection criteria in Section 3, this Section describes 
the criteria used to design the questionnaire and the semi-structure interview plan.  
The overriding objective of this survey research was to obtain ‘consistent answers 
from consistent questions through the application of a systematic, standardised data 
capture method’ (Sapsford, 1999).  This Section also describes how these 
arrangements were validated during a Pilot Project. 
4.1 Dimensions and Underlying Concepts - Rationale 
The constructs in the project were primarily measured using multi-item scales 
(questions under a heading).  The aim was to design an instrument that could be 
applied relatively easily to a large number of individuals and organisations to enable 
research with greater generalisability.  As mentioned earlier and introduced in 
Chapter 2, Section 5, Figure 2.23, the elements within Williamson’s (1975) 
Organisation Failure Framework representing an influence rather than a causal 
model, provide the underlying theoretical concepts for the project.  Against these (in 
yellow) are juxtaposed generic relationship success factors (in green) as the main 
dimensions for study and are illustrated in Figure 3.4.   
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Figure 3.4.  Williamson’s (1975) Economic Organisation Failure Framework 
Underlying Concepts with Supply Chain Success Factors Dimensions 
 
4.2 Question Validation Process 
This sub-Section describes the process by which the 5 dimensions of the theoretical 
framework shown in Figure 3.4 were operationalised using a series of questions that 
were incorporated within a questionnaire. The individual measures were selected 
from a pool of items taken from the empirical research mentioned in the last 
paragraph of sub-Section 2.3.  They reflected the distinctive characteristics of each 
dimension, which incorporated the different nuances (Churchill, 1979) and were 
considered suitable for use in a self-completion questionnaire (Bailey et al, 2000).  In 
most instances the measures have been used in previous research, modified to fit 
the context where necessary, and are thus considered being reliable indicators.  In 
some instances however, suitable measures were not found in the literature and 
were designed specifically for this project following preliminary research (Heide & 
Miner, 1992).  The measures and their derivations are described later in sub-
Sections 4.3, 4.4, 4.5, 4.6 and 4.7.  In order to ensure that both theoretical and 
practical aspects were considered, as detailed in the following sub-Sections, at 
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various stages of the development process academics a representative sample of 
practicing managers and staff evaluated the questions to ensure that it had 
methodological consistency, made sense established its face validity – that it looked 
as if it ought to measure the planned dimensions (Sapsford, 1999). 
4.2.1 Selection by Dimension Step 
The detail of this process to select appropriate questions for each dimension 
comprised 3 steps. 
4.2.2 Literature Search 
Within the body of knowledge reviewed as a foundation to this research (Chapter 2), 
15 papers that described the findings of empirical research were examined and a 
pool of 60 questions was selected as being appropriate to the aims of this project.  
4.2.3 Selection by Dimension & Refinement 
The 60 questions were listed in random order and emailed to 3 fellow part-time PhD 
students who because one was a career logistic manager, another was a senior ex-
Royal Air Force Officer and the other was a marketing manager, were able to make 
expert contributions.  The 5 numbered Dimensions and their definitions were also 
provided on a separate sheet.  The instructions were to allocate, using a common 
sense understanding of the meaning of the questions, a Dimension number to each 
question and to email the annotated list back.  A high degree of commonality of 
views was achieved with 48 questions allocated identically to the 5 Dimensions, a 
further 7 where 2 out of 3 selectors differed and the remaining 5 questions where 1 
selector differed.  These 12 questions were therefore removed from the list because 
of their inherent ambiguity.  A further 13 questions were removed because it was felt 
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that they each duplicated the sense of another questions and of each pair, was 
considered to be the weaker.  35 questions remained.   
 
4.2.4 Academic Validation 
The final, segmented list of 35 questions together with Dimension definitions was 
presented to 3 members of the Cranfield faculty for their scrutiny.  One was from 
Marketing and 2 were Logisticians.  They agreed that the groupings fairly 
represented the Dimension definitions and, that there was no ambiguity, overlap or 
deficiency. 
4.2.5 Business Community Input & Validation Step 
In order to validate the questionnaire questions within the target business 
environment, a 3 phase approach was adopted. 
4.2.6 Initial Workshop 
A group of 6 people from the Pilot Project teams (the team leaders, 2 commercial 
officers and 2 supply chain purchasers) were consulted in a 90 minute workshop.  
The objectives of the research were first presented and the Dimensions were 
defined.  A number of questions of clarification were answered and when it was felt 
that those present had a clear understanding of the situation, the segmented list of 
35 questions was introduced on 5 Powerpoint slides, one Dimension at a time for 
consideration and discussion.  As a result of the identification of specific business 
issues, 3 new questions were added with the text typed onto the screen at the time.  
Considerable effort was put into ‘getting the meaning right’.  The wording of a further 
7 questions was altered slightly to improve their meaning to the targeted business 
community. 
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4.2.7 Questionnaire Tests 
The refined questions were inserted into the questionnaire format and offered 
sequentially to 3 groups of 5 people from the business but deliberately outside of the 
proposed pilot project area in order to obtain a wider view.  The result was a further 6 
minor wording changes that improved understanding and clarity.  In the 50 
questionnaires (25 to the IPT and 25 to Industry) an additional space was provided 
for comments that might improve the instrument.  As a result, 4 further word changes 
were proposed and accepted. 
 
4.2.8 Academic Validation 
The results of this process including the final version of the questionnaire were 
presented to the academic review team at a formal Stage Review for approval prior 
to commencing the main research project.  An overview is shown below in Figure 
3.5. 
 
Figure 3.5 Questionnaire Questions Selection Process. 
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The theoretical constructs together with their dimensions and associated measures 
are described in more detail in the following sub-Sections.   
4.3 Bounded Rationality 
Herbert Simon’s (1957) concept suggests that people have only so much capacity to 
rationalise what is going on around them and they therefore naturally limit their 
performance to the adequate rather than the optimum. 
Construct: Relationship Development – enabling joint creativity.  Measures: 
• The relationship encourages us to be innovative in the way we do business 
(Nooteboom, 1999, Moorman et al, 1992). 
• The relationship encourages the achievement of high performance (eg. reliable 
equipment, on-time delivery) (Mohr & Spekman, 1994). 
• Performance measurement is used to raise standards (Harland, 1995, 1996, 
Noordewier et al, 1990, Phillips, 1981). 
• Disputes are resolved: 
• quickly (Mohr & Spekman, 1994). 
• fairly.  The perception of fairness is a particular problem in UK Defence 
Procurement because there is often a perception that the market is not fairly 
constructed i.e. not a level playing-field. 
• The other party:  
• is reliable and consistent in dealing with us (Parkhe, 1993). 
• is committed to making our business a success (Doney & Cannon, 1997, 
Spekman et al, 1998). 
• When some unexpected problem arises, both parties would rather work out a 
new deal than hold each other to the original contract terms (Doney & Cannon, 
1997, Heide & Miner, 1992, Nooteboom, 1999, Metcalf et al, 1990, Mohr & 
Spekman, 1994, Zheng et al, 2000). 
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4.4 Uncertainty/complexity  
Describes the difficulty people have of making sense of complex current and future 
events (Williamson, 1975). 
Construct: Relationship Stability – creating a framework for successful 
business.  Measures: 
• The other party displays a sound, strategic understanding of our business (Cox 
& Lamming, 1997, Moorman et al, 1992, Spekman et al, 1998). 
• The objectives of both parties are clearly stated (Nooteboom, 1999). 
• The objectives of both parties are fully compatible (Lambert et al, 1996). 
• Both parties co-operate wholeheartedly (Lamming, 1993, Mohr & Spekman, 
1994). 
• The relationship provides a dynamic business environment within which both 
parties can seek increasing rewards (Noordewier et al, 1990). 
• I have complete confidence in the intentions of the other party (Doney & Cannon, 
1997, Mohr & Spekman, 1994, Morgan & Hunt, 1994). 
4.5 Information Impactedness 
Resulting from both Uncertainty/Complexity and Opportunism, which refers to the 
imbalance caused by selective information disclosures, and distortions which are 
difficult or expensive to verify at the time and which undermine the durability of 
contract arrangements (Williamson, 1975). 
Construct: Communication – creating an environment for success.  Measures: 
• Where the other party has proprietary information that could improve the 
performance of the joint business, it is freely available (Doney & Cannon, 1997, 
Heide & Miner, 1992, Metcalf et al, 1990, Mohr & Spekman, 1994). 
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• We welcome a shared data environment where planning, technical and pricing 
information is made freely available (Lambert et al, 1996, Lamming et al, 2001, 
Nooteboom, 1999). 
• We understand the information requirements of all participants in the support 
chain from sub-contractors to end-user (Nooteboom, 1999). 
• Objective performance measurement is an important part of this relationship 
(Harland, 1996, Morgan & Hunt, 1994, Noordewier et al, 1990, Parkhe, 1993). 
• We are aware of the performance requirements for all participants in the support 
chain from sub-contractors to end-user (Lamming, 1993).  This measure was 
added after discussion with managers and staff who perceived a lack of 
adequate awareness of all chain participants as a particular issue in Defence 
support contracts. 
• Exchange of information in this relationship takes place frequently and informally 
– not just according to specified agreement (Lamming et al, 2001, Heide & 
Miner, 1992, Mohr & Spekman, 1994, Parkhe, 1993). 
• We provide the other party with regular information including long-range 
forecasts to enable him to do his business better (Lambert et al, 1996, Mohr & 
Spekman, 1994, Noordewier et al, 1990).   
4.6 Opportunism 
Constitutes a lack of candour or honesty and includes self-interest seeking with 
guile.  This factor can be especially debilitating if the exchange involves transaction-
specific human and physical capital investments such as management time, skilled 
labour and IS links, which can either give one party excessive power over the other 
or because of the fear of loss, can lock a partner into the deal when he would rather 
leave (Hill, 1990, Williamson, 1979).  
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Construct: Relationship Strengthening – creating a reliable business 
arrangement.  Measures: 
• The quality of the contract outputs (spares/repairs/services) is entirely 
satisfactory (Harland, 1996, Mohr & Spekman, 1994, Moorman et al, 1992). 
• The quality of service delivery (delivery times, billing, payment) is entirely 
satisfactory (Harland, 1995, Mohr & Spekman, 1994, Sako et al, 1994). 
• The relationship is characterised by a continually improving quality ethos 
(Lambert et al, 1996, Lamming, 1993, Nooteboom, 1999). 
• Problems are solved in a joint, open, constructive manner (Heide & Miner, 1992, 
Mohr & Spekman, 1994). 
• Such is the goodwill in the relationship, the other party would willingly put himself 
out to adapt to our changing requirements (Mohr & Spekman, 1994, Parkhe, 
1993). 
• We trust the other party to act in our best interests (Doney & Cannon, 1997, 
Lambert et al, 1996, Mohr & Spekman, 1994, Moorman et al, 1992, Morgan & 
Hunt, 1994). 
• The responsibility for making sure the relationship works is shared jointly (Heide 
& Miner, 1992, Nooteboom, 1999). 
• The other party provides us with useful cost reduction and quality improvement 
ideas (Noordewier et al, 1990, Metcalf et al, 1990). 
• The other party is always totally open and honest with us (Lamming et al, 2001, 
Morgan & Hunt, 1994, Parkhe, 1993). 
• The other party always does what he says he will do (Morgan & Hunt, 1994, 
Parkhe, 1993, Metcalf et al, 1990). 
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4.7 Small Numbers /Monopoly Market 
The combination of problem behaviours requires sophisticated controls that are only 
found in or close to the firm and may result in failure of market conditions 
(Williamson, 1979). 
Relationship Quality: creating the incentive to work together.  Measures: 
• The gains from this relationship are equally shared between both parties 
(Nooteboom, 1999). 
• We do not feel imprisoned within the current relationship (Nooteboom, 1999) 
• We are willing to invest more (eg. money, time, information, effort) in the current 
relationship (Lambert et al, 1996). 
• We are happy that our future is bound to the success of our relationship partner 
(Lambert et al, 1996, Nooteboom, 1999, Sako et al, 1994). 
• We feel totally committed to this relationship (Morgan & Hunt, 1994) (Moorman 
et al, 1992, Parkhe, 1993, Lambert et al, 1996). 
• The other party is genuinely concerned that our business succeeds (Doney & 
Cannon, 1997, Mohr & Spekman, 1994). 
• Both sides are working to improve this relationship.  A measure adopted 
following suggestions by practicing managers who believed that the 
measurement of the current relationship needed more than static measures and 
that an indication of progress (or otherwise) was also important. 
4.8 Questionnaire Design 
The overall questionnaire design requirements were to collect the data required as 
effectively and efficiently as possible and to this end it should be simple and easy to 
use in order to secure the maximum response rate and accuracy of data provision 
(Youngman, 1984).  It was also important to consider how the data would be used 
and therefore at the same time as the questionnaire was being designed all the 
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facilities deemed necessary for successful analysis – coding, non-response routine 
and data manipulation, needed to be considered (Hibberd, 1994).   The 
questionnaire was designed using the principles outlined in 2.6-2.12 but in addition 
achieved parsimony of words, a clear, consistent layout, an explicit theme, contained 
clear, logical instructions and included features that aided coding (Sapsford, 1999).  
A copy is included at Appendix 1 to this report.  Specific design issues are covered 
below. 
 
Various types of anchored, attitudinal scale such as Thurstone, semantic differential 
and Likert were considered for the main data capture medium.  But, because 
previous Supply Chain relationships research (Doney & Cannon, 1997, Mohr & 
Spekman, 1994, Noordewier et al, 1990, Parkhe, 1993, Spekman et al, 1998) has 
used Likert scales because of their appropriateness, their simplicity and the general 
familiarity of business people with them (Schertzer & Kernan, 1985), the method was 
selected for this project.  The use of scales require familiarity with a number of 
considerations including whether or not the descriptors (the words used to describe 
the question choices) have similar psychological meanings to people and thus can 
be arranged to form equal-interval response scales (Schertzer & Kernan, 1985).  
Other questions that need to be addressed include whether or not the scales are 
ordinal in their metric – i.e. do the scale points meaningfully reflect the order of 
meaning to respondents in the same way that their constructors assume, should 
scales be balanced – i.e. contain an equal number of positive and negative response 
categories and moreover, what is the optimum number of categories in a scale and 
should it contain a neutral point. 
 
Because Likert scales have been found to communicate interval properties to the 
respondents and therefore can produce intervally scaled data (Kohli, 1989, 
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Madsden, 1989, Perry, 1999, Schertzer & Kernan, 1985), the method is considered 
to be particularly suited to this project.  The need for positive data (the avoidance of 
‘don’t know’, ‘no opinion’ or ‘neither agree or disagree’) led to the selection of a scale 
size that  offered only limited choices of ‘agree’, ‘strongly agree’, ‘disagree’ and 
‘strongly disagree’ (Youngman, 1984).  Given that the sample respondents operated 
in a tensioned, monopoly environment, it was reasonably assumed that their views 
would be either pro or con; an approach that was justified following exposure to staff 
during development of the instrument and the pilot study.  However, an ‘insufficient 
knowledge’ category was also included to offer a firm alternative and provide an 
intermediate (neutral) response (Youngman, 1984).  The choice of these descriptors 
for cognitive (degree of belief) scales with associated ordinal qualities and the 
limitation of the size of scale to 5 in a balanced configuration is underlined by 
previous research as a particularly robust methodology (Schertzer & Kernan, 1985).  
 
The standard range of supplementary information was sought on the front page.  In 
particular, specific details about the relationship (equipment, firm, IPT identifier) were 
highlighted in bold and mentioned twice to ensure that those staff who dealt with 
multiple relationships were in no doubt as which relationship was covered by the 
questionnaire.  Also, from face-to-face interviews with managers and staff in the 
design phase, the level of the respondent was considered to be important because it 
was anticipated that senior personnel were likely to be more optimistic about the 
relationship, given the importance of partnering as a headquarters policy, than the 
desk staff at the working interface of the organisations.  In practice, tests to identify 
these response patterns in the Pilot Study and in a 15% sample of Main Project 
questionnaires revealed no tendency of this nature.  It is assumed that the 
assurance given to respondents that their responses would be treated in total 
confidence, that their questionnaires were to be submitted directly to the researcher 
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to avoid power influences and, that uninhibited expression would offer most benefit 
to the research outcomes, encouraged the submission of frank responses.  
Additionally, because in providing responses, informants sometimes inadvertently 
distort their reports because of certain response tendencies, a response tendency 
variable was included so as to allow more accurate parameter estimation during data 
analysis (Kohli, 1989).  As a result each respondent was asked to estimate his level 
of knowledge of the particular relationship.  Thus ‘no knowledge’ replies could be 
discounted from the survey.  A further filter, the length of time in role, was also used 
to remove unreliable responses.  In this case a cut-off of 3 months was decided after 
consultation with managers and staff.  The questionnaire validation process has 
been described in detail in sub-Section 4.2. 
4.9 Questionnaire Reliability 
As already mentioned in Section 2, having chosen dimensions and associated 
measures it was important to determine their reliability.   Given a homogeneous 
sample of respondents and groups of measures that test the same major constructs, 
one should obtain consistent, repeatable results, apart from those due to random 
factors (Cortina, 1993).  The most widely used, general form of internal consistency 
test is the Cronbach Alpha Coefficient which measures internal consistency by 
accounting for variances due to subjects and the interaction between subjects and 
items (correlation) (Bowman & Ambrosini, 1997).   Item-specific variance is the 
uniqueness of an item, which is assessed by Coefficient Alpha.  If there is a large 
Alpha then it can be concluded that a large portion of the variance is attributable to 
general and group factors i.e. very little item-specific variance (Churchill, 1979).  A 
satisfactory level of Alpha is however, open to some conjecture.  Bowman & 
Ambrosini, (1997) consider that the following context-specific minima: psychology – 
0.9; basic research – 0.8; applied setting – 0.9; management literature – 0.7 are 
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acceptable.  Churchill (1979) recommends that Coefficient Alpha be used for the first 
assessment of the quality of an instrument and that high (0.5 – 0.95) is good.  Where 
low scores are found the delinquent measures should be eliminated or re-drafted.  In 
this research the Pilot Project questionnaire results generated the following 
Coefficient Alphas: 
Development:  0.8039 
Stability:   0.7744 
Communication:  0.7639 
Strengthening:  0.7653 
Quality:   0.8812 
 
Overall:   0.7977 
 
Sensitivity analysis (excluding individual measure in turn) made an insignificant 
difference to the overall result.  It was therefore concluded on the basis of a score 
greater than 0.7 (management literature) that the Questionnaire as designed had 
sufficient internal consistency for the proposed research project. 
4.10 Semi-Structure Interview Design 
A copy of the semi-structured interview schedule is at Appendix 2.  It was carefully 
designed to focus clearly on capturing ‘why’ information from senior relationship 
managers (Wragg, 1984).  The questions were selected to match the dominant 
results recorded for each dimension of the relationship in question i.e. what were the 
key factors that resulted in success or failure?  Because this approach was 
considered to be extremely simple and explicit, the schedule was tested by seeking 
the opinions of a selection of senior personnel from the UK MoD and Industry and 
refined as a result of experience gained during the Pilot Project. 
4.11 Pilot Project 
A Pilot Project was carried out between Oct and Dec 00 to validate all aspects of the 
research design and the administration of its instruments.  The relationship selected 
was that between the Air-to-Air Refuelling (AAR) Integrated Project Team within the 
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Air Business Unit and its industrial partner British Aerospace Systems (BAe) PLC.  
This was a true monopoly worth £40m per year for both the purchase of spare parts 
and the provision of repair services.  It was chosen because it was representative of 
the type of relationship to be targeted by the Main Project, the AAR organisation was 
located close to the researcher’s work-place and because the Integrated Project 
Team Leader was a proponent of the research and keen to co-operate. 
 
Twenty five questionnaires were sent to the AAR Integrated Project Team Leader 
and 25 were sent to BAe Systems PLC point of contact manager.  An additional 
question was added to the questionnaire seeking respondents’ views on the design 
of the questionnaire.  A number of useful comments about clarity of layout and 
wording were received which resulted in the incorporation of some further 
improvements for the main research phase (see 4.2.7).  All 50 completed 
questionnaires were received following one reminder to the team leader on each 
side, a response rate of 100%.  In handling the reminder, the team leaders were 
asked to make their request know to their staff in a clear, neutral manner in order to 
avoid any suggestion of power or duress.  Once all the questionnaires had been 
received, two phoned, random checks to staff in each organisation elicited that this 
request had been complied with.    Follow-up semi-structured interviews then took 
place with both team leaders.  The data was used to further develop the recording, 
analysis systems and graphical outputs and the results, as provided to the 2 team 
leaders in report form are shown in Appendix 3.    
 
The next Section describes the operation of the research and in particular the 
administration of the instruments and the classification of the collected data. 
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5 Administration of Instruments & Data Classification 
5.1 Preliminary Notification 
Three important lessons learned were learned from the Pilot Project.  The first was 
the considerable amount of administration involved in dealing with paper 
correspondence and questionnaires.  As a result, email was used exclusively during 
the Main Project.  Secondly, contact by telephone before making contact with written 
material was essential to ensure that co-operation was immediately forthcoming.  
Thirdly, in order to maintain control and focus in a long, complex process, the 
research needed to be carried out within logical, sub-sets.  As a result, it was 
decided to tackle the 3 areas of the DLO (Land, Sea & Air) in sequential order of 
increasing size and complexity.  The appropriate Business Unit Director General was 
contacted and support to the research programme and the nomination of a senior 
sponsor were sought.  Each UK MoD Integrated Project Team Leader was contacted 
and asked to complete a return providing details of the relationships they believed 
fell into the monopoly category and would like investigated.   
5.2 Questionnaires 
Each UK MoD Integrated Project Team Leader was also asked to distribute copies of 
the questionnaire to staff to be returned by a deadline.  Using the contacts provided, 
the Industry Team Leader were contacted and asked to distribute and return 
completed questionnaires by the same deadline.  Although 75% of questionnaires 
were returned by the deadline, a phone call or email reminder usually brought in the 
remainder fairly quickly.  An analysis of early versus late responses (Armstrong & 
Overton, 1977) revealed no significant differences in the Integrated Project 
Team/Firm and situational characteristics, which suggests that non-response bias 
was not a significant issue (Kohli, 1989).   Following the analysis of the questionnaire 
data for each relationship a business report was prepared and emailed to each team 
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leader in the format shown at Appendix 3.  A number of the questionnaires contained 
additional manuscript comments, which were recorded for further analysis. 
5.3 Semi-Structured Interviews 
The part played by semi-structured interviews within the research project was 
explained verbally and in the initial letter to each Integrated Project and Industry 
Team Leader and normally took place within 3 weeks following publication of the 
report.  The graphical results were discussed and the reasons for any manifest 
relationship performance characteristics were sought.  Initially the intention was to 
hold the interviews in person but time constraints and geographical spread (UK, 
Europe and USA) meant that only 50% could be held in this way.  The remainder 
was carried out by telephone and it was found that often the latter format garnered a 
similar richness and quantity of data in a shorter time than the face-to-face 
interviews.  Interview duration varied between 20 and 90 minutes and were 
conducted in a reflexive manner that took full advantage of the favourable data 
collection opportunities of a relaxed social situation but mindful of the need to 
maintain neutrality and a reasonably standardised presentation (Foddy, 1993, 
Sapsford, 1999).  No attempt was made to record the face-to-face interview because 
the number carried out exceeded the time and resources available to transcribe, and 
analyse them.  In the event, due to the researcher’s experience and background, it 
was found that the points that explained the reasoning for the quality of the 
relationships (a fair representation of the surface content (Sapsford, 1999)) could be 
easily identified and noted by hand on the schedule.  At the end of the research 
project the key points (things to do and to avoid when doing business with the UK 
MoD) were placed in a CD-ROM database under the title: ‘UK Defence Procurement 
Best Practice’.  Complimentary copies were sent to all team leader participants and 
thus satisfying the requirement to feed-back their contributions.   
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5.4 Quantitative Data Classification 
In order to seek richer patterns within the quantitative data, a number of independent 
variables were selected that could be utilised for cross-tabulation in order to 
categorise the relationship types.  The categories listed in Figure 3.6 were sourced 
from an internal, classified, report entitled Project ASPIRE, Improving Supplier 
Management in the DLO dated Aug 1999 and were made available to the researcher 
as a consequence of his position within the DLO. 
 
# Variable Values 
1 Value of Contract in Year £ 
2 Relationship Duration Long: >20 yrs, Medium: 10-
19 yrs, Short: 1-9 yrs 
3 Team Size Number of questionnaire 
Respondents 
4 Technology Age Old: >2 Upgrades, Medium: 
1-2 Upgrades, New: 0 
Upgrades 
5 Technological Complexity System or Component 
6 MoD Contractors League - Annual MoD Spend 
per Firm (DASA, 2001) 
1: >£250m, 2: £100m-
£250m, 3: £50m-£100m, 4: 
£25m-£50m, 5: £10m-
£25m, 6: £5m-£10m 
 
Figure 3.6.  Relationship Independent Variables 
 
5.5 Qualitative Data Classification 
The key points collected from questionnaire ‘additional information’ and from the 
semi-structured interviews needed to be classified and ordered in a way that 
facilitated their analysis and use in support of the analysis of the statistical data.  
Unlike the somewhat subjective task of coding key text from transcripts which 
inherently involves analysis (Miles & Huberman, 1994), in this project the activity was 
an objective process.  Each key point was classified according to the appropriate 
dimension construct from the theoretical framework in Figure 3.4 and was also 
labelled according to whether it was a positive or a negative comment and also 
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whether it was from a successful or an unsuccessful relationship.  However, when in 
Chapter 4 it came to examining the qualitative responses within each dimension by 
means of the theoretical fields of interest (TCE, SCM and RM) appropriate groupings 
emerged and were compared with those suggested by the literature. 
5.6 Research Project Programme 
A table that shows the overall data collection programme is at Figure 3.7 below. 
Organisation Start Date End Date No of 
Relationships 
No of 
Respondents 
Value of 
Relationships 
Pilot Project Oct 00 Dec 00 1 50 £40.0m 
Land Business Unit Jan 01 Apr 01 6 64 £53.3m 
Sea Business Unit May 01 Jul 01 10 92 £28.9m 
Air Business Unit Jul 01 Dec 01 37 423 £453.6m 
Totals Oct 00 Dec 01 54 629 £575.80m 
   
Figure 3.7.  Overall Data Collection Programme 
 
A summary of the qualitative data records collected by theoretical framework 
dimension is in Figure 3.8.  The numbers vary by dimension because although the 
same questions were asked of each interviewee, some team leaders were more 
forthcoming than others.  Also, a number of points were recorded from the ‘any other 
comments’ field in the questionnaire. 
Bus Unit MoD/Industry 1. Creativity 2. Stability 3. Communication 4. Reliability 5. Quality Total 
MoD 11 8 9 21 14 63  
Land Industry 18 14 10 13 11 66 
MoD 15 19 8 21 11 74  
Sea Industry 16 20 14 22 9 81 
MoD 39 52 39 59 46 235  
Air Industry 35 43 41 40 22 181 
Totals  135 158 124 180 118 700 
 
Figure 3.8.  Qualitative Data Statistics 
 
5.7 Business Reports 
At the end of each research phase, a report was provided to the Director General 
responsible for that group of relationships.  An example of the Sea Business Report 
which summarises the findings from the relationships in that area is at Appendix 4.  
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Note that the qualitative data has been sorted in descending order of confidence 
(rated according to the parent relationship dimension score) so that positive 
comments have stronger feelings the higher the percentage value whereas for 
negative points, the reverse is the case.  A copy of the final report to the DLO HQ 
which summarises the findings from all three Business Units is at Appendix 5.  
Subsequent feedback on the utility of the research to the businesses has been 
extremely positive.   
 
The next Section identifies the limitations of the adopted methodology so that the 
value of the results can be properly judged.  
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6 Limitations of the Methodology 
The philosophical approach to the research described in Section 2 sets the scene for 
the research project design.  As such the combination of quantitative and qualitative 
is inevitably a compromise between the extremes of imposing rationality on the data 
collection and interpretation and, allowing the data to emerge and speak for itself.  
Care has been taken through the adopted design and methodology to ensure that 
the data collected is as consistent and a ‘known quantity’ as possible – see Section 9 
at the end of this Chapter.  Nevertheless, as stated in sub-Section 2.12, this is not 
always possible to fully achieve.  The 2 main limitations of the methodology used for 
this project are highlighted below and although considerable efforts were made to 
minimise their impact on the overall validity of the research, it is of course impossible 
to do this completely.  However, as long as the methodological shortfalls are borne in 
mind when assessing the results, then the true value of the research project will not 
be diluted (Perry, 1999). 
 
Perhaps the most serious limitation was the researcher himself.  A 32 year career in 
military logistics provides an inevitable cultural imprint comprising a very direct, 
objective-driven, logical approach to a fairly specialised type of supply chain 
business.  This could not help but create a certain mindset that needed to be both 
accepted and understood.  As far as it was possible to overcome this limitation, it 
was achieved by taking a very deliberate, open-minded stance combined with 
greater criticality.  Furthermore, at every reflection point it was important to examine 
ones observations and conclusions carefully to identify those that may have been 
coloured by the researcher’s background.  Moreover, a deeper reading of the 
literature was necessary to ensure that private sector concepts were thoroughly 
understood together with their implications for the research.  A further allied problem 
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was the proximity of the researcher to the UK Defence Procurement business due to 
his senior position (Director) within the organisation.  As a result his independence 
from the phenomenon of interest and objectivity must be questioned.  However, 
taking a predominantly positivist approach i.e. understanding that it is possible to 
stand back from the research situation (Hirschman, 1986), and being constantly 
aware of the need to maintain this stance, allowed the limitation to be overcome to 
some extent.  The position of the researcher within Defence Procurement could 
possibly be seen as ‘on-side’ by the UK MoD organisations studied and as ‘a 
customer who must not be upset’ by Industry people.  To counter this problem the 
importance of objectivity to ensure that the research findings provided each side of a 
business relationship with value was stressed, as was the assurance of complete 
confidentiality.  Furthermore, it was emphasised throughout that the research was 
the personal work of the researcher backed by the reputation of Cranfield University.  
In practice during the semi-structured interviews it was found that both sides 
appeared to be relieved to have someone they could confide their problems to or 
were proud to be able to explain their success to an independent party.  As a result, 
at no time was it sensed that the position of the researcher was felt to be associated 
with the ‘establishment’ and this was born out by the fact that both sides appeared to 
be equally honest and forthcoming.  It is very difficult however, to make the same 
assertion about the questionnaire inputs.  Considerable effort was made to design 
neutrality into the questionnaires, both in the questions themselves and in the 
instructions for their completion.  Apart from in the Pilot Project, the respondents had 
no contact whatsoever with the researcher so this might allow the assumption that 
he did not directly influence the responses.  Nevertheless, it must be a possibility 
that customers will naturally be more reticent about criticising their customers (power 
bias) than vis-a-versa and overall, Firm respondents were 8% more optimistic than 
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the MoD.  Although this does not correlate with the semi-structured interviews 
experience, it is impossible to rule out this as a source of bias in this research.   
 
A second limitation was that the data capture, for reasons of time and resource 
constraints, took place over a 14 months period and thus the organisation sample 
was not fixed within a consistent historical frame of reference.  Such a situation may 
concern all management researchers, especially since the pace of change today is 
rapid and unrelenting in all fields of business and their environments.  It is like 
looking out into the universe and attempting to fix a point when everything is in 
motion including yourself.  This problem has been rationalised in this project in 2 
ways.  Firstly, UK Defence Procurement monopoly contracts are, due to the 
technical nature of the equipment, complex, long-term and therefore relatively stable.  
Thus the impact of political, structural and organisational change on basic contract 
relationships takes time to have a noticeable effect – it is essentially a medium-term, 
permeation phenomenon.  Secondly, turbulence within the UK Defence Procurement 
business environment is now the norm and individual business units have become 
adept at managing within it so, as a background influence it can be largely 
discounted.  Both assumptions were validated by a question posed at the end of 
each interview conducted – see Appendix 2.  Nevertheless, it was important to 
remain vigilant to the possibility of any event, such as a firm becoming insolvent or 
subject to take-over, which might be the exception to these rules. 
 
To counterbalance the inevitable drawbacks associated with the researcher’s own 
position within the field of view, his personal experience and senior position allowed 
completely un-fettered access both to the very large MoD organisation and to its 
many industrial partners which allowed unprecedented insights to be gained.  It also 
allowed a very efficient and effective research programme to be run that completed 
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the data collection in less than 18 months.  In conclusion, no methodology is perfect 
and the researcher needs to maintain clarity of purpose and flexibility whilst 
navigating through the reefs and rapids of his project.  Fundamental to this 
achievement is constant awareness of one’s own interests and those of the 
respondents affected by the research (Easterby-Smith et al, 1991).  
 
The next Section describes the analysis design. 
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7 Analysis Design 
7.1 Overview of Requirements 
The overall requirement of the data analysis in this thesis is to allow the Research 
Question and supporting questions to be addressed.  The analysis therefore 
considers the questionnaire data and the qualitative points from semi-structured 
interviews in order to draw conclusions about the theoretical framework’s ability to 
explain, in Supply Chain Management, Relationship Marketing and Transaction Cost 
Economics theoretical terms, the business-to-business relationships within UK 
Defence Procurement.   It also intends to provide an objective description of the 
quality of those relationships across the UK Defence Logistics Organisation and to 
amplify this picture with a distillation of best and worst practice.  The latter 
information will be of particular interest to managers who wish to gain practical 
insights on how to improve their business relationships within UK Defence 
Procurement.  Since the data is populate rather than a sample, the analysis does not 
require inferential statistics.   
7.2 Introduction to Analysis Approaches 
The data analysis design therefore takes a two-fold approach.  Firstly it concentrates 
on building a ‘picture’ of business relationship performance from each individual 
Integrated Project/Industry pairing through the Sea, Land & Air Business Units to the 
overall Defence Logistics Organisation situation by aggregating quality 
measurements for each of the theoretical dimensions.  In effect this is a multiple 
questionnaire/interview design using replication logic (Sapsford, 1999).  The findings 
are displayed using simple comparative graphics.  The qualitative data is then sorted 
by dimension and examples are extracted and used to highlight the reasoning for the 
numerical findings.  The second approach considers the range of relationships that 
are revealed by the quantitative data with the objective of creating and describing a 
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relationship typology.  In this case a Cluster Analysis technique and cross-tabulation 
to external variables are used in an exploratory mode, and the qualitative data is 
sorted by grouping to allow the findings to be highlighted.   
 
7.3 Analysis Tools – Dimensional Quantitative Data 
Linked Microsoft Excel spreadsheets were used to record the base data and to 
provide the aggregation facility.  The structure is shown in Figure 3.9.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.9. Dimensional Quantitative Data Analysis Spreadsheet Hierarchy 
 
Standard format graphics were designed to accompany the spreadsheets at each 
level and examples of the design are shown in Appendix 3.    The Likert Scale 
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responses for each scale item from each informant were counted and processed to 
generate percentages for each major construct.  As per the design of the 
questionnaire scales, clear positive or negative responses were sought (see sub-
Section 4.8) and a relationship was deemed to be successful if each of the 5 
constructs generated a mean score of 50% or better in favour.  The percentages 
were not tied to specific degrees of perception but, provided a scale of relativity 
(Sapsford, 1999).  These percentages were carried forward and aggregated 
(covering both 1st and 2nd order constructs – the dimensions and the questions 
grouped under them) for each successive organisational level of analysis.  An 
example is shown in Appendix 4.  The overall theoretical framework was populated 
with the aggregated mean percentage success/failure scores as shown in exemplar 
form at Figure 3.10 and with actual results in Chapter 4, Figure 4.5. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.10.  Specimen Relationship Success Summary 
 
Finally, the full range of results from the 54 relationships surveyed was subjected to 
a Standard Deviation test using SPSS v 11.0 in order to measure their dispersion 
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around the mean and to determine whether they fitted the Normal distribution pattern 
in which around 68% of cases would fall within 1 SD and around 95% within 2 SD 
(Sapsford, 1999).  The actual results are plotted in Chapter 4, Figure 4.7. 
 
7.4 Analysis Tools – Relational Quantitative Data 
In addition to mapping the quantitative data onto the dimensions of the theoretical 
framework (described in sub-Section 7.3), the research also sought patterns within it 
to determine if business relationships could be characterised within a typology.  To 
this facilitate this approach Cluster Analysis (described below) was used to 
determine if logical groupings existed and then cross-tabulation with a number of 
external categories (variables) were attempted (see sub-Section 5.4) to further 
define them. 
7.4.1 Cluster Analysis 
Cluster Analysis is a family of techniques used to partition a set of objects into two or 
more groups based on the similarity of the objects for a set of specified 
characteristics (Everitt et al, 201, Hair et al, 1984, Kaufman & Rousseeuw,1990).  
More specifically, Cluster Analysis can be used in the following ways: 
• Classification. The most traditional use of cluster analysis has been for 
exploratory purposes and the formation of a taxonomy; an empirically based 
classification of objects. But cluster analysis can also generate hypotheses 
related to the structure of the objects. Although viewed principally as an 
exploratory technique, cluster analysis can be used for confirmatory 
purposes. If a proposed structure can be defined for a set of objects, cluster 
analysis can be applied, and a proposed typology (theoretically based 
classification) can be compared to that derived from the cluster analysis. 
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• Data simplification. In the course of deriving a taxonomy, cluster analysis 
also achieves a simplified perspective on the observations. Whereas factor 
analysis attempts to provide ‘dimensions’ or structurer to variables, cluster 
analysis performs the same task for observations.  
 
• Relationship identification. With the clusters defined and the underlying 
structure of the data represented in the clusters, the researcher has a means 
of revealing relationships among the observations. 
7.4.2 The Cluster Analysis Process 
Most approaches to cluster analysis first create a table of relative similarities or 
differences between all objects (for this research relationship dimension scores) and 
then use this information to combine the objects into groups (Hair et al, 1984).  The 
table of relative similarities is called a similarity matrix. The method of combining 
objects into groups is called a clustering algorithm.  The idea is to combine objects 
that are similar to one another into separate groups and the numbers in the table are 
measures of similarity or differences between the observations.  The distances 
between objects are found by using the Squared Euclidean Distance where the 
matrix Distance (x,y) = Σi (xi - yi)2.  The next step is to divide the objects into groups 
based on the distances.  A hierarchical approach is taken using an agglomerative 
method where each object or observation starts out as its own cluster and in each 
subsequent step, the two closest clusters (or individuals) are combined into a new 
aggregate cluster, thus reducing the number of clusters by one in each step. In 
some cases, a third individual joins the first two in a cluster.  In others, two groups 
of individuals formed at an earlier stage may join together in a new cluster. 
Eventually, all individuals are grouped into one large cluster but, any member of a 
cluster can trace its membership in an unbroken path to its beginning as a single 
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observation.  Hierarchical clustering methods do not require preset knowledge of the 
number of groups.  Within agglomerative hierarchical procedures there are different 
calculation methods available for computing the distance between subgroups at 
each step in the clustering algorithm.  These include Single Linkage, Complete 
Linkage, Average Linkage the Centroid Method and Ward's Method (Hair et al, 
1984).  The latter has been selected for this research because it appears to be 
the most preferred for management research and because it has the fewest 
inherent biases.  In Ward's Method, the distance between two clusters is the sum 
of squares between the two clusters summed over all variables. At each stage in 
the clustering procedure, the within-cluster sum of squares is minimized over all 
partitions (the complete set of disjoint or separate clusters) obtainable by com-
bining two clusters from the previous stage. 
7.4.3 Cluster Characterisation 
The agglomeration table was first plotted as a graph using Microsoft Excel V XP 
(2002) to allow the ‘break point’ at which the least number of consistent clusters was 
identified.  The statistical PC package SPSS For Windows V11.0 (Sep 2001) was 
then used to analyse the data based upon this number of clusters and the output 
was the significance (p) of the linkage between the cluster and each external 
variable.  All probabilities reported were based upon two-tailed tests as each 
comparison had 2 possible directions: Significant = 0.05> p < 0.001 (Sapsford, 
1999).  The clusters were first subjected to cross-tabulation tests against external 
variables and then described graphically using ‘spider diagrams’ and figuratively 
using the qualitative data.  The results of this analysis are described in Chapter 4, 
Section 8 and associated Appendices. 
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7.5 Analysis Tools – Qualitative Data 
A Microsoft Access V XP (2002) database was created to allow the qualitative data 
to be recorded and analysed.  A view of an input screen is shown at Figure 3.11. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.11.  Best Practice Database Input Screen 
 
As the project progressed additional flags and labels were added such as a 
Confidence Level linked to the dimension score for that relationship and, categories 
keyed to relational factors such as trust to allow increasingly sophisticated analysis 
as the possibilities of the data occurred to the researcher.  Selecting records by 
dimension and IPT or Firm enabled typical records to be chosen to support the 
dimensional quantitative data analysis and, sorting the database by identified 
clusters supported the relational quantitative data analysis phase.  The next Section 
identifies a number of important ethical issues associated with the research project. 
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8 Ethical Issues 
In its Code of Conduct regarding Research Activities, the Cranfield School of 
Management specifies the rule of always aspiring to subject ideas to the most 
stringent and appropriate tests and to draw conclusions only from within the context 
of the data and well-founded theory (Cranfield SOM, 2002).    This must include the 
need for researchers to make their own biases known (AMJ, 1992).  Furthermore, all 
research activity must consider its consequences on the communities served by it 
and especially to ‘preserve and protect the privacy, dignity, well-being and freedom 
of research participants’ (Cranfield SOM, 2002, Sapsford, 1999).  Ethics in the 
research context especially involves the responsibilities of more powerful people 
over those who are less powerful and can manifest itself in a number of different 
ways (AMJ, 1992).  Certainly one is a clash between personal and professional 
interests where the researcher might betray the confidence of a junior respondent to 
his organisation in the desire to obtain information (Easterby-Smith et al, 1991).   
 
The ethical responsibility for not publicising or revealing information that might harm 
the interests of less powerful individuals or organisations was a central plank in this 
project (Sapsford, 1999).  This was because of the personal beliefs of the researcher 
and because a lapse would spoil the professional reputation of the project and limit 
further co-operation from the organisations being examined.  For these reasons 
informed consent was obtained from all respondents (Sapsford, 1999), raw data was 
carefully safeguarded and individual business relationships were only revealed at the 
aggregate level to the senior managers concerned (Cranfield SOM, 2002). 
 
The decision about what data was collected and how it was recorded and interpreted 
provided a further ethical issue because it was quite possible that the researcher 
could skew the outcome to suit his own ends (Easterby-Smith et al, 1991).  In this 
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research, the provision of accurate reports to the team leaders of the groups of 
respondents, both from the results of the questionnaire and semi-structured 
interviews, ensured that data summaries were placed in the open to allow feedback 
to be provided and informed agreement to participate in the research to be given 
(Cranfield SOM, 2002).  Finally, the unfolding research was subjected to third-party 
review (AMJ, 1992) by the researcher’s supervisor and review committee and by a 
senior, jointly chaired forum comprising 30 senior MoD policy makers (The 
Partnering Steering Support Group) and the same number of Defence Industry 
directors that was established to support the development of DLO partnering 
techniques.  The latter met every 6 months, the researcher was invited on 4 
occasions to present the evolution, conduct and results of his research and, as well 
as receiving valuable feedback was able to influence policy development.  
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9 Conclusion 
This Chapter has laid an audit trail that allows the reader to follow the justification for 
the type of research selected and to confirm that the correct procedures were 
followed.  A cross-check between the crucial research design factors that affect, 
validity and generalisability is provided at Figure 3.12. 
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Figure 3.12.  Reliability, Validity, Generalisability Cross Reference Matrix 
 
The next Chapter describes the research results. 
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Chapter 4 
Analysis of Data 
1 Introduction 
1.1 Overview 
This thesis has introduced the business background to the research in Chapter 1.  
Chapter 2 described a review of appropriate literatures, highlighted specific gaps that 
supported the formulation of a Research Question (RQ) and supporting Questions 
(Q1, Q2, Q3, Q4) and finally presented a theoretical framework for research.  
Chapter 3 justified and described the chosen methodology and provided assurance 
that appropriate procedures were followed and in particular, Section 7 detailed the 
approach to the data analysis.  This Chapter presents the pattern of results and 
analyses them for their relevance to the research questions.  The full data analysis 
that links quantitative and qualitative data to the theoretical dimensions is provided in 
summary form with associated appendices to take the reader through the detail.  The 
data analysis deliberately does not draw general conclusions because of the need to 
separate the results from the discussion of their significance in order to preserve 
objectivity (Perry, 1998).  Chapter 5 will therefore discuss the findings within the 
context of the literature.  An overview of the structure of Chapter 4 is at Figure 4.1. 
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Figure 4.1.  Chapter 4 Structure 
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1.2 Phase 1: Theoretical Framework – High Level View 
The theoretical framework (Q4) is the foundation of the research methodology 
because its suitability as a ‘lens’ with which to examine the selected problem is a key 
test within the thesis.  Section 4 therefore considers the high level, aggregated, 
quantitative data when overlaid onto the framework and its suitability to answer Q4.  
Subsequent analysis phases examine the data in greater detail. 
1.3 Phase 2: Dimensional Data Analysis 
The Dimensional phase examines the data in detail when viewed through each of 
the theoretical framework’s 5 dimensions.  Because of the close affinity between the 
Theoretical Framework (Q4) and Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) (Q3), both are 
considered simultaneously in Section 5 and in Appendix 7.  Next, and in turn, the 
results are examined to show how they reveal relational perspectives on Supply 
Chain Management (SCM) (Q1) in Section 6 and in Appendix 8 and, Relationship 
Marketing (RM) (Q2) in Section 7 and in Appendix 9.  Although it is acknowledged 
that extremes of response exist at the individual respondent or relationship level, in 
this exploratory research an aggregated level of evidence is described using overall, 
mean satisfaction scores.  In each Section at the detailed level appropriate 
qualitative data is used to illustrate the 5 dimensions.  In the cases of SCM and RM 
emergent categories are used to group the managers’ key comments and are 
compared with those from the literature.  Aggregated mean scores from individual 
questionnaire questions are also used to explore these perceptions.     
1.4 Phase 3: Relational Data Analysis 
The Relational phase in Section 8 seeks further patterns within the data using cluster 
analysis in order to seek a typology from the body of relationships examined.  This 
element of the analysis contributes directly to satisfaction of the Research Question 
Chapter 4  170 
  
(RQ) in terms of being able to describe more fully the character of relationships in 
UK Defence Procurement. 
1.5 Chapter Conclusion 
Finally in Section 9, the threads are drawn together and the overall results are 
presented in terms of the RQ.  
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2 The Research Subjects 
In order to set the scene for a presentation of the data collected in this thesis, it is 
first useful to recapitulate the research approach (described in detail in Chapter 3) 
and highlight the research subjects (described in detail in Chapters 1 and 3).  The 
focus of the study in this study is the relationship between the UK MoD and Industry 
within the predominantly monopolistic UK Defence Procurement market conditions.  
In order to allow a significant piece of research to be completed the study has 
concentrated on a self-selected census of monopolistic relationships within the 
Defence Logistics Organisation of the UK MoD.  The basic level of data capture is 
individual relationships between equipment support Integrated Project Teams (IPTs) 
procuring spares, repairs and services for in-use weapon systems within the UK 
MoD Land, Sea and Air business units and their industrial suppliers.  It is based on a 
self-selected census of monopolistic business relationships.  The data is thus 
populate rather than a sample and the analysis does not require inferential statistics.  
The research instruments were designed around the 5 dimensions of the conceptual 
framework described in detail in Section 4 of Chapter 3.   Questionnaires (see design 
at Appendix 1) were returned from a cross section of knowledgeable staff including, 
logisticians, engineers, commercial, finance, project managers and business 
developers on each side.  The data were then aggregated up to business unit level 
and thence to a single, Defence Logistics Organisation perspective as described in 
Chapter 3, Section 7.  The statistical data was supplemented by semi-structured 
interview, key point data collected from the team leaders in each relationship pair.  
The design details for the qualitative data capture are described in Chapter 3, 
Section 4 and Appendix 2, the implementation in Chapter 3, Section 5 and the 
analysis in Chapter 3, Section 7. 
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The data collection phase of the study, fully described in Chapter 3, Section 5, took 
place with the full support of all organisations involved and was especially timely 
because it coincided with the beginning of a change in strategic direction towards 
increasing co-operation and partnership.  However, the UK MoD Commercial Policy 
staffs had initially to be persuaded to give special dispensation because they 
normally did not support perception surveys with industry on the grounds that these 
might prejudice the UK MoD’s contractual position.  Moreover, a number of 
companies were initially wary of participating, not wishing to contravene UK MoD’s 
commercial rules on surveys.  Finally, feedback of the survey results via short 
reports to each relationship pair, business unit grouping and to the Director of 
Defence Logistics Organisation together with a CD-ROM distribution of the 
qualitative data in a Best Practice database, were extremely well received. 
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3 Presentation of Results – The Data Structure 
This Section introduces the quantitative and qualitative data in order to describe their 
structure and components and, to show how they will be analysed in the rest of the 
Chapter.   
3.1 Quantitative Data 
The table at Figure 4.2 provides a high level overview of the quantitative data.  It 
shows the mean percentage relationship approval scores derived from the 
questionnaire respondents for each of the 54 relationships examined by the 
research.  The table has been sorted in ascending order on the positive overall 
percentage scores for each relationship tested (right hand column) and colour 
highlighted to shows there is a spectrum of relationship quality from very poor (32%) 
to very good (98%).  Within each relationship shown in Figure 4.2 a breakdown of 
data for each theoretical framework dimension is also provided.  The ‘-’ and ‘+‘ 
columns indicate negative (dissatisfaction) and positive (satisfaction) responses.  
The mean values for each dimension are calculated and located in the bottom row of 
the table.  This high level, aggregated data will be portrayed in comparative graphics 
and used primarily in: 
• Section 4: Analysis Phase 1: Q4 The Theoretical Framework (High Level 
Perspective). 
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1. Creativity 2.  Stability 3. Communication 4. Reliability 5. Quality Overall Serials 
- + - + - + - + - + - + 
1 72 28 100 0 43 57 72 28 54 46 68 32 
2 77 23 26 24 52 48 74 26 47 53 65 35 
3 44 56 56 44 67 33 83 17 60 40 62 38 
4 60 40 62 38 60 40 79 21 43 57 61 39 
5 71 29 63 37 49 51 72 28 40 60 59 41 
6 64 36 68 32 55 45 66 34 41 59 59 41 
7 58 42 71 29 30 70 76 24 44 56 56 44 
8 58 42 63 37 28 62 75 25 43 57 56 44 
9 65 35 48 52 43 57 69 31 50 50 55 45 
10 78 22 67 33 18 82 45 55 50 50 52 48 
11 51 49 33 67 59 41 50 50 39 61 46 54 
12 44 56 54 46 33 67 56 44 44 56 46 54 
13 48 52 57 43 48 52 52 48 24 76 46 54 
14 46 54 50 50 31 69 58 42 42 58 45 55 
15 39 61 65 35 32 68 58 42 33 67 45 55 
16 12 88 65 35 61 39 45 55 37 63 44 56 
17 50 50 58 42 36 64 60 40 14 86 44 56 
18 38 62 47 53 37 63 56 44 41 59 44 56 
19 42 58 44 56 43 57 57 43 29 71 43 57 
20 45 55 47 53 42 58 51 49 28 72 43 57 
21 50 50 50 50 14 86 47 53 43 57 41 59 
22 26 74 47 53 42 58 51 49 35 65 40 60 
23 36 64 62 38 45 55 34 66 23 77 40 60 
24 37 63 48 52 34 66 53 47 27 73 40 60 
25 44 56 51 49 33 67 50 50 20 80 40 60 
26 37 63 51 49 21 79 55 45 28 72 38 62 
27 31 69 33 67 36 64 45 55 43 57 38 62 
28 40 60 42 58 32 68 37 63 45 65 37 63 
29 29 71 34 66 36 64 50 50 45 65 37 63 
30 20 80 52 48 37 63 46 54 20 80 35 65 
31 33 67 32 68 54 46 31 69 16 84 33 67 
32 23 77 40 60 40 60 48 52 23 87 33 67 
33 31 69 25 75 32 68 27 73 43 57 32 68 
34 27 73 48 52 22 78 36 64 22 78 31 69 
35 19 81 17 83 57 43 35 65 21 79 30 70 
36 29 71 31 69 39 61 24 76 26 74 30 70 
37 20 80 36 64 27 73 37 63 19 81 28 72 
38 36 64 37 63 6 94 34 66 25 75 28 72 
39 19 81 42 58 36 64 30 70 7 93 27 73 
40 31 69 25 75 29 71 40 60 7 93 26 74 
41 18 82 14 86 44 56 32 68 17 83 25 75 
42 19 81 33 67 18 82 35 65 14 86 24 76 
43 24 76 31 69 28 72 27 73 8 92 23 77 
44 12 88 33 67 27 73 28 72 5 95 21 79 
45 16 84 19 81 29 71 17 83 21 79 20 80 
46 6 94 17 83 26 74 14 86 12 88 15 85 
47 23 77 13 87 11 89 14 86 10 90 14 86 
48 13 87 10 90 30 70 7 93 6 94 13 87 
49 12 88 21 79 21 79 7 93 4 96 13 87 
50 0 100 17 83 36 64 10 90 0 100 12 88 
51 6 94 15 85 6 94 17 83 5 95 10 90 
52 6 94 7 93 5 95 2 98 3 97 5 95 
53 0 100 0 100 0 100 10 90 7 93 3 97 
54 2 98 0 100 2 98 0 100 7 93 2 98 
overall> 36 64 44 56 32 68 46 54 27 73 36 64 
 
 
Figure 4.2.  Joint Mean Scores by Relationship and Dimension with Range Limits 
Highlighted 
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3.2 Quantitative Dimensional Data 
Detailed data was also captured for each questionnaire construct and this will be 
analysed in detail using comparative graphics as follows: 
• Section 5: Analysis Phase 1: Q4 – The Theoretical Framework (Detailed 
Perspective) & Analysis Phase 2: Dimensional Q3 Transaction Cost 
Economics.  These 2 elements are linked because of the Transaction Cost 
Economics common denominator. 
• Section 6: Analysis Phase 2: Dimensional Q1 Supply Chain Management. 
• Section 7: Analysis Phase 2: Dimensional Q2 Relationship Marketing.        
3.3 Quantitative Relational Data 
The bar graphs at Figures 4.3 and 4.4 show the overall percentage scores plotted for 
the relationships in the data table at Figure 4.2 and show more graphically the 
relationship spectrum uncovered by the research. The following Sections explore the 
significance of these data in the context of the research question as follows:  
• Section 4: Analysis Phase 1: Q4 The Theoretical Framework (High Level 
Perspective). 
• Section 8: Analysis Phase 3: Relational RQ The Research Question.  
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3.4 Qualitative Data 
In Sections 5, 6 and 7 the detailed data analysis is segmented using the relationship 
categories that emerge from the qualitative data under each of the 5 theoretical 
framework dimensions and TCE/SCM/RM applicability as listed in Appendix 6.  At 
the beginning of each of these Sections the emergent groupings of managers key 
comments are compared with those found in the literature.  In Section 8 the 
segmentation is by relationship cluster as shown in Appendix 11.  The quantitative 
data that pertains to each category is then displayed and illustrated by representative 
semi-structured interview key point quotations selected from the qualitative data. 
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4 Analysis Phase 1: Q4 The Theoretical Framework (High Level 
Perspective)  
4.1 Approach 
This Section examines in the light of the research data the question:  
• Q4 – Can the TCE Organisations Failure Framework be used as a 
theoretical lens with which to view monopolistic relationships within UK 
Defence Procurement?  
It first considers the high level summary statistics superimposed on the theoretical 
framework and notes that patterns emerge.  It then concludes with a summary of the 
key findings. 
 
4.2 Q4 - High Level Perspective 
Using the methodology described in Chapter 3 sub-Section 7.3 and especially Figure 
3.10, the mean success scores for both UK MoD and industry for each of the 5 
dimensions of the framework (drawn from the overall figures at the bottom of Figure 
4.2) are illustrated at Figure 4.5.  The research approach merely exposes the 
situation found within the Defence Procurement relationships examined.  Because 
Williamson’s (1975) Organisations Failure Framework has not been tested in this 
way before, no comparison can be made with a non-monopolistic situation and these 
results must stand alone until further research has been carried out.  
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Figure 4.5.  Overall Conceptual Framework Results by Dimension 
 
As can be seen, the overall outcome is positive (64%).  This is contrary to the 
potential expectations of a model derived from Williamson’s (1975) Economic 
Organisations Failure Framework which appears to expect a negative situation due 
to the essential untrustworthiness and self-seeking of ‘economic actors’.  A more 
detailed breakdown of the results is shown in the comparative graphics at Figure 4.6.  
This allows the pattern of results (mean success and failure scores by dimension) to 
be compared at the level of the focus of the study, which is the relationship between 
the UK MoD and its industrial partners both individually and jointly.  These data will 
be examined in greater detail in the rest of this Chapter.  
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Figure 4.6.  Comparative Views of Relationship Statistics 
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When all the relationship success statistics from the right hand column of Figure 4.2 
are plotted in a histogram, as shown in Figure 4.7, the results generally follow the 
shape of the Curve.   
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 Figure 4.7.  Standard Deviation Plot (SPSS 11.0) 
 
• The unweighted pattern (each area contained a different number of relationships 
surveyed: Land – 6, Sea – 10, Air – 38) of joint results from the Land, Sea and 
Air business units is shown in Figure 4.8.  A marked similarity in the shape of 
each graph can be seen.  At the relationship level the pattern was replicated in 
42 out of 54 (77.7% - SPSS 11.0).  Given that the relationship results follow a 
normal distribution as shown in Figure 4.5, it is deduced that the pattern shown 
in Figure 4.8 is a natural occurrence rather than a product of the design of the 
data collection instrument.  This indicates that the self-selected census used as 
a research population is a Normal Distribution where, in this case 64.4% of 
cases, fall within one standard deviation of the mean and this suggests a 
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commonality of respondents’ views across the 5 dimensions regardless of 
business grouping. 
Results by Business Unit
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Figure 4.8.  Comparison of Overall Business Unit Result Patterns 
 
Demonstrates that regardless of Business Unit or number of relationships 
 similar dimensional score patterns occurred 
 
4.3 Key Findings 
Phase 1 has overlaid the research data, at a high level, onto the theoretical 
framework in order to answer supporting research Question 4 
Q4 – Can the TCE Organisations Failure Framework be used as a theoretical 
lens with which to view monopolistic relationships within UK Defence 
Procurement? 
The following general observations can be made from a visual inspection of the high 
level results in the charts at Figure 4.6 and 4.8: 
• IPTs were less optimistic (59%) than Firms (67%).  Analysis of this situation 
shown in Figure 4.9. indicates that this difference is not statistically significant 
with a high correlation factor of 0.928 (Sapsford, 1999). 
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Figure 4.9.  Correlation of IPT & Firm Responses (MS Excel) 
 
However, as mentioned in Chapter 3 Section 6, no explanation could be found 
for the difference in perception although, power bias could not be ruled out, it is 
thus likely that further research into the phenomenon would prove interesting. 
• With the exception of Reliability where there was a divergence of views and, 
although the proportions were different, the pattern of results for each side was 
the same, which indicates a measure of agreement. 
• The wave shaped pattern of the research results indicates a commonality of 
respondents’ views across the 5 dimensions regardless of business grouping. 
 
It is concluded that when a high level view is taken of the findings derived from the 
adopted research methodology, the research administration and the various data 
collected, the TCE Organisations Failure Framework offers a robust perspective of 
the field of interest. 
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5 Analysis Phase 1: Q4 The Theoretical Framework (Detailed 
Perspective) & Analysis Phase 2: Dimensional Q3 Transaction 
Cost Economics  
5.1 Introduction 
This Section remains with Q4: 
• Q4 – Can the TCE Organisations Failure Framework be used as a 
theoretical lens with which to view monopolistic relationships within UK 
Defence Procurement? 
to consider it at the detailed level but, because of their clear theoretical linkage, it 
also broadens out the perspective to include the question: 
• Q3 – Can factors within Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) such as Asset 
Specificity and Opportunism explain the dynamics within monopolistic UK 
Defence Procurement relationships?  
5.2 Data Analysis 
The thesis now examines these questions in the light of the research results for each 
of the 5 theoretical framework dimensions as shown below together with the 
definition from Williamson’s (1975) Organisations Failure Framework (note that in 
order to retain a flow of the salient arguments, the detailed data analysis is located in 
Appendix 7): 
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5.2.1 Bounded Rationality (Relationship Creativity); People have only so 
much capacity to rationalise what is going on around them and they 
therefore naturally limit their performance to the adequate rather than 
the optimum (Simon, 1957) (see also Chapter 3, 4.2).  Full analysis found 
in Appendix 7, Section 2. 
Under this dimension aspects of bounded rationality and a lack of investment in 
specific assets are clearly featured in the relationships surveyed.  However, it 
appeared that more creative features such as equity and customer-focused flexibility 
were more dominant and bore out the overall dimension mean success score of 
64%. 
5.2.2  Uncertainty/Complexity (Relationship Stability); People have difficulty in 
making sense of complex current and future events (Williamson, 1975) 
(see also Chapter 3, 4.3).  Full analysis found in Appendix 7, Section 3.  
Although respondents views for this dimension were evenly balanced (56%) between 
the negative, monopolistic relationship features and the more successful aspects, 
the generally more pessimistic IPT views over the lack of relationship-stabilising 
behaviour of their partners was evident.  In the face of Uncertainty/Complexity acting 
on the monopolistic relationships a lack of interdependence-promoting actions and 
short-termism appeared to be prevalent amongst Firms.  Nevertheless, both sides 
acknowledged the need for clear, joint objectives and co-operation as means of 
achieving interdependence and reducing costly governance measures. 
5.2.3 Information Impactedness (Communication); The imbalance caused by 
selective information disclosures, and distortions which are difficult or 
expensive to verify at the time and which undermine the durability of 
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contract arrangements (Williamson, 1975) (see also Chapter 3, 4.4).  Full 
analysis found in Appendix 7, Section 4. 
Some aspects of information impactedness such as deliberate withholding important 
business data, the use of proprietary rights as a weapon and confusion over 
performance measures were clearly discernible in the survey.  Nevertheless, there 
are also more positive features in evidence such as routine all-level communications, 
special communication events and staff exchanges.  On balance adverse 
monopolistic features appeared to be outweighed by the more positive aspects found 
in normal markets and this was borne out by the dimension’s overall 68% mean 
success score. 
5.2.4 Opportunism (Relationship Reliability); Constitutes a lack of candour or 
honesty and includes self-interest seeking with guile.  (Williamson, 1979) 
(see also Chapter 3, 4.5).  Full analysis found in Appendix 7, Section 5.  
Dimension 4 gained the lowest overall mean success score (54%) in the survey.  
Although IPTs mentioned some satisfactory aspects of interdependence achieved 
through joint investment in relationship-building, the low rating was primarily because 
IPTs believed that Firms behaved opportunistically in providing poor service by 
taking advantage of their monopolistic market position. 
5.2.5 Small Numbers (Relationship Quality); The combination of problem 
behaviours requires sophisticated controls that are only found in or 
close to the firm and may result in failure of market conditions 
(Williamson, 1979) (see also Chapter 3, 4.6).  Full analysis found in 
Appendix 7, Section 6.  
Despite asking overt questions about the quality of monopolistic relationships, 
dimension 5 gained the highest joint mean score (73%) in the survey.  There were 
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comments about the hopelessness of the monopoly impasse situation, especially 
from the IPTs side but these were generally outweighed by more optimistic views 
about striving to turn round poor situations and an acceptance that making the best 
of the situation was preferable to the negative alternative.  The following IPT remark 
is salient: 
‘They have a monopoly but they also depend upon us for 95% of their business.  We 
have developed a symbiotic relationship’ (149). 
The large gap in the scale of optimism appeared to be in the areas of sharing gains, 
feelings of imprisonment and lack of long-term outlook. 
 
The Key Findings that emerged from the detailed data analysis described in 
Appendix 7 are summarised in the next sub-Section. 
 
5.3 Q3 Key Findings 
This Section has analysed the research data to discover evidence of satisfaction of 
the following question: 
• Q3 – Can factors within Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) such as Asset 
Specificity and Opportunism explain the dynamics within monopolistic UK 
Defence Procurement relationships? 
The following Key Findings drawn from Appendix 7 appear to support an affirmative 
answer: 
• Under each dimension both positive and negative TCE features were found.  
Although the negative aspect in each dimension predicted by the theoretical 
framework tended to predominate, others were also in evidence. 
• Firms complained that there was insufficient investment in specific assets such 
as a stable work force and product/process development and, that performance 
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measures were inadequate and provided insufficient motivation to achieve 
equitable outcomes. 
• IPTs were concerned that their monopoly situation lacked interdependence and 
locked them into unsatisfactory relationships.  They accused Firms of 
opportunistically taking advantage by providing poor goods and services and, 
using proprietary information as a weapon.  In these cases there appeared to be 
little incidence of trust other than at the cynical or calculative level.   
• On the other hand as the overall quantitative theoretical model success score 
suggests, there were counterbalancing examples of relationship-building, 
specific investments, co-operative behaviour, open communications and a desire 
to reduce the burden of governance through more equitable, long-term 
arrangements. 
• A variety of governance types were encountered and commented upon in the 
qualitative data.  Older relationships were based upon regulation and although 
some were successful, the majority was not and team leaders were loath to 
adopt long-term contracts until they could trust the other party to deliver an 
efficient service.  Respondents were generally very enthusiastic about newer 
relational, long-term contracts but in one case where the arrangement had been 
in place for 5 years, considerable problems were being encountered in trying to 
adjust to unforeseen environmental turbulence.    
5.4 Q4 (Detailed Perspective) Key Findings 
This Section has analysed the research data to discover evidence at the detailed 
level of satisfaction of the following question: 
• Q4 – Can the TCE Organisations Failure Framework be used as a 
theoretical lens with which to view monopolistic relationships within UK 
Defence Procurement? 
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The following Key Findings drawn from Appendix 7 appear to support an affirmative 
answer: 
• Utilisation of a monopoly theoretical framework allows detailed data patterns and 
specific negative and positive relational features to be identified and explained 
using an appropriate, associated terminology.   
• The level of granularity, down to individual questionnaire questions and by IPTs 
and Firms, allows a very clear view of perceptions, especially when linked to 
typical examples of the qualitative data. 
• The richness of meaning within the theoretical framework’s dimensions allows a 
very detailed ‘lens’ to be used to examine the research data.  
 
The next Section presents the findings from a Supply Chain Management 
perspective. 
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6 Analysis Phase 2: Dimensional Q1 – Supply Chain Management 
6.1 Introduction 
SCM concentrates on practical management systems including procurement that 
provide a framework for the business.  This Section addresses the following 
research question: 
• Q1 – Can SCM partnering activities, processes and requirements from the 
commercial environment, such as those encapsulated in Figure 2.8, 
provide an understanding of the monopolistic relationships found within 
UK Defence Procurement? 
It seeks examples of partnership-enhancing or other SCM activities from the 
qualitative and quantitative data within each theoretical framework dimension (note 
that in order to retain a flow of the salient arguments, the detailed data analysis is 
located in Appendix 8).   
6.2 Data Analysis 
Data was not found exactly on the features listed in Chapter 2, Figure 2.8 but the 
emergent classification of qualitative comments recorded in Appendix 8 indicates a 
remarkable similarity and this comparison is shown in Figure 4.10 below.  
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Figure 2.8 Features Matching Qualitative Data Categories 
Framework contracting Framework Contracting (App8,2.2) 
Commercial Understanding (App8,3.3) 
Corp culture matching Equality & Understanding (App8,6.3) 
Long term cost/investment sharing Relationship Development (App8,6.2) 
Information sharing Working Level Communication (App8,4.5) 
All level management Business Practices (App8,5.4) 
Frequent, interactive communications Management Communication (App8,4.2) 
Joint planning Planning & Control (App8,2.3) 
Cross firm controls & co-ordination – teams Joint Activity & Organisation (App8,2.5) 
Joint service level systems Customer Focus (App8,3.2) 
Service Delivery (App8,2.4) 
Technology sharing & product development Service/Product Focus (App8,5.3) 
Joint problem solving Co-operative Activities (App8,3.4) 
Joint quality systems Quality & Continuous Improvement 
(App8,5.2) 
Linked IS – e-commerce  
Joint performance measurement Supply Chain Performance (App8,4.4) 
Joint logistics & purchasing roles Supply Chain Planning (App8,4.3) 
Joint marketing  
 
Figure 4.10.  Comparison of Supply Chain Partnership-Enhancing Activities  
(Chapter 2, Figure 2.8) with Qualitative Data Categories (App=Appendix) 
 
The findings that emerged from the detailed data analysis described in Appendix 8 
are as follows.  
6.2.1 Dimension 1 – Bounded Rationality (Relationship Creativity).  Full 
analysis found in Appendix 8, Section 2. 
The qualitative data suggests that within monopolistic UK Defence Procurement 
successful relationships occur when innovative contracts exist, which reduce costs 
and promote customer focus.  Furthermore, organisational arrangements that 
promote consistency and performance are also valued.  However, it appears that 
both deliberate and unconscious expediency often come into play that reduce 
relationship effectiveness.  The balance of data bears out the overall dimension 
mean success score of 64%. 
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6.2.2 Dimension 2 – Uncertainty/Complexity (Relationship Stability).  Full 
analysis found in Appendix 8, Section 3. 
Forward-looking, holistic partnering arrangements supported by customer-focussed, 
supply chain-bolstering activities were detected.  However, there were a similar 
number of instances of negative approaches such as insular practices, disruptive 
organisational changes and short-term strategies that promoted rather than 
countered the adverse effects of uncertainty and complexity.  These views matched 
the overall positive dimension mean score of only 56%. 
6.2.3 Dimension 3 – Information Impactedness (Communication).  Full 
analysis found in Appendix 8, Section 4. 
Overall the research revealed that the importance of Supply Chain communication 
was understood and efforts were being made to improve.  This is born out by the 
overall dimension success mean score of 68%.  But, there were very few examples 
where integrated measures were in place and good results were being achieved.  
Some instances of information impactedness and lack of transparency due to the 
monopolistic situation were detected but, the practical difficulties of providing regular, 
management focus on order book performance through the use of joint performance 
measurement and service level systems appeared to be the key problems. 
6.2.4 Dimension 4 - Opportunism (Relationship Reliability).  Full analysis 
found in Appendix 8, Section 5. 
A number of positive SCM aspects such as quality ethos, service delivery and 
process improvement can be observed in the data.  However, this dimension scored 
the lowest success mean rate in the research project (54%) and it is possible to see 
that environmental limitations on time, budget and investment and, product technical 
complexity and age had a strong bearing on the monopolistic business environment 
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under scrutiny.  It is also evident that instances of opportunistic behaviour were 
prompted as reactions to these features. 
6.2.5 Dimension 5 – Small Numbers (Relationship Quality).  Full analysis 
found in Appendix 8, Section 6. 
This dimension provided the best overall mean success score (73%) in the 
theoretical framework but although there is some evidence of working together in the 
best interests of relationships, the majority of semi-structured interview comments 
were negative.  As already mentioned in sub-Section 4.3, although the gap in 
quantitative response perceptions between the IPTs and the Firms was not 
statistically significant with a high correlation factor of 0.928, the gap between the 
quantitative scores and the overall tone of the qualitative data was inexplicable and it 
is suggested that further research would be useful.  Finally, adverse points where the 
sides felt trapped and at the mercy of the other sides’ budgetary and commercial 
vagaries especially epitomise concerns about monopolist business and support the 
low quantitative results in 2nd level dimension Q5a. 
6.2.6 The SCM/Small Numbers Correlation 
An emergent finding is that difficulties of implementing SCM appear to be a standard 
feature of the business relationships examined just as is the monopolistic 
environment.  Figure 4.11 below shows the correlation of the mean joint scores for 
the Reliability (SCM efficiency) and Quality (Small Numbers) dimensions from 
Chapter 4, Figure 4.2.  The correlation factor of 0.804 is not statistically strong 
(Sapsford, 1999) however, visual inspection of the scatter chart seems to indicate 
some relationship between the dimensions which suggests that further research to 
understand the reasons for any linkage would be useful. 
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Figure 4.11.  Correlation Showing Relationship Between SCM & Small Numbers (MS 
Excel) 
 
The Key Findings that emerged from the detailed data analysis described in 
Appendix 8 are summarised in the next sub-Section. 
 
6.3 Q1 Key Findings 
This Section has analysed the research data to discover evidence of satisfaction of 
the following question: 
• Q1 – Can SCM partnering activities, processes and requirements from the 
commercial environment, such as those encapsulated in Figure 2.8, 
provide an understanding of the monopolistic relationships found within 
UK Defence Procurement? 
The following Key Findings drawn from Appendix 8 appear to support an affirmative 
answer: 
• The use of the theoretical framework dimensions provided focussed comparators 
against which to gauge the range of SCM relational features. 
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• The categories of Supply Chain Partnership-Enhancing Activities found in the 
research generally accorded with those found in the literature for ‘normal’ 
markets.   
• The underlying struggle to implement SCM principles such as seamless service 
delivery systems backed by joint planning, clear performance objectives and 
measurement and, freely available data was detected.  Also similar to open 
market situations, evidence of sincere intentions outweighed successfully 
implemented examples. 
• Adversarial behaviour, as one might expect to find when viewed through 
Williamson’s (1975) Organisations Failure Framework, such as deliberately 
withholding information, unrealistic performance expectations, short-termist 
commercial policies and unco-operative product strategies were identified. 
• Environmental problems such as old products, obsolescence, staff and 
organisational upheavals, poor end-customer visibility and lack of investment in 
modern procedures and systems seemed to accentuate managers’ frustrations 
due to lack of freedom of action and promoted the relationship negativity implied 
by the theoretical framework. 
• Although the correlation between SCM efficiency and Small Numbers appears to 
be statistically uncertain (0.804), visually there appears to be a link.  This would 
be a potentially interesting area for further research.  
 
In order to reinforce the findings in Section 5, this Section has also analysed the 
research data to discover evidence at the detailed level of satisfaction of the 
following question:  
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• Q4 – Can the TCE Organisations Failure Framework be used as a 
theoretical lens with which to view monopolistic relationships within UK 
Defence Procurement?  
The following Key Findings drawn from Appendix 8 appear to support an affirmative 
answer: 
• Utilisation of a monopoly theoretical framework allows detailed data patterns and 
specific negative and positive relational features to be identified and explained 
using an appropriate, associated terminology.   
• The level of granularity, down to individual questionnaire questions and by IPTs 
and Firms, allows a very clear view of perceptions, especially when linked to 
typical examples of the qualitative data. 
• The richness of meaning within the theoretical framework’s dimensions allows a 
very detailed ‘lens’ to be used to examine the research data. 
 
The next Section presents the findings from a Relationship Marketing perspective. 
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7 Analysis Phase 2: Dimensional Q2 – Relationship Marketing 
7.1 Introduction 
Relationship Marketing concentrates on the relationship variables that help to build 
and sustain successful business-to-business relationships.  This Section addresses 
the following research question: 
• Q2 – Can RM behavioural variables, especially those shown in Figure 2.16, 
provide an understanding of the monopolistic relationships found within 
UK Defence Procurement? 
In order to retain a flow of the salient arguments, the detailed data analysis is located 
in Appendix 9.  
7.2 Data Analysis 
In broad outline, a good correlation between the RM behavioural variables portrayed 
in Chapter 2, Figure 2.16 and the categories of qualitative data found in the research 
was found although the importance of Personal Relationships was not highlighted in 
the literature.  This is shown below in Figure 4.12. 
Figure 2.16 Variables Emergent Qualitative Data Categories 
Culture Change 
Adaption & Communication 
Interdependence, Power & Conflict 
Long Term Orientation 
C3 Behaviour 
Commitment 
Trust 
• C3 Behaviour (App9,2.2, 3.2, 4.2, 5.2) 
• Commitment (App9,2.3, 5.5, 6.3) 
• Adaption (App9,3.3, 4.3, 5.3, 6.2) 
• Personal Relationships (App9,3.4, 4.4, 7.5.6) 
• Customer Focus (App9,3.2) 
• Corporate Culture Matching (App9,3.5) 
• Long Term Orientation (App9,3.6, 4.5) 
• Trust (App9,5.4, 6.5) 
• Power Balance (App9,6.4) 
• Interdependence (App9,6.6) 
 
Figure 4.12.  Comparison of RM Behavioural Variables (Chapter 2, Figure 2.16) with 
Qualitative Data Categories (App=Appendix) 
 
The findings that emerged from the detailed data analysis described in Appendix 9 
are as follows. 
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7.2.1 Dimension 1 – Bounded Rationality (Relationship Creativity).  Full 
analysis found in Appendix 9, Section 2. 
The qualitative data suggests that within monopolistic UK Defence Procurement 
relationships Commercial attitudes and practices are both a source of frustration and 
the key to good partnerships – overall satisfaction mean score 64%.  Moreover, 
although there is evidence of long running relationships, lack of commitment to ‘walk 
the talk’ also contributes to short-termism and bounded rationality. 
7.2.2 Dimension 2 – Uncertainty/Complexity (Relationship Stability).  Full 
analysis found in Appendix 9, Section 3. 
The data highlights the problems of staff turnover, short-term commercial practices, 
the importance of culture change and the difficulty of establishing a long-term 
approach to business partnerships.  The importance of C3 Behaviour and Adaption 
are particularly emphasised but it is noticeable that respondents were especially 
sceptical about the sincerity of the other’s intentions.  Lastly, the significance of 
softer facets such as personal relationships and culture matching were emphasised.  
The positive and negative responses within this dimension were evenly balanced 
and bear out the overall 56% mean success score. 
7.2.3 Dimension 3 – Information Impactedness (Communication).  Full 
analysis found in Appendix 9, Section 4. 
A RM view of this dimension highlights the personal, co-operative attitude to frequent 
and interactive communication – overall satisfaction mean score 68%.  It also 
reveals the bitterness engendered by adversarial approaches, which ignore the 
important requirements of information exchange for risk reduction and effective 
planning. 
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7.2.4 Dimension 4 - Opportunism (Relationship Reliability).  Full analysis 
found in Appendix 9, Section 5. 
The RM perspective of the Relationship Stability dimension indicates that although 
enthusiasm exists, practical obstructions within C3 Behaviour and Adaption on 
commercial and operations activities prevent the achievement of satisfactory 
business outputs.  Opportunistic behaviour such as adversarial bidding and hidden 
agendas appears to suppress the Trust and Commitment success scores.  Overall, 
the generally negative qualitative data support the quantitative findings that present 
this dimension with the lowest success mean score of 54%. 
7.2.5 Dimension 5 – Small Numbers (Relationship Quality).  Full analysis 
found in Appendix 9, Section 6. 
The balance of comments made by respondents on the aspects of this dimension 
were predominantly negative, which is in contrast to the more favourable view 
portrayed through the quantitative data (73%).  There are clear examples of 
constructive conflict, maintaining a healthy balance of power and investment in 
relationship development and support measures.  However, IPTs generally felt 
threatened by the monopoly situation where they perceived unbalanced power, lack 
of interdependence and poor commitment from the other side.  Lack of long-term 
funding for projects and investment in systems appeared to exacerbate the ‘small 
numbers’ impoverishment of business relationships. 
 
The Key Findings that emerged from the detailed data analysis described in 
Appendix 9 are summarised in the next sub-Section.  
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7.3 Q2 Key Findings 
This Section has analysed the research data to discover evidence of satisfaction of 
the following question: 
• Q2 – Can RM behavioural variables, especially those shown in Figure 2.16, 
provide an understanding of the monopolistic relationships found within 
UK Defence Procurement? 
The following Key Findings drawn from Appendix 8 appear to support an affirmative 
answer: 
• The use of the theoretical framework dimensions provided focussed comparators 
against which to gauge the range of RM relational variables. 
• The RM behavioural variables observed in the research were closely similar to 
those identified in the literature. 
• Strong positive and negative views were expressed on C3 Behaviour and 
Adaption where the parties struggled with the practical aspects of relationship 
operations. 
• The negative influences of the monopolistic business environment, including 
power balance and interdependence, appeared to significantly reduce scores for 
the key Trust and Commitment variables. 
• The importance of Personal Relationships, Corporate Culture Matching and 
Long Term Orientation to the creation of a successful business environment 
were clearly emphasised. 
 
In order to reinforce the findings in Section 5, this Section has also analysed the 
research data to discover evidence at the detailed level of satisfaction of the 
following question:  
Chapter 4  202 
 
• Q4 –  Can the TCE Organisations Failure Framework be used as a 
theoretical lens with which to view monopolistic relationships within UK 
Defence Procurement?  
The following Key Findings drawn from Appendix 8 appear to support an affirmative 
answer: 
• Utilisation of a monopoly theoretical framework allows detailed data patterns and 
specific negative and positive relational features to be identified and explained 
using an appropriate, associated terminology.   
• The level of granularity, down to individual questionnaire questions and by IPTs 
and Firms, allows a very clear view of perceptions, especially when linked to 
typical examples of the qualitative data. 
• The richness of meaning within the theoretical framework’s dimensions allows a 
very detailed ‘lens’ to be used to examine the research data.  
 
The next Section presents the research findings from the more focused perspective 
of relationships characteristics and shows how they contribute to answering the RQ. 
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8 Analysis Phase 3: Relational 
8.1 Introduction 
Whereas the last few Sections explored the data in the widest context of the 
theoretical model dimensions, this Section presents the research findings from the 
more focused perspective of relationships characteristics.  It thus addresses the first 
part of the RQ: 
• RQ – To determine if it is possible to obtain an understanding of the 
monopolistic relationships within UK Defence Procurement using 
Williamson’s Organisations Failure Framework and to identify how SCM, 
RM and TCE relational and behavioural factors influence these 
relationships.  
As described in Chapter 3, sub-Section 7.4, cluster analysis was used in this 
research to determine whether similarities within the relationships measured 
(patterns within the data) might allow statistically coherent groupings to be revealed 
and if possible, characterised and amplified by using the qualitative data. The 
identification of groupings, or cluster, of similar relationships would also allow 
exploratory cross-tabulations with independent variables and further add to the 
richness of characterisation. 
  
This Section first describes the statistical outputs from the cluster analysis and 
describes the conclusions that can be drawn from it.  It then discusses the findings 
from the external variable cross-tabulations.  Having proposed that clusters are 
present in the data and that conclusions can be drawn from the cross-tabulation of 
independent variables, the Section then considers each cluster in-turn and describes 
it using inferences from the statistical analysis as well as general themes that 
emerge from the qualitative data.  Finally, overall conclusions are drawn. 
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8.2 Cluster Analysis Results Overview 
The statistical outputs from the cluster analysis are in Appendix 10.  The 
Agglomeration Table in Figure A10.1 and Coefficients/Cluster Mapping in Figure 
A10.2 show that 4 generic clusters of relationships were identified to a 95% 
confidence level.  The Descriptive Source Statistics Table at Figure A10.3 is also 
provided for information. A visual examination of the relationship clusters suggests 
they equate quite closely to good, moderate and poor success groupings.  This 
finding indicates that the original instrument design was satisfactory in that it enabled 
a consistent data set to be collected.    The clusters have been labelled as follows:  
Good - Cluster 1, Moderate Clusters 2a & 2b (although they are broadly similar, the 
2nd contains an especially low reading in one particular dimension and the sub-
groupings are thus worth differentiating), Poor – Cluster 3.  They have also been 
given descriptive titles based upon the generalistic attitude that typified them from 
the respondents key points. 
8.3 External Variables 
A number of external variables were selected and described in Chapter 3, sub-
Section 5.4.  The Cross Tabulation Table at Figure A10.4 provides a 95% or better 
confidence level that there are, or are not positive links between the relationship 
clusters and the external variables.  Both states (link or no link) are interesting in 
terms of this research and the results are described as follows: 
8.3.1 Spend Value  
Result: The lower the spend value the more likely the relationship would be 
successful.  This finding has face validity in that the variable, potentially, is indicative 
of less complex relationships which may be easier to manage.  This also correlates 
with findings in the exploration of the generic data such as in sub-Section 5.3 where 
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factors including lack of investment in specific assets and old, problematic products 
tended to generate adversarial behaviours as a consequence of managers’ 
frustrations from the lack of options available in their small numbers situation  
8.3.2 Relationship Duration   
Result: The medium and short length relationship durations tended to be more 
successful.   No link was established between relationship success and the longer 
duration relationships.  These findings are difficult to explain.  It might be expected 
that longer relationships would reach a maturity of trust and C3 behaviour and thus a 
better level of satisfaction.  Conversely, as products get older they become more 
difficult to sustain technically and less profitable to the Firm.  It is thus possible that 
there are a number of complex drivers that impact on these relationships as a result 
of duration and that more research is needed to better understand the situation.   
8.3.3 Team Size   
Result: No significant impact was measured on relationship success.  This is 
unexpected because one might surmise that smaller teams find it easier to establish 
and maintain better supply chain relationships because of the need to maintain fewer 
personal relationships.  However, other independent variables could also apply such 
as duration, complexity and spend.  This research deliberately took an wide, 
exploratory approach and it was felt that a multi-variate analysis was too detailed.  
The interrelationship of team size with other variables thus requires further research. 
8.3.4 Technology Age   
Result: No link between the age of the technology and the quality of relationships 
was found.  This is surprising given that longer duration relationships were less 
successful.  It might have been expected that older technology would be more 
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difficult and expensive to support and therefore apply strain to the relationship.  
However, statements in the qualitative data also suggested that good relationships 
could exist because they had been established over many years.  In conjunction with 
Relationship Duration and Spend Value, it is concluded that further research is 
needed to determine how these factors affect relationship quality. 
8.3.5 System or Component 
Result:  No link was found between the complexity/size of the product and the 
relationship Clusters.  It might have been expected that the larger, more complex 
product relationships such as aircraft and tanks might, due to the size and difficulty 
of the management task, be less successful that relationships dealing with 
components such as hydraulic motors.  This issue requires further research to 
understand.   
8.3.6 Contractors’ League 
Result: The more successful relationships were found to contain firms occupying the 
MoD’s top spend banding.  This does not contradict the findings on Spend Value 
because a variety of spend relationships were found with firms occupying a variety of 
MoD spend bandings.  This is understandable because the higher banded firms are 
the largest and thus have more resources to devote to the delivery of their services 
and their relationship management arrangements.  The lack of linkage to firms within 
the other 5 bands is inexplicable and requires further research to understand. 
8.4 Independent Variable Cross Tabulation Conclusions 
This analysis has offered a number of useful insights that assist with characterizing 
the relationship clusters however; it also indicates that the impact of the independent 
variables is far more complex than originally envisaged and specialized research is 
needed to understand the interactions. 
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8.5 Cluster Characterisations 
The data for each cluster has been represented by means of a Spider Diagram 
(Excel V. XP 2002) with the 5 theoretical dimensions located at the radials.  In order 
to put each cluster into context, a second plot in each diagram was drawn to show 
the mean of the other clusters.  In addition to the graphical representation and the 
results of the independent variable cross tabulation analyses, summarised views of 
the managers from the qualitative data are next used to describe each of the 
relationship clusters in turn.  To facilitate this process, during analysis the qualitative 
data was sorted by cluster grouping with the appropriate theoretical dimensions 
annotated to each comment.  The data table is provided in Appendix 11.  The 
quotations used below to typify the views of managers and illustrate each cluster are 
a selection from each identified cluster in Appendix 11.  It is observed that the 
relationship clusters generally align with the sorted views of respondents in the 
quantitative data which is a further indication of confidence in the research design 
and implementation. 
8.6 Cluster 1: ‘No can dos’ (Poor Relationships)  
Cluster 1 contains 10 relationships that represent the lowest quality group as shown 
in Figure 4.13 below. 
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Figure 4.13.  Poor Quality Relationships Grouping 
 
The trace indicates a level of satisfaction well below the mean of the other clusters 
with only the Quality (52%) and Communication (54%) dimensions approaching the 
level of the mean.  From the independent variable cross-tabulations these 
relationships were likely to be higher spending and longer duration (>20 years) and, 
less likely to contain firms from the top banding of MoD Suppliers.  Potentially one 
would thus expect adversarial conditions to apply with perceptions that efforts to 
improve or gain better equity were unrequited. It is also likely that in this cluster a 
high number of negative features as typified by the theoretical framework might be 
found.  Using the qualitative data these relationships are typified by the following 
types of statements: 
 
What the IPTs say: 
‘We are under great pressure to reduce our costs but the firm takes advantage of its 
sole supplier position by over-charging for proprietary items’. 
'Take it or leave it’ is their attitude.   
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‘We both realise that the only way forward is to partner but the firm has had its own 
way for so long that it is very reluctant to change’.   
‘Its ethos is rooted in the past’. 
‘They drag their feet over product improvements because they know greater 
reliability will reduce their earnings on repairs’. 
We have regular order progress meetings but they never fulfil their promises or reply 
to our requests for information’. 
‘We feel we are making all the moves to improve the relationship but they are not 
reciprocated’. 
 
What the Firms say: 
‘The IPT doesn’t know what it wants so how can we react properly to their 
requirements’.   
‘They don’t have a focus in their organisation to deal with us either.  We offered them 
a terminal from our system so they could check progress but their security people 
turned it down’. 
‘They provide no information so we can plan ahead’. 
‘The uncertainty makes it hard to concentrate on customer service’.   
‘I haven’t even met the end-customer’.   
‘At the lower levels their staff aren’t well trained’.   
‘It’s galling to know my people know more about their jobs than they do’.   
‘When we first got our teams together we put all the issues on the wall and agreed to 
change the relationship; they now seem to have forgotten all their good intentions’. 
 
Although there are some comments about poor supply chain practices and 
processes there is also evidence of adversarial behaviour as a result of the small 
numbers situation.  Feelings of ‘imprisonment’ and ‘impotence’ exacerbated by long 
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term lack of co-operation seem to have resulted in an ongoing situation of 
entrenched opposition to any form of innovation.  As predicted, the qualitative data 
does indicate efforts being made to seek improvements (unless these were just 
‘cries for help’ for the benefit of the researcher) but, lack of reciprocation is clear and 
this is often attributed to a ‘take it or leave it’, ‘no can do’ attitude.  In conclusion, 
Cluster 1 appears to provide a fairly close fit to the negative behavioural predictions 
of the theoretical framework. 
8.7 Cluster 2a: ‘Stable pragmatists’ (Moderate Relationships)  
Cluster 2a contains 22 relationships and represents the first and larger of 2 Moderate 
quality groups.  The spider diagram is shown in Figure 4.14 below.   
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Figure 4.14.  Moderate Quality Relationships Grouping 
 
The trace indicates a level of satisfaction just above the mean of the other clusters 
with only the Communication dimension just below this level.  From the independent 
variable cross-tabulations these relationships were likely to be in the middle of the 
spending bracket, less likely to be in the top banding of MoD Suppliers and of more 
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medium and short (1-19 yrs) durations.  Potentially one would expect greater 
incidence of C3 and reciprocity in these relationships with a more even balance of 
small numbers and normal supply chain operating difficulties.  Using the qualitative 
data these relationships are typified by the following types of statement: 
 
What the IPTs say: 
 
‘Their attitude is ‘we are world leaders, if you want our products you pay our prices’’.   
‘Although they know full well we can’t source their products elsewhere, the 
relationship is still amicable’.   
‘They recently attempted to modernise their business but they are very traditional 
and there was much in-built resistance to change’.   
‘Because our organisations are quite small it’s important to be realistic with our 
relationship improvement expectations’.   
‘They are a bit like us; evolutionary, quality-oriented, resource-capped and not full of 
management-speak.  They are almost fun to deal with!’ 
 
What the Firms say: 
‘We are a ‘static organisation’ that hopes the world will change round us’.   
‘We pride ourselves on the quality of our people who maintain the good relationship 
with the IPT but because of our small size we can only do so much’.   
‘We constantly have to build new relationships with the IPT because of their high 
staff turnover; this is very wasteful in resources’.   
‘Although we have done much to jointly set up objective performance measures they 
are poor at setting priorities and often cancel tasks without notice’. 
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As expected there is a range of views but the expressions of positive pragmatism 
appear to predominate.   The small numbers situation is openly acknowledged as a 
limitation on management freedom but, does not seem to deadlock the relationship 
as occurred in come cases in Cluster 1.  Culture-matching appears to have taken 
place which has engendered a sense of ‘being in the same boat’ and ‘stable 
pragmatism’.  Moreover, many of the problems mentioned appeared to be those 
normally associated with the effective implementation of SCM.  
8.8 Cluster 2b: ‘Evolving pessimists’ (Moderate Low Performance 
Relationships)  
Cluster 2b is shown in Figure 4.15.  It represents a second, smaller, Moderate  
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Figure 4.15.  Moderate Quality Relationships Grouping 
 
quality group of 12 relationships.  However, although the satisfaction level 
proportions and levels are generally very similar to Cluster 2a, overall this group is 
slightly less satisfied than Cluster 2a and the trace specifically indicates an 
especially low level in the Reliability dimension (45%).  The overall independent 
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variable cross-tabulation features of this cluster are the same as those of Cluster 2a.  
However, it is likely that operating problems such as Supply Chain complexity, 
inherent difficulties in predicting customer requirements and either cultural or 
financial obstacles to process/facility improvements are apparent and generally 
reducing the overall relationship satisfaction level.  Using the qualitative data these 
relationships are typified by the following types of statements: 
 
What the IPTs say: 
‘They never plan ahead, they are always reactive, and they promise much at the 
meetings but deliver very little in practice’.   
‘They often sit on work for 2-3 years and refuse to deliver the goods’.   
‘Their spares ordering point just seems to add more delay’.   
‘They don’t seem to have the resources to chase their sub-contractors who let them 
down’.   
‘We have given them numerous formal warnings but they seem to have no effect’.   
‘They have a long term ethos of failure and still behave like a nationalised company’. 
 
What the Firms say: 
‘We seem to constantly fight fires; there seems to be no planning’.   
‘They don’t seem to realize we have production schedules and cannot stop 
everything to satisfy their instant requirement’.   
‘They quibble over pennies and then take months to agree to the price’.   
‘There is a gulf in perception between the sides over performance, which also 
extends to the front line’.   
‘Without a common understanding of how we are doing and what we must achieve 
we cannot move forward’. 
 
Chapter 4  214 
 
The comments from both sides do not appear to wholly support the hypothesis 
based upon operating difficulties.  Although there are indeed statements on poor 
Supply Chain practices there also appears to be statements that link back to the 
adversarial attitudes found in Cluster 1 such as perception and cultural  differences 
and, a lack of will to be co-operative.  It is thus possible to hypothesise that Cluster 
2b is a development phase between Poor and Moderate quality relationships where 
although the will to co-operate is growing – ‘evolving pessimists’, the ability to 
translate this into reliable, Supply Chain services has yet to develop.  It would be 
interesting to carry out further specific research to explore this idea.   
 
8.9 Cluster 4: ‘Successful integrators’ (Good Relationships)  
Cluster 4 represents the Good quality group of 10 relationships as shown in Figure 
4.16 below.  The trace indicates a level of satisfaction well above the mean. 
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Figure 4.16.  Good Quality Relationships Grouping 
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of the other clusters.  From the independent variable cross-tabulations these 
relationships were likely to be lower spending, in the top banding of MoD Suppliers 
and of more medium and short (1-19 yrs) durations.  These relationships are likely to 
contain high levels of interdependence, C3 behaviour, information sharing and 
innovation resulting in efficient, effective supply chains focused on customer 
requirements.  Using the qualitative data these relationships are typified by the 
following types of statements: 
 
What the IPTs say: 
‘We have a win-win, 5 year, indexed, firm price contract’.   
‘This takes the drama out of re-negotiations and incentivises quality because rejects 
come out of profits’.   
‘The contract contains simple, obvious, open performance measures that were 
agreed by all including the end-customer’.   
‘We thus don’t have a contract monitoring team because it creates distrust and adds 
cost and we can all concentrate on customer-service’.   
‘The same team that did the negotiations now runs the business so there was an 
added incentive to get them right’.   
‘Every month we have a free exchange of data, which includes forecasts of future 
activity’.   
‘Interpersonal relationships are excellent; we all know and trust each other; this is a 
key success factor’.   
‘Although we have no choice in this relationship, by building trust and working hard 
to secure joint benefits, it is a pleasure to operate’. 
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What the Firms say: 
‘We provide a full service at the customer’s operating base where we integrate with 
the military personnel’.   
‘Transparency between all parties and a simple, framework contract which simplifies 
our joint operation free us to encourage one another to achieve higher levels of 
successes.   
‘Our partnering arrangement works really well because of the excellent mix of 
individuals who really work well together’.   
‘Another important feature is our frequent information exchange but this would be 
more efficient if it was by electronic means’.   
‘We all believe we can make improvements in our performance and are working 
together to achieve them’. 
 
There is evidence of open acknowledgement of the small numbers situation within 
the Good cluster but any opportunistic behaviours are negated by joint concentration 
on the supply chain processes – ‘successful integrators’ - that ensure optimal service 
deliver and mutual benefits. 
 
8.10 Key Findings 
The cluster analysis technique has proved to be a tool that has clearly identified 
richer patterns within the relationships data.  It has allowed specific groupings to be 
identified as shown in Figure 4.17 and described using the sorted qualitative data in 
Appendix 11.  They were further characterised by cross-tabulation to a number of 
external variables.  Some of the cross-tabulations such as Relationship Duration, 
Team Size, Technology Age, System/Component and Contractors’ League 
generated inexplicable results which indicated more complex issues were present.  
Further research would be worthwhile to examine these in greater detail.  The cluster 
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groupings were recognisable sub-divisions of Good, Moderate and Poor 
relationships which enabled description using examples of the qualitative data.  A 
sub-group shown in Figure 4.17 appeared to be a transition stage between the Poor 
and the Moderate clusters where although managers had realised the need to ‘break 
away’ from adversarial behaviours, they had not yet translated their intentions into 
improved business processes and customer benefits.  It is suggested that further in-
depth research would help to understand this potentially interesting linkage situation.  
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Figure 4.17. Clusters by Mean Satisfaction % and Size  
 
(‘Bubble’ size equates to the number of relationships contained in the cluster – 
Good: 10, Moderate 2a: 22, Moderate 2b: 12, Poor: 10) 
 
The results predominately indicate that normal supply chain relationship issues were 
in play within all the clusters as the IPTs and Firms struggled to improve process 
efficiency.  It was also apparent that managers in each cluster were aware of their 
monopoly environment however, it was especially where adverse conditions applied 
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such as poor relationship management and lack of investment in process that small 
numbers dynamics (frustration at limited management options and, adversarial 
behaviours) generated adversarial conditions.  On the other hand, where the 
relationships were able to concentrate on service delivery and long-term, equitable 
benefits sharing, the potential limitations of small numbers were minimised.  These 
findings reinforce those of sub-Section 6.2.6 where visually there appears to be a 
link between SCM efficiency and Small Numbers and further research would be 
useful to explore the phenomenon.  
 
The next Section summarises the findings described in this Chapter and presents 
the overall results in terms of the RQ. 
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9 RQ - The Research Question 
9.1 Introduction 
This Chapter has presented some background information about the research 
subjects and introduced the research data.  It then reflected each of the supporting 
questions in the light of that data.  This concluding Section summarises those 
findings and presents the overall results in terms of the RQ. 
9.2 Q3 Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) & Q4 The Theoretical Framework - 
Conclusions  
The presentation of data with respect to the following questions: 
Q4 – Can the TCE Organisations Failure Framework be used as a theoretical 
lens with which to view monopolistic relationships within UK Defence 
Procurement? 
Q3 – Can factors within Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) such as Asset 
Specificity and Opportunism explain the dynamics within monopolistic UK 
Defence Procurement relationships? 
was accomplished in 2 parts.  Firstly a high level view of the Theoretical Framework 
was taken then, because Transaction Cost Economics is the basis of the 
Framework, both Q3 and Q4 were addressed together at the detailed level.  The key 
findings are as follows: 
9.2.1 Q4 Theoretical Framework (High Level Perspective) 
The following conclusions are evident from the research (sub-Section 4.3): 
• The empirical research found strong evidence within the business environment 
examined that the essentially negative perspective of the theoretical framework 
was not found generally in practice.  The overall perceptual mean success rating 
by both sides was 64%. 
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• A strong pattern of relationship features ran consistently through the statistics 
which indicates a commonality of respondents’ views across the 5 dimensions 
regardless of business grouping. 
• The research revealed an overall gap in perceptions where IPTs were 8% less 
optimistic than Firms.  Statistically this difference was found to be not significant 
however lack of explanation, either a potential indication of power bias or 
otherwise, suggested that further research might be worthwhile. 
• Although the proportions were different, the pattern of results for each side was 
the same, which indicated a measure of agreement across all dimensions. 
9.2.2 Q3 Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) & Q4 Theoretical Framework 
(Detailed Perspective)  
The following conclusions are evident from the research (sub-Sections 5.3 & 5.4): 
• Under each dimension both positive and negative TCE features were found.  
Although the negative aspect in each dimension predicted by the theoretical 
framework tended to predominate, others were also in evidence. 
• Firms complained that there was insufficient investment in specific assets such 
as a stable work force and product/process development and, that performance 
measures were inadequate and provided insufficient motivation to achieve 
equitable outcomes. 
• IPTs were concerned that their monopoly situation lacked interdependence and 
locked them into unsatisfactory relationships.  They accused Firms of 
opportunistically taking advantage by providing poor goods and services and, 
using proprietary information as a weapon.  There appeared to be little incidence 
of trust other than at the cynical or calculative level.    
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• On the other hand as the overall quantitative theoretical model success score 
suggests, there were counterbalancing examples of relationship-building, 
specific investments, co-operative behaviour, open communications and a desire 
to reduce the burden of governance through more equitable, long-term 
arrangements. 
• Although the optimism gap across all dimensions revealed by the quantitative 
results was not statistically significant, it could have resulted from a natural 
reluctance of suppliers to make adverse comments about their customers but 
this was not apparent from the qualitative data collected where Firms’ semi-
structured interview comments were equally hard-hitting.  It is possible that this 
imbalance is a feature of the relationships in the study and would benefit from 
further research to discover the reason why. 
9.2.3 Questions 3 & 4 – Key Findings 
The following conclusion is evident from the research (sub-Sections 5.3 & 5.4): 
• Although negative behaviours indicative of adversarial, monopolistic, 
relationships were detected, they did not predominate and a spectrum of 
behaviours was observed. 
• Utilisation of a monopoly theoretical framework allows high level data patterns 
and specific negative and positive relational features to be identified and 
explained using an appropriate, associated terminology. 
 
9.3 Q1 Supply Chain Management (SCM) Conclusions 
The presentation of data in this sub-Section addressed the following question: 
Q1 – Can SCM partnering activities, processes and requirements from the 
commercial environment, such as those encapsulated in Figure 2.8, provide an 
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understanding of the monopolistic relationships found within UK Defence 
Procurement? 
The following conclusions can be drawn from the data (sub-Section 6.3): 
• The use of the theoretical framework dimensions provided focussed comparators 
against which to gauge the range of SCM relational features. 
• The categories of Supply Chain relationship-enhancing activity found in the 
research generally correlated with those identified in the literature.    
• The underlying struggle to implement SCM principles such as seamless service 
delivery systems backed by joint planning, clear performance objectives and 
measurement and, freely available data was detected.  Also similar to open 
market situations, evidence of sincere intentions outweighed successfully 
implemented examples. 
• Adversarial behaviour, as one might expect to find when viewed through 
Williamson’s (1975) Organisations Failure Framework, such as deliberately 
withholding information, lack of transparency, unrealistic performance 
expectations, short-termist commercial policies and unco-operative product 
strategies were identified. 
• Environmental problems such as old products, obsolescence, staff and 
organisational upheavals, poor end-customer visibility and lack of investment in 
modern procedures and systems seemed to accentuate managers’ frustrations 
due to lack of freedom of action and promoted the relationship negativity implied 
by the theoretical framework. 
• As already mentioned in sub-Section 4.3 the gap in quantitative response 
perceptions between the IPTs and the Firms was statistically not significant.  
However, the gap between the quantitative scores and the overall tone of the 
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qualitative data was inexplicable and would benefit from further research to 
discover the reason. 
• Although the correlation between SCM efficiency and Small Numbers appears to 
be statistically weak (0.804), visually there appears to be a link.  This would be a 
potentially interesting area for further research. 
 
9.4 Q2 Relationship Marketing (RM) Conclusions 
The presentation of data in this sub-Section addressed the following question: 
Q2 – Can RM behavioural variables, especially those shown in Figure 2.16, 
provide an understanding of the monopolistic relationships found within UK 
Defence Procurement? 
The following conclusions can be drawn from the data (sub-Section 7.3): 
• The use of the theoretical framework dimensions provided focussed comparators 
against which to gauge the range of RM relational variables. 
• The RM behavioural variables observed in the research were very similar to 
those identified in the literature. 
• Strong positive and negative views were expressed on C3 Behaviour and 
Adaption where the parties struggled with the practical aspects of relationship 
operations. 
• The negative influences of the monopolistic business environment, including 
power balance and interdependence, appeared to significantly reduce scores for 
the key Trust and Commitment variables. 
• The importance of Personal Relationships, Corporate Culture Matching and 
Long Term Orientation to the creation of a successful business environment 
were clearly emphasised. 
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9.5 RQ Relationships 
The research findings presented so far have answered the supporting questions 
using data analysis that considered the theoretical framework and its 5 dimensions.  
The analysis results in Section 8 considered the 54 relationships surveyed and 
revealed that it was possible to find richer patterns within the data that allowed them 
to be categorised within a typology and, described by means of external variables 
and the qualitative data.  The following conclusions can be drawn: 
• The cluster analysis technique proved to be a useful tool for identifying richer 
patterns within the relationships data.   
• It has allowed specific groupings to be described and further characterised by 
cross-tabulation to a number of external variables.  Some of the cross-tabulations 
such as Relationship Duration, Team Size, Technology Age, System/Component 
and Contractors’ League generated inexplicable results which indicated more 
complex issues were present.  Further research would be worthwhile to examine 
these in greater detail.   
• The cluster groupings were recognisable sub-divisions of Good, Moderate and 
Poor relationships which enabled description using examples of the qualitative 
data.   
• A sub-group shown in Figure 4.17 appeared to be a transition stage between the 
Poor and the Moderate clusters where although managers had realised the need 
to ‘break away’ from adversarial behaviours, they had not yet translated their 
intentions into improved business processes and customer service.  It is 
suggested that further in-depth research would help to understand this potentially 
interesting linkage situation.  
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• The results predominately indicate that normal supply chain relationship issues 
were in play within all the clusters as the IPTs and Firms struggled to improve 
process efficiency.   
• Managers in each cluster were aware of their monopoly environment however, it 
was especially where adverse conditions applied such as poor relationship 
management and lack of investment in process that small numbers dynamics 
(frustration at limited management options and, adversarial behaviours) 
generated adversarial conditions.   
• Where the relationships were able to concentrate on service delivery and long-
term, equitable benefits sharing, the potential limitations of small numbers 
influences were minimised. 
• Although the correlation between SCM efficiency and Small Numbers appears to 
be statistically tenuous (0.804), visually there appears to be a link.  This would be 
a potentially interesting area for further research.   
9.6  RQ Research Question Conclusions 
The methodological approach and captured research data in answer to the 
supporting questions were designed to answer the Research Question: 
RQ – To determine if it is possible to obtain an understanding of the 
monopolistic relationships within UK Defence Procurement using Williamson’s 
Organisations Failure Framework and to identify how SCM, RM and TCE 
relational and behavioural factors influence these relationships.  
and revealed the following key findings: 
• A pattern of results was discernible in the business environment studied. 
• When populated with research data, it was possible to reveal a different 
character of the intrinsically negative theoretical model. 
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• The 1st and 2nd level dimension statistical results provided clear insights into 
behavioural dynamics of the organisations studied when viewed through the 
selected disciplinary, relationship lenses. 
• A relationship view of the data allowed a typology to be identified and the 
groups of relationships to be described.  
• When the statistical results were illustrated with qualitative data, it was possible 
to identify not only what was revealed but also why.  
From an examination of the supporting questions conclusions summarised in this 
Section and the key findings listed above, this thesis concludes that, subject to the 
limitations identified in Chapter 3, the selected suite of theoretical components 
(monopolistic Theoretical Framework, TCE, SCM and RM) provide a comprehensive, 
coherent and insightful approach to the examination of UK Defence Procurement 
monopolistic business-to-business relationships.   
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10 Chapter 4 Conclusion 
This chapter began by offering some background information about the research 
subjects, the IPTs and their industrial partners.  It then introduced the research data 
and presented the results as they exposed the Theoretical Framework (Q4), first at 
the high level and then for each of its 5 dimensions.  Because of the close affinity 
between the Theoretical Framework and Transaction Cost Economics (Q3), Q3 was 
considered simultaneously with Q4 at the detailed stage.  Next, and in turn, the 
results were examined to show how they revealed perspectives on Supply Chain 
Management (Q1) and Relationship Marketing (Q2).  Cluster Analysis results in 
Section 8 considered the 54 relationships surveyed and revealed that it was possible 
to find richer patterns within the data that allowed them to be categorised within a 
typology and, described by means of external variables and the qualitative data.  
Having drawn the threads together of the research findings by satisfactorily 
answering the supporting questions and the RQ, this thesis now moves to its ending 
in the next chapter where general conclusions are drawn and their significance is 
discussed within the context of the literature. 
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Chapter 5 
Conclusions and Implications 
1 Introduction 
This Chapter begins by summarising the research project as a whole from the 
articulation of the business problem, through the identification of gaps in the 
literature reviewed, the postulation of a Research Question (RQ) and supporting 
questions, the design and operationalisation of a data capture programme to the 
presentation of results.  The Chapter next presents the conclusions for each of the 
research questions and the overall problem.  It then examines the findings within the 
context of this and previous research by addressing the contribution to theory as it 
applies to the research problem and the implications for theory within the wider body 
of knowledge.  The Chapter concludes with implications for policy and practice, a 
review of emergent limitations, a summary of conclusions and finally it details the 
implications for further research.  An overview of the structure of Chapter 5 is at 
Figure 5.1.   
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1.1 The Business Problem 
Chapter 1 identified the difficulty experienced by UK Defence Procurement in 
following Government policy by seeking to overcome traditional adversarial attitudes 
and establish long-term partnerships with industrial suppliers within an increasingly 
monopolistic situation.   
1.2 The Literature Review 
Chapter 2 described a review of appropriate literatures seeking to trace the 
development of business-to-business relationships over the last 30 years or so.  The 
influential factors appeared to be a transition from transactional roots to today’s 
relational practices in the face of increasing globalisation and customer 
sophistication.  Furthermore, the development of closer relationships with fewer 
partners suggests parallels with the research environment. 
1.2.1 Supply Chain Management (SCM) 
In Chapter 2, Section 2 the literature review first considered the relational features of 
SCM because this was the business of the researched environment.  The evolution 
of SCM covers Partnership Sourcing, Lean Supply, Supply Chain Networks, SCM 
and, Public Sector Supply Chains.  This body of literature described how the need to 
move away from the adversarial relationships resulting from market dominance 
strategies typified by the Car Industry in 1970s and 80s has lead to more co-
operative strategies to be adopted.  It showed, for those high value, complex supply 
chains, the development of increasingly sophisticated linkages between customers 
and suppliers dependent on a free-flow of information and close, operational co-
ordination could bring improved profitability.  In order to achieve this synergy, firms 
reduced the size of their supplier base and entered into closer relationships where 
less tangible aspects such as commitment and trust played a strong part alongside 
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the contractual arrangements. The literature was however, less specific about the 
problems of effective SCM implementation and the implications of reduced flexibility 
associated with working with fewer partners.  The purchasing role became 
recognised as a strategic relationship management function.  A review of Public 
Sector SCM indicated very similar developments although it needed to be 
recognised that stakeholder arrangements were fundamentally different.  Only 
limited research was available on small numbers situations in the private sector.  
Nevertheless, this provided useful insights into short-term, power interactions 
between major retailers and the governance choices for public utilities.  Overall, the 
literature provided a considerable body of empirical research to support theory which 
could be used to seek comparable results within the UK Defence Procurement 
relationships and, best-practice advice to managers.  However, a gap was identified 
in the area of SCM business-to-business relationships within the very specific 
monopoly situation found within UK Defence Procurement and the following question 
was therefore posed: 
• Q1 – Can SCM partnering activities, processes and requirements from the 
commercial environment, such as those encapsulated in Figure 2.8, 
provide an understanding of the monopolistic relationships found within 
UK Defence Procurement? 
Although SCM offered a pragmatic approach to supply chain business success 
factors, the thesis turned to Relationship Marketing for an in-depth review of key 
relationship variables.  
1.2.2 Relationship Marketing (RM) 
In Chapter 2, Section 3 the thesis next considered RM because this field specifically 
concentrated on the relational dynamics of business-to-business interactions.  Again 
the development of theory from managerial marketing via networked structures 
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through to Marriage analogies, Key Account Management and virtual organisations 
was traced.  Relational variables including trust, commitment, C3 behaviour, long-
termism and power effects were examined.  Although RM was considered by some 
to be an imprecise field, the body of research reviewed provided a number of useful 
empirical findings (albeit generally from only one side of the relationships surveyed) 
that would be useful to the design and implementation of the research and, a clear 
gap emerged in the region of prolonged monopoly relationships.  The following 
question was therefore posed: 
• Q2 – Can RM behavioural variables, especially those shown in Figure 2.16, 
provide an understanding of the monopolistic relationships found within 
UK Defence Procurement? 
Having examined the ‘what’ in SCM and the ‘how’ in RM, the thesis next considered 
the ‘why’ of business relationships in Transaction Cost Economics. 
1.2.3 Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) 
In Chapter 2, Section 4 TCE literature was reviewed because it provided a more 
technical level of analysis of the underlying relational economic factors in contractual 
relationships.  The field showed a trend begun by earlier economists to explain 
contractual relationships in other than market forces terms.  Although TCE 
introduced the human element, this was largely negative and used variables such as 
opportunism, bounded rationality and calculative trust.  Post TCE researchers such 
as Craswell, Granovetter and Kramer, developed more relational concepts that 
tended to converge with those in RM but the links with TCE theory were not always 
clear.  The monopoly phenomenon was considered in some detail but was deemed 
to be either a short-term, market aberration or a choice between governance options.  
Although TCE was supported by a significant body of empirical evidence and 
provided many interesting and useful explanations, which could be targeted in the 
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research, it lacked empirical research that integrated the salient factors within the 
theory and thus provided inadequate answers on sustained monopolistic business 
relationships.  However, Williamson’s (1975) Economic Organisations Failure 
Framework proposed a unified view of the human dynamics within a failing market 
and this allowed the following question to be raised: 
• Q3 – Can factors within Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) such as Asset 
Specificity and Opportunism explain the dynamics within monopolistic UK 
Defence Procurement relationships? 
1.2.4 Theoretical Model & Research Question (RQ) 
In Chapter 2, Section 5 the thesis highlighted the lack of integrated research on 
monopolies within the reviewed literatures and underlined the difficulty of finding an 
appropriate model through which to view UK Defence Procurement relationships.  
Both Porter’s (1980) Five Forces and Cox et al’s (2000) Relation Power Analysis 
considered competition-limiting strategies but appeared to be optimised for use in 
‘normal’/competitive markets.  However, Williamson's (1975) Economic 
Organisations Failure Framework (Chapter 2, Figure 2.29) provided both face validity 
in the research environment and an explanation of the business relationship 
circumstances that could lead to monopoly.  The following question was therefore 
posed: 
• Q4 – Can the TCE Organisations Failure Framework be used as a 
theoretical lens with which to view monopolistic relationships within UK 
Defence Procurement? 
The adoption of a theoretical framework to be used in combination with 3 bodies of 
knowledge led to the definition of the following Research Question: 
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• RQ - To determine if it is possible to obtain an understanding of the 
monopolistic relationships within UK Defence Procurement using 
Williamson’s Organisations Failure Framework and to identify how SCM, 
RM and TCE relational and behavioural factors influence these 
relationships. 
The approach to operationalising a testable theoretical framework and the design 
and implementation of the research programme are covered next.  
1.3 Methodology 
Because the RQ appeared to be an area that has received scant, co-ordinated 
attention from management researchers, in Chapter 3 it was decided that the project 
would essentially be exploratory in nature.  The need to constrain the research to as 
short a period as possible in order to minimise environmental change impacts limited 
the data capture programme to a self-selected census of 54 monopolistic 
relationships representing £575.8m annual spend within the In-Service Support 
portion of the UK Defence Logistic Organisation.  A triangulated data capture 
approach was employed using both quantitative and qualitative methods from the 
Industry and UK Ministry of Defence (MoD) sides of each relationship via staff 
questionnaires and team leader, semi-structured interviews.  The research 
instruments concentrated on the 5 dimensions of the theoretical model with 
questions grounded in the literature fields of interest although; relationship-specific 
data was also captured.  The research programme took place between Oct 2000 and 
Dec 2001 with the full support of the participating UK MoD and Industry 
organisations.  A comprehensive set of data was collected and organised for 
analysis and special attention was devoted to providing feedback to the research 
participants. 
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1.4 Findings 
The quantitative data revealed that the essentially negative Organisations Failure 
Framework was not so in practice with an overall mean success rating of 64%.  
None of the dimensions proved to be negative (<50% mean satisfaction); bounded 
rationality (66%), uncertainty/complexity (59%), information impactedness (66%) 
opportunism (58%) and small numbers (74%).   This pattern of results was also 
noted in each of the Land, Sea and Air survey areas and indicates a common set of 
characteristics across the business in question.  A typology of the 54 relationships 
revealed good, moderate and poor groupings but also a transitional cluster between 
poor and moderate.    Although both Firms and UK MoD Integrated Project teams 
(IPTs) reported characteristic adverse monopolistic relationship features, these were 
generally outweighed by more positive perceptions.  An apparent correlation 
between SCM efficiency and Small Numbers was examined but found to be 
statistically tenuous nevertheless, this could be a potentially interesting area for 
further research.  The qualitative data (semi-structured interview key points) was 
sorted according to the theoretical framework dimensions and when overlaid on the 
quantitative data, it was possible to determine not only the broad statistical trends 
but also some of the underlying reasoning.    
1.5 Conclusion 
This Chapter has begun by summarising the research project as a whole from the 
articulation of the business problem, through the identification of gaps in the 
literature reviewed, the postulation of a RQ and supporting questions, the design and 
operationalisation of a data capture programme and finally, the presentation of 
findings.  The next Section considers each question in turn in the light of the findings.    
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2 Conclusions about the Research Questions and Problem 
2.1 Introduction 
This Section summarises the research findings in terms of the Research Question 
(RQ) and the overall business problem.  It does this in the same logical order in 
which the data was presented and analysed in Chapter 4: the Theoretical 
Framework (Q4), TCE (Q3), SCM (Q1), RM (Q2), Relational Analysis, the Research 
Question (RQ). 
2.2 Qs 3 & 4 Conclusions – Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) & The 
Theoretical Framework 
Because these 2 questions are related by a common theory and provide the overall 
research model, they are treated together. 
• Q4 – Can the TCE Organisations Failure Framework be used as a 
theoretical lens with which to view monopolistic relationships within UK 
Defence Procurement? 
and 
• Q3 – Can factors within Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) such as Asset 
Specificity and Opportunism explain the dynamics within monopolistic UK 
Defence Procurement relationships? 
2.2.1 High Level Q4 – Theoretical Framework (High Level Perspective) 
The following conclusions are evident from the research (Chapter 4, sub-Section 
4.3): 
• The empirical research found strong evidence within the business environment 
examined that the essentially negative perspective of the theoretical framework 
was not found generally in practice.  The overall perceptual mean success rating 
by both sides was 64%. 
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• A strong pattern of relationship features ran consistently through the statistics 
which indicates a commonality of respondents’ views across the 5 dimensions 
regardless of business grouping and sample size. 
• The research revealed an overall gap in perceptions where IPTs were 8% less 
optimistic than Firms.  Statistically this difference was found to be insignificant 
however lack of explanation, either a potential indication of power bias or 
otherwise, suggested that further research might be worthwhile. 
• Although the proportions were different, the pattern of results for each side was 
the same, which indicated a measure of agreement across all dimensions.  
2.2.2 Q3 Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) & Q4 Theoretical Framework 
(Detailed Perspective) 
The following conclusions are evident from the research (Chapter 4, sub-Sections 
5.3 & 5.4): 
• Under each dimension both positive and negative TCE features were found.  
Although the negative aspect in each dimension predicted by the theoretical 
framework tended to predominate, others were also in evidence. 
• Firms complained that there was insufficient investment in specific assets such 
as a stable work force and product/process development and, that performance 
measures were inadequate and provided insufficient motivation to achieve 
equitable outcomes. 
• IPTs were concerned that their monopoly situation lacked interdependence and 
locked them into unsatisfactory relationships.  They accused Firms of 
opportunistically taking advantage by providing poor goods and services and, 
using proprietary information as a weapon.  There appeared to be little incidence 
of trust other than at the cynical or calculative level.   
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• On the other hand as the overall quantitative theoretical model success score 
suggests, there were counterbalancing examples of relationship-building, 
specific investments, co-operative behaviour, open communications and a desire 
to reduce the burden of governance through more equitable, long-term 
arrangements. 
• Although the optimism gap across all dimensions revealed by the quantitative 
results was not statistically significant, it could have resulted from a natural 
reluctance of suppliers to make adverse comments about their customers but 
this was not apparent from the qualitative data collected where Firms’ semi-
structured interview comments were equally hard-hitting.  It is possible that this 
imbalance is a feature of the relationships in the study and would benefit from 
further research to discover the reason why. 
• A variety of governance types were encountered and commented upon in the 
qualitative data.  Older relationships were based upon regulation and although 
some were successful, the majority was not and team leaders were loath to 
adopt long-term contracts until they could trust the other party to deliver an 
efficient service.  Respondents were generally very enthusiastic about newer 
relational, long-term contracts but in one case where the arrangement had been 
in place for 5 years, considerable problems were being encountered in trying to 
adjust to unforeseen environmental turbulence.  
2.2.3 Research Questions 3 & 4 
The following conclusions are evident from the research (Chapter 4, sub-Sections 
5.3 & 5.4): 
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• Utilisation of a monopoly theoretical framework allows high level data patterns 
and specific negative and positive relational features to be identified and 
explained using an appropriate, associated terminology. 
• Contrary to expectations, both positive and negative relational behaviours, of the 
types cited by TCE theory, were observed. 
2.3 Q1 - SCM Conclusions 
• Q1 – Can SCM partnering activities, processes and requirements from the 
commercial environment, such as those encapsulated in Figure 2.8, 
provide an understanding of the monopolistic relationships found within 
UK Defence Procurement? 
The following conclusions can be drawn from the data (Chapter 4, sub-Section 6.3): 
• The use of the theoretical framework dimensions provided focussed comparators 
against which to gauge the range of SCM relational features.  
• The Supply Chain Partnership-Enhancing Activities identified in the literature 
(Chapter 2, Figure 2.8) correlated fairly well with the categories of qualitative 
data found in the research – see Chapter 4, Figure 4.10).  
• The underlying struggle to implement SCM principles such as seamless service 
delivery systems backed by joint planning, clear performance objectives and 
measurement and, freely available data was detected.  Also similar to open 
market situations, evidence of sincere intentions outweighed successfully 
implemented examples. 
• Adversarial behaviour as one might expect to find when viewed through 
Williamson’s (1975) Organisations Failure Framework, such as deliberately 
withholding information, unrealistic performance expectations, short-termist 
commercial policies and unco-operative product strategies were identified. 
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• Environmental problems such as old products, obsolescence, staff and 
organisational upheavals, poor end-customer visibility and lack of investment in 
modern procedures and systems seemed to accentuate managers’ frustrations 
due to lack of freedom of action and promoted the relationship negativity implied 
by the theoretical framework. 
• As already mentioned in sub-Section 4.3 the gap in quantitative response 
perceptions between the IPTs and the Firms was statistically insignificant.  
However, the gap between the quantitative scores and the overall tone of the 
qualitative data was inexplicable and would benefit from further research to 
discover the reason. 
• Contrary to expectations, both positive and negative relational, SCM business 
behaviours of the types suggested in Chapter 2, Figure 2.8 were observed. 
• Although the correlation between SCM efficiency and Small Numbers appears to 
be statistically insubstantial (0.804), visually there appears to be a link.  This 
would be a potentially interesting area for further research. 
2.4 Q2 – RM Conclusions 
• Q2 – Can RM behavioural variables, especially those shown in Figure 2.16, 
provide an understanding of the monopolistic relationships found within 
UK Defence Procurement? 
The following conclusions can be drawn from the data (Chapter 4, sub-Section 7.3): 
• The use of the theoretical framework dimensions provided focussed comparators 
against which to gauge the range of RM relational variables. 
• The RM behavioural variables identified in the literature (Chapter 2, Figure 2.16) 
correlated quite closely with the categories of qualitative data found in the 
research – see Chapter 4, Figure 4.11). 
Chapter 5  240 
 
• Strong positive and negative views were expressed on C3 Behaviour and 
Adaption where the parties struggled with the practical aspects of relationship 
operations. 
• The negative influences of the monopolistic business environment, including 
power balance and interdependence, appeared to significantly reduce scores for 
the key Trust and Commitment variables. 
• The importance of Personal Relationships, Corporate Culture Matching and 
Long Term Orientation to the creation of a successful business environment 
were clearly emphasised. 
• Contrary to expectations, both positive and negative variations on the 
behavioural variables identified in as predicted in Chapter 2, Figure 2.16. 
2.5 RQ Relationships 
The research findings presented so far have answered the supporting questions 
using data analysis that considered the theoretical framework and its 5 dimensions.  
The analysis results in Chapter 4, Section 8 considered the 54 relationships 
surveyed and revealed that it was possible to find richer patterns within the data that 
allowed them to be categorised within a typology and, described by means of 
external variables and the qualitative data.  The following conclusions can be drawn: 
• The cluster analysis technique proved to be a useful tool for identifying richer 
patterns within the relationships data.   
• It has allowed specific groupings to be described and further characterised by 
cross-tabulation to a number of external variables.  Some of the cross-tabulations 
such as Relationship Duration, Team Size, Technology Age, System/Component 
and Contractors’ League generated inexplicable results which indicated more 
complex issues were present.  Further research would be worthwhile to examine 
these in greater detail.   
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• The cluster groupings were recognisable sub-divisions of Good, Moderate and 
Poor relationships which enabled description using examples of the qualitative 
data.   
• A sub-group shown in Figure 4.17 appeared to be a transition stage between the 
Poor and the Moderate clusters where although managers had realised the need 
to ‘break away’ from adversarial behaviours, they had not yet translated their 
intentions into improved business processes and customer service.  It is 
suggested that further in-depth research would help to understand this potentially 
interesting linkage situation.  
• The results predominately indicate that normal supply chain relationship issues 
were in play within all the clusters as the IPTs and Firms struggled to improve 
process efficiency.   
• Managers in each cluster were aware of their monopoly environment however, it 
was especially where adverse conditions applied such as poor relationship 
management and lack of investment in process that small numbers dynamics 
(frustration at limited management options and, adversarial behaviours) 
generated adversarial conditions.   
• Where the relationships were able to concentrate on service delivery and long-
term, equitable benefits sharing, the potential limitations of small numbers 
influences were minimised. 
• Although the correlation between SCM efficiency and Small Numbers appears to 
be statistically insubstantial (0.804), visually there appears to be a link.  This 
would be a potentially interesting area for further research.  
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2.6 RQ - Conclusions 
• RQ – To determine if it is possible to obtain an understanding of the 
monopolistic relationships within UK Defence Procurement using 
Williamson’s Organisations Failure Framework and to identify how SCM, 
RM and TCE relational and behavioural factors influence these 
relationships.  
The methodological approach and captured research data revealed the following key 
findings (Chapter 4, sub-Section 9.6): 
• A pattern of results was discernible in the business environment studied. 
• When populated with research data, it was possible to reveal a different 
character of the intrinsically negative theoretical model where relationship 
characteristics described in the literature from ‘normal’ markets were also found 
in the monopolistic UK Defence procurement relationships examined. 
• The 1st and 2nd level dimension statistical results provided clear insights into 
behavioural dynamics of the organisations studied when viewed through the 
selected disciplinary, relationship lenses. 
• A relationship view of the data allowed a typology to be identified and the 
groups of relationships to be described.   
• When the statistical results were illustrated with qualitative data, it was possible 
to identify not only what was revealed but also why.  
From an examination of the supporting questions conclusions summarised in this 
Section and the key findings listed above, this thesis concludes that, subject to the 
limitations identified in Chapters 1 and 3, the selected suite of theoretical 
components (monopolistic theoretical framework, TCE, SCM and RM) provide a 
comprehensive, coherent and insightful approach to the examination of UK Defence 
Chapter 5  243 
 
Procurement monopolistic business-to-business relationships (Humphries & Wilding, 
2004).   
 
The next Section presents and discusses the implications for theory. 
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3 Implications for Theory 
3.1 Implications for TCE Theory (Qs 3 & 4) 
In the majority of UK Defence Procurement major contracts there is only one buyer 
(the UK MoD) and one seller (one of the few, large defence contractors) (Humphries 
& Wilding, 2001b) – a technical monopoly (Fishwick, 1993).  Both sides need to rely 
on maintaining close relationships over the supply of highly specialised goods 
(Grant, 1995, Hill, 1990, Macneil, 1980) but inevitably are open to opportunistic 
behaviour (Faulkner & De Rond, 2000, Nooteboom, 1999, Madhok, 2000, Palmer, 
2001).  This still appears to be the case following the UK MoD’s ending of its ‘cosy 
relationship’ with industry in 1985 (Hartley, 1998) and the imposition of tighter 
regulatory controls.  Recent policy changes towards more relational forms of 
governance (Crocker & Masten, 1996) are still in their infancy.  As a result if 
Williamson’s (1975) Organisations Failure Framework is taken at face value, an 
essentially negative relationship situation is likely to be the outcome.  As an example 
the UK MoD will attempt to drive down the profit level to a ‘reasonable’ level and the 
contractor will inflate its costs to ensure the best possible rate of return – a prime 
example of Information Impactedness (Humphries & Wilding, 2000, Liston-Heyes, 
1995, Palmer, 2001).  The consequences are that industry loses its incentive to 
perform better and the UK MoD reduces the resources available in industry that 
might have been used to fund important R&D.  This in effect creates an adversarial 
relationship without the freedom to look to the market for alternatives (Hirschman, 
1970, Parker & Hartley, 1997).  Parker & Hartley, (1997) suggested in Chapter 2, 
Figure 2.26 that in normal markets there is a natural pressure to move away from the 
unsatisfactory, ‘zero-sum’ game within a monopoly.  However, within UK Defence 
Procurement it is possible to envisage the situation in Figure 5.2 below where both 
parties become locked in a  
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Figure 5.2.  The Procurement Continuum – Monopoly Buyer & Monopsony Seller 
(adapted from Parker & Hartley, 1997) 
 
‘deadly embrace’ from which there is no escape.  One would thus expect that 
research on monopolistic relationships, which measured satisfaction rates, would 
generate negative (<50% success) empirical results.  However, from Chapter 4, 
Figures 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4 it can be seen that this is not the case and that the mean 
scores from only 10 out of 54 (21.6%) relationships were in fact wholly negative.  
From Chapter 4, Figures 4.5 and 4.6 it is also evident that the individual framework 
dimensions were all positive (>50%).  Moreover, the pattern of results across the 
dimensions (Chapter 4, Figure 4.8) is characteristic of the majority (77.7%) of the 
relationships examined.  An 8% gap in perceptions between the buyers and the 
sellers was detected (Chapter 4, Figure 4.7).  Analysis of this situation shown in 
Chapter 4, Figure 4.9. indicates that this difference is not statistically significant with 
views highly correlation at 0.928.   Furthermore, the quantitative data did not support 
a more optimistic quantitative response from firms. No single reason stood out in the 
research to explain this phenomenon but the finding does appear to agree with 
Spekman et al’s, 1998 empirical research on normal market, supply chains where 
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buyers were sensitive to dependence on a smaller number of suppliers and were 
thus more pessimistic.  However, the opposite was discovered within the 
monopolistic UK Defence Procurement situation where the suppliers also had 
increasingly limited buyers for their wares.  It is thus likely that further research into 
the phenomenon would prove interesting.    
 
Each dimension is considered in turn below and it is evident from the research 
findings that although negative aspects of Williamson’s (1975) Organisations Failure 
Framework were observed, almost equally converse factors were present.       
• Bounded Rationality (66%).  A number of examples of bounded rationality 
(Simon, 1957) over a lack of determination to set and observe mutually agreed 
performance standards and unwillingness to invest in specific relationship-
building assets such as joint objective-setting and teamworking were observed  
(Appendix 7, sub-Section 2.2 & Chapter 4 sub-Section 8.7) (Ganesan, 1994).  
Nevertheless, creative approaches such as open contracts, joint innovation, 
ensuring disputes were resolved quickly and fairly and taking a long-term view of 
the relationship were also detected in this research  (Appendix 7, sub-Section 
2.3) (Beamish & Banks, 1987, Cooper & Ellram, 1993, Van de Ven, 1984).   
• Uncertainty/Complexity (59%).  Opportunistic, short-termist behaviour such as 
confusing cheapest for value for money (Liston-Heyes, 1985) and lack of 
relationship-developing actions such as joint objective setting were observed  
(Appendix 7, sub-Section 3.2 & Chapter 4 sub-Section 8.8).  These reduced 
relationship stability and the creation of a framework for successful business 
(Peck et al, 2000).  The highly idiosyncratic nature of the business, an imbalance 
in power positions and reduced interdependence because of few credible 
commitments were also observed   (Appendix 7, sub-Section 3.4) (Cooper et al, 
1997, Madhok, 2000).  On the other hand, the need for clear, joint objectives and 
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co-operation as a means of achieving interdependence and a reduction of costly 
governance measures were recognised by both sides (Appendix 7, sub-Section 
3.3) (Beamish & Banks, 1987, Faulkner & De Rond, 2000, Moss Kanter, 1994, 
Spekman et al, 1998).  
• Information Impactedness (66%). Problems of disclosure and implied power 
balance over proprietary information were detected (Sheth & Sharma, 1997).  
Additionally, reticence over joint performance measurement and a lack of 
contract fulfilment arrangements were marked by a calculative approach to trust 
(Appendix 7, sub-Section 4.2 & Chapter 4 sub-Section 8.6) (Hill, 1980, 
Matthyssens, 1994).  Nevertheless, free, frequent information sharing and the 
investment in specific resources such as shared data environments were evident 
(Appendix 7, sub-Section 4.3) (Faulkner & De Rond, 2000, Harrison, 1990, Mohr 
& Spekman, 1994, Morgan & Hunt, 1994).   
• Opportunism (58%).  Information impactedness resulting from selective and 
deliberate withholding of highly specific, proprietary and supply chain data as 
well as opportunism resulting in poor service delivery (Christopher, 1997, 
Harrison, 1990) and unsatisfactory commercial practices were found under this 
dimension (Hill, 1990, Noordewier et al, 1990).  Buyers especially accused 
sellers of abusing their monopoly position and behaving opportunistically by 
failing to display goodwill, trust and commitment (Beamish & Banks, 1987, 
Faulkner & De Rond, 2000, Palmer, 2001, Williamson, 1979) to provide an 
adequate service (Appendix 7, sub-Section 5.2 & Chapter 4 sub-Section 8.6).  
Conversely, interdependence achieved through the credible commitment of 
specific, relationship-building assets such as stable work force and 
product/process development and, joint problem-solving arrangements appeared 
to strengthen relationships by creating a more reliable business infrastructure 
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(Appendix 7, sub-Section 5.3 & Chapter 4 sub-Section 8.9) (Argyres & Porter 
Liebskind, 1999, Doz & Oguz, 2000, Goleman, 1998, Hatch, 1997, Hulme, 
1997).    
• Small Numbers (74%).  The failure of contractual governance to maintain equity 
(Watson, 1999, Zajac & Olsen, 1993) and relationships free of fear of 
‘imprisonment’ (Eisenhardt et al, 1997, Kramer, 1999) indicated that archetypal 
negative relationship features from Williamson’s (1975) framework and reported 
in research on public utilities (Crocker & Masten, 1996) are eminently possible in 
real life (Appendix 7, sub-Section 6.2 & Chapter 4 sub-Section 8.6).  This 
phenomenon tends to counteract Cox et al’s (2000) perspective where inequality 
was a prerequisite of adversarial relationships (Appendix 7, sub-Section 6.6) and 
reinforce the view expressed in Figure 5.2.  However, many instances of long-
termism and interdependence marked by co-operation and investments in 
relationship-promoting resources were also in evidence (Cooper & Gardner, 
1993 & Chapter 4 sub-Section 8.9).  Moreover, respondents realised the 
difficulties inherent in the business and the monopoly situation – positive 
pragmatism  (Chapter 4 sub-Section 8.7) - and were actively striving to turn 
round the unsatisfactory position because they felt that ‘some win’ was better 
than ‘all lose’ (Appendix 7, sub-Section 6.3) (Axelrod, 1984, Granovetter, 1985, 
Ouchi, 1980).    This was contrary to the view that within the failed market there 
is little incentive to co-operate, control costs or improve output quality 
(Hirschman, 1970, Williamson, 1996). 
 
Finally, a variety of governance types were encountered in the relationships 
surveyed and commented upon in the qualitative data.  Older relationships were 
generally based upon regulation and although some were successful, the majority 
was not and team leaders were loath to adopt long-term contracts until they could 
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trust the other party to deliver an efficient service.  Respondents were generally very 
enthusiastic about newer, relational, long-term contracts (Franchise Bidding) but in 
one case where the arrangement had been in place for 5 years, considerable 
problems were being encountered (including a loss of trust) in trying to adjust to 
unforeseen environmental turbulence.  This difficulty or positively correlating 
relationship age to success was born out by the results of the cluster analysis cross-
tabulation described in Chapter 4, Section 8.3.2.  Moreover, these findings support 
those of established TCE empirical research (Crocker & Masten, 1996, Parker & 
Hartley, 1997, Rindfleisch & Heide, 1997, Williamson, 1996) who have emphasised 
the difficulties of choosing appropriate governance modes for bilateral monopolies.    
3.1.1   Contributions to TCE Knowledge 
There is scant empirical research within TCE that integrates all the factors within 
Williamson’s (1975) Organisations Failure Framework (Rindfleisch & Heide, 1997).  
Furthermore, TCE research on monopolies considers them as either unnatural 
phenomena (Palmer, 2001, Williamson, 1996) or a problem of selecting appropriate 
governance options (Crocker & Masten, 1996).   
• This research project, which appears to be the only empirical study on a 
significant sample of stable monopoly relationships, has shown, contrary to 
expectations, a surprising diversity of adverse monopolistic dynamics as well as 
more positive, business-driven behaviours were present within the monopolistic 
UK Defence Procurement environment. 
• The use of Williamson’s (1975) Organisations Failure Framework as a 
theoretical model enabled new insights to be revealed into the monopolistic UK 
Defence Procurement business (see Section 3.1). 
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• The pattern of data was not overall negative and, within the environment studied, 
appeared to follow a pattern.  This included a gap in perceptions between buyers 
and suppliers. 
• Under each dimension both positive and negative TCE features were found. 
• As predicted by the model, lack of investment in specific assets such as work 
force stability and product/process development, the use of inadequate 
performance measures, opportunistically providing poor goods and services and, 
using proprietary information as a weapon, reduced the chances of achieving 
interdependence and equitable outcomes.  There appeared to be little incidence 
of trust other than at the cynical or calculative level.   
• Adversarial behaviours were not caused by power imbalance, rather by the 
frustration resulting from mutual disempowerment. 
• On the other hand despite the adverse monopolistic influences, strong 
counterbalancing, positive business drivers were able to produce examples of 
relationship-building, specific investments, co-operative behaviour, open 
communications and a desire to reduce the burden of governance through more 
equitable, long-term arrangements. 
• The importance of political acceptance of the bilateral monopoly situation (Parker 
& Hartley, 1997, Strutton et al, 2001) and, selecting appropriate governance 
modes and being prepared to change them over time as circumstances evolved, 
was underlined. 
3.2 Implications for SCM Theory (Q1) 
The research approach used a TCE-based model as a means of examining supply 
chain relationships within a monopolistic business environment and this allowed 
unique insights to be made and a clear contribution to the body of knowledge to be 
made.  Despite the negative behavioural predictions of the theoretical framework, a 
Chapter 5  251 
 
spectrum from good to poor relationships was observed in the sample – see Chapter 
4, Figures 4.3, 4.4 and 8.5.  Moreover, many of the features of managing supply 
chain relationships described in the literature review (Chapter 2, Section 2) were 
observed as follows: 
3.2.1 Traditional Behaviour 
Examples of power dominance (Cox & Lamming, 1997, Lamming 1993) such as 
Chapter 4, Appendix 8, sub-Section 3.4 and strong customer/supplier development 
influence (Lamming, 1993) in Chapter 4, Appendix 8, sub-Sections 2.5, 3.2, 3.3, 4.3, 
5.2, 6.2 were noted. 
3.2.2 Lean Supply 
Efforts to achieve process efficiencies and enhance value production by replacing 
traditional, wasteful, inefficient and adversarial practices were clearly evident in 
Chapter 4, Appendix 8, sub-Sections 2.2, 2.5, 3.3, 4.3, 5.2, 5.3, 5.4. 
3.2.3 Supply Chain Networks 
There was also evidence that managers had realised the problems of dealing with 
networks of relationships (Bectel & Jayaram, 1997, Christopher, 1992, Cooper et al, 
1997, Harland, 1996b, Hines, 1996) including end-customers, up-stream suppliers, 
other IPTs, firms and prime contractors Chapter 4, Appendix 8, sub-Sections 2.3, 
3.4, 4.4, 5.3. 
3.2.4 SCM 
Despite the forced partnership, monopolistic situation, many of the aims of SCM as 
an integrative, proactive approach to manage the total flow of a distribution channel 
to the ultimate customer (Matthyssens & Van den Bulte, 1994) were revealed within 
the examined relationships.  Also, efforts to build co-operative relationships in order 
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to achieve benefits for all supply chain participants (Stevens, 1989) involving trust, 
commitment, and collaboration (Hines & Jones, 1996, Macbeth & Ferguson, 1994, 
Naude & Buttle, 2000, Peck et al, 2000) were observed.  See examples in Chapter 4, 
Appendix 8, sub-Sections 2.4, 2.5, 4.3, 4.5, 5.3, 6.2. 
3.2.5 Public Sector Supply Chains 
Although research on Public Sector supply chain management has discovered many 
similarities of approach with the Public Sector, the impact of specific factors such as 
remote end-customers, the political influence of central government, the cultural 
issues surrounding MoD stakeholders and, the very long term aspects of public 
funding and investment cycles were evident (Brooks & Pawar, 2000, Harland et al, 
1998, Hartley 1998, Zheng, 1998).   See examples in Chapter 4, Appendix 8, sub-
Sections 2.4, 2.5, 3.3, 5.3, 6.2, 6.3. 
3.2.6 Partnering 
Partnering is where customers and suppliers commit to continuous improvement and 
shared benefits by exchanging information openly and resolving problems together 
(Lambert et al, 1996, Sako et al, 1994).  Their relationship is for the ‘long term’ and is 
based upon trust, complex, problem solving and shared risks and rewards (Boddy et 
al, 2000, Cooper and Gardner, 1993, Lambert et al, 1996, Olsen & Ellram, 1997, 
Spekman et al, 1998).  Lastly, partnering requires attitudinal changes to be 
successful (Anscombe & Kearney, 1994, Ellram & Edis, 1996, Hines & Jones, 1996).  
A full range of these aspects were found within the relationships surveyed.  See 
examples in Chapter 4, Appendix 8, sub-Sections 2.2, 2.3, 2.5, 3.3, 4.3, 4.4, 5.3, 5.4, 
6.3. 
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3.2.7 Interface Management 
The management of interfaces between customers and suppliers is of crucial 
importance when firms are inextricably linked (Cooper & Ellram, 1993). Moreover, 
this must be conducted in a completely transparent way which emphasises the 
equality of the partners, the need to share risk and recognises the strategic role of 
purchasing (Christopher, 1998, Cooper et al, 1997, Cox & Lamming, 1997, Lamming 
et al, 2001, Wilding 1999).  Many instances of these principles were found within UK 
Defence Procurement relationships as shown in Chapter 4, Appendix 8, sub-
Sections 2.2, 2.3, 2.5, 3.3, 4.3, 4.4, 5.3, 5.4, 6.3. 
3.2.8 Expectations Management 
The greater the interdependence of supply chain partners the greater the need to 
match expectations and to use time-based metrics for measuring and monitoring 
performance (Christopher, 1998, Ellram & Edis, 1996, Harland, 1995, 1996a, 1996c, 
Lamming, 1993).  These requirements featured strongly in the views of the 
respondents in this research in both positive and negative terms as shown in 
Chapter 4, Appendix 8, sub-Sections 3.4, 4.4, 5.1, 5.2.   
3.2.9 Small Numbers 
Where a reduction in choice exists because of a monopoly of supply and demand, 
tensions between the parties can result in reduced efficiency and lower economic 
gains (Basury et al, 1993, Christopher, 1998, Fishwick, 1993, Humphries & Wilding 
2004).  However, this was not always the case as evinced by the cluster analysis 
results in Chapter 4, Section 8 and the dimensional analysis in Chapter 4, Appendix 
8, sub-Sections 3.2, 5.3, 5.4, 6.2, 6.3.  It appeared that both IPT and Firm leaders 
were always aware of their small numbers situation but its impact on the quality of 
their business relationship depended on their particular situation.  In the ‘good’ 
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relationships Chapter 4, sub-Section 8.9 opportunistic behaviours were negated by 
joint concentration on the supply chain processes that ensure optimal service deliver 
and mutual benefits.  In the ‘moderate’ relationships Chapter 4, sub-Section 8.7 
negative behaviours did not seem to deadlock the relationship and culture-matching 
appeared to have taken engendered a sense of ‘being in the same boat’. 
 
However, negative behaviours symptomatic of the theoretical monopoly environment 
(Chapter 2, Section 5.6) were clearly discernible in the ‘poor’ and to a slightly lesser 
extent in the ‘low performance, moderate’ relationships Chapter 4, sub-Sections 8.6 
& 8.8.  These included deliberate withholding of supply chain information, insular, 
non-integrative practices, commercial opportunism and unco-operative product 
strategies.  It was strongly evident that environmental factors such as old, unreliable 
products, obsolescence, staff and organisational upheavals poor end-customer 
visibility and lack of investment in modern procedures and systems accentuated 
managers’ frustrations due to the lack of freedom of action available within the 
monopoly.  These frustrations resulted in feelings of ‘imprisonment’ and ‘impotence’ 
which were exacerbated by long term lack of co-operation and promoted an ongoing 
situation of entrenched opposition to any form of innovation and a ‘take it or leave it’ 
attitude.  This situation can be illustrated in Figure 5.3 when Lambert et al’s (1996) 
Partnering process model Chapter 2, Figure 2.6) is viewed from a negative, 
monopolistic perspective.   This model was designed to demonstrate the important 
features that impact upon partners when establishing and maintaining a partnership.  
It describes a continuous improvement approach with the reinforcement of success.   
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Figure 5.3. The Negative Monopolistic Partnering Process (adapted from Lambert et 
al, 1996) 
 
Under a poor monopolistic situation the partners are trapped in the arrangement.  
Depending on the degree of negativity affecting the Drivers and Facilitators, a 
potentially a self-reinforcing, low quality relationship will be generated through the 
Feedback loop.  This situation was perhaps foreseen by Macbeth & Ferguson (1994) 
when they suggested trust could be destroyed by ‘one stupid action’ (Chapter 2, sub-
Section 2.4.7).  The ‘low performance, moderate’ relationships mentioned in Chapter 
4, sub-Section 8.8 possibly represent a transition group that was attempting to break 
out the negative spiral shown in Figure 5.3 where although the will to co-operate was 
growing, the ability to translate this into reliable, Supply Chain services had yet to 
develop.  Overall this research provides a pragmatic focus that builds upon Spekman 
et al’s (1998) work in addressing the reasons why SCM is difficult to implement and 
sustain and would offer extremely interesting opportunities for further research.  
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3.2.10 Summary 
The research results indicated in Chapter 4, sub-Sections 6.3 and 8.10 found that a 
spectrum of supply chain relationship quality existed and that these were affected by 
both SCM process efficiency and small numbers factors.  These relationship drivers 
were described within the literature reviewed in Chapter 2.  However, the 
combination of the innovative methodology and the selection of an appropriate 
literature field allowed the dynamics within the long-term, monopolistic, UK Defence 
Procurement business-to-business relationships to be revealed.  These contributions 
to SCM knowledge are presented next.   
3.2.11 Contributions to SCM Knowledge 
Within the UK Defence Procurement monopoly businesses the use of Williamson’s 
(1975) Organisations Failure Framework as a theoretical model when matched to 
SCM and especially Procurement relational concepts, enabled new insights to be 
revealed.  These were 
• The underlying struggle to implement difficult SCM concepts in the UK Defence 
procurement monopolies paralleled that found in a wide range of private and 
public sector settings as described in the literature review. 
• A wide variety of adversarial behaviours as a result of the monopolistic situation 
were revealed that reduced the effectiveness of SCM implementation.  These 
included deliberately withholding information, unrealistic performance 
expectations, short-termist commercial policies and unco-operative product 
strategies. 
• Environmental problems such as old products, obsolescence, staff and 
organisational upheavals, poor end-customer visibility and lack of investment in 
modern procedures and systems seemed to accentuate managers’ frustrations 
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due to lack of freedom of action in the monopoly environment and promoted the 
relationship negativity implied by the theoretical framework. 
• The findings provide a pragmatic focus that builds upon Spekman et al’s (1998) 
work in addressing the reasons why SCM is difficult to implement and sustain. 
• Although the correlation between SCM efficiency and Small Numbers appears to 
be statistically insubstantial, visually there appears to be a link.  This would be a 
potentially interesting area for further research. 
• Cluster analysis revealed 3 main groupings of relationships equating to good, 
moderate and poor quality enterprises.  However, it also exposed a transition 
group that was attempting to move from a poor, adversarial mode to a more co-
operative one.  Although the will to co-operate was growing, the ability to 
translate this into reliable, Supply Chain services had yet to develop.  This would 
be a potentially interesting area for further research. 
 
3.3 Implications for Relationship Marketing Theory (Q2) 
The research approach used a TCE-based model as a means of examining RM 
within monopolistic business environment relationships.  The research results 
(Chapter 4, Section 6) found that as mentioned in Chapter 2, Section 3.4, a spectrum 
of different relationship qualities existed within those surveyed in UK Defence 
Procurement.  It was also evident that discrete market transactions had generally 
been displaced by closer, long-term, strategic relationships through purposeful co-
operation, shared compatible goals and seeking mutual benefit (Dyer & Chu, 2000, 
McDonald et al, 1997, Mohr & Spekman, 1994).  Furthermore, as noted in Chapter 2, 
Section 3.6, efforts had been made to forge improved relationships of a dyadic 
nature (Anderson et al, 1994, Dwyer et al, 1987, Metcalf et al, 1992, Tuten & Urben, 
2001).  But, it was found that the lack of network dynamics due to the monopoly 
Chapter 5  258 
 
environment had often reduced the effectiveness of attempts to discover ‘common 
ground’ on which to establish ‘embeddedness’ and provided a lack of incentive to 
dispel adversarial practices (Humphries & Wilding, 2001).  The Marriage Analogy on 
the other hand, involving managerial dependence and exchange efficiency (Gudlach 
& Murphy, 1993, Gummeson, 1999), has been dismissed as imprecise and 
misleading but, in the case of UK Defence Procurement’s forced dyadic 
relationships, a much stronger case seems possible for its relevance although a key 
limitation is the impossibility of ‘divorce’.  The use of key account managers 
(McDonald et al, 1997) was almost universal although their success was dependent 
on personal and cultural factors.  
 
The overwhelming majority of respondents placed strong emphasis on personal 
relationships (‘hitting it off’) (Appendix 9, sub-Sections 3.3, 4.3, 5.5) and culture-
matching (‘relating to the way the other side do things’) (Appendix 9, sub-Section 
3.4) on the growth of trust (Chapter 2, Section 3.20 – Gulati, 1995, Moorman et al, 
1992, Moss Kanter, 1994, Palmer, 2001).  This counters the enlightened, self-
interest approach (Faulkner, 2000, Goleman, 1998, Kumar, 1996, Wilson, 1995).  
The central importance of commitment (Appendix 9, sub-Sections 2.2, 5.4, 6.2) and 
trust (Appendix 9, sub-Sections 3.5, 6.4) to the stability and productiveness of UK 
Defence Procurement business-to-business relationships (Chapter 2, Section 3.10 – 
Faulkner & de Rond, 2000, Frow, 2001, Morgan and Hunt, 1994, Sheth & Sharma, 
1997) was also underlined.  Excellent, long-term commercial arrangements 
(Appendix 9, sub-Sections 3.5, 4.4), frequent, interactive, productive 
communications (Appendix 9, Section 4), and constructive conflict (Appendix 9, sub-
Section 6.3) that supported repeated cycles of exchange, risk-taking and successful 
fulfilment of expectations were observed.  These appeared to strengthen the 
willingness of parties to rely upon each other (Eisenhardt et al, 1997, Goleman, 
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1998, Lewin & Johnston, 1997, Oliver, 1990, Palmer, 2001). However, opportunistic 
behaviour (Appendix 9, Section 5) such as adversarial bidding, inflexible and unduly 
bureaucratic commercial practices, unwillingness to share proprietary data 
(Appendix 9, Section 4) and uncaring use of power (Appendix 9, Section 6) which 
clearly undermined both trust and commitment were also detected.  C3 Behaviour 
(Appendix 9, sub-Sections 2.1, 3.1, 4.1, 5.1) (Humphries & Wilding, 2004), adaption 
(Appendix 9, sub-Sections 3.2, 4.2, 5.2, 6.1) and interdependence (Appendix 9, sub-
Section 6.5) were particularly important components in relationship-building 
investment (Chapter 2, Section 3.19 – Doney & Cannon, 1997, Madhok, 2000, 
Moorman et al, 1992, Rugman & D’Cruz, 2000, Sheth & Sharma, Stern & Reve, 
1980, 1997, Wilson, 1995) but their effectiveness reduced when the sincerity of the 
other party’s intentions was doubted.   Finally, environmental factors such as lack of 
long-term, stable funding for projects and investment in efficient business systems 
seemed to induce reduced trust (Kumar, 1996) and exacerbate manager’s negative 
reactions to a lack of freedom to manoeuvre within their monopolistic situation 
(Appendix 9, Section 6). 
 
An illustration that summarises the potential impact of monopoly on trust and 
commitment is posed in a modified Morgan and Hunts (1994) Commitment-Trust 
Theory (Chapter 2, Section 3.10) shown in Figure 5.4. 
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Figure 5.4.  The Commitment-Trust Theory with Possible Monopoly Components 
(Adapted from Morgan & Hunt, 1994) 
 
Information Impactedness, Opportunistic Behaviour and Bounded Rationality are 
added as negative influences.  The model normally defines Reduced Propensity to 
Leave as a significant outcome whereas in a UK Defence Procurement monopoly 
the complete lack of opportunity to leave the relationship would instead provide a 
further negative input to Relationship Commitment and exclude Relationship 
Termination Costs.  The addition of these factors might make the attainment of the 
model’s positive outcomes rather more difficult to achieve and they illustrate the 
greater range of positive and negative inputs that potentially affect monopolistic 
business relationships. 
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3.3.1 Contributions to RM Knowledge 
• The use of a TCE theoretical framework whose dimensions provided focussed 
comparators against which to gauge the range of RM relational variables allowed 
a unique perspective of monopolistic UK Defence Procurement relationships to 
be taken. 
• A mix of strong positive and negative relationship variable outcomes indicated 
that the relational landscape within the business environment studied was far 
from uniform. 
• The practical aspects of relationship development including C3 Behaviour and 
Adaption occurred regardless of the monopolistic influences. 
• The negative influences of the monopolistic business environment, including 
power balance and interdependence, appeared to significantly reduce scores for 
the key trust and commitment variables. 
• The importance of Personal Relationships, Corporate Culture Matching and 
Long Term Orientation to the creation of a successful business environment was 
clearly emphasised. 
3.4 Summary of Overall Contribution to Knowledge 
In the previous Sections of this Chapter the research project and findings were 
summarised, the Research Questions and the overall business problem were 
answered and, the implications for theory and the contributions to knowledge for 
each of the 3 theoretical fields were presented.  It was demonstrated that the SCM, 
RM and TCE fields provide a useful basis for understanding business-to-business 
relationships.  They describe a trend away from transactional to relational business 
dealings in both the private and public sectors.  Moreover, some useful insights with 
regard to small numbers relationships are provided.  However, their explanations fall 
short where sustained monopolies of the specific kind found within UK Defence 
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Procurement are concerned.  This exploratory research, which appears to be the 
only empirical study on a large sample of stable, Defence Procurement monopoly 
relationships, has thus extended knowledge in SCM (sub-Section 3.2.11), RM (sub-
Section 3.3.1) and TCE (sub-Section 3.1.1) fields.  The main finding is that contrary 
to expectations, a surprising diversity of ‘normal’ market positive and negative, 
business-driven behaviours was present within the monopolistic UK Defence 
Procurement environment as well as more adverse monopolistic dynamics.  As 
predicted by Williamson’s (1975) Organisations Failure framework, lack of 
investment in specific assets such as work force stability and product/process 
development, the use of inadequate performance measures, opportunistically 
providing poor goods and services and, using proprietary information as a weapon, 
reduced the chances of achieving interdependence and equitable outcomes.  On the 
other hand despite the adverse monopolistic influences, strong counterbalancing, 
positive business drivers were able to produce examples of relationship-building, 
specific investments, co-operative behaviour, open communications and a desire to 
reduce the burden of governance through more equitable, long-term arrangements.  
The problems of selecting appropriate governance forms that provided durability 
over time as well as public safeguards were underlined.  A potential correlation 
between the degree of difficulty of implementing SCM and the extent to which 
adversarial behaviour was generated within small numbers situations was observed.  
Additionally, a group of relationships found between the poor and moderate ones 
seemed to indicate a degree of dynamics within the population.  Both findings 
indicate interesting opportunities for further research. 
 
The research findings suggest a different view of the adopted theoretical framework 
in Chapter 2, Figure 2.30.  Figure 5.5 summarises this position.  Rather than specific 
dimensions acting sequentially upon each other in a cyclical fashion (as represented 
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in Chapter 2, Figures 2.28 and 29), at either end of the transactional/relational 
spectrum there are positive and negative, attracting influences that have emerged 
from this research, which drive behavioural results that influence the relationships. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.5.  UK Defence Procurement Monopolistic Relationship Influences 
 
On the left, the negative results suggested by Williamson’s (1975) Organisation 
Failures Framework are driven by situational influences which make SCM hard to 
implement and engender an adversarial, transactional business lacking in trust and 
C3 Behaviour.  At the other end, the converse, positive results are driven by desires 
for joint achievement and equity which engender a relational business style.  The 
research quantitative findings have been superimposed on this model to illustrate its 
use and demonstrate the knowledge contribution of this research.  In effect it reveals 
a very complex set of business relational dynamics and opens up the possibility of 
many interesting opportunities for further research.  Finally, the interdisciplinarity 
approach to this research using 3 fields has produced transcendent insights that 
would not be perceived by the individual fields working alone (Starkey & Madan, 
2001).  The next Section discusses the implications for policy and practice. 
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4 Implications for Policy and Practice 
4.1 General 
In his discussion on a link between a theory of business success and best practice, 
Hines (1997) recommended that when undertaking research, which aimed to provide 
practitioners with added value, the following questions should be addressed: 
• Do the results offer a route to effective implementation? 
• Do the results offer a checklist for success? 
• Is continuous improvement a part of the approach? 
The next 3 sub-Sections indicate that the thesis has answered these questions 
satisfactorily. 
4.2 An Effective Route to Implementation 
The following paragraphs represent the salient features of good and bad 
relationships and therefore highlight those factors that are important to effective 
implementation. 
4.2.1 Generic Relationship Success Factors 
The following factors exposed by the research appeared to be important to 
successful business-to-business relationships within UK Defence Procurement: 
• Political acceptance of bilateral monopoly and the use of flexible governance 
arrangements based on innovative commercial practices such as framework 
contracting, tough but achievable incentives, and meaningful gainshare. 
• End-to-end, clearly visible performance objectives agreed by all supply chain 
players including the end-customers. 
• Frequent, interactive, open communications across all levels of the 
customer/supplier interface especially on performance reviews and continuous 
improvement of products/services and business processes. 
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• Open, no blame culture aimed at customer and relationship satisfaction which 
depend upon personal, trusting relationships. 
• Joint planning and business systems supported by free-flow of information. 
4.2.2 Generic Relationship Failures Factors 
The following factors exposed by the research appeared to be responsible for poor 
business-to-business relationships within UK Defence Procurement: 
• Lack of stable customer funding arrangements, which prevent supplier 
investment planning. 
• Insufficient project investment, which generates long term, costs and prevents 
performance incentivisation. 
• Lack of investment in good staff, which causes unnaturally high turnover and 
prevents personal relationship development and efficient business processes. 
• Adversarial, bureaucratic commercial practices and attitudes, which increase 
project costs, cause delays and reduce trust. 
• Lack of culture-matching results in ‘them and us’ attitudes, which result in a 
downward spiral of poor behaviour, reduced benefits and low performance. 
4.3 A Checklist for Success 
The following lessons for managers operating within the UK Defence Procurement 
sustained monopolies constitute a checklist for success: 
• There is a need to reduce the impact of environmental influences that, due to the 
limited availability of options for action, cause frustration and generate negative 
behaviours.  This means building an inventory of environmental problems that 
are normally considered to be ‘unavoidable features of the business’ and 
seeking joint, innovative ways of dealing with them. 
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• There is a need to take a strategic approach to measuring the quality of their 
business-to-business relationships so that the best and worst can be identified 
and why and, targeted action can be taken. 
• Within UK Defence Procurement the pattern of results indicates that managers 
should pay particular attention to synchronising objectives and confidence-
building as well as service and product delivery, lowering joint costs and risks 
and measures to support the growth of trust. 
• There is a need to accept that the monopoly environment will inevitably reduce 
relationship quality and that examining relationships from both sides, using this 
information in an open, constructive manner, will facilitate understanding and 
therefore improvement. 
• Relationship reviews should be repeated, perhaps annually, so that progress 
may be tracked and corrective action taken as necessary. 
4.3.1 Continuous Improvement 
This research has taken an essentially negative theoretical framework to examine 
Defence Procurement monopolistic business relationships and this could be viewed 
as a Failure Cycle shown in Chapter 2, Figure 2.29.  The research methodology 
adopted an approach that took the converse of the model’s negative dimensions as 
the basis of the questionnaire design.  This could be viewed as a Success Cycle as 
shown in Chapter 2, Figure 2.28.  The theoretical framework in Chapter 2, Figure 
2.30 thus combined both ends of the success and failure cycles.  Practitioners in this 
business should aim use the success checklist and the route to implementation to 
move from the Failure to the Success Cycle and to establish a virtuous circle of 
continuous improvement. 
 
The next Section discusses the emergent limitations of this research. 
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5 Limitations 
In Chapter 3, Section 6 a number of known methodological limitations was 
described.  At the conclusion of the thesis it is important to review the practical 
implementation of the research and to identify any further limitations.  It is now clear 
that the research has used a narrow view through a specific theoretical model lens to 
achieve a specified understanding of monopolistic business relationships within one 
of the two UK Defence Procurement organisations.  It is thus essential to view the 
value of the research only through this restricted gap and to accept that similar 
research in other military procurement organisations, as well as commercial 
applications, together with the use of different models and research designs, will be 
needed to triangulate its findings and assess its wider generalisability.  This research 
has nevertheless, been ‘grounded’ in the concepts from its theoretical foundations 
and thus clear linkages may be more easily made to the findings of follow-on 
projects.  A further consideration is that the subject of the research, sustained 
monopolistic business relationships, is not an unknown area but this research has 
taken a new, integrated approach to its exploration.  The methodology has thus 
sought results at a high level and across a broad front.  It is therefore, important to 
limit expectations of the depth of analysis that is possible to apply to the data and to 
accept that further research using more deeply focussed methods is needed to 
under-pin the high level findings of this thesis. 
 
The next Section summarises the main conclusions of this thesis. 
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6 Summary of Conclusions 
This Section provides a list of the key points from this thesis. 
• A methodology has been developed to document and quantify the quality of 
monopolistic relationships within selected UK Defence Procurement businesses. 
• The Supply Chain Management, Relationship Marketing and Transaction Cost 
Economics fields provide a useful basis for understanding business-to-business 
relationships in their trend from transactional to relational business dealings in 
both the public and private sectors.  Some useful although more limited insights 
were also gained on small numbers situations. 
• There is scant management research on sustained monopolistic business 
relationships utilising the entirety of Williamson’s (1975) Organisations Failure 
Framework. 
• Contrary to expectations, a surprising diversity of ‘normal’ market, positive and 
negative, business-driven behaviours was present within the monopolistic UK 
Defence Procurement environment as well as more adverse monopolistic 
dynamics. 
• A pattern of results was discernible. 
• As predicted by Williamson’s Organisations Failure Framework (1975), a lack of 
investment in specific assets such as work force stability and product/process 
development, the use of inadequate performance measures, opportunistically 
providing poor goods and services and, using proprietary information as a 
weapon, reduced the chances of achieving interdependence and equitable 
outcomes. 
• Adversarial behaviours were not caused by power imbalance, rather by the 
frustration resulting from mutual disempowerment.  
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• Environmental problems such as old products, obsolescence, staff and 
organisational upheavals, poor end-customer visibility and lack of investment in 
modern procedures and systems seemed to accentuate managers’ frustrations 
due to lack of freedom of action in the monopoly environment and promoted the 
relationship negativity implied by the theoretical framework. 
• Despite adverse monopolistic influences, strong counterbalancing, positive 
business drivers were able to produce examples of relationship-building, specific 
investments, co-operative behaviour, open communications and a desire to 
reduce the burden of governance through more equitable, long-term 
arrangements. 
• The problems of selecting appropriate governance forms (long-term contracts vs 
regulation) that provided durability over time as well as public safeguards were 
underlined. 
• The underlying struggle to implement difficult SCM concepts paralleled that 
found in commercial, open market settings and a wide range of partnership-
enhancing, relational activities, as found in the ‘normal’ market literature, were 
also found in the UK Defence procurement monopolies. 
• The Findings provide a pragmatic focus that builds upon Spekman et al’s (1998) 
work in addressing the reasons why SCM is difficult to implement and sustain. 
• A potential correlation between the degree of difficulty of implementing SCM and 
the extent to which adversarial behaviour was generated within small numbers 
situations was observed.   
• Using Cluster Analysis, a group of relationships found between the poor and 
moderate ones seemed to indicate a degree of dynamics within the population. 
• The practical aspects of relationship development including C3 Behaviour and 
Adaption occurred regardless of the monopolistic influences. 
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• The importance of Personal Relationships, Corporate Culture Matching and 
Long Term Orientation to the creation of a successful business environment was 
clearly emphasised. 
• Rather than specific dimensions acting sequentially upon each other, the 
research suggests that at either end of the transactional/relational spectrum 
there are positive and negative attracting, influences, which drive behavioural 
results that influence the relationships. 
• The interdisciplinarity approach to this research using 3 bodies of knowledge has 
produced transcendent insights that would not be perceived by the individual 
fields working alone. 
 
The next Section discusses the implications for further research. 
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7 Implications for Further Research 
This research has been limited in its scope and depth in order to carry out a new 
exploration of a segment of the UK Defence Procurement.  It has nevertheless, for 
the first time achieved a cross-relationship (UK MoD/Industry) perspective of a 
sample of sustained monopoly businesses.  This ‘cracking open the door’ suggests 
that further research would be interesting to academics and usefully benefit the 
increasingly globalised Defence Procurement business as well as other business 
areas with long-term, highly collaborative, closely coupled characteristics.  
Potentially rich opportunities for further research are: 
• The research has viewed Williamson’s (1975) Organisations Failure Framework 
as an environment or system.  It would now be interesting to attempt to map the 
interactions between its dimensions both to validate the original influences 
shown in the model at (Chapter 2, Figure 2.23) and to explore in more detail the 
Results and Drivers revealed in this research and shown at either end of the 
model at Figure 5.5.  Potentially, causal models could be developed and 
explored. 
• Cluster analysis revealed a 4th grouping of relationships that appeared to be in-
transit between the poor and the moderate clusters.  Further research into the 
dynamics of this situation including managers’ motivations and practical, 
business relationship improvement measures used would be interesting. 
• In order to add definition to the groups of relationships revealed by cluster 
analysis, cross-tabulation to a number of external variables such as relationship 
duration, team size, technology age, product type and contractor importance was 
carried out.  The results were generally inconclusive and suggested that a richer 
set of linkage relationships were present which would benefit from further 
investigation. 
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• The research has touched upon governance, on the types encountered and the 
problems associated with moving from regulatory to long-term, franchise-style, 
contracts.  It would be useful to focus further research on the relationship 
between Williamson’s (1975) framework and specific governance types and to 
link this to relationship performance. 
• The research revealed patterns in the results.  It would be interesting to see what 
patterns were found from similar research approaches but carried out in 
different, including commercial environments. 
• Differences were detected in the scale of the responses between the IPTs and 
the Firms in overall the perception of overall satisfaction such that the latter were 
8% more optimistic.  This was not born out by the qualitative data.  It is possible 
that bias may be the cause but an equally plausible reason might be some form 
of perceptive anomaly.  Further research could reveal more detail about 
customer/supplier dynamics within long-term, collaborative relationships. 
• A face value correlation between SCM implementation (the Reliability dimension) 
and small numbers effects (the Quality dimension) indicates that potentially 
negative behaviours might be triggered by difficult supply chain problems.  If this 
were the case, concentration on SCM implementation could overcome 
managers’ natural, adverse reactions to a lack of options situation.  More 
focussed research is necessary to investigate this potentially important linkage.   
•  To extend the research already carried out to the Defence Procurement Agency 
where £6.246bn (DASA, 2001) is spent annually on a reducing number of 
concentrating Defence companies. 
• To repeat the research on a regular basis to enable a longitudinal view to be 
taken of Defence Procurement relationships, especially against a background of 
reducing competition. 
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• To involve the end-customers and 2nd tier suppliers in the research in order to 
determine their impact on the quality of the main participants’ relationship. 
• To use the research findings to enable a closer view to be taken of specific 
relationships and possibly using the lessons learned to examine the outcomes of 
selectively influencing these relationships using more proactive approaches such 
as Action and Experimental Research methods. 
• To test other models of the type used as examples in Figures 5.2 & 5.3 in order 
to improve the details theoretical knowledge of monopolistic business-to-
business relationship dynamics. 
• This research has concentrated on the UK Defence Procurement business but 
similar problems affect all major countries in a post-Cold War world.  It would 
thus be interesting to repeat the research in other countries and to compare and 
contrast the results. 
• The research has used pragmatic disciplines with which to illuminate the 
business problem and the RQ.  It would be most interesting to use an alternative 
approach such as Organisation theory and to see how the results complement 
each other. 
• Finally, in many countries there still remain numerous business-to-business 
relationships that have public ownership antecedents where monopolistic 
characteristics can be found eg. airlines, postal services, telephone services, 
power generation.  It would thus be interesting to test Williamson’s (1975) 
framework in non-Defence and international environments and to determine if 
lessons can be learned that might enable the quality of the business 
relationships to be improved. 
It should be emphasised that none of these opportunities for research should be 
viewed in isolation.  Many of them overlap and converge to offer the chance to carry 
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out integrated research programmes and especially to include the international 
dimension. 
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8 A Final Word 
The literature suggests that the relationship dynamics within sustained monopolies 
generally predicts negative outcomes.  This research has shown that although 
negative behavioural characteristics can be recognised in the literature, a spectrum 
of positive and negative results were exposed and the main dynamics could be 
understood.  The contribution to knowledge plus the inherent limitations of the study 
have suggested an agenda for future research which it is hoped will advance the 
SCM, RM and TCE fields and provide greater insights into the workings of 
monopolistic and long-term, closely coupled, business-to-business relationships. 
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Appendix 1 
Questionnaire Format 
 
PARTNERING IN UK DEFENCE PROCUREMENT: RESEARCH PROJECT 
 
 
The aim of this questionnaire is to provide an objective assessment of the quality of 
the relationship between the MoD org and firm as it is TODAY.  The information 
provided will enable a view to be formed for the Defence Logistics Organisation and 
Industry of how best to improve UK Defence procurement relationships.  Your 
individual contribution will thus not be divulged and will be treated in the strictest 
confidence.  To this end please return the completed questionnaire directly to me 
using the email address at the end of the questionnaire. 
 
It is YOUR view that is required so please do not confer with your colleagues before 
you or they have completed the questionnaire.   
 
First, please provide the following details:  
 
Name:………………………………………………………………………………. 
 
Post:………………………………….. 
 
Location:…………………………………………… 
 
Role (eg. commercial, supply):…………………………… 
 
Level: (eg. Military rank, civil service grade, management level):………………………. 
 
Time working in same area (yrs/mths):………………………… 
 
How familiar are you with the MoD/Industry relationship in question?   
 
circle one: 
 
1.  Have No knowledge 
2.  Have Some Knowledge  
3.  Knowledgeable  
4.  Very Knowledgeable 
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Please put an ‘X’ only in the scale against each statement in this questionnaire to signify your view.  If 
you do not feel qualified to judge any particular statement, put an ‘X’ in the ‘insufficient knowledge’ 
box. 
1.  Relationship Development – enabling joint 
creativity 
Strongly 
Agree
Tend to 
Agree
Tend to 
Disagree 
Strongly
Disagree
Insufficient 
Knowledge 
• The relationship encourages the achievement of 
high performance by both parties ie. reliable 
equipment, on-time delivery, good forecasts. 
     
• The relationship encourages us to be innovative in 
the way we do business 
     
• Performance measurement is used to raise 
standards 
     
• Disputes & problems are resolved: 'quickly' 
 
     
• Disputes & problems are resolved: 'fairly' 
 
     
• The other party is reliable and consistent in 
dealing with us 
     
• The other party is dedicated to making our business a 
success 
     
• When an unexpected problem arises, both parties 
would rather work out a solution than hold each 
other to the original contract terms 
     
 
2.  Relationship Stability – creating a framework 
for successful business 
Strongly 
Agree
Tend to
Agree
Tend to 
Disagree 
Strongly
Disagree
Insufficient 
Knowledge 
• The other party displays a sound, strategic 
understanding of our business 
     
• The objectives of both parties are clearly stated 
 
     
• The objectives of both parties are fully compatible 
 
     
• Both parties co-operate wholeheartedly 
 
     
• The relationship provides a dynamic business 
environment within which both parties can seek 
increasing rewards 
     
• I have complete confidence in the intentions of the 
other party 
     
 
3.  Communication – creating an environment for 
business success 
Strongly 
Agree
Tend to
Agree
Tend to 
Disagree 
Strongly
Disagree
Insufficient 
Knowledge 
• Where the other party has proprietary information 
that could improve the performance of the joint 
business, it is freely available 
     
• We would welcome a shared data environment 
where planning, technical and pricing information 
are made freely available 
     
• We understand the information requirements of all 
participants in the support chain from sub-
contractors to end-user 
     
• Exchange of information in this relationship takes 
place frequently and informally – not just 
according to specified agreement 
     
• Objective performance measurement is an 
important part of this relationship 
     
• We are aware of the performance requirements 
for all participants in the support chain from sub-
contractors to end-user 
     
• We provide the other party with regular 
information including long-range forecasts to 
enable him to do his business better 
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4.  Relationship Strengthening – creating a 
reliable business arrangement 
Strongly 
Agree
Tend to
Agree
Tend to 
Disagree 
Strongly
Disagree
Insufficient 
Knowledge 
• The quality of the contract outputs ie. 
spares/repairs/services, is entirely satisfactory 
     
• The quality of service delivery ie. delivery times, 
billing, payment, is entirely satisfactory  
     
• The relationship is characterised by a continually 
improving quality ethos 
     
• Problems are solved in a joint, open, constructive 
manner 
     
• Such is the goodwill in the relationship, the other 
party would willingly put himself out to adapt to our 
changing requirements 
     
• We trust the other party to act in our best interests      
• The responsibility for making sure the relationship 
works is shared jointly 
     
• The other party provides us with useful cost 
reduction and quality improvement ideas 
     
• The other party is always totally open and honest 
with us 
     
• The other party always does what he says he will 
do 
     
 
5.  Relationship Quality – creating the incentive to 
work together 
Strongly 
Agree
Tend to
Agree
Tend to 
Disagree 
Strongly
Disagree
Insufficient 
Knowledge 
• The gains from this relationship are equally 
shared between both parties 
     
• We do not feel imprisoned within the current 
relationship  
     
• We are willing to invest more ie. money, time, 
information, effort, in the current relationship 
     
• We are happy that our future is bound to the 
success of our relationship partner 
     
• We feel totally committed to this relationship 
 
     
• The other party is genuinely concerned that our 
business succeeds 
     
• Both sides are working to improve this 
relationship 
     
 
Any other comments: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Thank you for taking the time to answer this questionnaire.  Please return it to:  
Gp Capt A S Humphries, AD SC Ops, Equipment Support (Air) 
Royal Air Force Wyton, Huntingdon, Cambridgeshire, PE17 2DL by email to 
andrew_humphries@bigfoot.com by date. 
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Appendix 2 
Semi-Structured Interview Plan 
 
Introductions 
Thanks for allowing the research to take place in the interviewees organisation and 
for the opportunity to carry out the interview which should last no longer than [x] 
minutes. 
Conduct 
Seek permission to record and take notes.  Explain that a summary of key points will 
be provided subsequently for agreement. 
Purpose of Interview 
To collect informed opinion on the results of the questionnaire survey in order that 
some explanation of the main findings can be captured. 
Questionnaire Results Summary 
Identify the salient aspects from the survey highlighting the overall picture, the 
successes and failures.  Introduce the intention to address each major dimension to 
gain the interviewee’s views on each. 
Relationship Development 
S:  What factors specifically allow you to create a sound, working relationship with 
the other party? 
or 
F:  What factors specifically prevent you from creating a sound, working relationship 
with the other party? 
 
Relationship Stability 
S:  What factors specifically provide you with stability in this relationship? 
or 
F:  What factors specifically prevent you from establishing a stable relationship with 
the other party? 
 
Communication 
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S:  What factors specifically allow you to establish good communications in this 
relationship? 
or 
F:  What factors specifically prevent you from establishing good communications in 
this relationship? 
 
Relationship Strengthening 
S:  What factors specifically allow you to establish good communications in this 
relationship? 
or 
F:  What factors specifically prevent you from establishing good communications in 
this relationship? 
 
Relationship Quality 
 
S:  What factors specifically characterise this as a good relationship? 
or 
F:  What factors specifically characterise this as an unsatisfactory relationship? 
 
Environmental Factors 
Has any recent organisational, political, economic or technical event had a significant 
influence on the quality of the relationship in question? 
 
Concluding Remarks 
 
Thanks for providing most useful contribution to the research.  Researcher will be in-
touch in due course and provide summary of the key points for agreement of 
completeness. 
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Appendix 3 
Pilot Project Business Report 
WYT/AARC/BAES 
 
10 Jan 00 
 
IPTL 
Firm TL 
 
RELATIONSHIPS IN DEFENCE PROCUREMENT RESEARCH 
REPORT ON AARC/BAES SURVEY 
 
Background 
The survey was carried between Oct-Dec 00 out as part of a pilot project to develop 
the research methods and tools.  Twenty-five respondents each from the IPT and the 
Firm provided completed questionnaires.  Additional, very useful comments on the 
questionnaire itself were also provided and for which the author is most grateful.   
 
General Results 
Given the involvement of staff in both organisations in the development process, the 
results must be taken with ‘a pinch of salt’.  Nevertheless, the results do show some 
interesting features that will aid the relationship development activities of the team 
leaders.  The overall statistics are at Annex A.  The following points are evident: 
 
• The Firm is generally more optimistic about the relationship than the IPT. 
• The failure proportions in the IPT and Firm results are about the same under 
each question category and overall indicating a measure of agreement. 
• A rather larger proportion of the IPT staff registered ‘insufficient knowledge’ on 
many questions – perhaps indicating a need for improved education. 
• Analysis of the data did not identify any particular rank/grade or role grouping as 
being particularly optimistic or pessimistic. 
• The overall relationship judgement indicates a bare 46% vote for success. 
 
Detailed Results 
Greatest benefit in terms of identifying potential actions will be derived from 
consideration of the detailed statistical results together with the individual questions 
asked.  The question details are below.  The individual grouping charts are at Annex 
B. 
 
1. Relationship Development – enabling joint creativity 
a. The relationship encourages the achievement of high performance by 
both parties ie. reliable equipment, on-time delivery, good forecasts. 
b. The relationship encourages us to be innovative in the way we do 
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business. 
c. Performance measurement is used to raise standards. 
d. Disputes & problems are resolved: 'quickly'. 
e. Disputes & problems are resolved: 'fairly'. 
f. The other party is reliable and consistent in dealing with us. 
g. The other party is dedicated to making our business a success. 
h. When an unexpected problem arises, both parties would rather work 
out a solution than hold each other to the original contract terms. 
 
2. Relationship Stability – creating a framework for successful business 
a. The other party displays a sound, strategic understanding of our 
business. 
b. The objectives of both parties are clearly stated. 
c. The objectives of both parties are fully compatible. 
d. Both parties co-operate wholeheartedly. 
e. The relationship provides a dynamic business environment within 
which both parties can seek increasing rewards. 
f. I have complete confidence in the intentions of the other party. 
 
3. Communication – creating an environment for business success 
a. Where the other party has proprietary information that could improve. 
the performance of the joint business, it is freely available. 
b. We would welcome a shared data environment where planning, 
technical and pricing information are made freely available. 
c. We understand the information requirements of all participants in the 
support chain from sub-contractors to end-user. 
d. Exchange of information in this relationship takes place frequently and 
informally – not just according to specified agreement. 
e. Objective performance measurement is an important part of this 
relationship. 
f. We are aware of the performance requirements for all participants in 
the support chain from sub-contractors to end-user. 
g. We provide the other party with regular information including long-
range forecasts to enable him to do his business better. 
 
4. Relationship Strengthening – creating a reliable business arrangement 
a. The quality of the contract outputs ie. spares/repairs/services, is 
entirely satisfactory. 
b. The quality of service delivery ie. delivery times, billing, payment, is 
entirely satisfactory.  
c. The relationship is characterised by a continually improving quality 
ethos. 
d. Problems are solved in a joint, open, constructive manner. 
e. Such is the goodwill in the relationship, the other party would willingly 
put himself out to adapt to our changing requirements. 
f. We trust the other party to act in our best interests. 
g. The responsibility for making sure the relationship works is shared 
jointly. 
h. The other party provides us with useful cost reduction and quality 
improvement ideas. 
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i. The other party is always totally open and honest with us. 
j. The other party always does what he says he will do. 
 
5. Relationship Quality – creating the incentive to work together 
a. The gains from this relationship are equally shared between both 
parties. 
b. We do not feel imprisoned within the current relationship.  
c. We are willing to invest more ie. money, time, information, effort, in the 
current relationship. 
d. We are happy that our future is bound to the success of our 
relationship partner. 
e. We feel totally committed to this relationship. 
f. The other party is genuinely concerned that our business succeeds. 
g. Both sides are working to improve this relationship. 
 
Conclusion 
 
I would like to thank you for your kind co-operation in this phase of the pilot project 
and to pass on both thanks and feedback to your staffs.  I would suggest that the 
statistics could be used as a starting point to trigger discussion, both within and 
between the organisations at all levels, with a view to beginning a continuous 
improvement programme. 
 
Andrew Humphries 
 
A S HUMPHRIES 
Gp Capt 
AD SC Ops 
WYT 5648, X106 
 
Annexes: 
 
A. Overall Results Charts. 
B. Detailed Results Charts. 
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Appendix 4 
Example Business Unit Report 
ES(SEA)/FINAL 
 
1 Aug 01 
 
D Spt Ops (E), WSA 
 
RELATIONSHIPS IN DEFENCE PROCUREMENT RESEARCHREPORT ON THE 
WARSHIP SUPPORT AGENCY SURVEYS 
 
Introduction 
 
Ten surveys of contracts worth £29.010m pa in the WSA were carried out between 
12 May - 30 Jul 01 as part of a PhD research project to examine the quality of 
relationships between MoD and its main industrial suppliers.  There were 60 IPT 
respondents versus 32 from the firms.  In addition to the completed questionnaire 
data, some very useful additional comments were provided for which I am most 
grateful.  Following the issue of each report, I spoke to the POC on each side and 
recorded the key points made.   
 
General Results 
 
The WSA Survey Results from the 10 relationships are shown in the graph at Annex 
A.  They range from exceptionally good (Phalanx) to rather poor (Periscopes) and 
potentially there are lessons that could be learned from examining these poles 
through the detailed survey results provided on each.  At a general level however, it 
is worthy of note that there is a predominance of ‘insufficient knowledge’ scores 
towards the right hand end and an examination of the Overall Results (average of all 
relationships) in Annex B seems to indicate that these are due to responses from 
IPTs.  It is possible that improving internal awareness is a factor for consideration.  
 
The statistics at Annex B suggest the following points: 
 
• The overall average WSA relationship judgement indicates a 63% vote for 
success.  
• The IPTs are more pessimistic (55%) about the relationships than the Firms 
(71%). 
• The pattern of results is similar for each side, which indicates a measure of 
agreement by proportion of those factors that are good and those that are not so 
successful.  Any high-level action plan to improve matters might tackle the 
dimensions in order of negativity: Stability (-33%), Reliability (-32%), Creativity   
(-29%), Communication (-25%), Quality (-18%). 
• At the detailed level Qs 2e and 2f (Stability - synchronisation of objectives and 
confidence building) suggest a marked lack of confidence by the IPTs in 
Industry’s intentions.  Although Communications - frequent, open dialogue and 
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information sharing, seems to be satisfactory, there are significant reservations 
by the IPTs over Industry’s ability to deliver against the contracts (Reliability - 
concentrating on service and product delivery, lowering joint costs and risks, 
building up trust).  In Q4h – joint efforts to seek cost reduction and quality 
improvement – both sides agree this aspect is failing.  
 
Detailed Results 
 
Greatest benefit in terms of identifying potential relationship improvement actions will 
be derived from consideration of the detailed statistical results in conjunction with the 
individual questions asked.  The questions are listed below.  The individual grouping 
charts are at Annex C. 
 
1. Relationship Development – enabling joint creativity 
a. The relationship encourages the achievement of high performance by 
both parties ie. reliable equipment, on-time delivery, good forecasts. 
b. The relationship encourages us to be innovative in the way we do 
business. 
c. Performance measurement is used to raise standards. 
d. Disputes & problems are resolved: 'quickly'. 
e. Disputes & problems are resolved: 'fairly'. 
f. The other party is reliable and consistent in dealing with us. 
g. The other party is dedicated to making our business a success. 
h. When an unexpected problem arises, both parties would rather work 
out a solution than hold each other to the original contract terms. 
 
2. Relationship Stability – creating a framework for successful business 
a. The other party displays a sound, strategic understanding of our 
business. 
b. The objectives of both parties are clearly stated. 
c. The objectives of both parties are fully compatible. 
d. Both parties co-operate wholeheartedly. 
e. The relationship provides a dynamic business environment within 
which both parties can seek increasing rewards. 
f. I have complete confidence in the intentions of the other party. 
 
3. Communication – creating an environment for business success 
a. Where the other party has proprietary information that could improve. 
the performance of the joint business, it is freely available. 
b. We would welcome a shared data environment where planning, 
technical and pricing information are made freely available. 
c. We understand the information requirements of all participants in the 
support chain from sub-contractors to end-user. 
d. Exchange of information in this relationship takes place frequently and 
informally – not just according to specified agreement. 
e. Objective performance measurement is an important part of this 
relationship. 
f. We are aware of the performance requirements for all participants in 
the support chain from sub-contractors to end-user. 
g. We provide the other party with regular information including long-
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range forecasts to enable him to do his business better. 
 
4. Relationship Strengthening – creating a reliable business arrangement 
a. The quality of the contract outputs ie. spares/repairs/services, is 
entirely satisfactory. 
b. The quality of service delivery ie. delivery times, billing, payment, is 
entirely satisfactory.  
c. The relationship is characterised by a continually improving quality 
ethos. 
d. Problems are solved in a joint, open, constructive manner. 
e. Such is the goodwill in the relationship, the other party would willingly 
put himself out to adapt to our changing requirements. 
f. We trust the other party to act in our best interests. 
g. The responsibility for making sure the relationship works is shared 
jointly. 
h. The other party provides us with useful cost reduction and quality 
improvement ideas. 
i. The other party is always totally open and honest with us. 
j. The other party always does what he says he will do. 
 
5. Relationship Quality – creating the incentive to work together 
a. The gains from this relationship are equally shared between both 
parties. 
b. We do not feel imprisoned within the current relationship.  
c. We are willing to invest more ie. money, time, information, effort, in the 
current relationship. 
d. We are happy that our future is bound to the success of our 
relationship partner. 
e. We feel totally committed to this relationship. 
f. The other party is genuinely concerned that our business succeeds. 
g. Both sides are working to improve this relationship. 
 
Supporting Comments 
 
Following the presentation of each report I had a phone conversation with the IPT 
and Industry Points of Contact and gleaned a number of useful comments, which I 
have recorded verbatim and without attribution.  I attach them at Annex D.  Also 
included are any additional comments offered on questionnaires.  Altogether they 
make interesting reading and may offer ideas on specific issues that need 
addressing as well as an indication of success factors.  The confidence levels relate 
to the overall success score for the IPT or Firm for that dimension hence positive 
comments are listed in descending order and negative ones are in ascending order. 
 
Conclusion 
 
I would like to thank you for your kind co-operation in this phase of my project and to 
pass on both thanks and feedback to your staffs who participated so readily.   
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I hope that this short survey will be of use to you both as an assessment exercise 
and as a means of promoting debate on how relationships with industry might be 
improved. 
 
Andrew Humphries 
 
A S HUMPHRIES 
Gp Capt 
AD SC Ops 
WYT 5648, X106 
 
Annexes: 
 
A. WSA Relationship Survey Results. 
B. Overall Results Charts. 
C. Detailed Results Charts. 
D. IPT and Industry Verbatim Comments. 
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Appendix 5 
Defence Logistics Organisation Report 
ES(AIR)/PHD/FINAL REPORT 
 
Jan 02 
 
DG Ops 
 
RELATIONSHIPS IN DEFENCE PROCUREMENT RESEARCH 
REPORT ON THE DLO BU SURVEYS 
 
Introduction 
 
1. In Jun 99 I received HQ DLO business endorsement from Air Cdre Cooper 
and Brig Hewitt to undertake a Cranfield University PhD research project to examine 
the quality of relationships between the DLO and its main industrial suppliers.  I have 
now completed the programme, which involved conducting surveys of 54 
relationships that spent £575.8m in FY 00/01 spread across the 3 BUs.  A total of 
629 questionnaires were administered to IPT and Firm team members and the 
programme is shown at Annex A.  The POC on each side of a relationship was also 
interviewed and overall 700 verbatim best practice points have been recorded.  
Some of these are used to illustrate the prevalent issues highlighted in this report.   
 
General Results 
 
2. The Survey Results from the 54 relationships listed in Annex A are shown in 
success order in the graph at Annex B.  In order to obtain honest inputs I assured my 
Industry respondents that this ranking information would not be publicised.  I would 
be grateful if DLO senior managers could honour this undertaking.   
 
3. The relationship success scores range from exceptionally good (97%) to 
rather poor (32%) and potentially there are lessons that could be learned from 
examining these poles through the detailed survey results provided to the individual 
IPTLs and their industry counterparts.  It is also worth noting that a number of high 
expenditure relationships are towards the right-hand end (least successful) of the 
graph.  
 
4. The overall, averaged score statistics derived from the questionnaire data are 
given at Annex C and suggest the following points: 
 
a. The overall joint IPT/Industry relationship success score was 58%.  
 
b. The IPTs were more pessimistic (52%) about the relationships than the 
Firms (63%). 
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c. The general pattern of results is similar for each side, which indicates a 
measure of agreement by proportion of those factors that are good and those 
that are not so successful. 
 
d. The questionnaire was divided into 5 separate dimensions and a 
comparison between the IPT and Firm results indicates that in the areas of: 
 
Creativity (promoting quality, innovation and long-term approach by 
encouraging high performance), 
  
Stability (synchronisation of objectives and confidence-building),  
 
Communication (frequent, open dialogue and information-sharing) and,  
 
Quality (creating a win-win relationship in which each side is delighted to be a 
part) 
 
the views of both sides were aligned.  However, in the area of 
 
Reliability (concentrating on service and product delivery, lowering joint costs 
and risks, building up trust) 
 
views were divergent where IPTs were pessimistic compared to Firms overall 
optimism.  The following quotation represents a common IPT perception: 
 
‘We have put in a huge amount of effort into streamlining processes but 
the Firm still does not deliver’.  
 
e. There were significantly more ‘insufficient knowledge’ scores from IPTs 
(11%) than Industry (7%) suggesting that improving internal awareness within 
the DLO is a factor worthy of consideration. 
  
Detailed Results 
 
5. Greater granularity of the results, grouped under each of the headings 
mentioned in para 4d, is available at the level of the individual survey questions and 
this is shown in Annex D.  The following observations can be made: 
 
a. Creativity.  Fair dealings together with a willingness ‘to go the extra 
mile’ (Qs 1e & 1h) were positively highlighted.  However problems over lack of 
objective performance measurement (Q1c) and a lack of confidence within 
Industry in the MoD’s capability to enter into long-term partnering 
arrangements, primarily due to the lack of stability of funding (Q1g), stood out. 
 
‘Our fear is the feast and famine situation of Defence spending.  There 
are times when we must stop work, lay off experienced staff and then 
race to get back going again.  I worry that we cannot respond fast 
enough and this adversely affects customer service’. 
 
Finally, many companies commented on the adverse impact of high staff 
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turnover within IPTs, for example: 
 
‘The regular cycling of IPT staff is not conducive to building long-term 
relationships that develop sound working practices and innovation’. 
 
b. Stability.  There were misgivings on both sides about compatibility of 
objectives (Q2c) and co-operative achievement (Q2e).  Both sides particularly 
expressed their frustrations with the commercial attitudes and practices: 
 
The biggest obstacle to improving business performance is the 
Commercial department.  There is a severe shortage of resources, risk 
aversion and lack of flexibility, which lead to significant effort and delay 
in agreeing contracts. 
 
But significantly in the very best performing relationships, innovative 
Commercial staff were singled out as the most important contribution to 
success.  Lastly, IPTs voiced significant doubt over their confidence in 
Industry’s intentions (Q2f). 
 
‘Although we negotiate down the price, we know they will recoup the 
money somewhere else’. 
 
c. Communication.  Both sides were reasonably happy with 
communication but, IPTs had worries about proprietary information (Q3a) 
especially where the Firm was the Design Authority and there was no 
competition available.  Conversely, Firms generally felt that performance 
measures lacked end-customer focus and therefore provided inadequate joint 
motivation to perform. 
 
‘There is a gulf in perception between the sides over performance, which 
also extends to the front line.  Without a common understanding of how 
we are doing we cannot move forward’. 
 
d. Reliability.  This was the lowest point in the relationship satisfaction 
survey.  IPTs expressed strong reservations over Industry’s ability to deliver a 
flexible service to time, quality and budget (Qs 4a & 4b).  
 
‘We have made huge progress with Repair & Overhaul but despite their 
good words and assurances their performance on Spares is appalling’. 
 
Industry often saw the IPTs lacking understanding of their resource 
constraints in today’s tight fiscal climate and the need to plan production (Qs 
4e & 4f).  Both sides believed that the other was not forthcoming when it came 
to ideas for service improvement and cost reduction (Q4h). 
 
e. Quality.  IPTs were generally concerned that the lack of competition 
open to them left them at the mercy of the contractor (Qs 5a, 5b & 5d). 
 
‘They have an air of arrogance - take it or leave it, we are sole suppliers’. 
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They also felt that they were vulnerable to Firm reorganisations and 
takeovers.  Conversely, Firms felt that they also were at the mercy of MoD 
bureaucracy, budget instabilities and its apparent desire to make 20% savings 
at the expense of their profits (Qs 5a and 5f).  Nevertheless, despite the 
numerous criticisms of each other throughout the survey, both IPTs and Firms 
registered higher overall scores in this category than any other.  This is 
possibly because there was still evidence of constructive tension in many of 
these relationships and also both sides realised, like it or not, that they 
needed each other to survive hence the high scores in Q5c and g. 
 
‘We have built a ‘head’ of good-will despite the problems’. 
 
Supporting Comments 
 
6. I am very grateful to the IPT and Firm POCs who during interviews 
enthusiastically contributed their views on the highs and lows of their business 
relationships.  I shall shortly be publishing a CD ROM database containing the 
complete, unnattributed set of comments which represents an accumulation of best 
and worse practice.  I intend to issue it to all contributors and other interested parties 
in the DLO. 
 
Conclusion & Recommendation 
 
7. I hope that this short survey will be of use to DLO senior managers both as an 
assessment exercise and as a means of promoting debate on how relationships with 
industry might be improved.  Although further detailed information could be derived 
from the data collected, this research was, due to time and resource limitations, an 
exploratory exercise.  The process of data collection and reporting back to both sides 
was itself a very useful and well-received exercise which has triggered many, local 
follow-up discussions to improve relationship understanding. 
 
‘The report was very interesting and revealing.  I am concerned about the 
aspects where our perceptions are at odds.  We are about to begin a joint 
process review with the IPT and will use the report to get things started’. 
 
Nevertheless, in addition to the findings detailed above, I have concluded that 
although much work is continuing apace to develop individual relationships in the 
DLO, there is currently no overview, which allows strategic management to be 
applied effectively.  The objective data that is provided by this research on the 
ranking of relationships as well as generic relationship factors is, as far as I can 
determine, a first and potentially the concept could also be of use to the DPA .  
 
8. I therefore recommend that consideration should be given to carrying out a 
comprehensive survey of DLO IPT/Industry relationships annually so that: 
 
a.  Changes could be tracked and management action targeted 
accordingly. 
 
b. Worst and best practices could be identified from more detailed 
analysis of the data and applied across the organisation where needed. 
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c. Specific improvements could be trialled and carefully monitored so 
those further lessons about IPT/Industry relationship dynamics could be 
learned and disseminated appropriately. 
 
9. Finally, I am most grateful to the DG ESBUs who permitted me to carry out 
the research in their areas and to the IPTLs who participated so readily. 
 
Andrew Humphries 
 
A S HUMPHRIES 
Gp Capt 
AD SC Ops 
WYT 5648, X106 
 
Annexes: 
 
A. Survey Programme. 
B. Performance Table. 
C. Overall Results Charts. 
D. Detailed Results Charts. 
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ANNEX A 
 
DLO BU IPT/INDUSTRY RELATIONSHIP SURVEY PROGRAMME 
 
Ser Equipment IPT Firm £m 
 Land    
1 Combat Vehicles LASS Alvis Vehicles Ltd 5.0 
2 Rapier GWSS Matra BAe Dynamics 1.8 
3 AS90 FASS BAe Systems Royal Ordnance 8.0 
4 Tyres ESPPA Michelin Tyres PLC 7.5 
5 Challenger 2 TSS Vickers Defence Systems 25.0 
6 ATE WSS Thales Optronics/Instruments 6.0 
   Total: 53.3 
 
 
Ser Equipment IPT Firm £m 
 Sea    
7 Gas Turbines MPS Rolls Royce PLC 10.0 
8 Submarine Seals MPS Deep Sea Seals Ltd .4 
9 One Man Controls MDMS Alenia Marconi Systems 2.5 
10 Phalanx AWS Devonport Royal Dockyard Ltd 1.8 
11 NBC Protection MDMS Graseby Dynamics Ltd 1.5 
12 Periscopes UWS Thales Optronics 7.4 
13 Submarine Air Purification MAES Wellman Defence Ltd 4.0 
14 Freq Standard Equipment FWS Steatite Insulations Ltd .5 
15 Machinery Controls MLS Vosper Thornycroft Conts Ltd .8 
16 Steering Gear MDMS Rolls Royce Power Eng .2 
   Total: 29.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ser Equipment IPT Firm £m 
 Air    
17 VC10 AARC BAe Systems 40.0 
18 Aerial Imagery AVEW Kodak Ltd .6 
19 Adour/Avon Can/Jag Rolls Royce PLC 18.5 
20 Bombs (540/1000lb) ALM BAe Systems Royal Ordnance 67.0 
21 Canberra Can/Jag BAe Systems 1.3 
22 Chinook Chinook Boeing Company Philadelphia 15.0 
23 DF Spinner Nimrod BAe Systems 1.0 
24 Dominie Trg AC Thales Defence Ltd .7 
25 Ejection Seats S&AD Martin Baker Aircraft Company  Ltd 3.0 
26 Aero Engine Controls AVEW Ultra Electronics Ltd 1.8 
27 Aircraft Generators AVEW TRW -Lucas 3.0 
28 ESP, ARI 23450 etc EW AVEW BAe Systems 2.0 
29 SLATE, MITRE etc EW AVEW BAe Systems 1.3 
30 Harrier Harrier BAe Systems 75.0 
31 Harrier EW AVEW BAe Systems 8.4 
32 Hawk Trg AC BAe Systems 38.0 
33 AC Instruments R&S AVEW Smiths 4.0 
34 AC Instruments PDS AVEW Smiths 2.0 
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Ser Equipment IPT Firm £m 
 Air (cont)    
35 Islander HIC Britten Norman Islander .3 
36 Jaguar Jag/Can BAe Systems 5.0 
37 Launchers ALM Flight Refuelling Ltd .4 
38 Link 11 & HF Radio Nimrod Aerosystems International 1.0 
39 Maverick ALM Raytheon Systems Ltd .4 
40 Missiles ALM Matra BAe Dynamics 17.0 
41 Nimrod Tactical System Nimrod BAe Systems .7 
42 Cameras & Recce Systems AVEW Vintens Ltd 1.6 
43 RB199 Tornado Rolls Royce PLC 100.0
44 Sea King Sea King WHL 32.0 
45 Sentry Radar Sentry Northrop Grumman Corp 6.0 
46 Sentry Sentry Boeing 10.0 
47 Spey Nimrod Rolls Royce PLC 10.0 
48 Tornado Actuators Tornado FHL 5.0 
49 Tornado EW AVEW BAe Systems 9.6 
50 Tornado Radar Tornado BAe Systems 1.9 
51 Tucano Trg AC Bombardier 3.0 
52 Viper Trg AC Rolls Royce PLC .1 
53 Yellowgate AVEW Thales PLC 1.2 
54 Yellowgate Mod 047 AVEW Thales PLC 6.4 
   Total: 494.2
 
 
   Total Value FY 00/01: 575.8
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ANNEX C 
 
OVERALL RESULTS 
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ANNEX D 
 
DETAILED RESULTS 
 
1. Relationship Development – enabling joint creativity 
a. The relationship encourages the achievement of high performance by 
both parties ie. reliable equipment, on-time delivery, good forecasts. 
b. The relationship encourages us to be innovative in the way we do 
business. 
c. Performance measurement is used to raise standards. 
d. Disputes & problems are resolved: 'quickly'. 
e. Disputes & problems are resolved: 'fairly'. 
f. The other party is reliable and consistent in dealing with us. 
g. The other party is dedicated to making our business a success. 
h. When an unexpected problem arises, both parties would rather work 
out a solution than hold each other to the original contract terms. 
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2. Relationship Stability – creating a framework for successful business 
a. The other party displays a sound, strategic understanding of our 
business. 
b. The objectives of both parties are clearly stated. 
c. The objectives of both parties are fully compatible. 
d. Both parties co-operate wholeheartedly. 
e. The relationship provides a dynamic business environment within 
which both parties can seek increasing rewards. 
f. I have complete confidence in the intentions of the other party. 
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3. Communication – creating an environment for business success 
a. Where the other party has proprietary information that could improve. 
the performance of the joint business, it is freely available. 
b. We would welcome a shared data environment where planning, 
technical and pricing information are made freely available. 
c. We understand the information requirements of all participants in the 
support chain from sub-contractors to end-user. 
d. Exchange of information in this relationship takes place frequently and 
informally – not just according to specified agreement. 
e. Objective performance measurement is an important part of this 
relationship. 
f. We are aware of the performance requirements for all participants in 
the support chain from sub-contractors to end-user. 
g. We provide the other party with regular information including long-
range forecasts to enable him to do his business better. 
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4. Relationship Strengthening – creating a reliable business arrangement 
a. The quality of the contract outputs ie. spares/repairs/services, is 
entirely satisfactory. 
b. The quality of service delivery ie. delivery times, billing, payment, is 
entirely satisfactory.  
c. The relationship is characterised by a continually improving quality 
ethos. 
d. Problems are solved in a joint, open, constructive manner. 
e. Such is the goodwill in the relationship, the other party would willingly 
put himself out to adapt to our changing requirements. 
f. We trust the other party to act in our best interests. 
g. The responsibility for making sure the relationship works is shared 
jointly. 
h. The other party provides us with useful cost reduction and quality 
improvement ideas. 
i. The other party is always totally open and honest with us. 
j. The other party always does what he says he will do. 
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5. Relationship Quality – creating the incentive to work together 
a. The gains from this relationship are equally shared between both 
parties. 
b. We do not feel imprisoned within the current relationship.  
c. We are willing to invest more ie. money, time, information, effort, in the 
current relationship. 
d. We are happy that our future is bound to the success of our 
relationship partner. 
e. We feel totally committed to this relationship. 
f. The other party is genuinely concerned that our business succeeds. 
g. Both sides are working to improve this relationship. 
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Appendix 6 
Semi-Structured Interview Key Points 
 
 
ID BU Orga
nisati
on 
Positive Comment Negative Comment Dimension 
1 Air IPT We have created a huge number 
of opportunities for dialogue 
including embedding staff in each 
other’s organisations. 
 Communication
2 Air IPT  The fact that we do not have an 
effective performance 
measurement system whilst the 
Firm believes we have is a real 
failure to communicate. 
Communication
3 Air IPT  We are not always sure that the 
prime contractor has clear 
communications with his sub-
contractors. 
Communication
4 Land IPT Quarterly, team leader-level 
review meetings have made a 
real difference. 
 Communication
5 Land IPT Quarterly review meetings where 
outstanding orders are discussed 
have led to improved availability. 
 Communication
6 Land IPT  The firm does not appear to be 
able to forecast expenditure with 
the accuracy needed by our 
FOO. 
Communication
7 Land IPT Regular meetings to discuss 
lead-times, deliveries and 
technical problems are essential 
enablers to building trust. 
 Communication
8 Land Firm Frequent contacts, even as often 
as daily, build confidence, reduce 
risks of misunderstandings and 
keep the teem focussed. 
 Communication
9 Land Firm The IPT never holds back on 
providing data on advance 
requirements when known.  This 
helps us to plan better. 
 Communication
10 Land Firm  Our negativity is caused by the 
unpredictability of the customer's 
requirements. 
Communication
11 Land Firm  We don't get any feedback on 
the effectiveness of our 
communications. 
Communication
12 Land Firm We are very proud of the way we 
communicate with the IPT; we 
speak at least daily. 
 Communication
13 Land IPT I must go and talk to a senior 
member of the firm to discuss the 
research report. 
 Communication
14 Land IPT  Their commercial staff are Communication
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ID BU Orga
nisati
on 
Positive Comment Negative Comment Dimension 
extremely poor at responding to 
price requests. 
15 Land Firm  They hide behind the excuse 
that their data is not good 
enough to give us as a means of 
keeping information from us.  
They are not open with us. 
Communication
16 Land Firm  We delivered over the stated 
requirement despite the IPT's 
total lack of communication. 
Communication
17 Land Firm  Very poor information on the 
MoD's consumption and usage 
rates makes planning extremely 
difficult 
Communication
18 Land Firm  The MoD won't answer our 
customer satisfaction surveys so 
how can we improve? 
Communication
19 Land IPT  We are not happy with the firm's 
marketing strategy; they have 
put the company up for sale 
without telling the MoD and all 
the good work on agreeing IPR 
could be lost. 
Communication
20 Land IPT  Because the operating system 
software IPR belongs to the firm 
we are locked into the 
relationship and they 'have us 
over a barrel'. 
Communication
21 Land Firm The IPT has a high degree of 
disclosure over its long term 
objectives. 
 Communication
22 Land IPT  We use technical data to 
compete; the firm uses it to 
make their products more 
proprietary. 
Communication
23 Sea Firm Because we know our opposite 
numbers personally we don't 
want to let them down. 
 Communication
24 Sea Firm We feel we can let our hair down 
with the IPT, say what we think 
and be honest without 
recrimination. 
 Communication
25 Sea Firm Regular meetings at strategic 
and tactical levels that examine 
performance and future plans 
and tasks enable the Firm to plan 
its forward allocation of 
resources. 
 Communication
26 Sea IPT We are continuing to discuss 
Smart procurement and 
management of stock following 
our Industry Breakthrough Day. 
 Communication
27 Sea IPT There is enthusiasm on both 
sides and regular meetings are 
held where we review the detail.  
Twice per year we review 
 Communication
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ID BU Orga
nisati
on 
Positive Comment Negative Comment Dimension 
strategy. 
28 Sea IPT  We do not provide the Firm with 
long range forecasts because 
often we do not have the 
information. 
Communication
29 Sea Firm  We have worked hard to make a 
success of communications but 
maybe this has taken our eyes 
off the other aspects of the 
relationship that need attention. 
Communication
30 Sea Firm We are starting to face up to 
performance issues at our 
regular meetings.  In the past 
mutual defensiveness has got in 
the way of making improvements. 
This is a very hard area matter to 
tackle. 
 Communication
31 Sea Firm By having a member of staff in 
their team we are able to 
communicate much better, 
reduce misunderstandings, and 
gain a much clearer idea of the 
plans for the business. 
 Communication
32 Sea IPT  It would be easier to pull teeth 
than get timely information from 
the firm. 
Communication
33 Sea Firm The report has given us yet 
another good reason to sit down 
and talk with the IPT. 
 Communication
34 Sea Firm The interesting divergence of 
views exposed by the report 
suggests a number of issues that 
I will need to discuss with the 
IPTL. 
 Communication
35 Sea Firm People do talk more freely and 
there is a genuine desire to solve 
problems in an open way. 
 Communication
36 Sea Firm  There seems to be a gap in 
communications between the 
IPT and the 2nd Customer.  We 
could solve modification 
problems much more quickly if 
they also were present at review 
meetings. 
Communication
37 Sea IPT We need to separate 
professional and personal 
relationships.  The latter is 
important but 'win-win' is based 
on openness and concentrating 
on the job in hand. 
 Communication
38 Sea Firm  We don't have routine meetings 
with the IPT; they have been to 
see me once in the last year. 
Communication
39 Sea Firm  We have spares order meetings 
in-house; the IPT does not 
attend. 
Communication
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ID BU Orga
nisati
on 
Positive Comment Negative Comment Dimension 
40 Sea IPT We have a pragmatic way of 
working with frank exchanges; 
we are always business-like. 
 Communication
41 Sea IPT We have introduced an industry 
forum where the companies we 
deal with come together and 
thrash through issues with us.  
They provide the chairman. 
 Communication
42 Sea IPT I have talked over the report with 
my opposite number in the firm.  
We have planned further 
meetings to go through it in 
detail. 
 Communication
43 Sea Firm We have good communications 
and as a result big service 
improvements have been made. 
 Communication
44 Sea Firm  We often have great problems 
contacting the IPT's Project 
Managers. 
Communication
45 Land IPT  The firm does not appear to be 
able to forecast expenditure with 
the accuracy needed by our 
FOO. 
Creativity 
46 Land IPT Regular meetings to discuss 
lead-times, deliveries and 
technical problems are essential 
enablers to building trust. 
 Creativity 
47 Land Firm Frequent contacts, even as often 
as daily, build confidence, reduce 
risks of misunderstandings and 
keep the teem focussed. 
 Creativity 
48 Air IPT The hard work of our contracts 
staff has ensured a creative 
environment 
 Creativity 
49 Air IPT  ‘Industry has trained us to 
expect we will be let down’ quote 
from CDL and sums-up why we 
think the Firm is not dedicated to 
our success 
Creativity 
50 Land Firm Compared to other customers I 
find the MoD innovative and 
forward-thinking 
 Creativity 
51 Land IPT By going 'head to head' on issues 
and working them through you 
bring responsiveness to the 
relationship 
 Creativity 
52 Land IPT Innovative commercial staff with 
little guidance on the new ground 
they were breaking, made a real 
difference 
 Creativity 
53 Land Firm A major success factor was the 
unusual combination of 
commercial staff on both sides 
who were lateral thinking and 
open to new ways of doing 
business 
 Creativity 
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ID BU Orga
nisati
on 
Positive Comment Negative Comment Dimension 
54 Land Firm As a result of working through the 
problems together, customer 
satisfaction appears to be 
improving 
 Creativity 
55 Land IPT The company are open and 
honest with us and thus we trust 
the suggestions for improvement 
that they make. 
 Creativity 
56 Land Firm Joint team-building activities from 
the outset were a help to building 
confidence in ourselves and each 
other. 
 Creativity 
57 Land Firm There's no point in exploiting our 
monopoly position because it 
prejudices our long-term 
business. 
 Creativity 
58 Land Firm  The MoD took unfair advantage 
by changing the delivery price 
arrangements in the small print 
of the contract without 
discussion.  This soured the 
relationship for some time. 
Reliability 
59 Land Firm The MoD's Commercial staff are 
much more flexible than they 
were. 
 Creativity 
60 Land Firm I intend to go and talk to the other 
side and using the research 
report to fine-tune the 
relationship. 
 Creativity 
61 Land IPT When we were able to focus 
together on an emergency 
programme to replace defective, 
safety-critical items, the 
Company found it hard to begin 
with but after that has really 
worked well. 
 Creativity 
62 Land IPT  The company is dealing with an 
old product, the spares are in 
short supply, there are 
obsolescence problems and on 
top of that its organisation is 
poorly focused. 
Creativity 
63 Land IPT They are committed to 
improvement and are on-track, 
through a big effort,  to clear the 
40% level of overdue orders. 
 Creativity 
64 Land Firm  They are still into buying the 
cheapest. 
Creativity 
65 Land Firm  The relationship is still immature 
and is not ready to face up to the 
hard issues to come. 
Creativity 
66 Land Firm  They have no idea or system for 
judging our performance. 
Creativity 
67 Land Firm  They show no sign of wanting to 
do better; their management is 
self-satisfied. 
Creativity 
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ID BU Orga
nisati
on 
Positive Comment Negative Comment Dimension 
68 Land IPT The Company representative is 
excellent. 
 Creativity 
69 Land IPT Enabling arrangements with the 
Company reduces admin costs 
by not requiring us to compete as 
long as the company can 
demonstrate it has either 
competed the work elsewhere of 
given us best value for money. 
 Creativity 
70 Land IPT This relationship is steadily 
improving. 
 Creativity 
71 Land Firm We have a particularly good 
relationship with the IPT because 
they are well-organised. 
 Creativity 
72 Land Firm  We have high hopes that 
Resource Accounting and 
Budgeting and full cost 
accounting will bring commercial 
realism to the IPT. 
Creativity 
73 Land Firm We are trying to develop a 
modern, competitive support 
service capability to handle the 
new out-sourcing era. 
 Creativity 
74 Land Firm  Smart Procurement brought a 
breakthrough but where is the 
follow-up? 
Creativity 
75 Land Firm Softer issues are important to this 
relationship's development. 
 Creativity 
76 Sea Firm Personal trust helps us to face 
each other over performance 
issues in a business-like, joint 
problem solving way 
 Creativity 
77 Sea IPT We have already sat down in a 
positive manner with the Firm to 
discuss the research report 
 Creativity 
78 Sea IPT We hope that the new 
discussions will lead to a 
paradigm shift in the way we do 
business but the Firm has 
already realised that the prospect 
is likely to be more difficult that 
they originally thought 
 Creativity 
79 Sea Firm The secret of success is small, 
easily controllable work packages 
and teams, where greater onus is 
put on individual responsibility 
and where performance is clearly 
visible. 
 Creativity 
80 Sea IPT  It is almost policy that we let 
these relationships run without 
much management effort.  We 
need to be more provocative. 
Creativity 
81 Sea IPT  We just don't have time to take a 
strategic view, we are too busy 
looking after 30 other contracts. 
Creativity 
82 Sea Firm  All fine words about partnering Creativity 
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ID BU Orga
nisati
on 
Positive Comment Negative Comment Dimension 
but the MoD Commercial people 
hold both sides back through 
lack of flexibility. 
83 Sea Firm We intend to speak with the IPT 
about the report and use it to 
generate fine tuning. 
 Creativity 
84 Sea IPT  We have been trying to get an 
enabling arrangement with the 
firm for 2 1/2 years but changes 
in the company and 
compartmentalisation of MoD 
Commercial staff have conspired 
against us. 
Creativity 
85 Sea IPT  The MoD Commercial approach 
does not encourage creativity, 
innovation and performance 
measurement. 
Creativity 
86 Sea IPT We have just entered into a 5 
year contract which gives the 
Firm sole rights to provide the 
service. because this gives them 
full responsibility for the end 
product. 
 Creativity 
87 Sea Firm  I see a very hard line from the 
MoD's Contracts people for old-
style traditional reasons.  They 
are always defensive when 
challenged and do not 
understand the meaning of 
innovation. I suspect the IPT is 
equally frustrated. 
Creativity 
88 Sea IPT I intend to sit down with my 
opposite number in the firm (just 
the 2 of us at first) and study the 
report to see where we go from 
here. 
 Creativity 
89 Sea IPT  Our efforts to improve this 
relationship are frustrated by 
continuous change and 
management initiatives within 
our Environment. 
Creativity 
90 Sea IPT  Performance measurement is 
used but standards are never 
raised.  Why invest more time 
and money for no benefit? 
Creativity 
91 Sea IPT  The company's performance has 
in most respects been 
unimpressive and frustrating. 
Creativity 
92 Sea Firm  They just don't seem to be able 
to take a long term view.  If we 
knew where we were we could 
start to plan. 
Creativity 
93 Sea Firm  Of all the MoD departments we 
speak to the Contracts staff are 
the worst.  They are set in their 
ways, won't take risks, have an 
adversarial mindset and they 
Creativity 
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ID BU Orga
nisati
on 
Positive Comment Negative Comment Dimension 
slow things down. 
94 Sea Firm It was difficult to get the contract 
so we try extra hard not to mess 
it up. 
 Creativity 
95 Sea Firm They are equally eager; they 
have their customer breathing 
down their neck - we are both in 
this together. 
 Creativity 
96 Sea Firm Because the equipment has to be 
accepted by the end-customer it 
pays us to get the quality right - 
we cannot afford not to. 
 Creativity 
97 Sea IPT  They are an engineering-
focussed firm who produce good 
products but they are 2nd rate 
on relationships, finance and 
contracts. 
Creativity 
98 Sea Firm We need inevitably to focus on 
the negative aspects of the 
relationship and seek 
improvement. 
 Creativity 
99 Sea Firm  The IPT doesn't seemed to have 
walked the talk; instead they 
have sunk back into their 
comfort zone. 
Creativity 
100 Sea Firm Both sides are committed to 
working together to improve the 
relationship. 
 Creativity 
101 Sea Firm  Although we have a partnering 
arrangement, the support 
aspects could have been better 
addressed by both sides and, 
would have resulted in major 
savings in whole life costs. 
Creativity 
102 Sea IPT We are fortunate that our 
commercial man is good at his 
job and understands what we are 
trying to do with partnering. 
 Creativity 
103 Sea IPT We have some consultants in to 
improve our business.  I shall 
give them the report to help their 
analysis. 
 Creativity 
104 Sea IPT  I hope the consultants will be 
able to implement some of the 
changes implied by your report.  
We don't have the time & 
resources; we are too busy 
fighting fires. 
Creativity 
105 Sea Firm  It's an extremely complex 
support scenario that needs 
massive investment.  There are 
never enough spares on the 
shelf. 
Creativity 
106 Sea Firm  Industry is still in Cold War 
deterrence mode; it is not yet 
prepared for long-term service 
Creativity 
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provision. 
107 Land Firm We now sit down with the IPT to 
write PDS requirements.  This 
saves many months of 
bureaucracy. 
 Creativity 
108 Air IPT We have built a ‘head’ of good-
will despite the problems. 
 Quality 
109 Air IPT The relationship contains a 
healthy measure of scepticism. 
 Quality 
110 Land IPT  An emphasis on customer 
satisfaction is sadly lacking. 
Quality 
111 Land IPT  They give us the impression that 
because their products were part 
of the original equipment buy 
that they now have a right to the 
business. 
Quality 
112 Land Firm We are investing heavily in time 
and effort to improve the 
relationship. 
 Quality 
113 Land Firm The need to dramatically improve 
the relationship is our number 
one priority. 
 Quality 
114 Land Firm Personal working relationships 
where people really get on well 
together in a close-knit group are 
important to developing trust. 
 Quality 
115 Land IPT Senior representatives from the 
company are dedicated to our 
business. 
 Quality 
116 Land IPT Gainshare is built into the 
contract which also supports the 
companies exports aims. 
 Quality 
117 Land Firm There was top-level commitment 
to the project from the outset and 
high quality leaders were 
selected. 
 Quality 
118 Land IPT  Individuals in the IPT are too 
familiar with the Firm's staff. 
Quality 
119 Land IPT  Their view of partnering is for us 
to hand over the whole business 
to them. 
Quality 
120 Land IPT  They are the Design Authority 
for modifications.  We then go 
out to tender and smaller 
companies with lower overheads 
get the manufacturing business.  
It's no wonder the firm is sore at 
us.  But, that's MoD competition 
rules for you. 
Quality 
121 Land IPT  The company is frustrated with 
the IPT because Post design 
services are often carried out by 
cheaper, smaller competitors. 
Quality 
122 Land Firm  The company is very frustrated.  
We have invested by placing a 
man in the IPT but the proposal 
Quality 
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was not welcomed.  They said 
they could take or leave the 
idea.  We would have to pay his 
costs. 
123 Land Firm  The IPT's attitude is: 'we'll share 
whatever you have got'. 
Quality 
124 Land Firm  We had to go out on a 
contractual limb, all the risk was 
ours because the IPT would not 
commit. 
Quality 
125 Land Firm  The MoD thinks we should be 
doing everything for nothing - it's 
the people in the MoD who are 
the problem.  Their current 
technical officer is the only ray of 
sunshine for a long time. 
Quality 
126 Land Firm Now that the MoD realises we 
are running a joint business 
things are improving. 
 Quality 
127 Land Firm The company has invested in a 
Key Account Manager to give the 
contract the appropriate focus. 
 Quality 
128 Land IPT There seems to be a genuine 
commitment to the customer. 
 Quality 
129 Land IPT  There is some reluctance for the 
Company to take risks in 
supporting our plans such as 
buying long lead-time items in 
advance. 
Quality 
130 Land IPT  Despite assurances from the 
firm, we have grave concerns 
over their commitment to 
continue to invest in the 30% of 
their business which is Defence. 
Quality 
131 Land IPT  No I don't know how much 
money I spend with the firm 
annually and I haven't time to 
talk about the relationship. 
Quality 
132 Land IPT  The company is feeling 
beleaguered because there are 
doubts over the future of this 
weapons system and they are 
currently a one-product firm.  We 
have the impression that we 
must support the company at all 
costs because of political 
reasons. 
Quality 
133 Land Firm Blame does not work it just 
perpetuates poor performance in 
the long term. 
 Quality 
134 Sea Firm  There is still a bit of the old 'cost-
plus, bowler-hatted' attitude in 
both Industry and the MoD 
commercial staffs to overcome.  
Things are maturing but at 
different rates. 
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135 Sea IPT We hope to use the report as a 
catalyst to 'reboot' the 
relationship 
 Quality 
136 Sea IPT  I feel trapped within the MoD 
contract terms and conditions 
which prevent us from improving 
the quality of the relationship 
Quality 
137 Sea Firm  The MoD Commercial staffs' 
view of sharing is they have the 
lion's share and we get what's 
left over. 
Quality 
138 Sea IPT  They have an air of arrogance - 
take it or leave it, we are sole 
suppliers. 
Quality 
139 Sea IPT  It is very frustrating to do 
business with the Company. 
Quality 
140 Sea IPT  The company is only concerned 
that our business succeeds for 
their benefit. 
Quality 
141 Sea IPT  Evidence of commitment is 
always promised but never 
delivered 
Quality 
142 Sea IPT  Responsibility should be shared 
but because the relationship 
does not work this does not work 
Quality 
143 Sea Firm  The MoD must trust us to make 
a reasonable profit in exchange 
for a better value for money 
service.  The current partnering 
debate has yet to address this 
thorny issue 
Quality 
144 Sea Firm  Our fear is the feast and famine 
situation of Defence spending.  
There are times when we must 
stop work, lay off experienced 
staff and then race to get back 
going again.  I worry that we 
cannot respond fast enough and 
this adversely affects customer 
satisfaction. 
Quality 
145 Sea Firm  Their worry is that because we 
are their single source and have 
changed hands a couple of 
times in the last 10 years we 
might go out of business and 
leave them high and dry. 
Quality 
146 Sea Firm The new partnering arrangement 
will run over 10 years and allow 
gainshare.  At last we can start to 
improve the quality of this 
relationship for both sides. 
 Quality 
147 Sea Firm The relationship is developing 
from a tight competition contract 
based customer/supplier role to a 
more open one based on trust 
and mutual gain. 
 Quality 
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148 Sea Firm We are looking forward to CLS 
and the opportunity to provide 
total support and to benefit from 
gain-share. 
 Quality 
149 Sea IPT They have a monopoly but they 
also depend for us for 95% of 
their business.  We thus have a 
symbiotic relationship. 
 Quality 
150 Sea IPT There have been improvements 
in the overall relationship and we 
seem to be moving forward 
together at last. 
 Quality 
151 Sea IPT This has always been a good, 
close-knit relationship.  We have 
worked together for about 7 
years. 
 Quality 
152 Sea IPT The majority of the relationship is 
single source.  This does not 
cause a problem. 
 Quality 
153 Sea Firm  Of all our relationships, this is 
the worst and yet it is our most 
important because of its size. 
Quality 
154 Air IPT The fact that the Firm 
acknowledges that it is not 
delivering a quality service is a 
favourable sign. 
 Reliability 
155 Air IPT  I believe that the Firm has a 
long-term ethos of failure to 
deliver to overcome – they still 
act like a nationalised company. 
Reliability 
156 Air IPT  The Firm lacks resources to 
change its culture and is a year 
behind us in progress. 
Reliability 
157 Air IPT  They have often promised to 
deliver by a set date but have 
not only failed to do so but also 
to provide a revised date. 
Reliability 
158 Land IPT At last they are micro-managing 
our requests and improving 
performance. 
 Reliability 
159 Land IPT  They are slow to understand our 
essential procedures including 
the supersession of NATO Stock 
Numbers. 
Reliability 
160 Land IPT  They often tender excessive 
price quotations, which are 
reduced after challenge.  This 
does not engender a trusting 
relationship. 
Reliability 
162 Land IPT  Responses to long-standing 
queries is either non-existent or 
un-helpful. 
Reliability 
163 Land Firm A sound, clearly understood 
working structure of contract and 
procedures has been an 
important success factor. 
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164 Land IPT  Individuals in the IPT are too 
familiar with the contractor's 
staff. 
Stability 
165 Land Firm  MoD is a bit slow to react; it is 
not dynamic like industry. 
Stability 
166 Land Firm Relationships between people is 
important in building trust and 
this is helped if people don't 
move around frequently.  I've 
been on this contract for 6 years.
 Stability 
167 Land Firm We organised a training day on 
the MoD's site (without being 
asked) in order to educate their 
staff about our company and its 
products.  Knowledge about each 
others' business is important to 
our professional relationship. 
 Stability 
168 Land IPT Despite the firm's structural 
problems there is a good working 
relationship at the desk level. 
 Stability 
169 Land IPT  They think that we are 
constantly stifling their creative 
ideas. 
Stability 
170 Land Firm  They just don't understand 
relationship management. 
Stability 
171 Land Firm  Generally their commercial staff 
are extremely risk-averse. 
Stability 
172 Land Firm  They seem to think the cheapest 
means Value For Money.  They 
do not take a long-term view of 
the relationship. 
Stability 
173 Land Firm I agree with the views of both 
sides as portrayed in the 
research report. 
 Stability 
174 Land Firm We are highly focussed on the 
customer's needs. 
 Stability 
175 Land Firm We have a healthy, open 
relationship. 
 Stability 
176 Land Firm  They are a relatively 
undemanding customer and 
because there are no real 
competitors they rely on us to 
deliver. 
Stability 
177 Land IPT  The firm would like to 'cherry-
pick' the easy and profitable 
spare for a Contractor Logistics 
Support arrangement rather than 
take the whole package. 
Stability 
178 Sea IPT The Firm surprised us by 18 mths 
ago taking up my challenge to 
face up to its lack of performance 
before looking forward to 
partnering.  As a result, an 
atmosphere has been created for 
constructive dialogue. 
 Stability 
179 Sea Firm The research report was both  Stability 
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interesting and useful and 
because it is from an unbiased 
source it allows us common 
ground for discussion. 
180 Sea Firm  Budget constraints in the MoD 
reduce the relationship to fire-
fighting.  It's impossible to plan 
ahead. 
Stability 
181 Sea Firm  Upheaval on the MoD side from 
staff and organisation change 
and vacant posts makes it 
impossible to generate a stable 
business environment. 
Stability 
182 Sea Firm We have a member of the IPT in 
our organisation and we employ 
a number of ex-naval personnel. 
 Stability 
183 Sea IPT Because the company is the only 
one in the world capable of 
designing and manufacturing the 
equipment, we trust them with 
the business. 
 Stability 
184 Air Firm  We gave the MoD a pukka 
solution.  They said it was too 
expensive.  We cut back and 
now we are all suffering. 
Stability 
185 Sea IPT  I am not unsurprised by the 
report's disparities; were the 
Firm being strictly honest? 
Stability 
186 Sea IPT  Our Commercial department is 
not good - they have a staff 
turnover problem.  This is 
hindering our efforts to make a 
partnering arrangement. 
Stability 
187 Sea IPT  Their senior managers don't like 
being exposed to the detail of 
their poor performance. 
Stability 
188 Sea IPT  If we hadn't been tied to the 
company by IPR we would have 
gone elsewhere. 
Stability 
189 Sea IPT I am not surprised by the results 
of the survey because I know we 
have a good relationship with the 
firm. 
 Stability 
190 Sea IPT  MoD commercial staff are 
always naturally cynical about 
the intentions of Industry and our 
standard terms do not include 
the concept of increasing joint 
rewards. 
Stability 
191 Sea IPT Although it has taken a long time,
the Firm has just begun to 
understand what we want by 
offering us a service at a realistic 
price. 
 Stability 
192 Sea IPT The report provides a true and 
useful assessment of the 
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relationship. 
193 Sea Firm The report was very interesting 
and revealing.  I am concerned 
about the aspects where our 
perceptions are at odds.  We are 
about to begin a joint process 
review with the IPT and will use 
the report to get things started. 
 Stability 
194 Sea Firm  The MoD Commercial staffs' 
view of sharing is they have the 
lion's share and we get what's 
left over. 
Stability 
195 Sea Firm  Even though their Commercial 
staff are embedded in their 
organisation I believe they still 
feel insecure and are constantly 
looking over their shoulders 
back up their traditional chains 
of command.  It is going to take 
a long time to change this 
culture. 
Stability 
196 Sea IPT  The company's recent 
performance has been a sad 
reflection of a leader of UK 
Industry. 
Stability 
197 Sea IPT The company has provided a 
member of staff to work in the 
IPT at their own expense.  This 
shows their commitment to the 
development of the new 
partnering arrangement. 
 Stability 
198 Sea Firm  Our main problem lies with the 
SPO who continue to operate 
under the old adversarial way.  
This must change to allow a 
100% committed and trusting 
partnership. 
Stability 
199 Sea Firm  The IPT change their staff too 
often and because the 
relationship is very personality-
dependent it is like a roller-
coaster ride.  Out go the old 
faces, in come the new and we 
are back to square one. 
Stability 
200 Sea Firm We get on very well with the 
current IPT Team Leader and 
have a frank and open 
relationship. 
 Stability 
201 Sea Firm We have placed a staff member 
within the IPT at our expense. 
 Stability 
202 Sea IPT  To the firm, service is just a 
public display.  In practice they 
have no delivery capability or 
understanding of the DLO's 
strategic goals and how they will 
be delivered. 
Stability 
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203 Sea Firm I am delighted to see from the 
report that our perceptions are in 
alignment. 
 Stability 
204 Sea Firm Our engineers talk daily and have 
a highly professional relationship 
with each other. 
 Stability 
205 Sea IPT  I am very surprised at the 
divergence of perceptions 
exposed by the report. 
Stability 
206 Sea Firm  During the IPT's breakthru there 
was a 6 mth period when 
decisions were stalled and 
communications reduced.  We 
worry this may happen again 
when the IPTL changes. 
Stability 
207 Sea Firm  At the set-up of our 10 year 
programme we had bright ideas 
for an innovative framework 
contract.  Disappointingly this 
was watered-down by the MoD 
Commercial people.  We are 
hoping that a review will look at 
both performance and the 
relationship. 
Stability 
208 Sea Firm  We can't see the IPT's desire to 
make this arrangement a 
success or to understand our 
drivers. 
Stability 
209 Sea Firm  The commercial side is the 
weakest.  The MoD still has 
traditional views.  We put in a lot 
of effort to work with them but 
they can't change. 
Stability 
210 Sea Firm  Changes in the IPT's logistics 
personnel have caused 
misunderstandings that have 
soured the atmosphere. 
Stability 
211 Sea IPT They are quite a small company 
so we know the people and we 
know we can trust them with our 
risk. 
 Stability 
212 Sea IPT It's very important to shed the 
'them and us' attitude as soon as 
possible. 
 Stability 
213 Sea IPT  The company want to be into 
new technology, volume 
manufacture to make fast gains.  
They don't like our old kit which 
is hard to maintain. 
Stability 
214 Sea IPT Their business has changed and 
we are now their main customer.  
This has changed their focus and 
our work is no longer on their 
'back burner'. 
 Stability 
215 Sea IPT A trusting commercial 
arrangement is the key. 
 Stability 
Appendix 6  346 
 
ID BU Orga
nisati
on 
Positive Comment Negative Comment Dimension 
216 Sea Firm  They think we are far too 
expensive and slow and that we 
fail to deliver. 
Stability 
217 Sea Firm  We speak different languages.  
To them it's a bit of kit to be 
pulled out and exchanged.  To 
us it's a delicate instrument. 
Stability 
218 Land Firm Personalities are extremely 
important in our relationship.  
Leadership is also key.  The IPTL 
really manages his business well. 
This makes life so much easier. 
 Stability 
219 Land IPT  The company moved a couple of 
years ago and often this is used 
to excuse poor response to 
queries on defective items – 
sometimes the sub-contractor is 
blamed.  They do not seem to 
have a focal point for dealing 
with customer problems. 
Reliability 
220 Land IPT  Adherence to delivery dates for 
spares is poor. 
Reliability 
221 Land IPT Team buy-in promotes openness 
and honesty on both sides. 
 Reliability 
222 Land IPT  There are still disconnects in the 
firm that upset efficiency which 
we do not understand. 
Reliability 
223 Land IPT The small structure of the firm's 
team ensures that it is dynamic 
and responsive to change. 
 Reliability 
224 Land Firm The 'baggage' was removed at 
the start of the relationship and 
people believe they can speak 
without recrimination. 
 Reliability 
225 Land Firm It was pure luck that a forward 
thinking, enlightened team 
happened to form.  It would have 
been impossible to create this 
deliberately because there are so 
few staff to choose from in our 
slimmed-down organisations. 
 Reliability 
226 Land Firm We have great faith in the quality 
of our products and our service. 
 Reliability 
227 Land Firm Creative tension in the 
relationship keeps us sharp and 
dynamic. 
 Reliability 
228 Land IPT  They are very poor at delivering 
spares - until they can do the 
simple things right there is no 
point in trying to be innovative. 
Reliability 
229 Land IPT  They are all talk and no 
performance.  They have always 
been bad. 
Reliability 
230 Land IPT  Quality issues are ignored. Reliability 
231 Land IPT They are making efforts to 
improve the quality of their 
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service. 
232 Land IPT  Their product support manager 
is 'Mr Smooth'. 
Reliability 
233 Land Firm  There seems to be a will to 
change at the IPTL level but I 
doubt if the organisation as a 
whole can do it. 
Reliability 
234 Land Firm  There is a poor track record in 
the IPT to embrace change.  We 
in the firm have had to bear the 
difficulties of the market and are 
changing faster. 
Reliability 
235 Land Firm  Post Design services have been 
managed by a long term sick 
post in the MoD.  This says little 
for their commitment. 
Reliability 
236 Land IPT Relationships are open and 
honest without hidden agendas. 
 Reliability 
237 Land IPT They will offer alternative 
solutions that are beneficial to 
both sides. 
 Reliability 
238 Land IPT They are quick to respond to high 
priorities. 
 Reliability 
239 Land IPT We work in partnership rather 
than confrontation. 
 Reliability 
240 Land IPT Technical awareness and 
expertise is important in the IPT 
to ensure that we negotiate on 
equal terms. 
 Reliability 
241 Land Firm  There is a prevalent view in the 
MoD that industry is not to be 
trusted otherwise it is not 
possible to obtain value for 
money. 
Reliability 
242 Land Firm A combination of good IPT staff 
and continuity in posts ensure the 
relationship is successful. 
 Reliability 
243 Land Firm We normally deliver when we say 
we will. 
 Reliability 
244 Land IPT  We feel that we have to keep the 
pressure on price and delivery 
times to keep the firm 'on its 
toes'; we feel we are paying a 
high price for mediocre 
performance. 
Reliability 
245 Land IPT The single-sourcing arrangement 
is working well because it is 
jointly micro-managed by the 
commercial staff. 
 Reliability 
246 Land Firm  They seem to measure our 
performance on the product 
when we should be 
concentrating on the overall 
process. 
Reliability 
247 Sea Firm  They want to do things right but 
their people return equipment to 
Reliability 
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us with little care or information.  
Often we find no fault and the 
diagnostic work costs the 
customer more. 
248 Sea Firm Personal relationships built up by 
frequent interaction build up 
rapport and trust. 
 Reliability 
249 Sea Firm I acknowledge 'permafrost' exists 
on both sides in the commercial 
departments but it is reducing 
although it takes time to build 
confidence. 
 Reliability 
250 Sea Firm Trust is quicker to build through 
personal contact than without. 
 Reliability 
251 Sea IPT Good relationships are based 
upon good performance.  This is 
our joint aim. 
 Reliability 
252 Sea Firm Because 60% of our business is 
with the MoD we are very 
experienced in meeting their 
needs and working with them. 
 Reliability 
253 Sea Firm  We jointly want to put a member 
of staff in the IPT but the MoD 
Commercial staff are very 
difficult to deal with. 
Reliability 
254 Sea IPT  Their deliveries are often late 
and the quality is poor.  We 
continue to speak and only 
slowly are we chipping away at 
the problems. 
Reliability 
255 Sea IPT  We have to concentrate on the 
numerous issues regarding poor 
products which prevents us from 
looking at strategy. 
Reliability 
256 Sea IPT  We pay for the firm to locate an 
individual in the IPT and this was 
partially successful but it is hard 
to justify; they should be 
delivering anyway. 
Reliability 
257 Sea IPT My reading of the report indicates 
the firm has issues over bill 
paying and delivery.  We intend 
to deal with these at the next 
progress meeting. 
 Reliability 
258 Sea IPT  As a Commercial Officer with 
responsibility for over 30 
companies we rarely get the 
opportunity to review individual 
relationships. 
Reliability 
259 Sea IPT By giving the Firm full control 
over the service we can reduce 
the number of spares we have to 
buy. 
 Reliability 
260 Sea Firm  I can appreciate their view of us; 
we have a member of the firm 
who runs round like a headless 
Reliability 
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chicken rather than telling the 
customer what the problem is. 
261 Sea Firm A trusting relationship depends 
heavily on the contracting 
environment and therefore on the 
quality of the Commercial staff on 
both sides. 
 Reliability 
262 Sea IPT  We have made huge progress 
with Repair & Overhaul but 
despite their good words and 
assurances their performance 
on Spares is appalling. 
Reliability 
263 Sea IPT  Our Logistics function is 
provided as a matrix-managed 
service.  The lack of integration 
with the IPT is a severe 
handicap. 
Reliability 
264 Sea IPT I hope that the Company's senior 
management will genuinely grasp 
the opportunity of the new 
partnering arrangement to turn 
round the situation and ensure 
that more than lip-service backs 
up promises of improved 
performance. 
 Reliability 
265 Sea IPT  Although some company staff 
are very willing to come up with 
the goods, others show willing 
but produce nothing. 
Reliability 
266 Sea Firm  Lack of clear lines of 
responsibility for various aspects 
of the relationship within the IPT 
hamper the development of 
improved relationships. 
Reliability 
267 Sea Firm  Their contracts staff have a real 
power to reduce the 
effectiveness of relationships as 
we have to respond to 
interminable price investigations. 
Reliability 
268 Sea IPT  The firm lives under a 'halo' 
effect; when the chips are down 
they respond amazingly quickly 
& effectively but they are very 
poor at routine supply, 
commercial & business 
improvement. 
Reliability 
269 Sea IPT There has been a considerable 
improvement in obtaining delivery 
forecasts from the firm's 
customer service desk and as a 
result a very good working 
relationship has developed. 
 Reliability 
270 Sea IPT General firm performance for 
delivery and feedback has 
improved lately. 
 Reliability 
271 Sea Firm Our quality culture isn't just ISO, 
it also includes IiP and these 
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things build-up with continuous 
improvement. 
272 Sea Firm We are keen to invest in peoples' 
abilities and obtain their buy-in to 
our objectives. 
 Reliability 
273 Sea Firm We are very proud that visitors 
comment that the refurbished 
equipment looks brand new. 
 Reliability 
274 Sea Firm I believe a healthy and positive 
relationship has built-up over a 
number of years and with a great 
deal of trust on both sides. 
 Reliability 
275 Sea Firm The trust that has built-up over 
the years is a result of working 
together to achieve the desired 
end.  I will go out of my way to 
help the MoD solve any problem.
 Reliability 
276 Sea IPT  At a strategic meeting with the 
firm I gained the impression that 
the research questionnaire had 
been completed by staff who 
didn't know about the 
relationship. 
Reliability 
277 Sea IPT  Their Project Officer is now also 
responsible for the Commercial 
side.  This says little for their 
concern for our relationship. 
Reliability 
278 Sea Firm We jointly test the equipment 
before issue. 
 Reliability 
279 Sea Firm  We have yet to finalise the price 
of our product 2 years into the 
new business arrangement.  
This doesn't help our planning 
and puts end of year pressures 
on me from the parent company. 
Reliability 
280 Sea IPT Our business success is based 
on trust.  Recently we had a 
serious problem.  The firm 
reacted instantly, sent a man and 
the job was done. 
 Reliability 
281 Sea Firm  Normally we have no problems 
with the MoD business.  I can't 
understand why they think so 
badly of us. Sometimes we don't 
get their paperwork right. 
Reliability 
282 Sea IPT  People who go back years will 
tell you the same thing; the 
company has always been a 
problem.  It is possibly the 
nature of the 'beast'; 
temperamental equipment. 
Reliability 
283 Sea IPT  As individuals we get on with all 
of them - engineers, commercial, 
projects and supply but, as a 
whole the company doesn't 
come together. 
Reliability 
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284 Sea IPT  Delivery and product reliability 
are the main problems.  They 
have outstanding repairs going 
back to 1992. 
Reliability 
285 Sea IPT It just comes down to people.  Reliability 
286 Sea Firm  The support chain is highly 
disjointed with a mix of in-house 
and industry participation.  There 
is over-capacity and inefficiency.  
No one has an overview of the 
whole. 
Reliability 
287 Sea Firm  It's a problem maintaining 30 
year old kit.  It's used and 
abused and we have difficulty 
finding people and sub-
contractors with the necessary 
skills. 
Reliability 
288 Sea Firm  The supplier base is very small; 
it is thus very easy to have 
critical support chain 
breakdowns. 
Reliability 
289 Sea Firm  The IPT's Project Managers 
need constant chivvying to get 
things done and then we get the 
blame for being late. 
Reliability 
290 Land Firm  The relationship has recently 
become more difficult because 
some of the long-standing IPT 
staff have turned over.  The new 
members are not at all 
experienced. 
Reliability 
291 Air Firm Compared to other customers I 
find the MoD innovative and 
forward-thinking. 
 Stability 
292 Air IPT  Limited weapon system life 
reduces incentive for long term 
approach. 
Stability 
293 Air IPT  Frequent reorganisations in the 
Firm Team increases 
uncertainty. 
Stability 
294 Air IPT  The Firm won’t give us product 
lead times, even for more 
money. 
Stability 
295 Land IPT Recognition of the team's 
achievements through awards 
and publicity breeds further 
success. 
 Stability 
296 Land IPT Trust is personality and leader-
driven and behind closed doors 
anything can be said. 
 Stability 
297 Land IPT Joint presentations externally 
provide a reinforcing image of the 
partnership. 
 Stability 
298 Land Firm Continuity of staff in both teams 
has been important in building 
and maintaining both expertise 
 Stability 
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and a trusting working 
relationship.  The fact that the 
teams are both fairly small is an 
additional strong point. 
299 Land Firm As the reputation of the team 
within the business has grown 
this has helped to boost the 
confidence of the members and 
spurred them on to further gains.
 Stability 
300 Air Firm  They have cancelled priority 
tasks at the last minute and 
incurred costs.  Better planning 
would have saved resources all 
round. 
Communication
301 Air Firm  The relationship between our 
people is excellent but frequent 
staff changes in the IPT disrupt 
our working arrangements and 
incur costs. 
Creativity 
302 Air Firm  We are a very static organisation 
that hopes the world will bend 
round us. 
Stability 
303 Air Firm We will use the report as a point 
of discussion in our next meeting 
with the IPT. 
 Reliability 
304 Air Firm  This relationship is highly 
dependent on people.  We are a 
small company and 
unfortunately a shortage of 
resources limits our ability to 
focus on developing the 
relationship. 
Reliability 
305 Air IPT  Routine pricing enquiries are 
dealt with promptly but any work 
of substance is dealt with slowly 
and no excuse is given for the 
delay. 
Reliability 
306 Air IPT My opposite number is new in 
post and I intend to invite him to 
an 'agenda-free day' to relate  
what I am offering and seeking in 
our relationship. 
 Stability 
307 Air IPT  I don't believe I am getting the 
service I know the company as a 
whole is capable of providing. 
Reliability 
308 Air IPT My relationship with my opposite 
number is a good one.  We both 
do our best to accommodate 
each other even though our 
systems are incompatible.  I 
would trust her to do her best for 
me as I would for her. 
 Reliability 
309 Air IPT  We still have a great deal to do 
in the areas of objective 
performance measurement and 
dynamism to benefit both 
parties. 
Communication
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310 Air IPT  Because the company is small 
there is a 'funnelling' effect when 
tasks reach a certain size 
because of lack of resources. 
Reliability 
311 Air IPT They have moved into a new line 
and we put them in-touch with 
other relevant platform IPTs.  We 
both felt good from this bit of 
cooperation. 
 Reliability 
312 Air IPT  Lack of momentum seems to be 
a feature of 'top down' 
management in the company. 
Creativity 
313 Air IPT  They are a family business led 
from the top and are very 
traditional.  They are also world 
leaders in their field.  Their 
attitude is 'if you want it you 
must pay for it'. 
Quality 
314 Air IPT Because the organisations are 
small the relationship is based 
upon key individuals at desk 
level. 
 Stability 
315 Air IPT They are almost fun to deal with; 
they are not full of management-
speak.  They are a bit like us: 
evolutionary and resource-
capped. 
 Stability 
316 Air IPT They know full well we can't go 
anywhere else but still the 
relationship is a good one. 
 Quality 
317 Air IPT We did have a problem and they 
rang me, the IPTL, direct.  It is 
good to know that they feel they 
can do this. 
 Communication
318 Air IPT We have learned not to set too 
fast a pace.  We are both busy 
and need to set realistic, long-
term targets. 
 Communication
319 Air IPT The report will prove extremely 
valuable in our continued 
deliberations. 
 Communication
320 Air IPT  We have tried hard to improve 
the relationship using in-house 
resources but now that we have 
run out we are getting no 
support from the corporate HQ. 
Communication
321 Air Firm Within the bounds of US 
regulations on data sharing we 
do our best to have a free flow of 
information. 
 Communication
322 Air IPT We've spent a lot of time working 
together including very frank 
exchanges when I told them they 
were gold-plated, expensive and 
slow. 
 Quality 
323 Air IPT We target individuals in the  Communication
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company to change their 
attitudes and see that they bring 
on their colleagues as a result. 
324 Air IPT I tell them that if we can excel 
then they will get good profits 
over the long term. 
 Quality 
325 Air IPT I spend my time working the low 
level politics in the company to 
promote my aims. 
 Communication
326 Air IPT You can't build trust without 
personal relationships to build up 
a good reputation. 
 Reliability 
327 Air IPT Your people must adopt a 
consistent approach when 
dealing with the other side. 
 Creativity 
328 Air IPT I offered them a 25 year contract 
to show how committed we were.  
This surprised the firm. 
 Quality 
329 Air IPT In the short time I have been 
working with them I have been 
impressed by their willingness to 
cooperate on all matters involving 
technical queries, spares 
procurement and repair of 
assets. 
 Reliability 
330 Air IPT The senior managers are very 
committed to us.  They have let 
us know of problems before we 
find out by other means and let 
us know what they are doing 
about them. 
 Reliability 
331 Air IPT A good working relationship has 
been developed between myself 
and my contact in the firm 
(mutual trust comes to mind) and 
this eases both our tasks. 
 Reliability 
332 Air IPT They were very arrogant with a 
take it or leave it attitude but we 
have worked hard to break this 
down. 
 Quality 
333 Air IPT We have invested a huge amount 
of time on them socially to build 
bridges and influence their 
culture 
 Quality 
334 Air IPT We have major issues meetings 
twice per year and they 
appreciate honesty from us over 
our quality requirements. 
 Reliability 
335 Air IPT They want to know when the 
service is wrong because they 
are very keen to improve: people 
don't go to work to do a bad job. 
 Reliability 
336 Air IPT We both concentrate on quality, 
not blame. 
 Reliability 
337 Air IPT I tell the firm honestly my budget 
for the coming year. 
 Communication
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338 Air Firm  Engineering staff talk the same 
language and get things done.  
However, constraints are 
imposed by Commercial 
Contracts staff who spend an 
inordinate amount of time 
arguing about 'pence'. 
Stability 
339 Air Firm  The MoD need to introduce a 
can-do culture as soon as 
possible. 
Creativity 
340 Air Firm  The Treasury objective of 
reducing expenditure by 20% 
was supposed to have been 
achieved by Smart Procurement 
however, by slowing down the 
whole process it has probably 
successfully reduced the amount 
of business placed by 20%. 
Creativity 
341 Air Firm  Airworthiness and giving the 
crews the best equipment to do 
the job should be our joint, prime 
aim in life.  Instead we appear to 
be trying to catch each other out 
and score points. 
Stability 
342 Air Firm  The IPT have introduced their 
Commercial department into the 
normal day running of the PDS 
contract which has slowed down 
the whole process considerably 
and introduced an element of 
conflict between us. 
Reliability 
343 Air Firm  Although top management have 
a good relationship with the firm, 
their Contracts branch still have 
a 'cannot-do, jobs-worth' 
attitude.  They should provide a 
service to the programme 
managers, not control.  They are 
the main stumbling block to 
good, timely, efficient 
relationships. 
Creativity 
344 Air Firm All support chain parties, 
including the end customer, 
attend planning meetings to 
discuss requirements, pool 
knowledge and resolve problems.
 Communication
345 Air Firm  Knowledge of spare, 
provisioning and supply is 
limited in my technical area and 
sometimes we are caught out by 
this. 
Communication
346 Air Firm We have a very good and open 
relationship with the IPT.  Where 
airworthiness is concerned it is 
essential to have mutual respect 
and trust of the other party's 
position. 
 Reliability 
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347 Air Firm  Despite the good words, 
countless initiatives and top 
management commitment to 
openness, honesty and 
transparency within the DLO 
there still seems to be a very 
long way to go. 
Reliability 
348 Air Firm  The true meanings of Integrated 
and Team are still to be learnt by 
the MoD. 
Reliability 
349 Air Firm  The biggest obstacle to 
improving business performance 
is MoD Contracts.  There is a 
severe shortage of resources, 
risk aversion and lack of 
flexibility which lead to 
significant effort and delay in 
agreeing contracts. 
Reliability 
350 Air Firm  The IPT has a high turnover of 
staff causing inconsistent 
approaches, duplication and 
increased workload. 
Creativity 
351 Air Firm  Because all our dealings with 
the IPT seem to concentrate on 
problems the relationship is poor 
and we never get to consider the 
wider picture. 
Stability 
352 Air IPT  Although we and some of the 
company are willing to create a 
better, fairer working 
environment, overall there is a 
lack of good will by the company 
and the feeling that they can 
charge what they like. 
Quality 
354 Air IPT  When there is no other option 
then we have to make the best 
of a bad job. 
Quality 
355 Air IPT Hopefully our proposed strategic 
partnering arrangement will 
address all the problems of this 
relationship. 
 Stability 
356 Air IPT  In answering some of your 
questions I could have done with 
another column: 'very very 
strongly disagree' especially the 
one 'the other party is always 
totally open and honest with us'. 
Reliability 
357 Air IPT We are endeavouring to improve 
the forecasting of our 
requirements to assist the firm 
with providing a better service. 
 Communication
358 Air Firm  I am concerned at our lack of 
touch with the end customers.  
We need seamless performance 
measurement throughout the 
logistics chain. 
Communication
Appendix 6  357 
 
ID BU Orga
nisati
on 
Positive Comment Negative Comment Dimension 
359 Air Firm  My experience of dealing with 
the MoD is one of frustration 
through time-consuming 
bureaucracy and regulatory 
requirements. 
Creativity 
360 Air Firm  Whereas industry is always 
under strong commercial 
pressures the MoD 
requisition/contracts process 
seems to lack urgency. 
Creativity 
361 Air Firm  We get more information about 
future policy plans from the MoD 
web site that from the IPT 
Communication
362 Air Firm  We desperately need better 
performance management 
systems to ensure that actions 
are logged and analysed against 
standards. 
Communication
366 Air IPT  On face value a good 
relationship exists but the 
underlying ethos is that we only 
get what we pay for and the firm 
is always looking for ways to 
spend more on 'gold plated' 
solutions. 
Reliability 
367 Air Firm  The attitude changes needed by 
Smart Procurement will 
inevitably take a long time. 
Stability 
368 Air Firm I am very keen to assist you in 
this research; I have been trying 
for years to break into our 
Customer Services department 
and your report will certainly help.
 Creativity 
369 Air Firm  Some contractual issues were 
missed at the beginning such as 
what happened when the 
operator subsequently halved 
the power by the hour usage 
rate and rogue arisings 
occurred. 
Stability 
370 Air Firm  Communications could be 
better.  We found the unit test rig 
had broken and u/s items were 
mounting up but no one told us.  
They also increased their 
operational reserves without 
telling us. 
Communication
371 Air Firm  At renegotiation time because 
their usage rate had dropped we 
needed to increase prices to 
cover our overheads.  This was 
not understood and we were 
blamed for attempting to milk the 
contract. 
Reliability 
372 Air Firm  We were to blame for slapping in 
a bill without warning when we 
heard they had loaned some of 
Reliability 
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our pool items to a foreign 
government. 
373 Air Firm It is very important to start small 
with innovative partnering 
arrangements in order to let the 
problems sort themselves out 
and to build up mutual trust. 
 Quality 
374 Air Firm We now need to leave the 
contract behind us and 
concentrate together on the 
output to the customer. 
 Quality 
375 Air IPT  Although we have produced 
good results for the end 
customer, the cost in 
management time has been 
huge; far more than anticipated. 
Quality 
376 Air IPT  Regrettably the relationship 
between the key personalities 
plays a major part in the lack of 
smooth running of the 
relationship. 
Quality 
377 Air IPT This is real support chain 
management; the mechanism is 
invisible to the end customer. 
 Creativity 
378 Air IPT Managing out risk costs a great 
deal of top management time.  
This is where the hard decisions 
such as how much we are going 
to spend are made. 
 Quality 
379 Air IPT  There was a clash of wills with 
them wanting to make more 
money by adding extras and us 
digging-in for basic outputs. 
Stability 
380 Air IPT We don't agree all the time but at 
least we communicate clearly. 
 Communication
381 Air IPT I intend to sit down with the firm 
and discuss the report.  I 
especially want to get to the 
bottom of the point where our 
views are clear opposites. 
 Communication
382 Air Firm We are doing a lot to educate the 
IPT into involving the end 
customer in the setting of 
performance targets. 
 Communication
383 Air Firm  There is much goodwill but we 
are still not always achieving 
joined-up results. 
Quality 
384 Air Firm  Unfortunately the unrewarding 
environment at the work face is 
causing the brightest and most 
innovative people on both sides 
to drift away into esoteric areas 
like training courses and studies. 
Quality 
385 Air IPT In the areas that I deal with there 
is nothing but enthusiasm.  At 
that level they know they must 
 Creativity 
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change. 
386 Air IPT  We have our own problems of 
adopting new partnering 
approaches.  A long history of 
'pushing water up-hill' has left 
the staff sceptical and 
disillusioned. 
Creativity 
387 Air IPT  At the middle-management level 
of the firm the message has not 
hit home and the same old 
culture and practices prevail. 
Communication
388 Air IPT We aim for a 10, 12, 15 or even 
30 year contract.  This fosters a 
long term ethos, cuts the costs of 
frequent re-negotiations and 
allows the Firm to plan and 
resource. 
 Stability 
389 Air IPT Information is useless unless it is 
shared.  It allows us to pre-empt 
risks so the Firm doesn't have to 
build 'insurance' into its prices.  
The results are increased 
competitiveness for the Firm and 
increased Value For Money for 
us. 
 Communication
390 Air Firm  The IPT have no intention of 
sharing any cost savings they 
make with us.  For instance they 
have told us that if the partnering 
arrangement makes a staff 
member redundant he will be 
redeployed in the office and no 
savings will be made or shared. 
Quality 
391 Air Firm  They are not sure what their 
costs are so it will be difficult to 
measure the savings for a 
partnering agreement. 
Reliability 
392 Air Firm  Because it's a fixed price 
contract they expect us to do all 
the liaison and problem-solving 
with their front line customers - 
even if the problems are not of 
our making. 
Reliability 
393 Air IPT  Information on pricing and 
delivery is difficult to obtain and 
is usually inaccurate when 
received. 
Communication
394 Air IPT  We feel we are being 'ripped-off' 
by the firm over prices and as a 
result we have real difficulty in 
reducing our costs. 
Stability 
395 Air IPT The new framework contract runs 
for 5 years at a fixed cost.  This 
gives us guaranteed availability 
and a 20% reduction in costs.  
The firm is incetivised to increase 
reliability, it can plan, cut 
 Creativity 
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overheads and home in on fault 
trends. 
396 Air IPT  We have been thwarted at every 
turn to obtain fair and 
reasonable prices from the firm.  
Recently without warning, they 
marked-up prices by 2-300%. 
Reliability 
397 Air IPT  For many years the firm has had 
it all their own way and they thus 
seem very reluctant to change. 
Stability 
398 Air IPT  They drag their feet on 
modifications that improve 
reliability because the more they 
stop things going wrong the less 
they make on repairs. 
Stability 
399 Air IPT We used to keep a pool of items 
to feed in to repair.  With our new 
partnering arrangement we track 
individual items and have 
significantly cut down on their 
number. 
 Creativity 
400 Air IPT  The firm shouldn't be shocked 
about the poor marks we have 
given them in the survey.  I have 
told them face-to-face many 
times. 
Communication
401 Air IPT  We have waited for month for 
answers to questions raised at 
our review meetings. 
Communication
402 Air IPT  We sent them 10 items to repair.  
They got stuck on one and held 
up the batch.  They didn't tell us 
for 9 months. 
Communication
403 Air IPT  Our Contract people agreed to 
the price change without 
reference to us. 
Stability 
404 Air IPT  The firm's customer support and 
the design authority appear to 
be rivals and we notice a poorer 
service as a result. 
Stability 
405 Air IPT  We have got as much out of 
doing things as well as we can; 
we now need to do things 
differently.  However, our 
commercial staff won't change. 
Stability 
406 Air IPT  We think we are being wholly 
reasonable with them but they 
do not reciprocate. 
Quality 
407 Air IPT  They are the worst company of 
the lot unless it is within their 
interest to cooperate. 
Quality 
408 Air IPT  Its not their people who are at 
fault; they are almost 
embarrassed at our comments 
but, they have to 'toe their 
company's line'. 
Quality 
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409 Air IPT  Our commercial staff have 
resisted integrating with us.  As 
a result my ability to be 
innovative is restricted. 
Creativity 
410 Air IPT  Even the IPTL can't sign 
anything without the ok of the 
commercial man.  They still have 
their own chain of command. 
Creativity 
411 Air Firm The benefits of the partnering 
arrangement are: we are 'future-
proofed', uncertainty is removed, 
we can plan and, we can really 
focus on the customer. 
 Creativity 
412 Air Firm  When we first got together with 
the IPT to establish our 
relationship we put it all up on 
the wall.  18 months later they 
have not changed. 
Stability 
413 Air Firm  We are so frustrated by the IPT 
we are prepared to wade in and 
stir them into action.  The 
research report will help us to 
expose the issues. 
Stability 
414 Air Firm  The IPT doesn't know what it 
wants.  How can we react 
properly. 
Communication
415 Air Firm  We would be grateful if you 
would tell the IPTL what is going 
on. 
Communication
416 Air Firm  I've never met the front line 
customer so I can't tell you what 
his view is. 
Communication
417 Air Firm  The MoD's lack of email is a real 
problem. 
Communication
418 Air Firm  At the working level they aren't 
trained very well.  It galls me to 
know that my staff know more 
about doing the IPT staffs' jobs 
than they do. 
Reliability 
419 Air Firm  We feel 'kicked in the crutch' by 
their view of us but we are still 
determined to improve the 
situation.  The problem is, we 
always seem to do the giving. 
Quality 
420 Air Firm  Three years ago we offered the 
IPT a terminal from our system 
to allow them to track the 
progress of their orders but their 
security people turned it down. 
Communication
421 Air Firm  The engineering relationship is 
very good on a day to day basis 
although this is limited by the 
commercial aspects. 
Creativity 
422 Air Firm  The relationship with the MoD is 
restricted by outdated practices.  
If there is risk-sharing & 
Reliability 
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incentives why are SPS and Def 
Con 43 ad 48 still being used?  
As long as there is a 'we do not 
trust you' attitude, an open & 
honest relationship cannot be 
encouraged. 
423 Air Firm We must move towards cost-
sharing type contracts to allow 
both parties to work-out problems 
effectively.  When they both care 
about each others' costs, 
innovative solutions follow and 
relationships flourish. 
 Reliability 
424 Air Firm  The firm has done much to 
disappoint the MoD but rather 
than working towards a 
satisfactory resolution of issues 
they are still trying to punish us.  
It is not possible to have 
effective teaming if the 
contractor is losing money as a 
result. 
Quality 
425 Air Firm  Legacy problems and 
perceptions are tough to 
overcome. 
Creativity 
426 Air IPT  Getting service out of the firm is 
like getting poop out of a rocking 
horse. 
Reliability 
427 Air IPT They have been the design 
authority for almost 20 years.  
We have thus a very good 
working relationship. 
 Stability 
428 Air IPT  The fact that the company has 
pointed out in the report a 
number of reservations has 
come as a complete surprise to 
us.  We are going to discuss the 
matter with them in a special 
meeting. 
Creativity 
429 Air IPT  The company might be finding 
the new CLS a bit difficult to get 
used to; it puts all the onus 
squarely on them. 
Reliability 
430 Air Firm The contract has flexibility built-in 
to handle unforeseen events - 
especially of an operational 
nature. 
  
431 Air Firm  Although we have been taken 
over some time ago we still have 
some of our old culture.  I think 
this adversely affects the 
customer's view of us. 
Stability 
432 Air Firm I try and talk to my opposite 
number at least weekly. We 
share information that allows 
planning and minimises 
assumptions. 
 Communication
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433 Air Firm Although our commercial people 
are no better or no worse than 
the other side, we recently 
achieved contract renewal a day 
before the old contract ran out.  
They must be doing something 
right at last. 
 Reliability 
434 Air Firm Now we have a 4 year, fixed-
price contract they let us get on 
with it without interference. 
 Quality 
435 Air Firm  The equipment was bought at 
minimum cost using COTS 
equipment and as a result has 
suffered from resistance from 
the weapon system Design 
Authority and the 1st Customer.  
We, the Firm, are caught in the 
middle. 
Quality 
436 Air Firm We have made great efforts to 
provide effective support despite 
the lack of MoD investment and 
as a result we have lost money. 
 Quality 
437 Air Firm Both sides are going to put their 
hands in their pockets to bail out 
this project. 
 Quality 
438 Air Firm  We have worked hard to build 
up good relations with most 
parties in the MoD and at a 
working level these are still good 
but, there is an overall difference 
of objectives which does not 
encourage us to be 
faster/cheaper/better. 
Stability 
439 Air Firm  We continue to be hounded by 
the MoD to provide a level of 
technical performance which 
was not part of the original 
contract. 
Reliability 
440 Air Firm Personal relationships with the 
opposite numbers are as well as 
can be expected given the 
overriding pressures of both 
parties but especially paucity of 
funds. 
 Creativity 
441 Air Firm Focussing on what you want is 
most important, then you can aim 
at the practical issues. 
 Stability 
442 Air Firm It would be a good idea to have 
an open forum debate at the end 
of your research so that issues 
could be aired freely. 
 Communication
443 Air Firm Time and money constraints and 
technical complexity will always 
have a bearing on the 
relationship success. 
 Reliability 
444 Air Firm Profit is all very well but it is 
customer service that keeps you 
 Reliability 
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in this business. 
445 Air Firm  Smart Procurement's prime aim 
is to take money away from 
industry.  I see no light at the 
end of the tunnel. 
Quality 
446 Air IPT  We have been struggling to take 
over this DPA project but it 
should have been worth £11m 
but it was whittled down to £4m.  
We are now having to pay to 
iron out the problems. 
Quality 
447 Air IPT There seems to have been a 
change in attitude of the firm 
recently.  I think it could be 
because of your research report. 
 Creativity 
448 Air IPT  We sit between the 1st 
Customer who wants the 
equipment with all the bells and 
whistles before it is even ready 
for operational use and the firm. 
We are the meat in the 
sandwich. 
Stability 
449 Air IPT  Constant changeover of people 
in the IPT is preventing lessons 
being learned and experience 
building up. 
Stability 
450 Air IPT  Once upon a time before the 
DLO we all shared our lessons.  
Now there are IPTs they are 
reluctant.  There is a blame 
culture that is not career-
enhancing. 
Communication
451 Air IPT  It’s a traditional contract which 
promotes archaic ways of 
working and provided no 
incentive to them to perform. 
Creativity 
452 Air IPT  The kit is old and unique; I am 
staggered at how much it costs 
to run. 
Reliability 
453 Air IPT  It takes the firm a month to give 
us a response; they just don't 
seem to see us as important. 
Reliability 
454 Air IPT  Their work is of good quality but 
they are very high charging. 
Quality 
455 Air Firm  Your study has given us some 
cause for concern.  Some of the 
other party's responses are 
rather surprising and alarming. 
Stability 
456 Air Firm  A DERA study reported that the 
product could not be beaten.  
We have now found out that the 
IPT has advertised for someone 
to do another and told us not to 
bid.  I think the money would be 
better spent on reducing current 
support costs. 
Communication
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457 Air Firm It's an amazing difference to be 
speaking to people who are in 
contact with the customers now 
that PE are out of the loop. 
 Communication
458 Air Firm The platform is not really core 
business; I have to fight my 
corner with management so I am 
really keen to improve the 
relationship. 
 Quality 
459  Firm We have a good relationship but 
the report shows we must pick 
away at the detail to fine-tune it. 
 Creativity 
460 Air Firm  I am still concerned at the IPT's 
high turnover of staff and the 
lack of accumulated experience. 
Creativity 
461 Air Firm  The regular cycling of military 
staff is not conducive to long 
term relationships that develop 
sound working practices and 
allow innovation. 
Creativity 
462 Air Firm  Transformation of the RAF into a 
commercial organisation with 
commercial business attitudes to 
contracting has been well-
publicised but in recent 
negotiations on a new contract 
many standard industry clauses 
such as Limited Liability were 
excluded. 
Creativity 
463 Air Firm The relationship with the 
MoD/RAF has improved 
significantly since the platform 
was handed over from the PE.  
Prior to this the atmosphere was 
very combatant and occasionally 
devious. 
 Stability 
464 Air Firm  The margins of MoD contracts 
are significantly lower than 
others.  We thus don't do any 
work at risk even where our PDS 
contract is fully funded and has 
little or no limited liability issues. 
Stability 
465 Air Firm  Reduced margins and intense 
competition in the sector are all 
very clear reasons for the 
reduced level of commitment 
and risk in the company.  It has 
thus become increasingly 
difficult to secure finance from 
senior management to invest in 
this relationship. 
Quality 
466 Air IPT  My opposite number has a 
vested interest in portraying a 
warm, comfortable position 
because otherwise it will be 
seen to be critical of him.  His 
job could be on the line. 
Quality 
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467 Air IPT  PDS performance is not too hot: 
they don't recruit the people so 
we don't place the orders and 
pay them as much as we could. 
Quality 
468 Air IPT  We sit in the company's 
commercial margins and have 
less leverage.  This makes for 
hard and protracted 
negotiations. 
Quality 
469 Air IPT  We couldn't easily go elsewhere; 
they have the drawings and the 
knowledge.  Taking Design 
Authority elsewhere is not really 
a practical proposition. 
Quality 
470 Air IPT  We fear the company 'pulling the 
plug' or worse, a long period of 
'take-it or leave-it'. 
Quality 
471 Air IPT  We need a strategic review with 
the company but we never see 
their boss - he barely seems 
engaged. 
Stability 
472 Air IPT  The company seems unable to 
understand that one point of 
contact is inadequate to deal 
with the multi-level issues that 
occur. 
Communication
473 Air IPT  At the individual level everyone 
does his best but I sense the 
company's organisation to serve 
us is a bit hit or miss. 
Reliability 
474 Air Firm The relationship we have 
established is very good and 
robust but, we still have a long 
way to go to understand each 
others drivers and how we can 
jointly improve the way we do 
business with each other. 
 Stability 
475 Air Firm In my experience the quality of 
our relationship with the DLO is 
one that the DPA could emulate. 
 Creativity 
476 Air Firm  The area of bidding could do 
with considerable improvement 
by both parties. 
Reliability 
477 Air Firm Many of the issues raised in your 
survey correspond to those we 
have found in our own exercise.  
We are going to workshop them 
through with the IPT. 
 Creativity 
478 Air Firm In other areas we put our own 
people into the IPT to help them 
do their PDS cases.  This saves 
both sides time, money and 
accuracy.  I hope to persuade 
this IPT to accept the same 
arrangement. 
 Creativity 
480 Air IPT  We have a very one-sided 
contract implementation regime 
Quality 
Appendix 6  367 
 
ID BU Orga
nisati
on 
Positive Comment Negative Comment Dimension 
where the contractor knows he 
cannot easily be replaced and 
uses this to his benefit and our 
cost. 
481 Air IPT  There is no competition in this 
field to break the hold the 
contractor has over us. 
Quality 
482 Air IPT  There is no evidence of risk-
sharing without us paying the 
cost at a later date. 
Quality 
483 Air IPT Their contribution to the success 
of the relationship is most 
apparent when we have to deal 
with a significant engineering 
problem.  They are responsive, 
constructive and work hard to 
resolve it whilst putting aside the 
commercial aspects. 
 Creativity 
484 Air IPT  Their response to routine work is 
much less efficient than that for 
problems. 
Reliability 
485 Air Firm Although the business 
arrangements and operational 
outputs of the 2 organisations are 
far from ideal, honesty and 
openness are not only promoted 
but are lived every day. 
 Reliability 
486 Air Firm Both organisations learn from 
their mistakes rather than 
blaming the other party (mostly..). 
This fosters an environment 
responsive to change at all 
levels. 
 Creativity 
487 Air Firm I believe that the will is evident 
from both sides to have the 
relationship succeed. 
 Stability 
488 Air Firm  The basis of some distrust and 
traditional methods of operation 
will require significant effort to 
breach.  ‘Us and them’ is still 
very apparent at a number of 
personal levels. 
Reliability 
489 Air Firm We try and keep abreast of 
possible problems and try to 
mediate between the various 
parties.  However we are 
constrained by budgets, 
timescales and product liability. 
 Reliability 
490 Air Firm We have a good working 
relationship despite differing 
backgrounds and experience. 
 Communication
491 Air Firm We are looking at ways of 
empowering individuals with 
better information to improve 
their effectiveness. 
 Communication
492 Air Firm We used to have a Civil service-
style structure.  Now we are 
 Communication
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much flatter and communication 
is better.  People also know 
where they stand. 
493 Air Firm The report has been very useful; 
it has provoked a response.  We 
intend to use it as a springboard 
to improved teamworking with the 
IPT. 
 Creativity 
494 Air Firm  I'm concerned the DLO does not 
have an objective view on where 
to focus on the important 
relationships. 
Stability 
495 Air Firm If you don't understand peoples' 
motives you can't improve.  
There seem to be some real 
barriers to progress at the lower 
levels. 
 Stability 
496 Air Firm There is a different culture that 
has crept in at the middle and 
above; an acceptance for the 
need to change. 
 Stability 
497 Air Firm The key is to harmonise the main 
objectives.  Others that are not 
important and act as obstructions 
must be identified and 
suppressed. 
 Stability 
498 Air IPT  The firm is unwilling to disclose 
problems until it has produced a 
solution which is advantageous 
to him and cannot be changed 
except at significant cost. 
Creativity 
499 Air IPT  He employs devious ways to 
ensure that the MoD and GFE 
suppliers are seen as holding up 
the programme. 
Stability 
500 Air IPT  The relationship is characterised 
by frustration at the contractor's 
unwillingness to share 
information. 
Communication
501 Air IPT  We will never achieve a true 
business footing because there 
is no open market competition 
for the MoD and we are 
shackled to this supplier - and 
he knows it! 
Reliability 
502 Air IPT  This relationship is at best arms-
length and routinely adversarial 
furthermore, individual 
relationships are not consistent 
and this creates communication 
difficulties. 
Stability 
503 Air IPT  Despite all the good words 
industry is still hide-bound by an 
order book mentality and an 
inability to change commercial 
practices to meet, deliver and 
cost schedules. 
Reliability 
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504 Air IPT  I am trying to support an ageing 
weapon system which does not 
bear a good return to industry. 
Quality 
505 Air Firm  Due to moving responsibility 
from one department to another 
they seem to be unable to get 
their act together in a timely 
manner to let a contract to repair 
the equipment. 
Reliability 
506 Air IPT  They are nice chaps who take 
us out to lunch but as an entity 
they are lacking in service 
delivery. 
Reliability 
507 Air IPT  It takes ages to get information 
out of them despite numerous 
reminders. 
Communication
508 Air IPT  It's old technology; maybe we 
are small beer. 
Quality 
509 Air Firm  I go back a long way and when 
we did business with the MoD 
PE they had much better control 
over their money. 
Creativity 
510 Air Firm  We seem to have too much 
interaction with numerous 
stakeholder agencies.  There is 
no buffer between us and a 
plethora of voices, often giving 
conflicting messages. 
Communication
511 Air Firm  We have a finite pool of 
engineers.  The more we can 
plan together the more chance 
there is of having the resources 
available when needed. 
Communication
512 Air IPT  We have a good relationship 
with our counterparts but when 
their project manager is around 
they clam-up.  Now he has 
moved on things should 
improve. 
Creativity 
513 Air IPT When we go to meetings with 
them we ensure that we are fully 
prepared so we can appear as a 
cohesive, intelligent, professional 
customer. 
 Creativity 
514 Air IPT I am open and above board as to 
where my objectives lie - they 
may be hard but I have no 
secrets. 
 Creativity 
515 Air IPT I have assembled a full team of 
stakeholders so the Firm can get 
a comprehensive view of the 
customer. 
 Communication
516 Air IPT  I worry that within a year I will be 
moved on and all my 
relationship building work will be 
lost. 
Reliability 
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517 Air IPT I don't want to move yet to a CLS 
arrangement until I am confident 
it will work.  I'm carefully watching 
the progress of others to see how 
they get on and why. 
 Quality 
518 Air IPT  I'm very dubious about any CLS 
arrangement that involves 
DARA.  They still have a long 
way to go until they become 
commercially competitive.  Their 
hourly rate is double that of my 
partner firm. 
Quality 
519 Air IPT  There is a gulf in perception 
between the sides over 
performance which also extends 
to the front line.  Without a 
common understanding of how 
we are doing we cannot move 
forward. 
Creativity 
520 Air IPT My team is only 60 strong and 
small is beautiful.  Many people 
can't understand they can do 
more with less.  We concentrate 
on essentials; the nice to do only 
encourages growth in overheads.
 Creativity 
521 Air IPT  The supply staff think they are 
pond-life but they seem to have 
the clearest view of what's 
happening across the boundary 
between us.  I'm not sure how to 
use this capability effectively. 
Communication
522 Air IPT We're making progress with the 
company.  At our last monthly 
meeting I was surprised to see 
they were portraying their 
performance figures honestly and 
without massaging. 
 Reliability 
523 Air Firm  They see us as over-priced 
outputs supplied late and where 
quality could be better.  
However, the customer shows 
no recognition of our problems 
and therefore offers us no 
sympathy or practical 
assistance. 
Creativity 
524 Air Firm  They don't seem to realise that a 
fixed price contract limits our 
ability to react flexibly to 
changes once work has started. 
Reliability 
525 Air Firm  They don't seem to realise that 
we have great difficulty in finding 
and retaining people with the 
right skills.  If we do not receive 
orders we cannot afford to hang 
on to these people. 
Reliability 
526 Air Firm  Cash flow is very important to a 
business like our's but asking for 
Reliability 
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part-payment for partial 
completion of the job does not 
meet with a positive response. 
527 Air Firm  Although I believe our success 
should be closely linked to that 
of our customer, his willingness 
to competitively tender every 
requirement to the absolute 
lowest bidder and the lack of 
information to allow us to plan 
our future R&D do not help. 
Quality 
528 Air Firm  Maybe we marked the 
questionnaire too generously; 
not wanting to be too open about 
our customer. 
Communication
529 Air Firm  We thought the relationship was 
a lot better than the report 
suggested. 
Communication
530 Air Firm  We have had a few problems 
with some key individuals on the 
other side. 
Stability 
531 Air Firm Is their team-leader concerned 
about the findings of the report 
and keen to do something about 
it?  We want to change the 
perception.  We don't want to 
fight over it. 
 Creativity 
532 Air Firm The situation in the report give us 
serious cause for concern.  We 
have a sizeable business with 
our main UK customer who 
thinks we are 'crap'.  We must do 
something about it. 
 Quality 
533 Air Firm  Communications at working 
level are good but we don't have 
any high-level reviews; I haven't 
seen their team-leader for 18 
months.  I don't even know if 
they think we are important. 
Communication
534 Air Firm  When the new team-leader 
arrived he organised an industry 
day and planned working groups 
to tackle issues.  Eighteen 
months later what, has 
happened? 
Stability 
535 Air IPT  New business must be 
diminishing.  The firm must start 
concentrating on long-term 
service to existing products. 
Stability 
536 Air IPT  We went to see them and 
offered them a total support 
package.  We have had no 
response. 
Creativity 
537 Air IPT  They think they are brilliant but 
the legacy side is almost 
forgotten.  They have had a 
horrendous turnover of staff; god 
Creativity 
Appendix 6  372 
 
ID BU Orga
nisati
on 
Positive Comment Negative Comment Dimension 
knows what their HR policy is 
like. 
538 Air IPT  I suspect that our respondents 
did not provide you with a 
balanced view. 
Communication
539 Air IPT  We do have a poor relationship 
but it's not as bad as your report 
implies. 
Communication
540 Air IPT  Their PDS performance is 
mediocre at best.  I think this is 
because they don't see it as a 
money-earner and thus do not 
allocate enough manpower 
resources to supporting the 
contract. 
Stability 
541 Air Firm  They are generally easy to do 
business with but we often have 
to chase them for information.  
Why not give it up-front? 
Communication
542 Air Firm We don't have any problems with 
their commercial people; they are 
quick and efficient.  Probably the 
best area in the MoD I have 
worked with. 
 Communication
543 Air Firm  They don't seem to understand 
we have lead-times; they often 
want it tomorrow. 
Stability 
544 Air Firm  In the PDS area we are totally 
dependent on production; we 
have to fit-in wherever we can.  
The MoD just isn't realistic in it 
expectations. 
Reliability 
545 Air Firm  I seem to be fighting fires all the 
time rather than planning ahead.  
All I seem to deal with is 
problems. 
Reliability 
546 Air Firm  I programme-manage 20 or 30 
contracts.  There is lots of 
contact between my engineers 
and the other party.  It's a pity I 
don't have a similar relationship 
with their programme managers. 
Communication
547 Air IPT  The knee-jerk reaction of the 
MoD to its current funding 
problems is the biggest turn-off 
to industry. 
Quality 
548 Air IPT  We are locked into a 10 year 
contract set up by the DPA 
whose aim was to sustain the 
company's regional business for 
employment purposes and to 
maintain a capability.  To us this 
is not 'smart' and we are 
trapped. 
Quality 
549 Air IPT  The legacy equipment is not 
'sexy' to the company.  They put 
all their brightest commercial 
Quality 
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and programme managers on 
the new projects. 
550 Air IPT  They are constantly turning over 
their staff. 
Stability 
551 Air IPT  Their commercial attitude is: 'you 
have a problem, what are you 
going to do about it'.  Mind you, 
we screw them into the ground 
and know every detail of their 
costs. 
Reliability 
552 Air IPT  They think they can make 
money by taking over the whole 
business.  But we don't pay for 
storage and distribution so only 
small Supply Chain efficiencies 
are possible.  There are no easy 
solutions. 
Reliability 
553 Air IPT We envisage we will set up a 
joint management team with 
future, new equipments. 
 Creativity 
554 Air IPT Their customer services people 
are trying hard; they seem to 
have vision. 
 Stability 
555 Air IPT  If we start a long term 
agreement for say 30 years, we 
must have top-level support to 
ensure we do not do the usual 
MoD trick of cutting back the 
funding at little notice. 
Stability 
556 Air IPT  At the moment we are getting 
conflicting messages.  The MoD 
wants us to enter into long term 
arrangements but the finance 
community is trying to hold back 
spending.  We are not geared up 
to implement Smart Acquisition. 
Stability 
557 Air Firm  We are concerned that the 
DLO's target of a 20% reduction 
in support costs within 5 years is 
incompatible with our desire to 
grow the business. 
Stability 
558 Air IPT We jointly attended a partnership 
team building workshop to 
improve our working relationship.  
The results have been agreed at 
senior level and we have since 
seen a steady improvement. 
 Reliability 
559 Air IPT Their man is on our side.  He 
takes the trouble to sit down and 
talk to us.  This is good for a 
director. 
 Communication
560 Air IPT They are always thinking of the 
future; wanting to know what our 
budget is for the next 4 years, 
what are our equipment plans, 
what they can do to enhance the 
equipment and exploring how 
 Stability 
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they can offer a better support 
service. 
561 Air IPT  There is some uncertainty in the 
company; they are talking of 
moving and centralising.  We are 
worried that they will lose 
expertise. 
Stability 
562 Air IPT  I've had a 90% staff turnover.  
Maybe this is why they think we 
are bad. 
Stability 
563 Air IPT  They have a really bad supply 
manager that we normally by-
pass - hence perhaps their low 
mark for our communication. 
Communication
564 Air IPT  The company increased the 
responsibilities of this division at 
short notice.  Due to lack of 
knowledge and resources they 
have struggled to achieve their 
personal and contractual 
objectives. 
Reliability 
565 Air IPT  It is important that the results of 
your study are promulgated to 
the senior levels in the company 
so that they will allocate more 
resources to improve the 
service. 
Creativity 
566 Air IPT  We need the senior 
management to put pressure on 
industry to develop a better 
attitude to working together, to 
set long term objectives and to 
agree joint objectives. 
Quality 
567 Air IPT  The current contract is due to 
expire and I note the company 
proposes a 32% price increase 
for the follow-on. 
Quality 
568 Air IPT  The company's performance has 
been very poor with numerous 
warnings at progress meetings 
and several letters of formal 
complaint. 
Reliability 
569 Air IPT  The company closed their site 
and moved.  As a result all 
expertise was lost and delays in 
getting things done are very 
frustrating. 
Stability 
570 Air IPT  Their man promises a lot at 
meetings but nothing is 
delivered.  They are totally 
reactive. 
Reliability 
571 Air IPT  They have taken on additional 
tasks without the resources.  
They don't have the staff to 
chase their sub-contractors who 
let them down. 
Reliability 
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572 Air IPT  They are not at all proactive in 
offering us ideas to improve the 
equipment. 
Reliability 
573 Air IPT  They are located a long way 
away and we haven't had a team 
building meeting to develop 
forward plans.  This is our fault. 
Communication
574 Air IPT They have been involved with 
supporting our equipment for 
over 20 years and are fully 
committed to us. 
 Creativity 
575 Air IPT We are good friends and thus 
talk openly and often. 
 Communication
576 Air IPT  Because the equipment gives us 
no problems we have to 
concentrate on fire-fighting 
elsewhere hence we have never 
met to talk about the future. 
Communication
577 Air Firm  Your procurement people like to 
remind us that we haven't a 
divine right to the business.  
However, we have invested 
heavily in knowledge and 
experience.  This doesn't seem 
to be recognised or valued. 
Communication
578 Air Firm  They need to value continuity; 
we are not the cheapest in the 
world. 
Creativity 
579 Air Firm My opposite number and I find 
innovative ways of providing the 
best support. 
 Creativity 
580 Air Firm It's individuals that make it 
happen. 
 Creativity 
581 Air Firm We need to find a new way of 
achieving long term contracts 
that are all-embracing.  Short 
term gains and cheapest prices 
will cost more in the end. 
 Stability 
582 Air Firm  I feel really let down that the 
current review by the IPT into a 
new product has cut us out and 
ignored our long experience. 
Stability 
583 Air Firm  In this day and age I believe no 
large company will try to rip-off 
the MoD.  The audit trail and 
accountability are there so why 
not trust us? 
Quality 
584 Air Firm  Although it is easy to do 
business with my opposite 
number there is still a 'them and 
us' atmosphere. 
Quality 
585 Air Firm  We have built a lengthy bid 
approvals process that is 
designed to protect ourselves 
because we have been stung by 
the MoD in the past.  This does 
Reliability 
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not come cheap and is reflected 
in our price. 
586 Air Firm  There are often different 
expectations from them; it’s the 
Civil Service v Commercial 
attitude.  Today we don't have 
time to provide a gilded solution; 
95% has to do. 
Stability 
587 Air Firm  The company closed down a site 
and we inherited the work 
without staff.  The IPT was not 
consulted.  They are frustrated 
that we are taking a long time to 
sort ourselves out. 
Stability 
588 Air Firm We get as much forward planning 
information as they can give us.  
There is a lot of 'out of the blue' 
work and we must be flexible. 
 Communication
589 Air Firm  We would like to meet more 
often than we do but budgetary 
issues seem to impact on the 
matter in the IPT. 
Communication
590 Air IPT He's a forward-thinking, go-getter 
in the company who is going 
places.  He is a pleasure to do 
business with. 
 Stability 
591 Air IPT He's open and honest and gets 
on the phone to deal with 
problems as soon as they 
appear. 
 Reliability 
592 Air IPT  We recently had a joint 
partnering workshop.  Despite 
lots of promises at working and 
senior level since, nothing has 
changed. 
Quality 
593 Air IPT  Our ability to compete is 
completely hampered by 
reliance on the company as 
Design Authority to authorise 
alternatives. 
Quality 
594 Air IPT  The relationship seems to be 
always driven by us. 
Reliability 
595 Air IPT  Although we are committed to a 
contracted spend profile, the 
annuality and fluctuations of 
Defence budgets makes getting 
the best out of the relationship 
very difficult. 
Reliability 
596 Air IPT  Despite chasing, we often don't 
get information on delivery 
delays until the routine progress 
meetings. 
Communication
597 Air IPT  It is difficult to harmonise our 
objectives because the company 
appears to keep theirs close to 
their chest. 
Stability 
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598 Air IPT  There is tremendous 
commitment on both sides at 
working-level but we are all short 
of resources to take forward 
strategic relationship 
improvements.  We don't seem 
to have the top management 
support that we need. 
Quality 
599 Air Firm We have had a few days out on 
the golf course which really helps 
people to get to know each other.
 Quality 
600 Air Firm  We have a customer satisfaction 
survey and I am audited on its 
results under ISO 9000.  
However, because the MoD are 
unsure of their regulatory 
position they refuse to cooperate 
and I fail the test. 
Reliability 
601 Air Firm We are hosting the next quarterly 
progress meeting.  I am going to 
raise the report for consideration.
 Communication
602 Air Firm I am happy to see our views in 
the report are in accord.  We 
have had a recent brain-storming 
session which put everything on 
the table. 
 Communication
603 Air Firm The relationship has been 
absolutely outstanding.  The trust 
established makes us want to do 
anything we can for the 
customer. 
 Quality 
604 Air Firm Our parent company is very 
customer-oriented and typical of 
the best of the American people. 
 Creativity 
605 Air Firm It wasn't an easy project but 
regardless of time of day they 
would hop a plane and be here.  
'You have a problem: how can 
we work it out?' 
 Creativity 
606 Air IPT The speed with which the project 
was placed to contract and the 
success of the programme is 
largely due to our close 
partnering arrangement.  They 
have proved to be reliable and 
innovative. 
 Reliability 
607 Air IPT They have proved to be excellent 
partners and have actively 
supported us in all aspects of a 
difficult procurement. 
 Stability 
608 Air IPT At every stage of the acquisition 
process they applied a 
consistently positive and 
constructive approach to 
negotiations.  If anything this 
attitude has continued to develop 
since contract let. 
 Creativity 
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609 Air IPT  We are not optimising our 
support policy.  Our engineers 
are not interested in the wider 
aspects of support and we leave 
too many important decisions to 
un-supported, supply staff. 
Reliability 
610 Air Firm  In the recent strategic review we 
didn't have clear accountability 
in the company and we didn't 
resource the effort with the right 
skills. 
Stability 
611 Air Firm  Perhaps the results of the review 
were threatening to people at 
the lower levels in their 
organisation which is why it 
failed. 
Stability 
612 Air Firm  Maybe the company is still 
stumbling to come to terms with 
a new support business area.  
We are still working out what we 
can add or not. 
Stability 
614 Air Firm  One of the real problems in 
trust-building is the rapid change 
of IPT staff and especially 
because the newcomers want to 
stamp their persona on the 
relationship.  We waste so much 
time.  Progress is really slowed. 
Creativity 
615 Air IPT  My confidence in their ability has 
taken a real knock since the 
failure of our strategic review.  I 
hoped they would think 
differently.  Now they are 
suspicious of my motives and 
the relationship has soured. 
Stability 
616 Air IPT  They don't seem to be at all 
good at learning from 
experience.  Their organisation 
is very network-based and thus 
loop-closing is poor. 
Stability 
617 Air IPT  Their inability to change fill me 
with despair that they can ever 
become a partnership-oriented 
organisation. 
Stability 
618 Air IPT  The equipment is mature, I don't 
want to invest any more effort; I 
am quite happy to have an 
adversarial relationship. 
Reliability 
619 Air IPT  Their performance against the 
contract continues to decline.  I 
intend to increasingly use the 
contract to manage the situation. 
Reliability 
620 Air IPT  Although our engineering 
relationships are very strong we 
sometimes suffer problems due 
to the various commercial 
requirements and frequently 
Creativity 
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protracted negotiations. 
621 Air IPT  I think they take the view that 
our equipment is legacy, that we 
are an undemanding customer 
and they can use us as a 'milk 
cow'. 
Quality 
622 Air IPT  Although we negotiate down the 
price, we know they will recoup 
the money somewhere else. 
Quality 
623 Air IPT  They only achieve about 30% of 
their delivery forecasts.  They 
don't seem to have the capacity 
to meet our needs. 
Reliability 
624 Air IPT  They never ask us why we are 
ordering things - perhaps we are 
ordering the wrong things. 
Reliability 
625 Air IPT We need to understand industry's 
capabilities.  They are very good 
at engineering but very bad at 
service. 
 Stability 
626 Air IPT  In engineering terms the 
equipment is old hat and our 
best people want to work on new 
projects. 
Stability 
627 Air IPT  Their commercial people are 
intransigent and at loggerheads 
with their engineers. 
Stability 
628 Air IPT  We offered to remove 
components prior to a return to 
works programme which their 
engineers approved and 
believed would save us £2m.  
Their commercial people offered 
us a rebate of £2.5k.  The nerve 
of it! 
Stability 
629 Air IPT  For economy reasons we have 
centralised our Commercial 
Organisation.  This is a big 
mistake.  Although they are 
focussed on the company, they 
are not focussed on the 
business output and don't 
appear to be accountable for 
their actions. 
Stability 
630 Air IPT  The DLO HQ does not have a 
strategic view of industry 
relationships.  This is a big 
problem.  They do not know that 
we our responsible for future 
systems.  They think that's DPA 
business. 
Stability 
631 Air IPT  Our relationship is very 
personality-driven and we get on 
with them extremely well.  
However at the professional 
level they are terrible. 
Reliability 
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632 Air IPT  Our efforts to persuade the firm 
to be more output focused are 
not helped by a front line 
customer who cannot provide us 
with a CSA. 
Reliability 
633 Air Firm  Our engineering staff firmly 
believe in providing the best 
possible support to the front line 
customer but the constraint on 
this are often not understood by 
other staffs on both sides. 
Reliability 
634 Air Firm I strongly believe that successful 
working relationships are built on 
trusting personal relationships. 
 Reliability 
635 Air Firm  The teams are doing their best 
to provide the end customer with 
the best possible service but 
budget constraints are often not 
understood either by the MoD or 
by our own people. 
Reliability 
636 Air Firm  We are particularly concerned 
about DARA and its so called 
'protected order book'. 
Stability 
637 Air Firm Our relationship is changing for 
the better because we have 
understood that closer 
involvement, communications 
and understanding between all 
stakeholders are the key. 
 Communication
638 Air IPT  Objectives can never be fully 
compatible because industry aim 
to maximise their profit and the 
MoD seeks best Value For 
Money. 
Stability 
639 Air IPT  Our contract is single source 
and although the relationship 
works well, we would prefer to 
have a competition option. 
Quality 
640 Air Firm Our arrangement is amicable, 
sensible and pragmatic. 
 Stability 
641 Air IPT  All they want to do is make 
products and push them out of 
the door.  They don't understand 
the meaning of Service. 
Stability 
642 Air IPT I have recently arrived in this job 
and find your report a really 
useful introduction to this 
relationship.  I will also use it in 
my first meeting with the Firm. 
 Creativity 
643 Air IPT Having been in trouble, the 
company is now restructuring 
and recruiting staff and the 
performance has improved 
markedly. 
 Creativity 
644 Air Firm I am currently composing a 
presentation for dissemination 
within the company to put new 
 Communication
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life into our customer focus.  I 
shall use your report to support 
this. 
645 Air Firm It's great to see how we see each 
other.  One generally has a 
feeling but an objective view is 
better. 
 Communication
646 Air Firm  There is some reticence in the 
company about moving into 
support rather than supply.  Our 
Culture does not accommodate 
this and needs to change. 
Stability 
647 Air Firm  We are driven by commercial 
needs and it is a continual battle 
to pump the IPT for planning 
data. 
Communication
648 Air Firm We look forward to a shared data 
environment where more 
information both ways is 
available. 
 Communication
649 Air Firm  As a sub-contractor we feel out 
on a limb with new prime 
contractor/MoD partnering 
schemes.  We will lose touch 
with the IPT staffs and the end 
customers. 
Reliability 
650 Air Firm We are especially keen to 
embrace a payment system that 
does away with the expensive 
and unreliable MoD F640 
system. 
 Reliability 
651 Air Firm A good team is dependent on the 
mix of individuals.  We have been 
particular lucky that the people in 
our joint teams have hit it off so 
well. 
 Creativity 
652 Air Firm Our good partnering contract 
simplifies the operation of our 
relationship and frees us to 
encourage one another to higher 
performance levels. 
 Stability 
653 Air Firm Direct access to MoD data 
sources such as stocks and flying 
hours would speed up processes 
and improve support. 
 Communication
654 Air IPT Our 5yr, periodically indexed firm 
price arrangement removes all 
the tension from price re-
negotiations. 
 Creativity 
655 Air IPT Our firm price contract 
incentivises quality because all 
rejects come out of profit. 
 Creativity 
656 Air IPT Now that we have a partnering 
arrangement around a good 
framework contract we just 
concentrate on the customer - we 
no longer refer to the small print. 
 Creativity 
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657 Air IPT We don't have a contract 
monitoring team - they just create 
distrust. 
 Creativity 
658 Air IPT We have simple, obvious, open 
performance measures.  Every 
week the firm sends us a 
statement of work achieved, 
problems and forecasts and we 
pass them consumption data.  
The achievements are open for 
all to see. 
 Communication
659 Air IPT We have 2 kinds of modifications. 
Those to our benefit we subject 
to the full procedure and pay for, 
those to the firm's benefit which it 
pays for but is free of admin.  
This way increased reliability is 
incentivised. 
 Stability 
660 Air IPT All stakeholders were involved in 
the project including the end 
customers who helped design the 
performance targets.  The same 
people are involved in 
implementation. 
 Stability 
661 Air IPT  Interpersonal relationships are 
very important.  Recently all our 
staff have changed.  It will be 
interesting to see if things run 
smoothly. 
Stability 
662 Air IPT I'm not sure if our success in 
setting up a good partnering 
arrangement was all luck 
(people) - maybe the clarity of 
contract aims helped. 
 Creativity 
663 Air IPT Their team had to keep an eye 
on their commercial man; he had 
a tendency to go for the small 
print. 
 Creativity 
664 Air Firm I would like to repeat this survey 
over time to see how perceptions 
change as a result of our joint 
efforts. 
 Creativity 
665 Air Firm If we are to be successful we 
must change the perceptions of 
our customers about us. 
 Stability 
666 Air IPT  Communication has proved 
difficult at the managerial level. 
Communication
667 Air IPT  We do not feel valued as a 
customer. 
Quality 
668 Air IPT We work closely and most 
successfully with a small team. 
 Stability 
669 Air IPT  A lot of problems of late 
deliveries arise because of 
incompatibility of IT systems 
between the MoD, the firm and 
the sub-contractors and, 
because of lack of manpower. 
Reliability 
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672 Air Firm  When you drill down into any 
organisation you will uncover 
frustrations. 
Reliability 
673 Air Firm  IPTs are often better resourced 
than Industry with specialised 
people in larger teams. 
Reliability 
674 Air Firm Currently quotes take a long time 
to process.  I am suggesting 2 
monthly meetings with the IPT 
Commercial Officer to smooth the 
task. 
 Creativity 
675 Air Firm Our margins are much smaller 
these days and this limits the 
number of people involved in our 
interface channels.  We are 
having to learn how to make this 
as effective as possible. 
 Communication
676 Air IPT I receive an understanding, 
consistent service from the 
company.  They tend to do what 
they say. 
 Reliability 
678 Air IPT  DARA have come up with a 
money-saving idea (£1m per 
annum) but it depends on the 
co-operation of the Firm.  
However, the latter are not 
enthusiastic because this cuts 
their profit. 
Quality 
679 Air IPT  If we scream they react.  
Everything is short term; they 
are not forward-looking. 
Creativity 
680 Air IPT  No one seems to own the 
problem.  It's always been the 
same with this company.  
Nothing has changed despite big 
words about Smart Acquisition. 
Creativity 
681 Air IPT  We have put in a huge amount 
of effort to jointly streamline 
processes but the Firm just does 
not deliver what they should do.  
They are currently achieving 
less than 50% performance 
against their order book in all 
areas. 
Reliability 
682 Air IPT  We have little incentive to help 
them grow their business if they 
can't even do the basics. 
Stability 
683 Air IPT  I think they understand that they 
must do a great deal to improve 
their performance but, we are 
locked-in with them either way; 
no one else can do the work. 
Quality 
684 Air IPT  I am convinced that we must do 
more to reduce our own costs 
because the Firm has been 
unable or unwilling to.  Maybe 
our emphasis on developing 
Quality 
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partnering over the last 2 years 
has been premature. 
685 Air IPT  We are about to sign an 
incentivised contract and if they 
do well they will get paid more 
but, I have not got the money.  
Smart Acquisition is not geared-
up for this kind of flexibility 
Creativity 
686 Air IPT  We agree round the table then 
nothing ever happens. 
Reliability 
687 Air IPT  Part of our process improvement 
has meant finding and paying 
lost/un-submitted invoices.  This 
is going to cost my IPT £9m this 
year from a very tight budget.  I 
feel I am paying for the Firm's 
inefficiency. 
Reliability 
688 Air IPT  We are developing a partnering 
arrangement with the Firm.  At 
the managerial level they are 
keen to improve their 
performance but this has not 
filtered down to the workers. 
Stability 
689 Air IPT  Although we work well with our 
opposite numbers in the 
Company, I am always wary of a 
hidden agenda in their hierarchy. 
Reliability 
690 Air Firm  SPS are a bunch of gautleiters 
and gestapo.  They argue over 
pennies and halfpennies and it 
takes us 9 months to agree 
prices.  This is a huge disaster 
when we are trying to respond 
quickly to the IPT. 
Reliability 
691 Air Firm  the original breakthru 
atmosphere was brilliant but 
when we got down to the 
practicalities of doing business 
we are again walking through 
treacle. 
Stability 
692 Air Firm Success is personality-driven.  
Meeting in pleasant 
circumstances where minds are 
allowed to meet will develop 
mutually profitable solutions. 
 Stability 
693 Air Firm We recently held a Kaisan event 
to talk about the ordering 
process.  Everyone was present 
and 'books were opened'.  We 
are now doing activities in 
parallel rather than series and 
have eliminated the nastiness 
that has existed for years. 
 Creativity 
694 Air Firm  The IPT is reluctant to take the 
initiative and adopt new 
business practices that have 
been developed in other areas. 
Creativity 
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695 Air IPT  They just don't seem to be 
customer-focussed.  Perhaps 
this is due to their frequent 
reorganisations. 
Stability 
696 Air IPT  We asked them to quote for an 
order worth over £1m.  Only 9 
months later after some 
pressure did we get a response. 
Communication
697 Air IPT  They have established a 
centralised spares ordering 
point.  It just seems to build-in 
delay. 
Reliability 
698 Air IPT  They sit on repairs for 2-3 years.  
Perhaps we are small beer 
compared to other customers. 
Reliability 
699 Air IPT  They have plans to centralise 
their facilities.  We fear they will 
lose expertise in the process. 
Reliability 
700 Air IPT  They speak nicely, make lots of 
promises but nothing ever 
happens. 
Reliability 
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Appendix 7 
Detailed Data Analysis Q3 Transaction Cost Economics & Q4 The 
Theoretical Framework (Detailed Perspective) 
1 Introduction 
This Appendix shows in the following Sections the detailed data analysis for each of 
the theoretical dimensions against the following questions: 
• Q3 – Can factors within Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) such as Asset 
Specificity and Opportunism explain the dynamics within monopolistic UK 
Defence Procurement relationships?  
and: 
• Q4 – Can the TCE Organisations Failure Framework be used as a 
theoretical lens with which to view monopolistic relationships within UK 
Defence Procurement? 
In each of the following Sections the appropriate questions from the questionnaire 
(see Appendix 1) are repeated and the overall comparative graphical results are 
portrayed.  Then, under categories that emerged from the qualitative data, examples 
of the qualitative data (listed fully at Appendix 6) are used to illustrate the salient 
numerical points (numbers in brackets following quotations refer back to Appendix 
6).  Because the theoretical model is essentially negative in its perspective, the 
presentation of results in these Sections highlights the high and low relationship 
aspects revealed by the data.  At the end of each, the key points are provided. The 
overall summary of Key Points from this Appendix is found in Chapter 4, Section 5. 
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2 Dimension 1 – Bounded Rationality (Relationship Creativity) 
People have only so much capacity to rationalise what is going on around them and 
they therefore naturally limit their performance to the adequate rather than the 
optimum (Simon, 1957) (Chapter 3, 4.2).  The converse of this statement generated 
the following questionnaire questions (see Appendix 1): 
a. The relationship encourages the achievement of high performance by both 
parties ie. reliable equipment, on-time delivery, good forecasts. 
b. The relationship encourages us to be innovative in the way we do business. 
c. Performance measurement is used to raise standards. 
d. Disputes & problems are resolved: 'quickly'. 
e. Disputes & problems are resolved: 'fairly'. 
f. The other party is reliable and consistent in dealing with us. 
g. The other party is dedicated to making our business a success. 
h. When an unexpected problem arises, both parties would rather work out a 
solution than hold each other to the original contract terms. 
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2.1 Introduction 
Although the Firms were overall generally more optimistic (68%) than the IPTs 
(59%), the pattern of positive results is virtually identical and indicates a strong 
measure of agreement between the parties. 
2.2 Low Relationship Points 
There appeared to be 2 low relationship points in this dimension and both of which 
are illustrated by semi-structured interview quotations that are examples of bounded 
rationality and also a lack of willingness to invest in specific assets.  The lowest point 
was Q1c – Performance measurement is used to raise standards (IPTs: 52%/Firms: 
50%).  
IPT: 
‘There is a gulf in perception between the sides over performance.  Without a 
common understanding of how we are doing we cannot move forward’ (519). 
and: 
‘Performance measurement is used but standards are never raised.  Why 
invest more time and money for no benefit’ (90). 
Firm: 
‘They show no signs of wanting to do better; their management is self-
satisfied’ (67). 
and: 
‘They have no idea or system for judging our performance’ (66). 
In the second low point, Q1g – Mutual dedication to business success, there was a 
slight difference of opinion between the sides where the IPTs had a positive view 
and the Firms were negative.  However, the difference was not very marked due to 
the general low opinion expressed (IPTs: 45%/Firms: 46%). 
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Firm : 
‘The customer shows no recognition of our problems and offers us no 
sympathy or practical assistance’ (523). 
IPT: 
‘Industry has trained us to expect we will be let down and this sums up why 
we think the Firm is not dedicated to our success’ (49). 
and: 
‘We offered them a total support package.  We have had no response’ (536). 
2.3 High Relationship Points 
Both sides agreed that Fair dispute and problem resolution (Q1e) were the best 
aspect of the relationships (IPTs: 77%/Firms: 85%).  A sample of illustrative 
comments indicated examples of long-termism and investment in relationship-
building specific assets.   
IPT: 
‘Our 5 year, periodically indexed, firm price arrangement removes all the 
tension from price re-negotiations’ (654). 
Firm: 
‘Frequent contacts, even as often as daily, build confidence, reduce risks of 
misunderstandings and ensure fair and reasonable outcomes’ (47). 
A close second (IPTs: 76%/Firms: 80%) was Q1h where each side would react 
flexibly to unexpected problems. 
IPT: 
‘They are responsive, constructive and work hard to resolve problems whilst 
putting aside the commercial aspects’ (483). 
 
Appendix 7  390 
 
 
Firm:  
‘It wasn’t an easy project but regardless of time of day they would hop a plane 
and be here.  You have a problem, how can we work it out?’ (605). 
2.4 Key Findings 
Under this dimension aspects of bounded rationality and a lack of investment in 
specific assets are clearly featured in the relationships surveyed.  However, it 
appeared that more creative features such as equity and customer-focused flexibility 
were more dominant and bore out the overall dimension success score of 64%. 
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3  Dimension 2 – Uncertainty/Complexity (Relationship Stability) 
People have difficulty in making sense of complex current and future events 
(Williamson, 1975) (Chapter 3, 4.3).  The converse of this statement generated the 
following questionnaire questions (see Appendix 1): 
a. The other party displays a sound, strategic understanding of our business. 
b. The objectives of both parties are clearly stated. 
c. The objectives of both parties are fully compatible. 
d. Both parties co-operate wholeheartedly. 
e. The relationship provides a dynamic business environment within which both 
parties can seek increasing rewards. 
f. I have complete confidence in the intentions of the other party. 
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3.1 Introduction 
Firms were overall generally more optimistic (69%) than IPTs (53%) in this 
dimension.  The pattern of both positive and negative results indicated some 
measure of agreement although in the Q2f 2nd level dimension the parties’ views 
were clearly at variance. 
3.2 Low Relationship Points 
There were 2 low relationship points of virtually equal intensity.  The first was Q2e – 
A dynamic business environment - (IPTs: 40%/Firms: 47%) and illustrative 
comments indicate opportunistic, short-termist behaviour and lack of relationship-
developing investments. 
IPT: 
‘We feel we are being ripped-off by the Firm over prices and as a result we 
have real difficulty in reducing our costs’ (394). 
and: 
‘They drag their feet on modifications that improve reliability because the 
more they stop things going wrong the more they make on repairs’ (398) 
Firm: 
‘They seem to think the cheapest means value for money.  They do not take a 
long-term view of the relationship’ (172). 
and: 
‘We can’t see the IPT’s desire to make this arrangement a success or to 
understand our drivers’ (208). 
The second was Q2c – Fully compatible objectives - (IPTs: 41%/Firms: 48%) where 
the highly idiosyncratic nature of the business, imbalance in power positions and a 
lack of interdependence based upon credible commitments were suggested. 
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IPT: 
‘The company wants to be into new technology, volume manufacture.  They 
don’t like our old kit that is hard to maintain’ (213). 
Firm: 
‘We are concerned that the DLO’s target of 20% reduction in support costs is 
incompatible with our desire to grow the business’ (557). 
3.3 High Points 
Both interdependence and a reduction in the need for sophisticated controls to guard 
against opportunism are noted.  Both sides agreed that Q2b – Clear objectives - was 
the best aspect of the relationship (IPTs: 65%/Firms: 71%). 
IPT: 
‘Our strategic partnering arrangement has addressed many of the old 
problems including poor objectives’ (355). 
Firm: 
‘We are highly focussed on the customer’s needs’ (174). 
and: 
‘A sound, clearly understood working structure of contract and procedures has 
been an important success factor’ (163). 
A close second was Q2d – Co-operation - (IPTs: 60%/Firms: 68%). 
IPT: 
‘They have proved to be excellent partners and have worked with us in all 
aspects of a difficult procurement’ (607). 
and: 
‘Despite the Firm’s structural problems, there is a good working relationship at 
desk level’ (168). 
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Firm: 
‘Our engineers talk daily and have a highly professional relationship with each 
other’ (204). 
3.4 Significant Relationship Difference 
The 2nd order dimension Q2f – Mutual confidence - suggested a significant difference 
of views where one side had a positive perception (IPTs) and the other’s (Firms) was 
negative (IPTs: -42%/Firms: +61%).  This is illustrated in the first instance by a lack 
of mutual hostages (specific asset investments) to prevent opportunism and short-
termism. 
IPT: 
‘All they want to do is make products and push them out of the door.  They 
don’t seem to understand the meaning of service’ (641). 
and: 
‘He employs devious ways to ensure that the UK MoD and OEMs are seen as 
holding-up the programme’ (499). 
On the other hand in the second case the relationships appeared to be more co-
operative and interdependent. 
Firm: 
‘Our arrangement is amicable, sensible and pragmatic’ (640). 
and: 
‘I believe the will is evident from both sides to have the relationship succeed’ 
(487). 
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3.5 Key Findings 
Although this dimension was overall evenly balanced (56%) between the negative, 
monopolistic relationship features and the more successful aspects, the generally 
more pessimistic IPT views over the lack of relationship-stabilising behaviour of their 
partners was evident.  In the face of Uncertainty/Complexity acting on the 
monopolistic relationships a lack of interdependence-promoting actions and short-
termism appeared to be prevalent amongst Firms.  Nevertheless, both sides 
acknowledged the need for clear, joint objectives and co-operation as means of 
achieving interdependence and reducing costly governance measures.  
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4  Dimension 3 – Information Impactedness (Communication) 
The imbalance caused by selective information disclosures, and distortions which 
are difficult or expensive to verify at the time and which undermine the durability of 
contract arrangements (Williamson, 1975) (Chapter 3, 4.4).  The converse of this 
statement generated the following questionnaire questions (see Appendix 1): 
a. Where the other party has proprietary information that could improve. 
the performance of the joint business, it is freely available. 
b. We would welcome a shared data environment where planning, technical and 
pricing information are made freely available. 
c. We understand the information requirements of all participants in the support 
chain from sub-contractors to end-user. 
d. Exchange of information in this relationship takes place frequently and 
informally – not just according to specified agreement. 
e. Objective performance measurement is an important part of this relationship. 
f. We are aware of the performance requirements for all participants in the 
support chain from sub-contractors to end-user. 
g. We provide the other party with regular information including long-range 
forecasts to enable him to do his business better. 
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4.1 Introduction 
Firms were overall generally more optimistic (71%) than IPTs (66%) in this 
dimension.  The pattern of both positive and negative results correlated quite clearly 
and indicated a good measure of agreement although in the Q3a 2nd level 
dimension, the parties’ views were at variance. 
4.1.1 Low Relationship Points 
The agreed low relationship point was Q3a – Availability of proprietary information - 
(IPTs: 44%/Firms: 58%).  It is also noticeable that because of the inversion of 
results, the IPTs believed this factor was especially unsatisfactory.  However, both 
sides mentioned information disclosure selectivity and implied power-balance 
problems.  
IPT: 
‘We use technical data to compete; the Firm uses it to make their products 
more proprietary’ (22). 
and: 
‘Because the operating system software Intellectual Property Rights belongs 
to the Firm we are locked into the relationship and they ‘have us over a 
barrel’’ (20). 
Firm: 
‘They hide behind the excuse that their data is not good enough to give us as 
a means of keeping information from us.  They are not open with us’ (15). 
The further low point from the IPTs’ perspective was Q3f – Support chain 
performance requirements - (IPTs: 51%/Firms: 56%), which suggested a lack of 
ability to verify contract fulfilling arrangements and a calculative approach to trust. 
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IPT: 
‘We are not always sure that the prime contractor has clear communications 
with his sub-contractors’ (3). 
4.2 High Relationship Points 
Under both the high point, 2nd order dimensions the value of sharing information 
freely and the importance of investing in specific resources to support the approach 
were highlighted.  Both sides agreed that Q3b – Shared data environment - was the 
best aspect of the relationship (IPTs: 93%/Firms: 89%). 
IPT: 
‘Information is useless unless it is shared.  It allows us to pre-empt risks so 
the firm doesn’t have to build ‘insurance’ into its prices.  The results are 
increased competitiveness for the Firm and increased value for money for us’ 
(389). 
Firm: 
‘We are exploring ways of empowering individuals with better information to 
improve their effectiveness’ (491). 
Q3d – Frequent Information exchange - (IPTs: 76%/Firms: 81%) was also seen as a 
high point. 
IPT: 
‘We have introduced an industry forum where the companies we deal with 
come together and thrash through issues with us.  They provide the chairman’ 
(41). 
and: 
‘Their man is on our side.  He takes the trouble to sit down and talk to us.  
This is good for a director’ (559). 
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Firm: 
‘Regular meetings at strategic and tactical levels that examine performance 
and future plans and tasks enable us to plan our forward allocation of 
resources’ (25). 
and: 
‘We are very proud of the way we communicate with the IPT; we speak at 
least daily’ (12). 
4.3 Key Findings 
Some aspects of information impactedness such as deliberate withholding, the use 
of proprietary rights as a weapon and confusion over performance measures were 
clearly discernible in the survey.  Nevertheless, there are also more positive features 
in evidence such as routine all-level communications, special communication events 
and staff exchanges.  On balance adverse monopolistic features appeared to be 
outweighed by the more positive aspects found in normal markets and this was 
borne out by the dimension’s overall 68% success score. 
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5  Dimension 4 - Opportunism (Relationship Reliability) 
Constitutes a lack of candour or honesty and includes self-interest seeking with 
guile.  (Williamson, 1979) (Chapter 3, 4.5).  The converse of this statement 
generated the following questionnaire questions (see Appendix 1): 
a. The quality of the contract outputs ie. spares/repairs/services, is entirely 
satisfactory. 
b. The quality of service delivery ie. delivery times, billing, payment, is entirely 
satisfactory.  
c. The relationship is characterised by a continually improving quality ethos. 
d. Problems are solved in a joint, open, constructive manner. 
e. Such is the goodwill in the relationship, the other party would willingly put 
himself out to adapt to our changing requirements. 
f. We trust the other party to act in our best interests. 
g. The responsibility for making sure the relationship works is shared jointly. 
h. The other party provides us with useful cost reduction and quality 
improvement ideas. 
i. The other party is always totally open and honest with us. 
j. The other party always does what he says he will do. 
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5.1 Introduction 
Firms were overall more optimistic (59%) than IPTs (49%) who saw this dimension 
as a failure.  Nevertheless, the pattern of both positive and negative results 
correlates quite distinctly which indicates a good measure of agreement between the 
Firms and the IPTs on the 2nd level dimension highs and lows. 
5.2 Low Relationship Points 
The qualitative data reveals aspects of information impactedness with both reticence 
and selectivity over disclosure as well as opportunistic behaviour concerning poor 
service delivery and commercial practices.  The agreed low point was Q4h – 
Provision of cost and quality improvement ideas - (IPTs: 35%/Firms: 31%). 
IPT: 
‘They are not at all proactive in offering us ideas to improve the equipment’ 
(572). 
Firm: 
‘We continue to be hounded by the UK MoD to provide a level of technical 
performance which was not part of the original contract’ (439). 
and: 
‘They want to do things right but their people return equipment to us with little 
care or information.  Often we find no fault and the diagnostic work costs us 
all money’ (247). 
A further joint, low point was Q4b – Customer service - (IPTs: 33%/Firms: 51%): 
IPT: 
‘Getting service out of the Firm is like getting ‘poop’ out of a rocking horse!’ 
(426). 
and: 
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‘They only achieve about 30% of their delivery forecasts.  They don’t seem to 
have the capacity to meet our needs’ (623). 
Firm: 
‘The IPT’s Project Managers need constant chivvying to get things done and 
then we get the blame for being late’ (289). 
IPTs were also concerned over Q4c – Continuous improvement - (IPTs: 41%/Firms: 
67%): 
IPT: 
‘The firm lives under a ‘halo’ effect.  When the chips are down they respond 
amazingly quickly and effectively but, they are very poor at routine supply, 
commercial and product improvement’ (606). 
and: 
‘We have to concentrate on the numerous issues regarding poor products 
which prevents us from looking at strategy’ (252). 
and Q4i – Openness & honesty - (IPTs: 42%/Firms: 61%): 
IPT: 
‘We have been thwarted at every turn to obtain fair and reasonable prices 
from the Firm.  Recently without warning, they marked-up prices by 2-300%’ 
(591). 
5.3 High Relationship Points 
The high relationship point exhibited incidences of interdependence which also 
involved the commitment of specific assets used to cement the relationships.  Both 
sides agreed that Q4g – Shared relationship responsibility - was the best aspect of 
the relationships (IPTs: 79%/Firms: 81%). 
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IPT: 
‘The speed with which the project was placed to contract and the success of 
the programme are largely due to our close partnering arrangement.  They 
have proved to be reliable and innovative’ (278). 
Firm: 
‘Because 60% of our business is with the UK MoD we are very experienced in 
meeting their needs and working with them’ (255). 
A second, agreed high point was Q4d – Joint, open, constructive problem solving 
(IPTs: 69%/Firms: 78%). 
IPT: 
‘He is open and honest and gets on the phone to deal with problems as soon 
as they appear’ (268). 
Firm: 
‘We jointly test and de-bug the equipment before handover to the end-
customer’ (396). 
5.4 Key Findings 
Dimension 4 gained the lowest overall success score (54%) in the survey.  Although 
IPTs mentioned some satisfactory aspects of interdependence achieved through 
joint investment in relationship-building, the low rating was primarily because IPTs 
believed that Firms behaved opportunistically in providing poor service by taking 
advantage of their monopolistic market position. 
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6  Dimension 5 – Small Numbers (Relationship Quality) 
The combination of problem behaviours requires sophisticated controls that are only 
found in or close to the firm and may result in failure of market conditions 
(Williamson, 1979) (Ch3, 4.6).  The converse of this statement generated the 
following questionnaire questions (see Appendix 1): 
a. The gains from this relationship are equally shared between both parties. 
b. We do not feel imprisoned within the current relationship.  
c. We are willing to invest more ie. money, time, information, effort, in the current 
relationship. 
d. We are happy that our future is bound to the success of our relationship 
partner. 
e. We feel totally committed to this relationship. 
f. The other party is genuinely concerned that our business succeeds. 
g. Both sides are working to improve this relationship. 
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6.1 Introduction 
The Firms were markedly more optimistic (79%) than IPTs (66%) in this dimension.  
However, the pattern of both positive and negative results suggests enough similarity 
to indicate a measure of agreement in most of the 2nd level dimensions. 
6.2 Low Relationship Points 
Despite the optimism gap in this dimension (13%), Firms provided equally poignant 
comments to the IPTs and clearly indicated frustration at the failure of contractual 
governance to maintain equity and relationships free of the fear of ‘lock-in’.  The 
agreed low relationship point was Q5a – Equally shared gains - (IPTs: 50%/Firms: 
60%). 
IPT: 
‘Although we negotiate down the price we know they will recoup it elsewhere’ 
(622). 
and: 
‘There is no evidence of risk-sharing without us paying the price later’ (482). 
Firm: 
‘The IPT has no intention of sharing any cost savings they make with us.  
They have told us that if the partnering arrangement makes a staff member 
redundant he will be redeployed in the office and no saving will be shared’ 
(390). 
and: 
‘The UK MoD Commercial staff’ view of sharing is they have the lion’s share 
and we get what’s left over’ (137). 
A further joint, low relationship point from the IPTs perspective was Q5d – Future 
bound to the partner - (IPTs: 57%/Firms: 84%): 
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IPT: 
‘We have the impression that we must support the company at all costs 
because of political reasons’ (132). 
The IPTs were also concerned over Q5b – Being imprisoned in the relationship - 
(IPTs: 54%/Firms: 81%): 
IPT: 
‘We fear the company ‘pulling the plug’ or worse, applying a long period of 
take it or leave it’ (470). 
and: 
‘The current contract is due to expire and I note the Firm proposes a 32% 
price increase for the follow-on’ (567). 
and: 
‘The contractor knows he cannot easily be replaced and he uses this to his 
benefit and our cost’ (480). 
Both sides were also concerned over Q5f – Mutual, beneficial concern - (IPTs: 
68%/Firms: 64%): 
IPT: 
‘Our equipment is old and not ‘sexy’ to the company.  They put all their 
brightest commercial and programme managers on the new projects’ (549). 
Firm: 
‘Their willingness to competitively tender every requirement to the lowest 
bidder does not engender a long-term spirit of partnership’ (527). 
6.3 High Relationship Points 
The high relationship points were characterised by long-termism and 
interdependence marked by co-operation and investment in relationship-promoting 
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resources.  The agreed highest point was Q5g – Both sides working to improve the 
relationship  (IPTs: 82%/Firms: 87%). 
IPT: 
‘This has always been a good, close-knit relationship.  We have worked 
together for about 7 years’ (151). 
Firm: 
‘The new partnering arrangement will run over 10 years and allow gainshare.  
At last we can start to improve the relationship for both sides’ (146). 
A second, agreed high point was Q5c – Willingness to invest more in the relationship 
(IPTs: 80%/Firms: 88%). 
IPT: 
‘They were very arrogant with a take it or leave it attitude but we have worked 
hard to break this down’ (332). 
Firm: 
‘We are investing heavily in time and effort to improve the relationship’ (112). 
and: 
‘Both sides are going to put their hands in their pockets to bail out this project’ 
(437). 
Firms independently saw Q5e – Commitment (IPTs: 69%/Firms: 92%) as their 
highest point. 
Firms: 
‘There was top-level commitment to the project from the outset and high 
quality leaders were selected’ (117). 
and: 
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‘We have made great efforts to provide effective support despite the lack of 
investment by the UK MoD.  We have lost money in this process’ (436). 
6.4 Key Findings 
Despite asking overt questions about the quality of monopolistic relationships, 
dimension 5 gained the highest joint score (73%) in the survey.  There were 
comments about the hopelessness of the monopoly impasse situation, especially 
from the IPTs side but these were generally outweighed by more optimistic views 
about striving to turn round poor situations and an acceptance that making the best 
of the situation was preferable to the negative alternative.  The following IPT remark 
is salient: 
‘They have a monopoly but they also depend upon us for 95% of their 
business.  We have developed a symbiotic relationship’ (149). 
The large gap in the scale of optimism appeared to be in the areas of sharing gains, 
feelings of imprisonment and lack of long-term outlook. 
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Appendix 8 
Detailed Data Analysis Q1 – Supply Chain Management 
1 Introduction 
This Appendix shows in the following Sections the detailed data analysis for each of 
the theoretical dimensions against the following questions: 
Q1 – Can SCM partnering activities, processes and requirements from the 
commercial environment, such as those encapsulated in Figure 2.8, provide an 
understanding of the monopolistic relationships found within UK Defence 
Procurement? 
In each of the following Sections the appropriate questions from the questionnaire 
(see Appendix 1) are repeated and the overall comparative graphical results are 
portrayed.  Then, under categories that emerged from the qualitative data, examples 
of the qualitative data (listed fully at Appendix 6) are used to illustrate the salient 
numerical points (numbers in brackets following quotations refer back to Appendix 
6).  At the end of each Section the key points are provided.  The overall summary of 
Key Points from this Appendix is found in Chapter 4, Section 6. 
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2 Dimension 1 – Bounded Rationality (Relationship Creativity) 
People have only so much capacity to rationalise what is going on around them and 
they therefore naturally limit their performance to the adequate rather than the 
optimum (Simon, 1957) (Ch3, 4.2).  The converse of this statement generated the 
following questionnaire questions (see Appendix 1): 
a. The relationship encourages the achievement of high performance by both 
parties ie. reliable equipment, on-time delivery, good forecasts. 
b. The relationship encourages us to be innovative in the way we do business. 
c. Performance measurement is used to raise standards. 
d. Disputes & problems are resolved: 'quickly'. 
e. Disputes & problems are resolved: 'fairly'. 
f. The other party is reliable and consistent in dealing with us. 
g. The other party is dedicated to making our business a success. 
h. When an unexpected problem arises, both parties would rather work out a 
solution than hold each other to the original contract terms. 
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2.1 Introduction 
Under this dimension the data is searched for instances of SCM actions that 
overcome short-term approaches to logistics business relationships. 
2.2 Framework Contracting 
A number of positive and negative points were made on the significance of the 
contract type that governed the relationship that are covered by Q1b – Innovative 
business arrangements (IPTs: 54%/Firms: 66%). 
IPT: 
‘Now we have a partnering arrangement around a good framework contract 
we just concentrate of the customer – we no longer refer to the small print’ 
(656). 
and: 
‘Enabling contracts reduce admin costs by freeing us from frequent 
competitions as long as the company continues to demonstrate it has given 
us best value for money’ (69). 
countered by: 
‘It’s a traditional contract which promotes archaic ways of working and 
provides no incentive to them to perform’ (451). 
Firm: 
‘The contract has flexibility built-in to handle unforeseen events – especially of 
an operational nature’ (430). 
and conversely: 
‘Although we have a partnering arrangement, both sides at the outset could 
have better addressed the support aspects.  This would have resulted in 
major savings in whole-life costs’ (101). 
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2.3 Planning & Control 
The next feature reported in the data concerns Q1b - Innovation (IPTs: 54%/Firms: 
66%) and Q1a – Performance (IPTs: 57%/Firms: 73%). 
IPT: 
‘We used to keep a pool of items to feed into repair.  With our new partnering 
arrangement we track individual items and have significantly cut down on their 
number’ (399). 
and conversely: 
‘We just don’t have time to take a strategic view, we are too busy looking after 
30 other contracts’ (81). 
Firm: 
‘The benefits of the partnering arrangement are we are ‘future-proofed’, 
uncertainty is removed, we can plan and most importantly, we can really focus 
on the customer’ (411). 
and alternatively: 
‘They just don’t seem to be able to take a long-term view.  If we knew where 
we were we could start to plan’ (92). 
2.4 Service Delivery 
Focus on the customer involving Q1a – Performance  (IPTs: 57%/Firms: 73%) and 
Q1b - Innovation (IPTs: 54%/Firms: 67%) is the next grouping. 
IPT: 
‘This is real support chain management; the mechanism is invisible to the end 
customer’ (377). 
and alternatively: 
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‘They are an engineering-focussed firm who produce good products but they 
are second rate on relationships, finance and contracts’ (97). 
Firm: 
‘My opposite number and I find innovative ways of providing the best support’ 
(579). 
conversely: 
‘Industry is still in Cold War deterrence mode; it is not yet prepared for long-
term service provision’ (106). 
2.5 Joint Activity & Organisation 
Finally under this Dimension, joint endeavour and organisational issues that affect 
the relationship found under Q1b - Innovation (IPTs: 54%/Firms: 67%), Q1c - 
Performance (IPTs: 52%/Firms: 50%) and Q1f - Consistency (IPTs: 59%/Firms: 
74%) are considered. 
IPT: 
‘My team is only 60 strong and small is beautiful.  We seem to be able to do 
more with less.  We concentrate on essentials; the nice to do only encourage 
growth in overheads’ (520). 
and: 
‘We will form a joint management team for the next project’ (553). 
conversely: 
‘Our efforts to improve this relationship is inhibited by continuous change and 
management initiatives within our own area’ (89). 
also: 
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‘The company is dealing with an old product, the spares are in short-supply, 
there are obsolescence problems and on top of that, its organisation is poorly 
focussed’ (62). 
Firm: 
‘The secret of success is small easily controllable work packages and teams 
where greater onus is put on individual responsibility and where performance 
is clearly visible'’(79). 
and: 
‘We now sit down with the IPT to write their Post Design services 
requirements.  This saves months of bureaucracy’ (107). 
alternatively: 
‘The relationship between our people is excellent but frequent staff changes in 
the IPT disrupt our working arrangements and incur costs’ (301). 
and: 
‘We have high hopes that Resource Accounting and Budgeting and full cost 
accounting will bring commercial realism to the IPT’ (72). 
2.6 Key Findings 
The qualitative data suggests that within monopolistic UK Defence Procurement 
successful relationships occur when innovative contracts exist, which reduce costs 
and promote customer focus.  Furthermore, organisational arrangements that 
promote consistency and performance are also valued.  However, it appears that 
both deliberate and unconscious expediency often come into play that reduce 
relationship effectiveness.  The balance of data bears out the overall dimension 
success score of 64%. 
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3  Dimension 2 – Uncertainty/Complexity (Relationship Stability) 
People have difficulty in making sense of complex current and future events 
(Williamson, 1975) (Chapter 3, 4.3).  The converse of this statement generated the 
following questionnaire questions (see Appendix 1): 
a. The other party displays a sound, strategic understanding of our business. 
b. The objectives of both parties are clearly stated. 
c. The objectives of both parties are fully compatible. 
d. Both parties co-operate wholeheartedly. 
e. The relationship provides a dynamic business environment within which both 
parties can seek increasing rewards. 
f. I have complete confidence in the intentions of the other party. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
IPT Stability
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
Q2a Q2b Q2c Q2d Q2e Q2f OV
Staff Views
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
Success -%
Failure - %
Firm Stability
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
Q2a Q2b Q2c Q2d Q2e Q2f OV
Staff Views
P
er
ce
nt
ag
e
Success -%
Failure - %
Appendix 8  416 
 
3.1 Introduction 
The following instances of SCM that either overcome or succumb to business 
environmental uncertainty/complexity were found in the research data. 
3.2  Customer Focus 
Firstly under this dimension, SCM aspects found under Q2a - Mutual understanding 
(IPTs: 69%/Firms: 54%) and Q2d - Co-operation (IPTs: 60%/Firms: 68%) are 
considered. 
IPT: 
‘Their customer services are trying hard; they seem to have vision’ (554). 
alternatively: 
‘New business must be diminishing.  The Firm must start concentrating on 
long-term service to existing products’ (535). 
and: 
‘Their business managers don’t like being exposed to the detail of their poor 
performance’ (187). 
Firm: 
‘We organised a training day on the MoD’s site to educate their staff about the 
company and its products.  Knowledge about each other’s business is 
important to our professional relationship’ (167). 
conversely: 
‘They don’t seem to understand we have lead times; they often want it 
‘tomorrow’’ (543). 
and: 
‘Maybe the company is still stumbling to come to terms with a new support 
business area and working out what we can add or not’ (612). 
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3.3 Commercial Understanding 
Next, SCM aspects found under Q2c – Compatible objectives (IPTs: 40%/Firms: 
49%) and Q2e – Dynamism (IPTs: 40%/Firms: 48%) are considered. 
IPT: 
‘We aim for a 10, 12, 15 or even 30 year contract.  This fosters a long-term 
ethos, cuts the costs of frequent renegotiations and allows the Firm to plan 
and resource’ (388). 
but on the other hand: 
‘The Firm would like to ‘cherry-pick’ the easy and profitable spares for the new 
contract rather than take the whole package' (177). 
Firm: 
‘Our partnering contract simplifies the operation of the relationship and frees 
us to encourage one another to higher performance levels’ (652). 
however: 
‘Budget constraints in the MoD reduce the relationship to ‘fire-fighting’.  It’s 
impossible to plan ahead’ (180). 
and: 
‘We gave them a proper solution.  They said it was too expensive.  We cut 
back and now we are all suffering’ (184). 
3.4 Co-operative Activities 
Lastly, SCM aspects found under Q2d – Co-operation (IPTs: 60%/Firms: 68%), Q2e 
– Dynamism (IPTs: 40%/Firms: 48%) and Q2f – Confidence (IPTs: 42%/Firms: 61%) 
are considered. 
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IPT: 
‘They are always thinking ahead; wanting to know our budget over the next 4 
years, our equipment plans, what they can do to enhance its performance 
and, exploring how they can offer better support services’ (560). 
and: 
‘All stakeholders were involved in the project including the end-customers who 
helped design the performance targets.  The same people are now involved in 
implementation' (660). 
but: 
‘Their commercial people are intransigent and at loggerheads with their 
engineers’ (627). 
and: 
‘The Company closed their site and moved.  As a result all expertise was lost 
and delays in getting things done are very frustrating’ (569). 
Firm: 
‘Upheaval on the MoD side from staff and organisation change and vacant 
posts makes it impossible to generate a stable business environment’ (181). 
and: 
‘I feel really let down that the current review by the IPT into a new project has 
cut us out and ignored our long experience’ (582). 
and: 
‘The commercial side is the weakest.  The MoD still has traditional views.  We 
put in a lot of effort to work with them but they are unable to change’ (209). 
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3.5 Key Findings 
Forward-looking, holistic partnering arrangements supported by customer-focussed, 
supply chain-bolstering activities were detected.  However, there were a similar 
number of instances of negative approaches such as insular practices, disruptive 
organisational changes and short-term strategies that promoted rather than 
countered the adverse effects of uncertainty and complexity.  These views matched 
the overall positive dimension score of only 56%. 
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4 Dimension 3 – Information Impactedness (Communication) 
The imbalance caused by selective information disclosures, and distortions which 
are difficult or expensive to verify at the time and which undermine the durability of 
contract arrangements (Williamson, 1975) (Chapter 3, 4.4).  The converse of this 
statement generated the following questionnaire questions (see Appendix 1): 
a. Where the other party has proprietary information that could improve. 
the performance of the joint business, it is freely available. 
b. We would welcome a shared data environment where planning, technical and 
pricing information are made freely available. 
c. We understand the information requirements of all participants in the support 
chain from sub-contractors to end-user. 
d. Exchange of information in this relationship takes place frequently and 
informally – not just according to specified agreement. 
e. Objective performance measurement is an important part of this relationship. 
f. We are aware of the performance requirements for all participants in the 
support chain from sub-contractors to end-user. 
g. We provide the other party with regular information including long-range 
forecasts to enable him to do his business better. 
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4.1 Introduction 
In this dimension communication provide the ‘life-blood’ of planning and performance 
data to facilitate the flow of goods and services from suppliers to customers.  
Unfortunately, deliberate actions and poor management can hinder this information.  
This sub-Section considers the research data found on SCM Communication. 
4.2 Management Communication 
Firstly under this Dimension, SCM aspects found under Q3d – Frequent, open 
communication (IPTs: 76%/Firms: 81%) are considered and it can be seen that 
these scores do not quite match the generally negative comments made. 
IPT: 
‘Quarterly review meetings where outstanding orders are discussed have led 
to improved availability’ (5). 
alternatively: 
‘We have waited for months for answers to questions raised at review 
meetings’ (401). 
Firm: 
‘We have worked hard to make a success of communications but, maybe this 
has taken our eyes off the other aspects of the relationship that need 
attention’ (29). 
and: 
‘Communications at working level are fine but we don’t have any high-level 
reviews; I haven’t seen their team leader for 18 months.  I don’t even know if 
they think we are important’ (533). 
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4.3 Supply Chain Planning  
Next, SCM aspects found under Q3c – SC Information provision (IPTs: 61%/Firms: 
70%) and Q3g – Information for forecasting (IPTs: 72%/Firms: 75%) are considered 
and show that although some very positive comments were made, fundamental 
problems were raised. 
IPT: 
‘We are endeavouring to improve the forecasting of our requirements to assist 
the Firm in providing a better service’ (357). 
alternatively: 
‘We sent then 10 items to repair.  They got stuck on one, held up the batch 
and didn’t tell us for 9 months' (402). 
Firm: 
‘Very poor information on the MoD’s consumption and usage rates makes 
planning extremely difficult’ (17). 
conversely: 
‘All support chain parties, including the end customer, attend planning 
meetings to discuss requirements, pool knowledge and resolve problems’ 
(344). 
4.4 Supply Chain Performance 
SCM aspects found under Q3e – Performance measurement (IPTs: 59%/Firms: 
61%) and Q3f – SC performance (IPTs: 52%/Firms: 66%) are considered next but 
they show that although respondents understood the importance of performance 
measurement, effective implementation was a difficult issue. 
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IPT: 
‘We have simple, obvious, open performance measures.  Every week the firm 
sends a statement of work achieved, problems encountered and forecasts.  
We provide them with consumption data.  Achievements are open for all to 
see’ (658). 
but surprisingly: 
‘The fact that we do not have a performance measurement system whilst the 
Firm thinks we have is a real failure to communicate' (2). 
Firm: 
‘We are starting to face up to performance issues at our regular meetings.  In 
the past mutual defensiveness has got in the way of making improvements.  
This is a very hard area to tackle ’ (30). 
and: 
‘I am concerned by our lack of touch with the end customers.  We need 
seamless performance measurement throughout the logistics chain’ (358). 
4.5 Working-Level Communication 
SCM aspects found under Q3b – Shared data (IPTs: 93%/Firms: 89%) and Q3d – 
Frequent, open communication (IPTs: 76%/Firms: 81%) are considered. 
IPT: 
‘They have a really bad supply manager that we normally by-pass (563). 
and: 
‘People think the supply staff are pond life but they seem to have the clearest 
view of what’s happening between us.  I’m not sure how to use this capability 
effectively' (521). 
 
Appendix 8  424 
 
 
Firm: 
‘We look forward to a shared data environment where more information is 
available both ways’ (648). 
and: 
People do talk more freely and there is a genuine desire to solve problems in 
an open manner’ (35). 
4.6 Key Findings 
Overall the research revealed that the importance of Supply Chain communication 
was understood and efforts were being made to improve.  This is born out by the 
overall dimension success score of 68%.  But, there were very few examples where 
integrated measures were in place and good results were being achieved.  Some 
instances of information impactedness due to the monopolistic situation were 
detected but, the practical difficulties of providing regular, management focus on 
order book performance through the use of joint performance measurement and 
service level systems appeared to be the key problems. 
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5 Dimension 4 - Opportunism (Relationship Reliability) 
Constitutes a lack of candour or honesty and includes self-interest seeking with 
guile.  (Williamson, 1979) (Chapter 3, 4.5).  The converse of this statement 
generated the following questionnaire questions (see Appendix 1): 
a. The quality of the contract outputs ie. spares/repairs/services, is entirely 
satisfactory. 
b. The quality of service delivery ie. delivery times, billing, payment, is entirely 
satisfactory.  
c. The relationship is characterised by a continually improving quality ethos. 
d. Problems are solved in a joint, open, constructive manner. 
e. Such is the goodwill in the relationship, the other party would willingly put 
himself out to adapt to our changing requirements. 
f. We trust the other party to act in our best interests. 
g. The responsibility for making sure the relationship works is shared jointly. 
h. The other party provides us with useful cost reduction and quality 
improvement ideas. 
i. The other party is always totally open and honest with us. 
j. The other party always does what he says he will do. 
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5.1 Introduction 
From the SCM perspective Relationship Reliability involves the creation and 
operation of joint service delivery systems.  This sub-Section illustrates how the 
research data portrays this feature together with its opportunistic antithesis. 
5.2 Quality & Continuous Improvement 
Firstly under this Dimension, SCM aspects found under Q4c – Quality Ethos (IPTs: 
41%/Firms: 67%) and Q4h - Co-operation (IPTs: 35%/Firms: 30%) are considered. 
IPT: 
‘We have major issues meetings twice per year and they appreciate honesty 
from us over our quality requirements’ (334). 
alternatively: 
‘Quality issues are ignored by the Firm’ (230). 
Firm: 
‘Our quality culture isn’t just ISO, it also includes IiP.  These things build-in 
continuous improvement’ (271). 
and: 
‘We have great faith in the quality of our products and our service’ (226). 
5.3 Service/Product Focus 
Next, the following SCM aspects found under Q4a – Contract outputs (IPTs: 
48%/Firms: 59%) are considered.  A number of quite crucial points are made about 
environmental influences. 
IPT: 
‘I am impressed by their willingness to co-operate on all matters involving 
technical queries, spares procurement and repair of assets’ (329). 
however: 
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‘We feel that we have to keep the pressure on price and delivery to keep the 
Firm on its toes.  We feel we are paying a high price for mediocre 
performance' (244). 
and: 
‘The Company moved a couple of years ago and often use this to excuse 
defective products’ (219). 
Firm: 
‘We are very proud that visitors comment that the refurbished equipment 
looks brand new’ (273). 
however: 
‘In the Post Design Services business we are totally dependent on Production 
resources.  The MoD is totally unrealistic in its expectations’ (544). 
and: 
‘They don’t seem to realise that a fixed price contract limits our ability to react 
flexibly once work has started’ (524). 
and: 
‘The supply chain is highly disjointed with a mix of in-house and industry 
participation.  There is over-capacity and inefficiency.  No one has an 
overview of the whole’ (286). 
and: 
‘The supplier base is very small; it is thus easy to have critical supply chain 
breakdowns’ (288). 
and lastly: 
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‘It’s a problem maintaining 30 year old equipment.  It’s used and abused and 
we have difficulty finding people and sub-contractors with the necessary skills’ 
(287). 
5.4 Business Practice 
Lastly, SCM aspects found under Q4b – Service delivery (IPTs: 34%/Firms: 51%) 
and Q4e – Adaption (IPTs: 48%/Firms: 49%) are considered. 
IPT: 
‘By giving the Firm full control over the service we can reduce the number of 
spares we need to buy’ (259). 
however: 
‘They have taken on additional tasks without the resources.  They now don’t 
have the staff to chase their sub-contractors who let them down' (571). 
Firm: 
‘We are especially keen to embrace a payment system that does away with 
the current, expensive, unreliable, paper-based MoD system’ (650). 
but: 
‘At the working level they are not trained very well.  It galls me to know that 
my people know more about the IPT staff’s jobs than they do’ (418). 
5.5 Key Findings 
A number of positive SCM aspects such as quality ethos, service delivery and 
process improvement can be observed in the data.  However, this dimension scored 
the lowest success rate in the research project (54%) and it is possible to see that 
environmental limitations on time, budget and investment and, product technical 
complexity and age had a strong bearing on the monopolistic business environment 
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under scrutiny.  It is also evident that instances of opportunistic behaviour were 
prompted as reactions to these features. 
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6 Dimension 5 – Small Numbers (Relationship Quality) 
The combination of problem behaviours requires sophisticated controls that are only 
found in or close to the firm and may result in failure of market conditions 
(Williamson, 1979) (Ch3, 4.6).  The converse of this statement generated the 
following questionnaire questions (see Appendix 1): 
a. The gains from this relationship are equally shared between both parties. 
b. We do not feel imprisoned within the current relationship.  
c. We are willing to invest more ie. money, time, information, effort, in the current 
relationship. 
d. We are happy that our future is bound to the success of our relationship 
partner. 
e. We feel totally committed to this relationship. 
f. The other party is genuinely concerned that our business succeeds. 
g. Both sides are working to improve this relationship. 
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6.1 Introduction 
This sub-Section examines the impact of the restricted freedom on managers’ 
actions within monopolistic relationships on SC operations. 
6.2 Relationship Development 
Firstly under this Dimension, SCM aspects found under Q5c – Willingness to invest 
(IPTs: 80%/Firms: 88%) and Q5g – Working for improvement (IPTs: 83%/Firms: 
87%) are considered. 
IPT: 
‘I offered them a 25 year contract to show how committed we were.  This 
surprised the Firm’ (328). 
conversely: 
‘There is reluctance by the Firm to take risks in supporting our plans such as 
buying long lead-time items in advance’ (128). 
and: 
‘I am trying to support an ageing weapon system which does not bear a good 
return to industry’ (504). 
Firm: 
‘We can now leave the contract behind us and concentrate on the output to 
the customer’ (374). 
on the other hand: 
‘There is a bit of the old ‘cost-plus, bowler-hatted’ attitude in both the Industry 
and MoD commercial staffs that must be overcome’ (134). 
and: 
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‘We are very frustrated.  We have invested by placing a man in the IPT but 
the proposal was not welcomed.  They said they could take or leave the idea 
and we would have to pay the costs’ (122). 
6.3 Equality & Understanding 
Lastly, the following SCM aspects found under Q5a – Equality (IPTs: 50%/Firms: 
60%) and Q5f – Concern for success (IPTs: 68%/Firms: 64%) are considered. 
IPT: 
‘Gainshare is built into the contract which also supports the Company’s export 
aims’ (116). 
but: 
‘Our ability to compete is completely hampered by reliance on the Company 
as design Authority to authorise alternatives' (593). 
and lastly: 
‘Overall the Company lacks goodwill and believes it can charge what it likes’ 
(352). 
Firm: 
‘Blame does not work, it just perpetuates poor performance in the long term’ 
(133). 
however: 
‘Our fear is the feast and famine situation of Defence spending.  There are 
times when we must stop work, lay off experienced staff and then race to get 
back going again.  I worry that we cannot respond fast enough and that this 
adversely affects customer-satisfaction’ (144). 
and: 
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‘Their worry is that because we are their single source and have changed 
hands a couple of times in the last 10 years, we might go out of business and 
leave them high and dry’ (145). 
6.4 Key Findings 
This dimension provided the best overall success score (73%) in the theoretical 
framework but although there is some evidence of working together in the best 
interests of relationships, the majority of semi-structured interview comments were 
negative.  As already mentioned in Chapter 4, sub-Section 4.2.1, although the gap in 
quantitative response perceptions between the IPTs and the Firms was not 
statistically significant with a high correlation factor of 0.928, the gap between the 
quantitative scores and the overall tone of the qualitative data was inexplicable and it 
is suggested that further research would be useful.  The adverse points in 6.2 where 
the sides felt trapped and at the mercy of the other sides’ budgetary and commercial 
vagaries especially epitomise concerns about monopolist business and support the 
low quantitative results in 2nd level dimension Q5a. 
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  Appendix 9 
Detailed Data Analysis Q2 – Relationship Marketing 
1 Introduction 
This Appendix shows in the following Sections the detailed data analysis for each of 
the theoretical dimensions against the following questions: 
Q2 – Can RM behavioural variables, especially those shown in Figure 2.16, 
provide an understanding of the monopolistic relationships found within UK 
Defence Procurement? 
In each of the following Sections the appropriate questions from the questionnaire 
(see Appendix 1) are repeated and the overall comparative graphical results are 
portrayed.  Then, under categories that emerged from the qualitative data, examples 
of the qualitative data (listed fully at Appendix 6) are used to illustrate the salient 
numerical points (numbers in brackets following quotations refer back to Appendix 
6).  At the end of each Section the key points are provided.  The overall summary of 
Key Points from this Appendix is found in Chapter 4, Section 7. 
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2  Dimension 1 – Bounded Rationality (Relationship Creativity) 
People have only so much capacity to rationalise what is going on around them and 
they therefore naturally limit their performance to the adequate rather than the 
optimum (Simon, 1957) (Ch3, 4.2).  The converse of this statement generated the 
following questionnaire questions: 
a. The relationship encourages the achievement of high performance by both 
parties ie. reliable equipment, on-time delivery, good forecasts. 
b. The relationship encourages us to be innovative in the way we do business. 
c. Performance measurement is used to raise standards. 
d. Disputes & problems are resolved: 'quickly'. 
e. Disputes & problems are resolved: 'fairly'. 
f. The other party is reliable and consistent in dealing with us. 
g. The other party is dedicated to making our business a success. 
h. When an unexpected problem arises, both parties would rather work out a 
solution than hold each other to the original contract terms. 
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2.1 Introduction 
Under this dimension the data is searched for instances of RM relationship variables 
used to overcome short-term approaches to monopolistic business relationships. 
2.2 C3 Behaviour (Co-operation, Collaboration, Co-ordination) 
A number of positive and negative points were made on working together in a 
harmonious and efficient manner towards shared objectives that are covered by Q1a 
– High performance (IPTs: 57%/Firms: 73%) and Q1h – Flexibility (IPTs: 77%/Firms: 
81%).  It will be noted that comments specifically home in on commercial functions. 
IPT: 
‘When we were able to focus together on an emergency programme to 
replace defective, safety-critical items, the Company initially found it hard but 
after that it really worked well’ (61). 
but: 
‘Our Commercial staff have resisted integrating with us.  As a result my ability 
to be innovative is restricted’ (409). 
and: 
‘No one seems to own the problem.  It’s always been the same with this 
Company.  Nothing has changed despite big words about Smart Acquisition’ 
(680). 
Firm: 
‘As a result of working through the problems together, customer satisfaction 
appears to be improving’ (54). 
and: 
‘Currently quotes take a long time to process.  I am suggesting 2 monthly 
meetings with the IPT Commercial Officer to smooth the task’ (674). 
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but conversely: 
‘Of all the MoD departments we speak to the Contracts staff are the worst.  
They are set in their ways, won’t take risks, have an adversarial mindset and 
they slow things down’ (93). 
and: 
‘My experience of dealing with the MoD is one of frustration through time-
consuming bureaucracy and regulatory requirements’ (359). 
2.3 Commitment 
The next relationship variable considers the willingness of the parties to devote 
maximum effort to sustaining and improving the relationship and data is found under 
Q1g – Mutual dedication (IPTs: 51%/Firms: 49%) and Q1f – Reliability and 
consistency (IPTs: 59%/Firms: 74%). 
IPT: 
‘They are committed to improvement and are on-track, through a big effort, to 
clear the 40% level of overdue orders’ (63). 
and : 
‘They have been involved with supporting our equipment for over 20 years 
and are fully committed to us’ (574). 
however: 
‘It’s almost policy that we let these relationships run without much 
management effort.  We need to be more proactive’ (80). 
Firm: 
‘It was difficult to get the contract so we try extra hard not to mess it up’ (94). 
but: 
‘Smart Procurement brought a breakthrough but where is the follow-up?’ (74). 
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and: 
‘The IPT doesn’t seem to have walked the talk; instead they have sunk back 
into their comfort zone’ (99). 
2.4 Key Findings 
The qualitative data suggests that within monopolistic UK Defence Procurement 
relationships Commercial attitudes and practices are both a source of frustration and 
the key to good partnerships – overall satisfaction score 64%.  Moreover, although 
there is evidence of long running relationships, lack of commitment to ‘walk the talk’ 
also contributes to short-termism and bounded rationality. 
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3  Dimension 2 – Uncertainty/Complexity (Relationship Stability) 
People have difficulty in making sense of complex current and future events 
(Williamson, 1975) (Chapter 3, 4.3).  The converse of this statement generated the 
following questionnaire questions: 
a. The other party displays a sound, strategic understanding of our business. 
b. The objectives of both parties are clearly stated. 
c. The objectives of both parties are fully compatible. 
d. Both parties co-operate wholeheartedly. 
e. The relationship provides a dynamic business environment within which both 
parties can seek increasing rewards. 
f. I have complete confidence in the intentions of the other party. 
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3.1 Introduction 
Under this dimension the data is searched for instances of RM relationship variables 
used to overcome environmental uncertainty and complexity within UK Defence 
Procurement monopolistic business relationships. 
3.2 C3 Behaviour (Co-operation, Collaboration, Co-ordination) 
This variable is supported by data found under Q2d – Co-operation (IPTs: 
60%/Firms: 68%) and Q2e – Dynamic environment (IPTs: 40%/Firms: 48%). 
IPT: 
‘Joint presentations externally provide a reinforcing image of the partnership’ 
(297). 
and: 
‘We work closely and most successfully with a small team’ (668). 
however: 
‘We offered to remove components prior to a return to works programme 
which their engineers approved and believed would save us £2m.  Their 
Commercial people offered us a rebate of £2.5k.  the nerve of it!’ (628). 
and: 
‘It’s difficult to harmonise our objectives when the Company keep their’s so 
close to their chest’ (597). 
Firm: 
‘We have a healthy, open relationship’ (175). 
and: 
‘As the reputation of the team within the business has grown this has helped 
to boost the confidence of the members and spurred them on to further gains’ 
(299). 
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but conversely: 
‘Quality and giving the end-customer the best equipment to do the job should 
be our joint, prime aims in life.  Instead we appear to be trying to catch each 
other out and score points’ (341). 
and: 
‘The original ‘breakthru’ atmosphere was brilliant but when we got down to the 
practicalities of doing business we are again walking through treacle’ (691). 
3.3 Adaption 
The next relationship variable concerns efforts made by the partners to adjust to 
each other’s business partnership requirements.  The quantitative data concerns 
Q2b – Clear objectives (IPTs: 65%/Firms: 70%) and Q2c – Compatible objectives 
(IPTs: 41%/Firms: 49%). 
IPT: 
‘Frequent reorganisations in the Firm’s team increases uncertainty’ (293). 
and : 
‘There was a clash of wills with them wanting to make more money by adding 
extras and us digging-in for basic outputs’ (379). 
and: 
‘At the managerial level they are keen to improve their performance but this 
has not filtered down to the workers’ (688). 
Firm: 
‘The key is to harmonise the main objectives.  Others that are not important 
and act as obstructions must be identified and suppressed’ (497). 
but: 
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‘We speak different languages.  To them it’s a bit of kit to be pulled out and 
exchanged.  To us it’s a delicate instrument’ (217). 
3.4 Personal Relationships 
Quantitative data concerning the importance of personal relationships to business 
partnership success is found under Q2f – Mutual confidence (IPTs: 41%/Firms: 
60%). 
IPT: 
‘He’s a forward thinking, go-getter in the company who is going places.  He is 
a pleasure to do business with’ (590). 
Firm: 
‘The IPT changes its staff too often and because the relationship is very 
personality-dependent is like a roller-coaster ride.  Out go the old faces, in 
come the new and we are back to square one 
3.5 Corporate Culture-Matching 
Culture is something of an intangible but comments recorded emphasised the 
importance of the ‘right attitude and atmosphere’ to the success of business 
relationships.  The quantitative data concerns Q2e – Dynamic environment (IPTs: 
40%/Firms: 48%). 
IPT: 
‘They are almost fun to deal with; they are not full of management-speak.  
They are a bit like us; evolutionary and resource-capped’ (315). 
Firm: 
‘Even though their Commercial staff are embedded in their organisation I 
believe they are constantly looking over their shoulders back up their 
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traditional chain of command.  It is going to take a long time to change this 
culture’ (195). 
3.6 Long Term Orientation 
The final variable concerns efforts made by the partners to overcome the instability 
engendered by uncertainty and complexity by taking a long-term view of the 
relationship.  The quantitative data concerns Q2a – Strategic understanding (IPTs: 
69%/Firms: 54%). 
IPT: 
‘If we start a long-term agreement for say 30 years we must have top-level 
support to ensure we do not do the usual MoD trick of cutting back the funding 
at little notice’ (555). 
Firm: 
‘We need to find new ways of achieving long-term contracts that are all 
embracing.  Short-term gains and cheapest prices will cost more in the long 
run’  (581).  
3.7 Key Findings 
The data highlights the problems of staff turnover, short-term commercial practices, 
the importance of culture change and the difficulty of establishing a long-term 
approach to business partnerships.  The importance of C3 Behaviour and Adaption 
are particularly emphasised but it is noticeable that respondents were especially 
sceptical about the sincerity of the other’s intentions.  Lastly, the significance of 
softer facets such as personal relationships and culture matching were emphasised.  
The positive and negative responses within this dimension were evenly balanced 
and bear out the overall 56% success score. 
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4  Dimension 3 – Information Impactedness (Communication) 
The imbalance caused by selective information disclosures, and distortions which 
are difficult or expensive to verify at the time and which undermine the durability of 
contract arrangements (Williamson, 1975) (Chapter 3, 4.4).  The converse of this 
statement generated the following questionnaire questions: 
a. Where the other party has proprietary information that could improve. 
the performance of the joint business, it is freely available. 
b. We would welcome a shared data environment where planning, technical and 
pricing information are made freely available. 
c. We understand the information requirements of all participants in the support 
chain from sub-contractors to end-user. 
d. Exchange of information in this relationship takes place frequently and 
informally – not just according to specified agreement. 
e. Objective performance measurement is an important part of this relationship. 
f. We are aware of the performance requirements for all participants in the 
support chain from sub-contractors to end-user. 
g. We provide the other party with regular information including long-range 
forecasts to enable him to do his business better. 
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4.1 Introduction 
Under this dimension the data is searched for instances of RM relationship variables 
used to overcome poor and deliberately confused communication within monopolistic 
business relationships. 
4.2 C3 Behaviour (Co-operation, Collaboration, Co-ordination) 
Qualitative data on this variable was encompassed by Q3d – frequent information 
exchange (IPTs: 76%/Firms: 81%) and Q3g – Regular planning data (IPTs: 
72%/Firms: 75%). 
IPT: 
‘We asked them to quote for an order worth over £1m.  Only 9 mths later after 
some pressure did we get a response’ (696). 
and: 
‘We don’t agree all the time but at least we communicate clearly’ (380). 
but: 
‘The firm does not seem to be able to forecast expenditure with the accuracy 
needed by our forecast of outturn’ (6). 
and: 
‘Information on pricing and delivery is difficult to obtain and I usually 
inaccurate when received’ (393). 
Firm: 
‘Frequent contacts, even as often as daily, build confidence, reduce risks of 
misunderstandings and keep the team focussed’ (8). 
and: 
‘The IPT never holds back on providing data on advance requirements when 
known.  This helps us to plan better’ (9). 
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but: 
‘There seems to be a gap in communications between the IPT and the end-
customer.  We could solve modification problems much more quickly if they 
were also present at reviews’ (36). 
and: 
‘We desperately need better performance management systems to ensure 
that actions are logged and analysed against standards’ (362). 
4.3 Adaption 
The next relationship variable reported in the data concerns Q3g – Regular planning 
data (IPTs: 72%/Firms: 75%). 
IPT: 
‘We have a pragmatic way of working with frank exchanges; we are always 
business-like’ (40). 
alternatively: 
‘Communication has proved difficult at the managerial level’ (666). 
and: 
‘The company seems unable to understand that one point of contact is 
inadequate to deal with the multi-level issues that occur’ (472). 
Firm: 
‘By having a member of staff in their team we are able to communicate much 
better, reduce misunderstandings and, gain a much clearer idea of the plans 
for the business’ (31). 
and: 
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‘Our margins are much smaller these days and this limits the number of 
people involved in our interface channels.  We are having to learn how to 
make this as effective as possible’ (675). 
but: 
‘Their procurement people like to remind us that we haven’t a divine right to 
the business.  However, we have invested heavily in knowledge and 
experience.  This doesn’t seem to be recognised or valued’ (577). 
4.4 Personal Relationships 
The quantitative data for this variable concerns Q3d – Frequent & informal data 
exchange (IPTs: 76%/Firms: 81%). 
IPT: 
‘We need to separate professional and personal relationships.  The latter is 
important but ‘win-win’ is based on openness and concentration on the job in 
hand’ (37). 
and: 
‘We are good friends and thus talk openly and often’ (575). 
Firm: 
‘Because we know our opposite numbers personally we don’t want to let them 
down’ (23). 
4.5 Long Term Orientation 
The quantitative data concerns Q3e – Performance measurement (IPTs: 59%/Firms: 
61%) and Q3g – Regular planning data (IPTs: 72%/Firms: 75%). 
IPT: 
‘We have learned not to set too fast a pace.  We are both busy and need to 
set realistic, long-term targets’ (318). 
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and: 
‘I tell the Firm honestly my budget for the coming year’ (337). 
Firm: 
‘We get more information about future policy and plans from the MoD website 
than from the IPT’ (361).  
4.6 Key Findings 
A RM view of this dimension highlights the personal, co-operative attitude to frequent 
and interactive communication – overall satisfaction score 68%.  It also reveals the 
bitterness engendered by adversarial approaches, which ignore the important 
requirements of information exchange for risk reduction and effective planning. 
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5 Dimension 4 - Opportunism (Relationship Reliability) 
Constitutes a lack of candour or honesty and includes self-interest seeking with 
guile.  (Williamson, 1979) (Chapter 3, 4.5).  The converse of this statement 
generated the following questionnaire questions: 
a. The quality of the contract outputs ie. spares/repairs/services, is entirely 
satisfactory. 
b. The quality of service delivery ie. delivery times, billing, payment, is entirely 
satisfactory.  
c. The relationship is characterised by a continually improving quality ethos. 
d. Problems are solved in a joint, open, constructive manner. 
e. Such is the goodwill in the relationship, the other party would willingly put 
himself out to adapt to our changing requirements. 
f. We trust the other party to act in our best interests. 
g. The responsibility for making sure the relationship works is shared jointly. 
h. The other party provides us with useful cost reduction and quality 
improvement ideas. 
i. The other party is always totally open and honest with us. 
j. The other party always does what he says he will do. 
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5.1 Introduction 
Relationship Reliability requires a combination of RM variables to be exercised in 
order to generate a positive business interaction that results in a successful 
exchange relationship.  This sub-Section illustrates how the research data portrays 
this feature together with its opportunistic antithesis. 
5.2 C3 Behaviour (Co-operation, Collaboration, Co-ordination) 
Under this relationship variable quantitative data were found under Q4g – Joint 
responsibility (IPTs: 78%/Firms: 81%) and Q4h – Cost & quality co-operation (IPTs: 
35%/Firms: 31%). 
IPT: 
‘They have moved into a new line and we put them in-touch with other 
relevant IPTs.  We both felt good from this bit of co-operation’ (311). 
and: 
‘We both concentrate on quality not blame’ (336). 
and: 
‘We’re making progress with the company.  At our last monthly meeting I was 
surprised to see they were portraying their performance figures honestly and 
without massaging’ (522). 
but: 
‘We agree round the table but nothing ever happens’ (686). 
Firm: 
‘Although our Commercial people are no better or no worse than the other 
side, we recently achieved contract renewal a day before the old contract ran 
out.  They must be doing something right‘ (433). 
however: 
Appendix 9  451 
 
‘Their contracts staff have a real power to reduce the effectiveness of the 
relationship as we have to respond to interminable price investigations’ (267). 
and: 
‘Cash flow is very important to a business like our’s but asking for a part-
payment for partial completion of the job does not meet with a positive 
response’ (526). 
5.3 Adaption 
Next, data concerning the Adaption relationship variable were found under Q4c - 
Continuous improvement (IPTs: 41%/Firms: 67%) and Q4d – Problem solving (IPTs: 
69%/Firms: 79%) are considered. 
IPT: 
‘The fact that the Firm acknowledges that it is not delivering a quality service 
is a favourable sign’ (154). 
and: 
‘There has been a considerable improvement in obtaining delivery forecasts 
from the Firm’s customer service desk and as a result a very good working 
relationship has developed' (269). 
but: 
‘They are slow to understand our essential procedures including stock 
numbering’ (159). 
and: 
‘A lot of problems of late deliveries arise because of incompatibilities of IT 
systems between the MoD, the Firm and the sub-contractors and because of 
lack of manpower’ (669). 
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Firm: 
‘The relationship has recently become more difficult because some of the 
long-standing IPT staff have turned over.  The new members are not at all 
experienced’ (290). 
and: 
‘the biggest obstacle to improving business performance is MoD Contracts.  
There is a severe shortage of resources, risk aversion and lack of flexibility 
which lead to significant effort and delay in agreeing contracts’ (349). 
and: 
‘The relationship is highly dependent on people.  We are a small company 
and unfortunately a shortage of resources limits our ability to focus on 
developing the relationship’ (304). 
and: 
‘The teams are doing their best to provide the end-customer with the best 
possible service but, budget constraints are often not understood either by the 
MoD or by our own people’ (635). 
5.4 Trust 
Trust involves a belief that the other party will act reliably and with integrity.  
Quantitative data is found under Q4f – Trust (IPTs: 48%/Firms: 52%). 
IPT: 
‘Our business success is based on trust.  Recently we had a serious problem.  
The firm reacted instantly, sent a man and the job was done’ (280). 
and: 
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‘You can’t build up trust without personal relationships to build up a good 
reputation' (326). 
however: 
‘They often tender excessive price quotations, which are reduced after 
challenge.  This does not engender a trusting relationship’ (160). 
and: 
‘Although we work well with our opposite numbers in the Company, I am 
always wary of a hidden agenda in their hierarchy’ (689). 
Firm: 
‘The trust that has built up over the years is a result of working together to 
achieve the desired end.  I will go out of my way to help the MoD solve any 
problem’ (275). 
and: 
‘Although the business arrangements and operational outputs of the 2 
organisations are far from ideal, honesty and openness are not only promoted 
but are lived every day’ (485). 
however: 
‘At renegotiation time because their usage rate had dropped we needed to 
increase prices to cover overheads.  This was not understood and we were 
blamed for attempting to milk the contract’ (371). 
and: 
‘We have a built a lengthy bid approvals process that is designed to protect 
ourselves because we have been stung by the MoD in the past.  This does 
not come cheap and is reflected in our price’ (585). 
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5.5 Commitment 
The next variable reported in the data concerns Q4j – Commitment (IPTs: 
49%/Firms: 60%). 
IPT: 
‘The senior managers are very committed to us.  They have let us know of 
problems before we find out by other means and let us know what they are 
doing about them’ (330). 
however: 
‘We have made huge progress with repairs and overhauls but despite their 
good words and assurances on spares their performance has been appalling’ 
(262). 
Firm: 
‘Profit is all very well but it is dedication to customer-service that keeps you in 
business’ (444). 
although: 
‘Despite the good words and countless initiatives and top-management 
commitment to openness and honesty and transparency, there still seems like 
a long way to go’ (347). 
5.6 Personal Relationships 
The last relationship variable reported in the data under this dimension concerns 
Q4e – Goodwill (IPTs: 49%/Firms: 49%). 
IPT: 
‘It just comes down to people’ (285). 
however: 
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‘Our relationship is very personality-driven and we get on with them extremely 
well.  However, at the professional level they are terrible’ (631). 
Firm: 
‘It was pure luck that a forward-thinking, enlightened team happened to form.  
It would have been impossible to create this deliberately because there are so 
few staff to choose from in our slimmed-down organisation’ (225). 
and: 
‘I strongly believe that successful working relationships are built on trusting 
personal relationships’ (634). 
5.7 Key Findings 
The RM perspective of the Relationship Stability dimension indicates that although 
enthusiasm exists, practical obstructions within C3 Behaviour and Adaption on 
commercial and operations activities prevent the achievement of satisfactory 
business outputs.  Opportunistic behaviour such as adversarial bidding and hidden 
agendas appears to suppress the Trust and Commitment success scores.  Overall, 
the generally negative qualitative data support the quantitative findings that present 
this dimension with the lowest success score of 54%. 
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6 Dimension 5 – Small Numbers (Relationship Quality) 
The combination of problem behaviours requires sophisticated controls that are only 
found in or close to the firm and may result in failure of market conditions 
(Williamson, 1979) (Chapter 3, 4.6).  The converse of this statement generated the 
following questionnaire questions: 
a. The gains from this relationship are equally shared between both parties. 
b. We do not feel imprisoned within the current relationship.  
c. We are willing to invest more ie. money, time, information, effort, in the current 
relationship. 
d. We are happy that our future is bound to the success of our relationship 
partner. 
e. We feel totally committed to this relationship. 
f. The other party is genuinely concerned that our business succeeds. 
g. Both sides are working to improve this relationship. 
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6.1 Introduction 
Under this dimension the data is searched for instances of RM relationship variables 
that illustrate the last dimension of the theoretical framework.  
6.2 Adaption 
Data on Adaption were found under Q5c – Relationship investment (IPTs: 
80%/Firms: 88%) and Q5g – Mutual endeavour (IPTs: 82%/Firms: 87%). 
IPT: 
‘Managing out risk costs a great deal of top management time,  This is where 
the hard decisions such as how much we are going to spend are made’ (378). 
although: 
‘The knee-jerk reaction of the MoD to its current funding problems is the 
biggest turn-off to industry’ (547). 
Firm: 
‘The Company has invested in a Key Account Manager to give the contract 
the appropriate focus’ (127). 
but: 
‘Smart procurement’s prime aim is to take money away from industry.  I see 
no light at the end of the tunnel’ (445). 
6.3 Commitment 
The next relationship variable reported in the data concerns Q5e – Commitment 
(IPTs: 69%/Firms: 92%). 
IPT: 
‘We have built a head of goodwill despite the problems’ (108). 
alternatively: 
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‘There is tremendous commitment on both sides at working-level but we are 
all short of resources to take forward strategic improvements.  We don’t seem 
to have the top management support that we need’ (598). 
Firm: 
‘The need to dramatically improve the relationship is our number one priority’ 
(113). 
but: 
‘Reduced margins and intense competition in the sector are all very clear 
reasons for the reduced level of commitment and risk in the company.  It has 
thus become increasingly difficult to secure finance from senior management 
to invest in this relationship’ (465). 
6.4 Power Balance 
Power Balance refers to the respective feelings or actions that the parties experience 
which engender a sense of relationship equality.  The reported data concerns Q5b – 
Relationship freedom (IPTs: 54%/Firms: 80%). 
IPT: 
‘The relationship contains a healthy measure of scepticism’ (109). 
and: 
‘They know full-well we can’t go anywhere else but still the relationship is a 
good one’ (316). 
however: 
‘They have an air of arrogance – ‘take it or leave it, we are the sole supplier’’ 
(138). 
and: 
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‘I think they take the view that our equipment is legacy, that we are an 
undemanding customer and they can use us as a ‘milk-cow’’ (621). 
and: 
‘We couldn’t easily go anywhere else; they have the drawings and the 
knowledge.  Taking Design Authority elsewhere is really a practical 
proposition’ (469). 
Firm: 
‘The IPT’s attitude is: ‘we’ll share whatever you have got’’ (123). 
and: 
‘The problem is; we always seem to do the giving’ (419). 
and: 
‘Rather than work towards a satisfactory resolution of issues they keep trying 
to punish us’ (424). 
6.5 Trust 
Aspects of Trust found within the data under Q5f – Mutual concern (IPTs: 
68%/Firms: 64%) are considered next. 
IPT: 
‘Because my opposite number’s job could be on the line he has a vested 
interest in portraying a warm, comfortable position’ (466). 
Firm: 
‘It’s very important to start small with innovative partnering arrangements in 
order to let the problems sort themselves out and to build up mutual trust’ 
(373). 
but: 
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‘In this day and age I believe no large company will try to rip-off the MoD.  The 
audit trail and accountability are there so why not trust us?’ (583). 
6.6 Interdependence 
This relationship variable represents the dependence of each partner on the other to 
secure success and includes a willingness to invest effort and resources to further its 
ends.  Data found under Q5a – Equality (IPTs: 50%/Firms: 60%) and Q5f – Mutual 
concern (IPTs: 68%/Firms: 63%)are considered. 
IPT: 
‘The Company is only concerned that our business succeeds for their benefit’ 
(140). 
and: 
‘They don’t recruit the people so we don’t place the orders’ (467). 
and: 
‘Our in-house partner has come up with an idea that saves £1m per year but it 
depends on the Firm taking part.  However, they are not enthusiastic because 
the old way gave them more profit’ (678). 
Firm: 
‘The relationship is developing from tight competition contract to a more open 
one based upon trust and mutual gain’ (147). 
but: 
‘The equipment was bought at minimum cost and as a result there is much 
dissatisfaction from the end-customer and the IPT.  We are the butt of their 
frustrations’ (435). 
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6.7 Key Findings 
The balance of comments made by respondents on the aspects of this dimension 
were predominantly negative, which is in contrast to the more favourable view 
portrayed through the quantitative data (73%).  There are clear examples of 
constructive conflict, maintaining a healthy balance of power and investment in 
relationship development and support measures.  However, IPTs generally felt 
threatened by the monopoly situation where they perceived unbalanced power, lack 
of interdependence and poor commitment from the other side.  Lack of long-term 
funding for projects and investment in systems appeared to exacerbate the ‘small 
numbers’ impoverishment of business relationships. 
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Appendix 10 
Cluster Analysis Data 
 Cluster 
Combined 
 Coefficients Stage 
Cluster First 
Appears 
 Next Stage 
Stage Cluster 1 Cluster 2  Cluster 1 Cluster 2  
1 12 14 16.000 0 0 8
2 19 20 44.000 0 0 18
3 52 54 91.000 0 0 11
4 27 29 138.000 0 0 20
5 24 25 196.500 0 0 17
6 37 42 256.500 0 0 22
7 7 8 321.500 0 0 32
8 12 18 390.833 1 0 25
9 5 6 464.333 0 0 19
10 43 44 543.833 0 0 16
11 52 53 627.500 3 0 37
12 46 49 722.500 0 0 14
13 35 41 824.500 0 0 31
14 46 48 928.167 12 0 24
15 30 32 1035.667 0 0 36
16 39 43 1155.500 0 10 30
17 24 26 1291.000 5 0 33
18 13 19 1429.000 0 2 28
19 4 5 1588.167 0 9 26
20 22 27 1763.167 0 4 27
21 47 51 1939.167 0 0 37
22 34 37 2118.500 0 6 34
23 33 36 2312.000 0 0 39
24 46 50 2513.583 14 0 29
25 12 15 2753.750 8 0 35
26 2 4 2995.333 0 19 38
27 22 28 3238.083 20 0 39
28 13 17 3525.333 18 0 33
29 45 46 3823.483 0 24 46
30 39 40 4127.400 16 0 40
31 31 35 4467.400 0 13 47
32 7 9 4851.067 7 0 38
33 13 24 5234.960 28 17 43
34 34 38 5621.376 22 0 40
35 12 21 6072.276 25 0 43
36 23 30 6552.110 0 15 41
37 47 52 7091.843 21 11 46
38 2 7 7777.498 26 32 44
39 22 33 8498.248 27 23 42
40 34 39 9259.748 34 30 50
41 16 23 10120.164 0 36 49
42 11 22 11025.164 0 39 47
43 12 13 11976.455 35 33 51
44 2 3 13085.633 38 0 48
45 1 10 14333.133 0 0 48
46 45 47 16002.133 29 37 53
47 11 31 17816.333 42 31 49
48 1 2 19746.583 45 44 52
49 11 16 21830.562 47 41 50
50 11 34 25366.179 49 40 51
51 11 12 32073.741 50 43 52
52 1 11 55161.209 48 51 53
53 1 45 94847.296 52 46 0
 
Figure A10.1.  Agglomeration Schedule (SPSS V.11) 
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Figure A10.2.  Proximity Plot Showing Coefficients/Cluster Mapping (MS Excel) 
 
(The break point occurs when subsequent clusters cease to be statistically 
significant – hence 4 clusters were chosen for analysis). 
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 Cluster N Mean Std. 
Deviation
Std. Error 95% 
Confidence 
Interval for 
Mean 
 Minimum Maximum
      Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
  
Creativity 1 10 35.3000 10.33925 3.26956 27.9037 42.6963 22.00 56.00 
 2 22 73.3636 9.36836 1.99734 69.2099 77.5173 49.00 88.00 
 3 12 56.6667 4.77367 1.37804 53.6336 59.6997 50.00 63.00 
 4 10 91.6000 7.48628 2.36737 86.2446 96.9554 77.00 100.00 
 Total 54 65.9815 20.27033 2.75844 60.4487 71.5142 22.00 100.00 
Stability 1 10 32.6000 13.84197 4.37721 22.6981 42.5019 .00 52.00 
 2 22 63.0909 12.53912 2.67335 57.5314 68.6504 35.00 86.00 
 3 12 48.1667 5.82835 1.68250 44.4635 51.8698 35.00 56.00 
 4 10 88.1000 7.50481 2.37323 82.7314 93.4686 79.00 100.00 
 Total 54 58.7593 20.88507 2.84210 53.0587 64.4598 .00 100.00 
Communication 1 10 54.5000 14.46260 4.57347 44.1541 64.8459 33.00 82.00 
 2 22 63.3182 13.52735 2.88404 57.3205 69.3159 39.00 94.00 
 3 12 66.3333 9.22776 2.66382 60.4703 72.1964 52.00 86.00 
 4 10 83.4000 13.26817 4.19577 73.9085 92.8915 64.00 100.00 
 Total 54 66.0741 15.51366 2.11114 61.8397 70.3085 33.00 100.00 
Reliability 1 10 28.9000 10.35428 3.27431 21.4930 36.3070 17.00 55.00 
 2 22 62.6364 8.32978 1.77592 58.9431 66.3296 49.00 76.00 
 3 12 45.5833 3.84846 1.11095 43.1381 48.0285 40.00 53.00 
 4 10 90.2000 5.88407 1.86070 85.9908 94.4092 83.00 100.00 
 Total 54 57.7037 21.30252 2.89891 51.8892 63.5182 17.00 100.00 
Quality 1 10 52.8000 6.33859 2.00444 48.2656 57.3344 40.00 60.00 
 2 22 76.8182 12.05794 2.57076 71.4720 82.1644 57.00 95.00 
 3 12 68.9167 9.69966 2.80005 62.7538 75.0795 56.00 86.00 
 4 10 92.5000 5.83571 1.84541 88.3254 96.6746 79.00 100.00 
 Total 54 73.5185 15.74890 2.14315 69.2199 77.8171 40.00 100.00 
 
Figure A10.3.  Descriptive Source Statistics Table (SPSS V.11) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
External Variable Case Chi-Squared Test Significant 
Spend Value  0.048 yes 
Relationship Duration Bands 1 & 2 0.047 yes 
Team Size  0.144 no 
Technology Age  0.582 no 
System or Component  0.414 no 
Contractors’ League Band 1 0.045 yes 
 
Figure A10.4.  External Variable Cross-Tabulation Results (SPSS V.11) 
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Appendix 11 
Cluster Analysis Qualitative Data Table 
 
 
 
 
 
Key to Table Headings: 
Clu#: Cluster Number 
Rel#: Relationship Number (1-54) 
ID#: Database Number of the Semi-Structured Interview Key Point  
Positive Comment: Optimistic Semi-Structured Interview Key Point 
Negative Comment: Pessimistic Semi-Structured Interview Key Point 
